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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine European international politics 
towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from 
1969 to 1973. The importance of the CSCE is widely recognised by historians 
and political scientists, but the pre-diplomacy of the Conference is poorly 
understood. Based on the British, French and West German archive 
documents, and focusing on international political dynamics, this study 
explores how multilateral European detente represented by the CSCE was 
realised in the early 1970s.
The four-year period leading up to the opening of the CSCE was also 
highly significant, because these four years saw the crucial transformation of 
the nature of European detente. When the Soviets proposed the European 
Security Conference in 1969, their aim was to consolidate the status quo in 
Europe. However, the West Europeans were the leading actors in convening 
the Conference, and between 1969 and 1973, they made the CSCE 
meaningful and substantial in two ways* its procedure and its content. The 
idea of a three-stage Conference, which was developed by the Europeans 
during the pre-conference diplomacy, made it possible to negotiate 
thoroughly on the text of the Helsinki Final Act and steer it in the direction 
the West wanted. More significantly, the West succeeded in incorporating the 
human rights and human contact agenda into the Conference. This study 
will thus examine how the ideas of the constructive procedure and 
humanitarian subjects were developed. It will further argue that 
multilateral European detente was uncontrollable by the superpowers, and a 
transformation of detente was possible in the context of multilateral 
diplomacy. Britain, France and West Germany respectively played an 
important role in the opening up and development of the CSCE. As a result, 
multilateral European detente went beyond the status quo.
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Introduction
In the first years after the Second World War, Europe was divided into two 
blocs. Mistrust between the United Kingdom/United States and the Soviet 
Union over ideology and security in Europe and other regions gradually 
increased, and the Cold War conflicts between them were reflected above all 
in the European continent. Indeed, America’s European Recovery 
Programme of 1947, the so-called Marshall Plan, was a landmark in the 
division of Europe; West European countries joined the Programme, but East 
European countries rejected it or were forced by the USSR to reject it. The 
Iron Curtain fell; two camps appeared. Economic, cultural, and human 
contacts between the two sides were restricted politically and practically. 
The Eastern regimes implemented and then strengthened their oppressive 
one-party dictatorships, becoming suppressive on their people. The defeated 
Germany was also divided in two. The Allies’ enemy had been occupied by 
the Four Powers -  the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union 
—, but eventually the three Western sectors were merged and in 1949 became 
one independent state, the Federal Republic of Germany '(FRG). Immediately, 
the Soviets also made their sector another state, the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). The two Germanies did not recognise each other as states 
representing the German people. A peace treaty, which would formally have 
ended the World War II, was not concluded because there was no official 
country that all war-participating countries could agree was an eligible 
Germany. The division of Europe and Germany (without a peace treaty) 
would continue for more than 40 years.
Within 10 years after World War II, the East/Wes;t division was also 
institutionalised with the establishment of two military alliances. In 1949, 
West European countries, the United States and Canadia signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty and then developed a collective security organisation (NATO)
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against the Eastern bloc. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which 
was regarded by the West as an example of the Kremlin’s communist 
expansionism, also caused deep anxiety amongst Americans and West 
Europeans about Western security, and thus convinced them of the necessity 
to rearm West Germany so as to build up NATO’s military strength. The 
Soviets seriously feared the rearmament of their former enemy. In order to 
prevent it, at the 1954 Berlin Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers, 
the USSR Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, proposed the convening of 
an all-European conference in which a ‘General European Treaty of 
Collective Security in Europe’ would be signed. However, Western countries 
rejected such a conference, and the FRG concluded the Paris treaty in 
September 1954 which partially restored its sovereignty including the 
authority to rearm with the exception of the procurement of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, and then entering NATO in May 1955. 
Simultaneously, the Soviets and East Europeans created the Warsaw Pact 
Organisation, which the GDR joined. In Europe, two military alliances came 
to confront one another.
An arms race between the East and the West escalated too. Four years 
after the United Stated dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the Soviet Union successfully conducted its first atomic bomb test in 1949. 
Within four years, moreover, both superpowers succeeded in detonating 
hydrogen bombs; their explosion yielded 10.4 megatons of energy — over 450 
times the power of the bomb dropped onto Nagasaki. Britain too became a 
nuclear power in 1952. The atomic powers continued nuclear tests, and 
developed smaller and more easily deliverable thermonuclear weapons. 
During the 1950s, the number of such weapons skyrocketed, and the 
destructive capabilities of the superpowers were significantly expanded. 
While the United States had an advantage in the number of nuclear weapons, 
the Soviet Union had larger-scale conventional forces in Europe than NATO. 
Although in 1952 NATO agreed to set a target of 96 divisions to counter 175
8
Soviet divisions, the members of the Atlantic Alliance could not meet the 
target mainly because conventional troops were expensive. Hence, in order to 
preserve the military balance, Western Europe became more and more 
dependent on America’s tactical nuclear weapons. If a crisis between the two 
Blocs had escalated, nuclear exchanges between the two Alliances would 
have been a real possibility. Europe, and the world, found themselves in the 
highly darigerous situation where all civilisation might have disappeared 
because of a nuclear war.
Understandably, some efforts to reduce the tension between the East 
and the West were attempted. However, in the 1950s in particular, the 
results were limited. A clear example was the 1955 Geneva Summit. Here 
the top leaders of the US, the UK, France and the USSR gathered for the 
first time since the end of the Second World War, but in the end could not 
produce any practical outcome. The essence of the ‘Geneva spirit’ was the 
agreement that they were not able to resolve the central problem in Europe, 
namely the German question. Nor did disarmament advance. Since 1952, 
there had been the United Nations Disarmament Commission, but in 
retrospect it merely continued fruitless discussions. After the second Berlin 
Crisis of 1958-1961 and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States, 
Britain and the Soviet Union, in 1963, signed the first arms control 
agreement; the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Throughout the 1960s, bilateral 
East/West exchanges developed in Europe. However, they were sporadic, 
fragmented, and unsystematic. Although the Warsaw Pact countries again 
proposed a pan-European conference in the mid-1960s, it was not until the 
early 1970s that such multilateral detente covering the whole European 
region came to pass.
This dissertation has two main aims. Its first purpose is to examine 
how such multilateral European detente was realised in the early 1970s. In 
particular, it will focus on the way in which the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) came to be held in 1973-75. The second major
9
aim of this study is to analyse the way in which the West transformed the 
content of detente in the CSCE context. The CSCE began in 1973, including 
thirty-five European States (plus the United States and Canada). Members 
of both the Eastern and Western blocs participated, as did the neutral 
countries. After two years of negotiations, in 1975, the participants in the 
Conference successfully signed the so-called Helsinki Final Act. The 
multilateral European conference thus became a symbolic event in European 
detente. Yet, the most important aspect of the CSCE was that the Final Act 
signed in 1975 contained a clause on human rights in the Basket I as well as 
the celebrated Basket III stipulating the freer movement of people, ideas and 
information -  developments which many argue ultimately contributed to 
ending the Cold War.1 These were undoubtedly new elements in East-West 
dialogue. How did they emerge and how were they incorporated into the 
agenda of the CSCE?
In order to understand more clearly the process towards the CSCE and 
the transformation of European detente, this study distinguishes the concept 
of ‘detente’ in three ways. Firstly, it contrasts bilateral detente with 
multilateral detente. Indeed, it will argue that although bilateral detente 
served to stabilise the Cold War, it was multilateral detente that contributed 
to the overcoming of the division of Europe. The focus of the study is 
therefore on the multilateral rather than bilateral dimension of detente. 
Secondly, it also differentiates European detente from superpower detente. 
This implies not only that European detente was regional and superpower 
detente was global. More importantly, while detente between the US and the 
USSR could be developed independently of European matters, the advance of 
detente in Europe was significantly impeded by the German question. It is 
thus necessary to underline the difference between the two. The focus will be
r Peter Schlotter, Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt: Wirkung einer internationalen 
Institution. Frankfurt^ Campus, 1999; Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect- International 
Norms. Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism. Princeton, NJ- Princeton University 
Press, 2001.
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on European detente rather than superpower detente.
Finally, it argues that there were three pillars of detente; the status 
quo, economic-cultural exchanges, and arms control and disarmament. 
Status quo detente was the search for stability through the recognition of the 
current borders and regimes. Economic-cultural exchange detente aimed not 
at only economic benefits but also at producing a friendly atmosphere 
between European states and developing mutual understanding through 
communication at various levels, such as the relationships between business 
people, academics, students, scientists, athletes, musicians etc. Arms control 
and disarmament detente was intended to create a militarily less 
confrontational environment by restricting the arms race or by limiting or 
reducing the number of weapons of mass destruction and conventional 
weapons. This study will illustrate a decline in disarmament detente and, in 
particular, an expansion of economic and cultural detente to include 
humanitarian questions in the early 1970s.
For the two purposes mentioned above, this dissertation will 
concentrate primarily on the diplomacy of the Western Bloc. Although the 
idea of a European security conference originated in the Eastern Bloc, it was 
Western reactions to this Eastern initiative that determined almost the 
entire content and procedure of the Conference. While the East’s main 
purpose was simply to hold an East-West conference and thereby consolidate 
the status quo, the West countered by insisting on what would be discussed 
in such a conference. In particular, the addition of human rights and the 
Basket III to the agenda was a significant contribution made by NATO 
alliance members. Among them, Britain, France and West Germany played 
significant roles in moving NATO towards a multilateral conference and in 
developing its content and procedure. Therefore, it is meaningful to analyse 
the road to the convening of the CSCE by focusing on the West European 
policies towards the Conference.
Moreover, this study will focus exclusively on the pre-conference
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diplomacy, in particular from 1969 to 1973, because the most important 
elements of the CSCE were arranged before the Conference itself had 
convened. From 1969, when the Warsaw Pact proposed an “all-European 
conference” in its Budapest Appeal, to the start of the Conference in 1973, 
the agenda and the procedural principles were discussed within the Western 
bloc and then between East and West. Although the details were only finally 
settled during the working phase of the CSCE from 1973 to 1975, the 
substance of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975 went no further than 
what the West had discussed before the opening of the Conference in 1973. 
On top of that, this pre-diplomacy matters all the more since it is clear that 
the basic Soviet idea of a 'conference which would consecrate the status quo 
was decisively transformed by the Western powers before the Helsinki talks 
themselves had even begun. Without an understanding of the pre-conference 
international politics, therefore, it is difficult to grasp fully either the 
subsequent course or the ultimate importance of the CSCE.
So as to understand the process leading to multilateral European 
detente in a broader context, this thesis will examine separately two 
developments that occurred simultaneously. First, it will analyse 
consultations, arguments and controversies within NATO and EPC on the 
agenda and procedure of the CSCE. Second, the international politics around 
the Conference, namely, the German/Berlin problem and Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in particular, will be investigated. These 
were inseparably related to the diplomacy which led to the opening of the 
CSCE. The Western initiative on mutual conventional disarmament first 
aired in 1968 became a counter-proposal to the Eastern initiative on a 
European security conference. The settlement of the Berlin problem was a 
precondition for a multilateral European conference. Hence, the examination 
of the German/Berlin question and MBFR in relation to the CSCE is an 
indispensable part of looking at the whole picture of multilateral European 
detente. The pre-conference diplomacy will thus be highlighted by these two
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dimensions.
Finally, the overarching issue of this thesis is the political dynamics 
which led the West to a multilateral European conference. To ensure that 
this point remains central, the study will ignore highly technical details 
which were entailed in particular in the preparation for the economic or 
military agenda of the CSCE. Instead, it will concentrate on the way in 
which several coalitions or groupings developed within the Western bloc, 
which significantly affected the directions in which the West’s approach to 
detente and the CSCE itself evolved. In order to understand diplomacy 
within NATO and European Political Cooperation (EPC) -  a foreign policy 
consultation framework for the European Community members established 
in 1970, it is thus highly significant to take an international approach. 
Although this study will primarily focus on Britain, France and West 
Germany, it will also examine not only the attitude of the United States — 
one of the countries most negatively disposed towards the idea of the CSCE — 
but also that of smaller Western partners such as Belgium. By analysing the 
process leading to the CSCE from a Western perspective, this thesis will 
elucidate the development and transformation of European detente.
The international process leading towards the convening of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has so far been analysed 
only superficially. Because of secrecy not only within the Soviet bloc, but also 
within NATO and surrounding each Western state’s policy-making on the 
CSCE, together with restricted access to primary documents, it was highly 
difficult to examine internal discussions on both sides.2 Furthermore, most 
previous writing including memoirs on the CSCE has focused mainly on the 
exchanges between East and West within the conference itself from 1973 to
2 Only the official papers of the Conference itself were available. There are some studies 
using these. Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Alphen 
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands! Rockville, Md., USA* Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981! Victor-Yves 
Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Detente: la CSCE. d'Helsinki a Vienne. 1973-1989. E. Bruylant, 
1989! Schlotter, Die KSZE.
13
1975 or after.3 In these works, therefore, diplomacy before 1973 has been 
generally and briefly described as the period of ‘dialogue by communique.’4 
And where some analysis was attempted, it rarely went beyond the language 
of the communiques issued by NATO and the Warsaw Pact themselves. Of 
these, Ljubivoje Acimovic’s and Michael Palmer’s research has illustrated 
the exchange of communiques in most detail.5 However, previous arguments 
have scarcely touched on the diplomacy among NATO states and the debate 
and decision-making process within NATO.
Furthermore, the arguments in these earlier studies do not rely on 
primary historical materials, because the relevant official documents of 
NATO governments have only just started to be declassified. There are a few 
exceptions, but they adopt a mostly national approach; hence they fail to 
examine international political dynamics which led the West to multilateral 
European detente. Georges-Henri Soutou and Marie-Pierre Rey used 
President Pompidou’s private papers and shed light on French policy under 
Pompidou towards the CSCE.6 Because of the limitations of the Pompidou
3 Acimovic, Problems of Security, pp.72-97; John J. Maresca, To Helsinki—the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1973-1975. Duke University Press, 1985, pp.3-7; 
Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation. Hel si nTd -Gene va-Helsinki 1972-1975. 
Alphen aan den Rijn-Geneve, 1979; Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Detente; Schlotter, Die 
KSZE; Elizabeth Jane Burdett, ‘The effectiveness of European political cooperation as a 
system of collective diplomacy: a study of the CSCE process, 1972-1992/ Ph.D. (London) 
thesis 1997 LSE; Kenneth Dyson, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe- 
Europe before and after the Helsinki Final Act,” in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), European Detente- 
Case Studies of the Politics of East-West Relations. F. Pinter, 1986; Jussi Hanhimaki, ‘“They 
Can Write it in Swahili’- Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973-1975,” The 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies. 1/1 (2003); Jacques Andeani, Le Piege- Helsinki et la chute 
du communisme. Paris- Odile Jacob, 2005.
4 Dyson, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” pp.86-93; Acimovic, 
Problems of Security, pp.72-97; Maresca, To Helsinki, pp.3-7; Ferraris, Report on a 
Negotiation. Chapter V, Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security Conference. 
London- Chatham House, PEP, 1971; Ghebali, La Diplomatie. pp.3*7; John van Oudenaren, 
Detente in Europe- the Soviet Union and the West since 1953. Duke University Press,
1991,pp.317-22; Richard Davy, “Up the Learning Curve; An Overview”. Richard Davy (ed.), 
European Detente: A Reappraisal. Royal Institute of International Affairs: Sage, 1992.
5 Acimovic, Problems of Security; Palmer The Prospects.
6 Georges-Henri Soutou, “L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face a l’Allemagne”, in 
Association Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Europe. Editions Complexe, 1995; 
Georges-Henri Soutou, L’Allianne Incertaine: Les Rapports Politico-Strategiaues 
Franco-Allemands 1954-1996. Fayard, 1996, Chapter IX; Marie-Pierre Rey, “Georges
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papers, however, these arguments have remained rough sketches. Neither 
author examined the French attitude within NATO nor its exchanges with 
Alliance partners other than with West Germany. More detailed and 
well-documented studies on the FRG policies towards the CSCE have 
recently been done by Kristina Spohr Readman and Petri Hakkarainen.7 
However, their perspectives are also limited to West German national 
diplomacy. Robert Spencer’s classic work on Canadian policy falls into the 
same category.8
There exist some other works examining the policy of individual 
countries, although most were written before the declassification of archival 
sources. Peter Becker and Helga Haftendorn analysed the FRG’s CSCE 
policy.9 In so doing, Becker used a theoretical framework and has focused on 
the domestic decision-making process of the Conference. Michael Meimeth 
studied French detente policy during the 1970s, arguing, however, from the 
parochial French national-interest point of view.10 Brian White and Philip 
Williams examined British foreign policy during the detente era. While 
White assessed the British contributions to detente positively, though 
admitting they were limited, Williams by contrast scrutinised the reasons for 
British reluctance regarding the CSCE process.11 In addition, a number of
Pompidou, l’Union sovietique”, in Association Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et 
rEurope. Editions Complexe, 1995.
7 Kristina SpohrReadman, “National Interests and the Power of ‘Language’: West German 
Diplomacy and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-1975”, Journal 
of Strategic Studies. 29/6 (2006); Petri Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement: 
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations and 
Deutschlandpolitik, 1969*72”, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nunlist (eds.), 
At the Roots of European Security: The Early Helsinki Process Revisited. 1969-1975 
(forthcoming, 2007).
8 Robert Spencer, “Canada and the Origins of the CSCE,” in Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada 
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. University of Tront, 1984.
9 Peter Becker, Die fruhe KSZE-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland. Hamburg: Lit, 
19921 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung: zur Aussenpolitik der 
Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland. 1955-1982. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, pp.415*461.
10 Michael Meimeth, Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status 
quo und friedlichem Wandel. Die Ara Georges Pompidou und Valerv Giscard d’Estaing. 
Baden-Baden 1990, pp. 156-173.
11 Brian White, Britain. Detente, and Changing East-West Relations. Routledge, 1992, 
pp. 120*30; Philip Williams, “Britain, Detente and the Conference on Security and
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articles contained in European Detente' A Reappraisal take a non-archival, 
one-nation centred view.12 These books and articles give us general views of 
each government’s policy towards the CSCE and detente. They have also 
shown that each state had different motivations and opinions. But they leave 
plenty of scope for an international and multi-archival-based study.
This study takes advantage of the opening of Western archives. Indeed, 
it is based on the archives of three principal West European states’ Britain, 
France and West Germany. The ‘30 years rule’ makes it possible to consult 
the documents relating to the period from 1969 to 1973. However, some 
restrictions still unfortunately remain that will be discussed below. In order 
to examine an international history of Western diplomacy leading to the 
CSCE, this study adopted the following archival methodology. The most 
informative and well declassified archive is the British one. The UK 
government documents are available through the National Archives (the 
Public Record Office) at Kew. A wide range of papers concerning the CSCE is 
found in the FCO 41 collection in particular. It provides extensive 
information not only about British diplomacy, but also that of its partners. It 
also tells us about what happened within NATO, in particular through many 
dispatches and telegrams from Brussels. Inevitably, records kept by the 
British are not neutral and contain some biases. In order to achieve as much 
objectivity as possible, therefore, they were compared and contrasted with 
the collections of the French and the German archives, though sadly the 
levels of their declassification are less satisfactory than the British archive. 
As regards France, the French Foreign Ministry’s official papers, available in 
the historical archives of the Foreign Ministry in Paris, are the main sources. 
President Pompidou’s private papers, held in the Archives Nationales (Paris), 
are also important. Yet, unfortunately, the documents directly relating to the
Cooperation in Europe”, in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), European Detente- Case Studies of the 
Politics of East-West Relations. F. Pinter, 1986.
12 Richard Davy (ed.), European Detente- A Reappraisal. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs^ Sage, 1992.
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CSCE and MBFR have not yet been declassified.13 The most important West 
German documents on the CSCE are amongst the official papers of the West 
German Foreign Ministry, kept by the Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen 
Am ts (Berlin). The availability of the records of the Chancellor’s office in the 
Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) relating to the CSCE is highly limited because the 
catalogue of the Chancellor’s office files has not yet been completed. In fact, 
the French and German archival information is patchy and fragmented; thus 
it is sometimes difficult to follow the process of their policy-making. However, 
ample British materials fill in much of the context needed to interpret the 
real meaning and importance of each French and German document. Of 
course, French and German archives themselves are helpful in providing 
more detail about French and German policies, and often provide fresh views. 
In brief, the combination of the archives of the three Western European 
powers makes it possible to an acceptable albeit imperfect extent, to explore 
the Western pre-conference diplomacy from an international perspective.
Archival documents have also been complemented with other sources. 
The published collection of the West German official documents, the Akten 
zur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland, offers a vitally 
important complement to the German archives. These contain very valuable 
documents, such as the records of top-level discussions or position papers on 
important subjects. The British equivalent, Documents on British Policy 
Overseas (Series III) is also helpful, but its focus is on the European Security 
Conference itself from 1972 to 1975, not on the period before the holding of 
the Conference. Some information on US policy towards European detente 
can be obtained through the internet and a CD-Rom. In particular, the 
website of the Digital National Security Archive holds valuable collections 
such as that of the Presidential Directives and Kissinger’s Transcripts.14
13 The carton, 5 AG 2 /1041, which, according to the catalogue of Pompidou’s paper, contains 
documents on the CSCE and MBFR. Archives nationals, Archives de la nresidence de la 
Republique. Ve Republique: Georges Pompidou. 19 luin 1969-2 avril 1974. Paris- 
Documentation franchise, 1997, p. 180.
14 http7/nsarchive.chadwvck.com/marketing/index.isp
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The CD-ROM The Rise o f Detente, edited by prominent historians, also 
contains important US documents from the 1960s and the early 1970s.15
The chapters of this study are organised in loosely chronological 
fashion. In order to analyse some issues in a coherent way, however, they will 
sometimes depart from a rigid chronological sequence. Chapter 1 will 
present an overview of European detente in the 1960s. In particular, the 
origins of four issues will be explored. Firstly, focusing on the 1963 Limited 
Test Ban Treaty, it will discuss the beginning of the separation between 
superpower and European detente, the latter developing in the 1960s only 
bilaterally as symbolised by De Gaulle’s detente with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. Secondly, it will recall how the concept of a European security 
conference reappeared in the mid-1960s. Thirdly, it will also analyse the 
origins of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions proposal, which in the 
late 1960s was to be the West’s main counter-proposal to the East’s call for a 
European security conference. And finally, it will briefly describe two 
significant events which would have a psychological impact on policy-makers 
in the Western bloc' the 1968 student rebellions and the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in the same year.
Chapter 2 will highlight NATO’s gradual commitment to the idea of a 
European Security Conference. Firstly, after a brief examination of the East’s 
Budapest Appeal of 1969 advocating the convention of a pan-European 
conference, it will discuss the West’s reactions and scepticism towards it. 
Analysing NATO members’ policies towards a European security conference, 
this chapter will then illustrate how the West’s most significant idea of “freer 
movement of people, ideas, and information,” which first appeared in NATO’s 
Declaration on East-West relations of 1969, came to the fore. And thirdly, it 
will also address the process of how the Atlantic Alliance accepted the East’s
15 This electronic document reader was complied by Mircea Munteanu, Hedi Giusto, and 
Christian Ostermann in cooperation with William Burr and with the CWIHP’s research 
assistants for the international conference “NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Detente, 
1965*1972” in Dobiacco, Italy, on 26*28 September 2002.
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proposal for a conference on European security in its May 1970 Rome 
communique. The debates within NATO were acute, but this chapter will 
demonstrate that, thanks to a British initiative and the influence of public 
opinion, the West for the first time indicated its commitment to the CSCE on 
condition that progress was made on other important issues such as the 
Berlin question.
The Warsaw Pact’s reply to the NATO Rome communique constitutes 
the starting-point for Chapter 3. In particular, it contained the first 
indications that the East might consider the Western idea of mutual force 
reductions. Therefore, this chapter will first analyse NATO’s reactions to 
these first signs of flexibility from the Soviet bloc. The second major focus of 
this chapter is the German and Berlin problems. On the one hand, the period 
covered by this chapter saw a decisive advance on the German question with 
the first significant success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Therefore the important 
implications of Brandt’s policies for multilateral European detente will be 
briefly discussed. On the other hand, in order to explain why the attitude of 
NATO governments hardened remarkably in the latter half of 1970, it will 
analyse the impasse of the Berlin negotiations which had begun to develop in 
early 1970. This chapter will also examine important behind-the-scenes 
developments; the policy changes of the French and the British governments, 
which now made Paris a champion of the idea of CSCE within the Western 
bloc, while London became a pragmatic and business-like, albeit far from 
enthusiastic, supporter of the CSCE.
Chapter 4 will demonstrate how deeply the idea of the CSCE was 
linked to the Berlin question and MBFR. Firstly, it will attempt to explain 
why the FRG leaders agreed with the French opinion that the Berlin 
settlement should be the only pre-condition of the opening of multilateral 
preparatory talks for a European security conference and dropped other 
pre-conditions, in particular the conclusion of the German-German 
negotiations. Secondly, it will look at how the deadlock of the Berlin talks
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was broken. Then the chapter will address a British proposal to connect 
MBFR with the CSCE, because it indicated a possibility that the preparatory 
talks for the CSCE might have been held earlier than they actually were. 
However, such a possibility vanished, as the USSR refused to sign the final 
protocol of the Berlin Agreement before the ratification of the Moscow Treaty 
in the West German Parliament. The Soviets’ counter-linkage thus meant 
that the final settlement was suspended for some time? hence the start of 
preparations for the CSCE was also postponed.
Chapter 5 will go back to the internal debates within the Western camp, 
and explore three essential debates that were subsequently to affect the 
basic character of the CSCE. Firstly, it will examine the Western debates 
about the procedure which should be adopted in the Conference. This 
discussion about the way in which the East-West meeting should work 
became one of the most controversial issues among NATO members, and in 
particular between France and the United States. Secondly, it will reveal 
how and why the topic of human rights emerged. This was eventually to 
produce the most celebrated clause in the Helsinki Final Act’s ten principles 
governing relations between states but its origins lie in the discussions 
between Western powers in the course of 1971-2 and in a West German 
initiative in particular. And thirdly, the chapter will explain how EC 
members developed their cooperation on CSCE matters within the 
framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Indeed, it will 
demonstrate that the key factor in allowing EPC to function effectively was 
the convergence of EC countries’ policy on the procedural question relating to 
the CSCE.
Chapter 6 will examine the final stages of the road towards the CSCE. 
The military aspects of the CSCE remained as an unsolved problem within 
NATO. The chapter will thus first explore how the new concept of Confidence 
Building Measures appeared, arguing that it was an indication of the retreat 
of disarmament detente. It will then discuss how MBFR came to be
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completely separated from the CSCE. It will also demonstrate that, in order 
to obtain the USSR’s commitment to MBFR unlinked to the CSCE, the 
Americans secretly agreed with the Soviets on a timetable for both sets of 
negotiations. With Moscow’s consent to the opening of exploratory talks on 
mutual force reductions, the Multilateral Preparatory Talk (MPT) for the 
CSCE began in November 1972. The result of the MPT -  the Final 
Recommendations — was in the end a significant success for the West. The 
chapter will therefore analyse how the Western countries were able to 
achieve such a success. In order to make the best use of this successful result, 
it was imperative that the CSCE had time to develop its own rhythm. The 
chapter will thus conclude with an examination of West European resistance 
to the superpowers’ very tight CSCE/MBFR timetable. The Europeans were 
ultimately successful enabling the West to prepare well for the start of the 
actual negotiations at the CSCE.
The manner in which the pre-negotiations had operated was absolutely 
fundamental not merely to the opening of the conference altogether but also 
to their ultimate achievements, especially over human rights and freer 
movement. As a result, the humanitarian elements were added in 
multilateral European detente. Eventually -  one could argue -  they would be 
one of the significant factors eroding the institutionalised division of Europe. 
In this sense, the pre-conference period of 1969-1973 represented a crucial 
turning point in Cold War history.
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Chapter V D6tente in the 1960b
It was the early 1970s that saw the beginning of multilateral European 
detente. In particular, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) started its preparatory talks at the end of 1972, which finally lead to 
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act- the climax of European detente. The process 
leading up to the CSCE was heavily affected by events in the 1960s. 
Moreover, in order to understand fully why the Conference was held in the 
1970s, it is important to compare the international situation in the 1970s 
with that of the 1960s. For that purpose, this first chapter will focus on four 
origins. Firstly, it will consider the difference and separation between 
superpower and European detente. Analysing the 1963 Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, it will emphasise the structural importance of the German question 
for multilateral European detente, and explain why detente in the 1960s 
progressed on a bilateral basis. Secondly, this chapter will look at the origins 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was 
proposed by the Eastern Bloc. Reviewing NATO’s reaction, it will underline 
how and why the West ignored the Warsaw Pact proposals for a European 
conference on security during the 1960s. Thirdly, it will explore the origins of 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which would be NATO’s chief 
proposal for multilateral European detente. Finally, it will consider briefly 
student protests in Western Europe, the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. These events significantly affected 
Western countries’ attitudes in dealing with the East’s detente proposals 
from 1969.
The Origins of the Separation of Superpower and European Detente
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It is often said that “detente” began in 1963. Especially, the signing of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 is referred to as the start of “little 
detente”.1 It was in essence the first step towards superpower rather than 
European detente. In order to understand this point, it is necessary to see 
how US-Soviet rapprochement in the field of arms control became possible. 
The key factor proved to be the detachment of superpower detente from the 
German question in two ways. On the one hand, in West-West relations the 
problem of German reunification had to be disconnected from the arms 
control agreement. On the other hand, in the East-West relations the 
controversy over the recognition of two Germanies needed to be shelved.
Firstly, in order to begin negotiations on the test ban with the Soviet 
Union, the United States had to separate the German question from the 
arms control talks. As early as 1955, the USSR proposed a comprehensive 
disarmament plan that included a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.2 
This was the first time that they suggested such a test ban, and the Soviets 
insisted at the 1955 Geneva Conference that this was their most important 
proposal.3 The West did not accept Moscow’s initiative, however, contending 
that a resolution of the political questions had to come before arms control 
and disarmament- German reunification had to be first.4 Indeed, the British 
government had already advocated German unification based on free 
elections (the Eden Plan).5 A new French government led by Guy Mollet 
from February 1956 was at first a strong supporter of an ambitious 
disarmament programme. The French Prime Minister insisted that 
negotiations on arms control and disarmament had to precede German
1 Jennifer W. See, “An Uneasy Truce: John F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Detente, 1963,” 
Cold War History. 2/2 (2002).
2 M. Smith-Norris, “The Eisenhower Administration and the Nuclear Test Ban Talks, 
1958—1960: Another Challenge to ‘Revisionism’”, Diplomatic History. 27/4 (2003), p. 506.
3 John van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: the Soviet Union and the West since 1953. Duke 
University Press, 1991, p. 37, 165.
4 Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, p. 40.
5 Saki Dockrill, “Eden Plan,” in Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), Cold War Respite: 
The Geneva Summit of 1955. Louisiana State University Press, 2000.
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unification.6 Konrad Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, however, 
vehemently opposed Mollet, stressing that the linkage between disarmament 
and the resolution of the German question was a Western principle. For him, 
detente could not occur before the reunification of Germany. Adenauer’s 
stance was supported by US Secretary of State John F. Dulles. Consequently, 
Mollet had to retreat from his desire for disarmament.7 That it why the 
linkage between arms control/disarmament and German unification 
prevented detente in the military field in the mid-1950s.
It was in 1957 that the linkage was brought to an end. According to 
Kurashina, during the spring of that year, Dulles decided to begin test ban 
negotiations separated from the comprehensive disarmament package 
proposed by the USSR.8 While, in order to coax Adenauer, he admitted that 
conventional disarmament in Europe would not advance before the 
unification of Germany, the US Secretary of State tried to push forward 
nuclear arms control without being disturbed by the German question. 
Growing protests at the H-bomb tests of the late 1950s pushed the 
Eisenhower administration into arms control talks.9 The then Soviet Prime 
Minister Nikolai Bulganin had again suggested a nuclear test ban treaty at 
the end of 1956. Although there was opposition from the Atomic Energy 
Commission within the US government, the US President decided to start 
test ban negotiations, which were formally initiated in October 1958.10 In 
the context of West-West relations, detaching the problem of German
6 Pierre Guillen, “Le probleme allemand dans les rapports East'O uest de 1955 a
1957”, Relations internationales. vol. 71, 1992, p. 303; Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs 
and Visions of Unity- the Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe. 
1955-1963. University of North Carolina Press, 2002, p. 27.
7 Wilfried Loth, “Adenauer’s Final Western Choice, 1955-58,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), Europe. 
Cold War and Co-Existence 1953-1965. Frank Cass & Co, 2004, p. 26.
8 Itsuki Kurashina, “1950 nenndai kouhan no beikoku gunnsyuku gunnbi kannri seisaku to 
doumei kankei [U.S. Disarmament Policy and the Allies in the Second Half of the 19508- 
Over the ‘Junktim ’ with German Unification],” Kokusaiseiii [International Relations], vol. 
134, 2003, pp. 47-48.
9 Andreas Wenger and Jerem i Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History: 
The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent and Detente”, Cold War History. 1/3 (2001), p. 12.
10 Smith-Norris, ‘The Eisenhower Administration”, p. 509*514.
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unification from arms control detente was an important pre-condition for 
launching the test ban talks, and at the same time keeping the principle of 
linkage between European security (conventional disarmament in Europe in 
particular) and German unification. In other words, in order to start 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear matters, the US government 
firstly had to make superpower relations independent from the central 
problem in Europe- the German question.
Needless to say, the German question was not the only problem for the 
test ban treaty. Indeed, verification was the most controversial issue during 
the negotiations. The West insisted that inspections of nuclear tests were 
indispensable for the effective application of a test ban agreement. The 
Soviet Union, however, strongly rejected the argument, denouncing 
verification as a form of espionage. In the end, in order to avoid the 
inspection problem, Moscow proposed an agreement forbidding nuclear tests 
in the air, which were far easier to observe without internal verification. As a 
result, the test ban treaty became limited or partial, rather than a 
comprehensive one including underground nuclear testing.
However, the second aspect of the German question also closely related 
to the test ban talks, namely the problem of East German recognition. Since 
1955, the Soviet government had followed a two Germanies policy.11 Instead 
of a unified Germany, Moscow sought the recognition of both East and West 
Germanies as sovereign states in the international arena. The USSR had 
established formal diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic Germany 
(FRG) in September 1955, at the same time as it had concluded the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR)-USSR treaty. By recognising the existence of two 
Germanies, the Soviets sought status quo detente. They also demanded that 
Western countries respect the GDR as a formal international actor. Yet, the 
FRG and its NATO partners adamantly opposed this. They stubbornly
11 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe- Forty Years of German Foreign Policy. 
Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 85*86. See also, Loth, “Adenauer’s Final Western Choice,” 
pp. 24*26.
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maintained that West Germany was the only representative of the German 
people, and therefore could not admit East Germany as a legitimate state. 
Indeed, the Adenauer government issued the so-called “Hallstain Doctrine”: 
the FRG principle not to maintain diplomatic relations with states which 
recognised the GDR after 1956. With this doctrine, Bonn tried to isolate East 
Germany in international society.12 One of the ways for the Soviet Union to 
force the West to recognise East Germany as a member of the international 
community was to bring the GDR into multilateral treaties, such as a 
Non-Aggression Pact (NAP) or the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).
In order to conclude the LTBT, however, both superpowers had to 
shelve the second German problem. While the United States had to pay 
attention to its relations with West Germany, the Soviet Union also had to 
take East Germany into account. When Nikita Khrushchev visited East 
Berlin, the capital of GDR, on 2 July 1963, he made a speech proposing a link 
between a non-aggression pact and the LTBT.13 By doing so, he implicitly 
tried to involve East Germany in the pact. However, the Soviet leader’s 
language in the speech was perhaps intentionally ambiguous enough to 
permit the West not to regard the link as an absolute precondition.14 On the 
one hand, the Soviet leader showed attention to East Germany by suggesting 
a NAP. On the other hand, he also prepared an escape hole for the West. In 
fact, after the Americans repeatedly stressed that a NAP would have to be 
preceded by consultations within NATO, the Soviets accepted that they 
initially would have to focus solely on the LTBT. In order to make an 
agreement with Washington on arms control issues, Moscow was ready to 
drop the linkage between an NAP and the LTBT.
12 William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War- The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany. 
1949-1969. The University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
13 Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO? Conflicting Western 
Perceptions of Detente, 1963-65”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies. 2/2 (2004), p .187.
14 See, “An Uneasy Truce,” p. 176>' Kendrick Oliver, “West Germany and the Moscow Test 
Ban Treaty Negotiations, July 1963,” in Saki Dockrill (ed.), Controversy and Compromise- 
Alliance Politics between Great Britainr Federal Republic of Germany, and the United 
States of America. 1945-1967. Bodenheim- Philo, 1998, pp. 163*64.
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The recognition of the GDR by the West through the LTBT was also 
evaded by another trick. Adenauer had feared that if East Germany joined 
the test ban treaty, it would mean the recognition of this other part of 
Germany, thereby consolidating the division of Germany that he had opposed 
for a long time.15 The US, the USSR and the UK, however, agreed to prepare 
their own versions of the LTBT, and the East German government was to 
sign only the Soviet version, implying that the Americans and the British 
could insist that they did not recognise the GDR through the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty.16 By postponing the non-aggression pact negotiations and with 
the idea of preparing three LTBT documents, the USA, the Soviet Union and 
Britain could finally conclude the LTBT on 5 August 1963 in Moscow. It 
became possible because the superpowers implicitly understood the necessity 
of shelving the East German recognition problem.
The success of the superpower detente on arms control was achieved by 
dividing it from European affairs, the German question in particular. In fact, 
the test ban treaty was accomplished by the USA and the USSR bilaterally, 
and their European allies only played a little role.17 In this sense, the 1963 
LTBT was the starting point for the separation of superpower and European 
detente. From now on, Washington and Moscow could carry on their bilateral 
rapprochement — in particular in the nuclear field — and stabilise their 
privileged positions. By contrast, the German question still remained a huge 
obstacle for multilateral European detente. As long as the German question 
was not solved, detente in any form had to be pursued bilaterally during the 
1960s.
Bilateral superpower detente did not spill over into multilateral 
European detente. After the August 1963 signing of the LTBT, several
15 Oliver, “West Germany and the Moscow Test Ban,” p. 168; Locher and Nuenlist, “What 
Role for NATO?,” p. 188.
16 Oliver, ‘West Germany and the Moscow Test Ban,” pp. 169*70.
17 Vojtech Mastny, “Detente, the Superpowers and their Allies, 1962*1964,” in Wilfried Loth 
(ed.), Europe. Cold War and Coexistence 1953*1965. Frank Cass, 2004, p. 222; Wenger and 
Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic,” p.7; van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, p. 170.
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smaller countries in NATO such as Belgium, Canada, Norway, and Italy 
favoured further East-West agreements. The development of “little detente” 
clearly stimulated some of the West Europeans. They wanted for instance to 
consider the idea of a Non-Aggression Pact and ground observation posts for 
watching and preventing surprise attacks. However, France and West 
Germany opposed further steps towards detente. Bonn in particular could 
not accept a NAP that might lead to the recognition of East Germany.18 Any 
other ideas of rapprochement would also be linked to the German question 
by the East.19 Hence, the hope of post-LTBT multilateral detente in Europe 
was rapidly curtailed.
Detente in the 1960s therefore progressed on a bilateral basis. First 
and foremost, the West German Foreign Ministry under Gerhard Schroder 
had adopted a new policy from 1961, a ‘policy of movement’ that sought the 
informal establishment of commercial and cultural relations with East 
European countries.20 In an atmosphere of relaxation, the FRG’s Foreign 
Minister pragmatically pursued a new policy to fend off Eastern criticism of 
Bonn’s confrontational cold war policy, without deviating from the Hallstain 
Doctrine.21 Indeed, by the end of 1963, West Germany successfully set up 
trade missions that had no diplomatic responsibility, in Warsaw, Budapest, 
Sofia and Bucharest.22 Yet, this policy also aimed to dissociate East 
Germany from other Eastern states.23 While strengthening the relationship 
with East Europeans except the East Germans, Bonn intended to isolate the 
East German regime from other Socialist states. However, the FRG’s 
attitude antagonized the Warsaw Pact countries and they would later 
demand the recognition of East Germany’s sovereignty in the context of
18 Locher and Nuenlist, “W hat Role for NATO?,” p. 189.
19 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 142.
20 Locher and Nuenlist, ‘W hat Role for NATO?,” p. 119-2,' Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the 
Cold War- A History of Detente. 1950-1991. Palgrave, 2002, p.85; Hanrieder, Germany. 
America, Europe, pp. 178-82; Oliver, W est Germany and the Moscow Test Ban,” p. 154.
21 Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung- Gerhard Schroder als Aufienminister 1961-1966. 
Munich- Oldenbourg, 2001, p. 153.
22 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 142.
23 Hanrieder, Germany America. Europe, p. 180.
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European detente. Excluding another Germany was unacceptable to the 
East. From the outset, Schroder’s ‘policy of movement’ contained limits for 
further advances in East/West relations.
The British also quietly enhanced economic relations with the Eastern 
Bloc. In the early 1960s, the Planning Staff of the British Foreign Office tried 
to encourage internal reform of the Warsaw Pact states by developing 
commercial, cultural and scientific contacts.24 In the summer 1964, London 
then concluded agreements with Prague and Moscow, giving long-term credit 
for improving East*West trade. The new British Labour government, elected 
in October 1964 and led by Harold Wilson, also favoured an improvement in 
economic relations with the communist powers.25 As Michael Clarke points 
out, however, “There were surprisingly few substantive matters for London 
and Moscow to discuss on a bilateral basis, and fewer still between, say, 
Britain and Poland, or Britain and Hungary.”26 And Britain’s trade with the 
states of the Eastern Bloc constituted no more than 3 per cent of its total 
trade.27 In addition, Wilson was less interested in diplomatic initiatives with 
the other side of the iron curtain.28 As a consequence, bilateral relations 
between the UK and the Warsaw Pact countries developed quietly and had 
little political impact.29
It was De Gaulle’s France that pursued more dynamic bilateral 
rapprochements with the Soviet Union and East European countries. During 
the Adenauer era, the French President, together with the West German 
Chancellor, had opposed detente in general. Showing his support for the 
FRG’s interest in striving for reunification, the General had initially wanted 
a European political union led by France, and closer Franco-German
24 Geraint Hughes, “British policy towards Eastern Europe and the impact of the ‘Prague 
Spring’ 1964-8”, Cold War History. 4/2 (2004), p. 118.
25 Ibid., p. 121.
26 Brian White, Britain. Detente, and Changing East-West Relations. Routledge, 1992, p.
92.
27 Ibid.
28 Hughes, “British policy towards Eastern Europe,” p. 121.
29 John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964-70- International Policy (The Labour 
Governments 1964-70). Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 128.
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cooperation in particular.30 However, the Fouchet Plan aiming at political 
consultation among EEC members, failed because of Belgian and Dutch 
opposition in 1962.31 Swiftly, the French leader switched to an alternative- a 
closer relationship between France and West Germany. Thus, in January 
1963, de Gaulle and Adenauer concluded the Elysee treaty institutionalizing 
cooperation between the two governments in diplomatic, economic, and 
cultural fields, including regular summit meetings twice a year.32 Again, 
however, the Paris-Bonn axis did not last long. There was strong hostility 
towards the exclusive bilateral treaty in West Germany and among its NATO 
partners. When the treaty was ratified in May 1963, the FRG Parliament 
modified it adding a preamble asserting the significance of the Atlantic 
Alliance. For the French leader, who was antagonistic to NATO, the 
preamble meant the death of the Franco-German treaty.33 Furthermore, the 
relationship between the two countries deteriorated after Ludwig Erhard 
replaced Adenauer in October 1963. The new chancellor, who preferred closer 
relations with the US to France, was strongly opposed to the Elysee treaty.34 
When the two leaders met in July 1964, it became clear that they had very 
different opinions on the future vision of international affairs. As Soutou 
puts it, “this meeting of July 1964 marked a point of rupture in the 
Franco-German relations.”35 After the failures of cooperation with West 
European countries, de Gaulle then turned to the East.
From 1964 French relations with the states of the Eastern Bloc 
developed rapidly. It started firstly in commercial and technological
30 Georges*Henri Soutou, “Le General de Gaulle et le Plan Fouchet d’Union Politique 
Europeenne- un Projet Strategique,” Ann Deighton and Alan Milward (eds.), Widining. 
Deeping and Acceleration- The European Economic Community 1957-1963. Nomos, 1999.
31 Yves Stelandre, “Les Pays du Benelux, l'Europe Politique et les Negociations Fouchet,” 
Ann Deighton and Alan Milward (eds.), Widining. Deeping and Acceleration: The European 
Economic Community 1957-1963. Nomos, 1999; Jeffrey W. Vanke, “An Impossible Union: 
Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959*62,” Cold War History. 2/1 (2001).
32 As regards the Elysee Treaty, Corine Defiance et Ulrich Pfeil (dir.), Le traite de l'Elvsee: 
Et les relations franco-allemandes 1945 * 1963 * 2003. Paris: CNRS, 2005.
33 Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine. pp. 290*291.
34 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 141.
35 Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine. p. 274.
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cooperation. The French Minister of Economy and Finance, Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing, visited Moscow in January 1964. In return for a previous visit by 
French parliamentarians, the chairman of the Soviet presidium, Nikolai 
Podgorny, came to Paris and began a dialogue with the French government, 
which in the end led to the Franco-Soviet commercial treaty of October 
1964.36 Moreover, the official visit of Ion Maurer, the Premier of the 
Rumanian Council of Ministers, to Paris in July 1964 marked the beginning 
of a political as well as economic dialogue. It was important, according to a 
French diplomat, because Maurer’s visit hinted at the possibility of 
rapprochement with the East.37 During 1965, bilateral diplomatic exchanges 
between France and the Warsaw Pact countries continued at the Foreign 
Minister level.38 French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville also 
began to insist in May 1965 that the German problem should be solved with 
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he declared in December 1965 that “we 
believe the time has come for links with Soviet Russia on a more political — 
and therefore frequent -  basis.”39 De Gaulle wanted this “new course” and 
put forward his idea of “constructive entente from the Atlantic to the 
Urals.”40 For the General, who vehemently opposed the two “blocs”, 
East-West exchanges had to be carried out on a bilateral basis. He therefore 
objected to any joint NATO policy towards the Eastern Bloc.41 The French 
President’s independent initiative was to culminate with a 1966 Moscow 
visit.
The Origins of the European Security Conference
36 Vaisse, La Grandeur, p. 418.
37 Frangois Puaux, “L’originalite de la politique frangaise de detente,” in Institut Charles de 
Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siecle- L'Europe. Tome 5. Paris • Plon, 1992, p. 433.
38 Vaisse, La Grandeur, pp. 423*24, 435.
39 Locher and Nuenlist, “W hat Role for NATO?”, pp. 200*201.
40 Vaisse, La Grandeur, p. 424. The concept “la cooperation de l’Atlantique a l’Oural” firstly 
appeared as early as in February 1965. Soutou, LAlliance incertaine. p. 284.
41 Locher and Nuenlist, “W hat Role for NATO?”, p. 201.
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After the separation of superpower and European detente, the latter 
progressed on a bilateral basis. From the East, however, proposals for 
multilateral European detente came in the mid-1960s. Firstly, Polish 
Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki presented his idea of a European conference 
for security at the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1964.
I must stress our strong belief tha t the time is ripe for examining the problem 
of European security in its entirety. In our considered opinion, the advisability 
of convening for this purpose a conference of all-European States with the 
participation, of course, of both the Soviet Union and the United States, should 
be closely examined. 42
According to Helga Hafterndorn, this was proposed so as to prevent NATO’s 
Multilateral Force (MLF) project, which aimed to create a NATO 
multi-national nuclear fleet with six Polaris missiles, and would give West 
Germany a finger on the nuclear trigger.43 In order to promote East-West 
dialogue and his long-standing idea of creating a denuclear zone in particular, 
Rapacki took up the concept originally submitted by the Soviets in 1954, 
which had at that time called for a European conference to conclude an 
all-European treaty on collective security designed to impede West German
42 Quoted in John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. 
The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe. Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 11. See also, 
Ljubivoje Achimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands)' Rockville, Md., USA- Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981, p. 78.
43 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung- zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. 1955-1982. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, p. 415. As regards the Western 
controversy on the MLF, see Marilena Gala, “The M ultilateral Force- A Brief History of the 
American Efforts to M aintain the Nuclear Status Quo Within the Atlantic Alliance,” Stria 
delle Relazioni Internazionali. 13/1 (1998); Susanna Schraafstter and Stephen Twigge, 
“Trick or Truth?: The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Nonproliferation Policy, 
1964-68”, Diplomacy and Statecraft. 11/2 (2000); Martin Koopmann, “Le malentendu d’une 
defense nucleaire commune: l’Allemagne et la Force multilaterale”, in Wilfried Loth (ed.), 
Crises and Compromises: the European Project. 1963-1969. Nomos, 2001; John Young, 
“Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964-66”, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft. 14/2 (2003).
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rearmament.44 The Polish Foreign Minister’s initiative was independent 
and undertaken without consultation with his Warsaw Pact partners.45 One 
month later, the Polish Communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had 
also in February 1964 tabled his plan for a nuclear armaments freeze in 
Central Europe, brought up again the proposal of a European security 
conference in front of his colleagues at the January 1965 Political 
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Warsaw. It should be 
underlined here that, Poland’s view, as the above quotation demonstrates, 
did not exclude the participation of the United States in a European 
conference. For Warsaw, an agreement between the nuclear states including 
America whose nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe, and other 
European states was necessary for European security.46 This Polish proposal 
was in the end hesitantly accepted by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw 
Pact states, and they jointly called for a conference of European states in 
their final communique.47
Since the late 1950s, NATO had rejected Warsaw’s plan for establishing 
a nuclear free zone in the central Europe for three reasons.48 Firstly, from a 
disarmament point of view, the Polish idea did not cover Soviet territory.
44 van Oudenaren, Detente in Eurone. pp. 29*30; As regards the so-called Rapacki Plan of a 
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, Piotr Wandycz, “Adam Rapacki and the Search for 
European Security,” in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), The Diplomats. 
1939-1979. Princeton, N.J- Princeton University Press, 1994.
45 At the 1965 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, 
Wladyslaw Gomulka, the first secretary of the Polish Communist Party, apologised for his 
Foreign Minister’s unilateral act, stating tha t “Rapacki came forward a t the UN with a 
proposal related to the question of European security. We feel guilty th a t we did not consult 
with the other socialist countries on this issue, although the proposal was presented in a 
very general form.” Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 
1963*1965,” Cold War International History (CWIHP) Working Paper 32, 2001, p. 47.
46 Vojtech Mastny, “VII. Meeting of the PCC, Warsaw, 19*20 January 1965: Editorial Note,” 
in the “Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact” website (hereafter PHP); 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection 3/PCC texts/ed note 65.htm
47 Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. p. 416. The communique of the Political 
Consultative Committee meeting stated th a t “Supporting the initiative of the Polish People’s 
Republic, the Political Consultative Committee calls for the convocation of a conference of 
European states to discuss measures to ensure collective security in Europe.” 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection 3/PCC docs/1965/1965 19.pdf
48 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (hereafter MAE), Serie Europe 1966*1970, 2034, 
“L’U.R.S.S. et la securite europeenne,” 23.5.1966.
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Without it, the West thought, disarmament could not truly stabilize the 
situation. Secondly, in regards to European security, the Rapacki/Gomulka 
Plan could not stabilise Europe because it would maintain the division of 
Germany. Finally, from a balance-of-power point of view, creating a nuclear 
free zone would diminish Western military capabilities without affecting 
Soviet armed power. If the agenda for a European conference itself, namely 
the Rapacki/Gomulka Plan, was unattractive, the conference itself was also 
meaningless for the West.
The Polish proposal for a European security conference, however, had 
some, albeit limited, impact on the smaller NATO countries. It stimulated 
some detente-oriented states to move further on arms control agreements 
with the East. For instance, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was 
inclined towards modifying the Rapacki Plan so as to make it acceptable to 
the West. Other smaller countries in NATO such as Norway, Denmark and 
Canada, also supported Spaak and wanted some progress in arms control.49 
Nonetheless, the West Germans who rigidly adhered to the principle of 
linkage between European security and the German question, had 
confidence that as long as the United States, which was one of the Four 
Powers having responsibility on the German question, remained committed 
to the linkage, there would be no negotiations with the Eastern Bloc that 
could damage Bonn’s vital interests.50 In fact, due to American indifference 
to a European conference and their observance of the 
German-reunification-first principle, Belgian eagerness was contained.
The Erhard government however needed to take a new initiative 
because its diplomacy had reached a deadlock. Firstly, the USA-West 
German policy convergence on a Multilateral Force project collapsed in 
1964/65. The two governments had pursued the MLF together from the late 
1950s. After the detonation of Communist China’s first nuclear device in
49 Akten zur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereafter AAPD).1965, 
Dok. 152, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Krapf, 26.3.1965.
5° Ibid.
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October 1964, however, the Johnson administration gradually shifted its 
priority from a MLF to nuclear non-dissemination. 51 Although the 
relationship with Bonn was still important, it became equally significant for 
Washington to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that, it was 
indispensable to cooperate with the Soviet Union, which insisted that the 
renunciation of MLF was a precondition for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 
short, West Germany’s aspiration for nuclear weapons, of which the Eastern 
countries were seriously afraid, became incompatible with America’s desire 
for arms control detente. The British government was also strongly 
interested in arms control and disarmament from the start. Indeed a 
non-proliferation treaty was attractive to the Wilson government in order to 
restrain the FRG’s nuclear ambition.52 In addition, as argued above, 
Franco-West German relations had already worsened. And more ominously 
for Bonn, Paris was reaching out to the Soviet Union and East European 
countries in the course of 1965.53 Finally, as already mentioned, many 
smaller NATO countries were pro-detente. By the mid 1960s, therefore, 
Schroder’s first Ostpolitik, which aimed to merely develop informal economic 
relations with the Eastern Bloc, seemed insufficient. West Germany was 
clearly isolated on arms control and disarmament detente, to which the West 
Germans were highly negative partly because of their adherence to a MLF, 
and partly because it was completely unacceptable for them to conclude any 
arms control/disarmament agreements that included East Germany. This 
would imply the recognition of another Germany as a legitimate state. 
Although the FRG Foreign Ministry understood that NATO governments 
showed little interest in a European security conference, they anticipated 
that the Polish government would take another step on European security 
matters.54 Erhard and Schroder were therefore looking for a way out of the
51 Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson and Europe- In the Shadow of Vietnam.
Harvard University Press, 2003, pp.53-5.
52 White, Britain. Detente, pp. 114*15.
53 Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine. pp. 281*86.
54 AAPD 1965. Dok. 262, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Krapf, 29.6.1965.
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diplomatic impasse.
The outcome was a new West German initiative launched on 25 March 
1966- the famous “peace note”. Its original idea came from the head of the 
Eastern Bloc department in the Auswartigen Amt, Erwin Wickert, who in 
January 1966 recommended that the Federal Republic of Germany should 
present its own detente proposal in order to undercut communist 
propaganda attacks on West Germany.55 Wickert’s suggestion was taken up 
by State secretary Karl Carstens, and a memorandum was prepared in the 
Foreign Ministry. It was then adopted by Schroder who was seeking 
something novel. In late March 1966, the Erhard government sent the “peace 
note” to the East with the exception of East Germany, the West and the 
Third World countries, proclaiming that the German people opposed the 
division of Germany, wanted its reunification, desired to live in friendship 
with its Eastern neighbours, rejected war, and proposed non-aggression 
pacts with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East 
European states.56
Yet, the note only provoked antagonistic reactions from Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. True, Bonn’s Western partners welcomed the Erhard 
government’s new initiative. For example, the British Ambassador in Bonn, 
Frank Roberts, praised the peace note as “a turning point in post-war foreign 
policy of the Federal Republic.”57 He was however correct in his observation 
that the note contained little that was new with regard to the German 
question.58 In fact, the West Germans ignored the existence of the GDR, and
55 Eibl, Politik der Be westing, p.423.
56 Europa-Archiv. 21/7 (1966), pp. 171-175.
57 Gottfried Niedhart, “The British Reaction towards Ostpolitik. Anglo - West German 
Relations in the Era of Detente 1967-1971,” downloaded from the website “Ostpolitik and 
CSCE”, http7/www.ostpohtik.net/
58 Ibid. Many scholars also complain tha t the peace note said little new. William E. Griffith, 
The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany. MIT Press, 1978, pp. 127-28; Hanrieder, 
Germany. America. Europe, p. 182; Gray, Germany’s Cold War, pp. 193-94; W. R. Smyser, 
From Yalta to Berlin- the Cold War struggle over Germany. Macmillan, 1999, p. 215; Peter 
Bender, Die “Neue Ostpolitik” und ihre Folgen- vom Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung. 
Miinchen- Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995, pp. 116*18. Suri places a high value on the 
peace note, but it is less clear why he praises it, given tha t the note was condemned by the
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did not recognise the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. They also did not call 
for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the East European 
governments. In brief, Erhard and Schroder had no intention of abandoning 
their basic positions set in the Adenauer era, which prevented the advance of 
East-West reconciliation in Europe. Although the proposal of non-aggression 
pacts was new from the Western side, the idea itself had already been tabled 
by the Eastern Bloc from the mid-1950s. Still more importantly, a NAP 
excluding East Germany was worthless from the Eastern point of view. 
Answering the peace note with polemics, the Soviet Union and East 
European countries criticised West Germany for not respecting the status 
quo.59 As William Gray put it, “the peace note symbolized the bankruptcy of 
Erhard’s approach.”60
For the purposes of this study, the important thing is that the idea of a 
European conference on security re-emerged as a reaction to the peace note. 
Soon after Bonn’s friendly gesture, the Soviet Union picked up this concept, 
and started to advocate it aggressively and polemically throughout 1966. 
Firstly, while complaining that “the FRG intends to continue its aggressive 
and revenge-seeking policy,” the first secretary Brezhnev, in his speech at the 
23rd Congress of the CPSU on 29 March 1966, called for the convention of 
“an appropriate international conference” on European security.61 Following 
the remarks of the Kremlin’s head, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko also 
made public Moscow’s willingness to hold such a conference, when he visited 
Rome on 27 April 1966.62 Moreover, in the Soviet’s formal reply of 17 May 
1966 to the West German peace note, the USSR government insisted upon
East and therefore did not promote detente in any real sense. Jeremi Suri, Power and 
Protest' Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente. Cambridge, MA- Harvard University 
Press, 2003, pp. 219*20.
59 Eibl, Politik der Be weening, pp. 426*27.
60 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, p. 194.
61 Quoted in Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet power and Europe. 1945*1970. Baltimore- Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 285*6,' See also, Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. pp. 
416*17.
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the importance of a European security conference, in which not only the 
concept of a nuclear-free-zone, but also the questions of force reductions and 
“a peaceful solution of the German question” would be addressed.63 This was 
clearly in retaliation against West Germany’s peace offensive which had 
aimed at isolating East Germany, by establishing non-aggression pacts with 
East European countries. The Soviets probably proposed a European 
conference in which the GDR would participate and be recognised as a 
member of international society in order to counter the FRG’s tactics to 
divide the Eastern Bloc. For the East, a multilateral framework was a useful 
concept for saving East Germany from its isolation. Once the rupture of the 
Sino-Soviet relationship became clear, maintaining Warsaw Pact solidarity 
had surely become even more important for the Kremlin.64 Bonn’s peace 
note may also have radicalised Russian attitudes. When Poland had 
proposed a European security conference at the end of 1964, the 
participation of the United States had been taken for granted. After the 
peace note, the Soviet government put forward the same idea, but 
intentionally dropped references to US participation in such a European 
conference. In addition, in answering Bonn’s peace note, the Soviet attacked 
the US presence in Europe stressing the European character of European 
security.65 As Bonn tried to divide the Eastern Bloc, Moscow also attempted 
to isolate the USA from European affairs.
Also, De Gaulle’s imminent visit to Moscow in July 1966, probably 
encouraged the Soviets to exclude the United State from a pan-European 
conference. The antagonistic attitude of Paris towards Washington was no
63 Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik. IV/12, p. 723-732.
64 As regards the SincrSoviet conflict in the 1960s, see Vladislav Zubok, “Unwrapping the 
Enigma- What was behind the Soviet Challenge in the 1960s?” in Diane B. Kunz (ed.), The 
Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s. Columbia 
University Press, 1994; Sergey Radchenko, “Splitting Asia: Beijing and Moscow in Search of 
Allies,” which was presented at the LSE at the invitation of the Cold War Studies 
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65 AAPD 1966. Dok. 166, Botschafter von Walther, Moskau, an das Auswartige Amt,
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doubt a useful diplomatic tool for Moscow. From 1963, the Franco-American 
relationship had gone from bad to worse. To begin with, De Gaulle had 
opposed any cooperation with the US on nuclear matters, and pursued 
French nuclear independence. In January 1963, for example, he rejected the 
Anglo-American Nassau agreement which had offered Polaris medium-range 
missiles to France as well as to Britain.66 He also continued to oppose the 
MLF, a NPT and NATO’s flexible response strategy, all of which the 
Americans wanted to agree with their European partners. Still more critical 
for Paris-Washington relations, the General had started publicly to criticise 
US policy in Indo-china. Condemning the Vietnam War, he had instead 
proposed the unification of North and South Vietnam and its neutralisation, 
a stance which was completely unacceptable to the Americans.67 In the 
course of 1964, as mentioned above, the French President had also 
condemned West Germany’s closeness to the United States and had 
emphasised the necessity of a “European Europe” independent of America. 
Approaching the Warsaw Pact countries, furthermore, he announced in 
February 1965 a new concept of “cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals” 
through which the German question would be solved.68 France’s boycott of 
the European Community Council of Ministers, the so-called “Empty Chair 
Crisis” of 1965, also gave the impression that the French were retreating 
from the Western Bloc.69 Finally, last but not least, de Gaulle, in his 7 March 
1966 letter to Johnson, announced the withdrawal of French forces from 
NATO’s integrated military command.70 All of these Gaullist challenges
66 Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine. pp. 230-40. At the same time, de Gaulle publicly rejected 
British membership of the European Economic Cooperation at the famous press conference 
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towards the United States and NATO were seen by the Soviets as evidence of 
a trend towards division within the Western Bloc.71 For Moscow, a 
Franco-Soviet rapprochement could be a good opportunity to accelerate this 
centrifugal tendency. The Soviet leadership probably expected to obtain the 
General’s support of a European security conference without America given 
de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals”.72
The Western Bloc countries, however, vehemently opposed the Soviet 
attempt to separate the United States from Europe. Although the Danish 
government suggested to its NATO partners that the West should take the 
initiative for a European security conference including America, other 
Alliance members were remarkably prudent and critical of the idea, 
doubting that such a conference could succeed at that time.73 At the 
Ministerial meeting of the NATO council in June 1966, Foreign Ministers 
judged the value of a European conference negatively, and underlined that 
the participation of the Americans in any East-West negotiation on 
European security was crucial.74 The Danish proposal was also regarded by 
the French and US Foreign Ministers as “dangerous [and likely] to raise 
false hopes in this area”.75 Other Ministers also supported this opinion. As a 
consequence, they deliberately ignored Moscow’s call for a conference, did not 
mention it in their final communique, and, instead, underlined bilateral 
cooperation in the cultural, economic, scientific and technical fields.76 Even 
de Gaulle, when he met Brezhnev in June 1966, argued that one could not
Alliance. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. See also, Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 
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Vsolve the German question without the US, and, although he did not reject 
the idea of a European conference, the French President stressed that he 
would see a conference as a result of detente, not as a means towards it.77
In a sense, the Soviet attempt to exclude American participation in a 
European security conference gave the West a good excuse to reject Moscow’s 
proposal. However, a more fundamental obstacle to multilateral European 
detente was still the German problem. West Germany stubbornly 
maintained its non-recognition policy towards East Germany. Thus, if and 
when a European conference took place, it would be vitally important for the 
West Germans how the “Soviet occupied zone” would be involved.78 As long 
as the Warsaw Pact countries demanded that East Germany should enjoy 
equal status to all other participants, Erhard’s CDU government could never 
accept it. The Americans and more reluctantly the British endorsed Bonn’s 
stance. The French also would not recognise the GDR. De Gaulle saw East 
Germany as an artificial entity which would disappear in three hours if the 
Soviets withdrew from it.79 Although Brezhnev suggested a rapprochement 
of two Germanies must be done at a European conference, the General 
replied that German reunification would be a historical necessity in the long 
run; hence he could not accept two Germanies.80 The 1966 Franco-Soviet 
summit thus came to an impasse on the German problem. As French Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville put it, a European security conference was 
“highly premature, because one is still far from mutual understanding on the 
German question.”81 In order for detente to advance multilaterally, either 
German reunification would have to be realised beforehand or the existence 
of two Germanies would have to be accepted. The former seemed highly 
unlikely in the near future. Rather, a West German Social Democratic Party
77 Vaisse, La Grandeur, pp. 426-28; Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, p. 177.
78 AAPD 1966. Dok. 169, Ministerialdirigent Ruete an die Standige Vertretung bei der 
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(SPD) had adopted the latter direction. As early as 1963, Willy Brandt, at 
that time mayor of Berlin and the chairman of SPD from 1964, and his 
political advisor Egon Bahr had proclaimed the celebrated slogan “ Wandel 
durch Annaherung(change through rapprochement)”. During the SPD party 
conference in June 1966, they committed themselves to pursue 
rapprochement between East and West Germany. In addition, the opposition 
in West Germany won the local elections in July 1966. The Federal Republic 
was changing.
Although de Gaulle did not concur with Brezhnev about a European 
security conference, the Soviets did not abandon the idea. Rather they made 
their proposal a more formal, concrete and collective initiative. On 4-6 July 
1966, Warsaw Pact leaders gathered in Bucharest, and adopted the 
“Declaration of the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe”. The 
so-called Bucharest Declaration called for the convocation of an all-European 
conference for security and cooperation, as well as the dissolution of military 
alliances, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the reduction of forces in both 
Germanies, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, West German 
renunciation of nuclear weapons, and the recognition of existing borders and 
East Germany.82 By issuing such a declaration, the Eastern Bloc made its 
conference proposal that much more official. A Soviet newspaper praised the 
Declaration as “the most comprehensive and realistic plan for European 
security ever offered the people of Europe.”83 Calling for the dissolution of 
the two alliances was unrealistic, however, and was regarded by the West as 
propaganda. The proposal for an all-European conference without 
mentioning America also indicated the exclusion of the United States. NATO 
governments thus dismissed the Declaration as an attempt to play the West 
Europeans off against the Americans, in order to weaken, and in the end
82 Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. p. 417. The text of Bucharest Declaration in 
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disunite the Atlantic Alliance.84 Therefore, NATO never referred to the 
Bucharest Declaration or a European security conference in public.85 As will 
be seen, it was not until 1969 that the West publicly began to commit to the 
idea of a European conference for security and cooperation.
In the course of the mid-1960s, however, the way in which both the East and 
West pursued detente became clearer. There were three pillars. The first was 
in the economic and cultural fields including scientific and technical 
cooperation. Economic and cultural detente aimed at developing 
communications between the East and West for mutual benefit, thereby 
improving relations generally. The second pillar was the recognition of the 
status quo. By recognising the reality of the international situation through, 
for example, the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, status quo detente was 
to serve to stabilise East-West relations. And finally, arms control and 
disarmament was the third pillar of detente. Agreements on limitations or 
reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons were expected to bring 
about a militarily less confrontational situation. While the Warsaw Pact 
preferred the first two pillars of detente, NATO was to emphasise arms 
control and disarmament detente from 1967.
The Origins of MBFR and the Harmel Report
In June 1968, the Foreign Ministers of NATO countries issued the so-called 
“Reykjavik signal,” which was a declaration proposing mutual and balanced 
reductions of conventional forces between East and West. This Declaration 
has been regarded as a counter-proposal to the Warsaw Pact’s initiative on a
84 Peter Becker, Die friihe KSZE-Politik der Bundesropuhlik Deutschland- Per 
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European security conference.86 The Signal, which would eventually lead to 
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in the 1970s, 
was in appearance the first proposal for multilateral European detente from 
the Western side.
The idea of balanced force reduction can be seen in the report of “The 
Future Tasks of the Alliance”, known as the “Harmel Report,” which defined 
NATO’s roles as being both defence and detente.87 The report was an answer 
to de Gaulle’s challenges.88 The Atlantic Alliance had to respond to French 
criticisms of its credibility and legitimacy.89 France’s retreat from NATO’s 
integrated command and the General’s trip to Moscow in 1966 were serious 
attacks on the raison d’etre of the military Alliance in the detente era. It was 
the Belgians who first took the initiative to review the roles of NATO in order 
to deal with its identity crisis. After the French withdrawal, Western 
ministers had decided to move the headquarters of the North Atlantic 
Alliance to Brussels, the capital of Belgium. Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre 
Harmel therefore needed to explain the importance of NATO to his domestic 
citizens who risked becoming the main targets of any Warsaw Pact 
offensives.90 At the December 1966 NATO Ministerial meeting, the Belgian 
Foreign Minister thus proposed to “study the future tasks which face the 
alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the 
Alliance as a factor for durable peace.”91 This recommendation was 
welcomed, and the Harmel study began in February 1967. Details of the 
Harmel exercise which eventually led to the report of “The Future Tasks of
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Problems of Security, p. 81.
87 The text of the Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance annexed to the 14 December 1967 
NATO ministerial communique, http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c671213b.htm
88 Frederic Bozo, “Detente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the 
Harmel Report (1964-1968)”, Contemporary European History. 7/3 (1998).
89 Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity* NATO and the Miscalculation of Detente, 
1966-1968”, Journal of Cold War Studies. 6/1 (2004), pp. 25-34.
90 Rik Coolsaet, La politique exterieure de la Belgique* Au Coeur de l’Eurone. le noids d’une 
petite puissance. Graduit du neerlandais par Serge Govaert, Bruxelles^ De Boeck Universite,
2002, p. 180.
91 Quoted in Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”, p. 59.
44
the Alliance” adopted in December 1967 have been extensively examined 
elsewhere.92 However, the origins of the concept of balanced force reductions 
in the Harmel report have not been sufficiently examined.93 Although the 
idea of mutual conventional disarmament existed from the 1950s or earlier, 
the more precise origins of MBFR can be traced back to mid* 1966.
It was at a meeting between Anglo-American Foreign Ministers on 9 
June 1966, immediately after the spring NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris 
that a secret suggestion emerged. In the US Embassy in London, US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk met UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, 
and offered to study the possibility of a reciprocal withdrawal of Soviet and 
Allied troops. Rusk brought up this idea, because the Americans expected 
that, when de Gaulle visited Moscow in June 1966, the French and the 
Soviets would agree to pull their forces out of Germany. The US State 
Secretary said “from indications he had received he did not think the 
Russians were uninterested in the subject of reciprocal withdrawals and it 
might be dangerous if the French raised this.”94 At that time, the Johnson 
government was under pressure because of the worsening balance of 
payments caused largely by the Vietnam War -  a problem which 
strengthened Congressional pressures demanding unilateral withdrawal of
92 Helga Haftendorn, “The Adaption of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Detente- The 1967 
Harmel Report”, in Wilfried Loth (ed.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project. 
1963-1969. Nomos, 2001," Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” pp. 59*71,' Bozo, “Detente versus 
Alliance”, pp. 350*355.
93 Haftendorn has referred to the May 1966 German proposal on armaments control 
measures including balanced reduction of forces. Haftendorn, “The Adaption of the NATO 
Alliance,” p. 306. Bluth has also stress the German origins of MBFR. Christoph Bluth, 
“Detente and Conventional Arms Control- West German Policy Priorities and the origins of 
MBFR”, German Politics. 8/1 (1999). However, as will be argued below, this study will stress 
the Anglo-American, as well as West German origins of MBFR. In their works, Wenger and 
Keliher have implied the US origins of MBFR. But they have completely missed the British 
factor. Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”, pp. 50*51,' Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual 
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94 The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, London (hereafter TNA). FO 
371/190712, an extract from the record of the conversation between Rusk and Stewart on 9 
June 1966. As regards Anglo-American relations and the Gaullist challenge, see also, James 
Ellison, “Defeating the General- Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 
1966”, Cold War History. 6/1 (2006).
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US troops in Europe.95 If the USSR was ready to reduce its forces in Central 
Europe, mutual reductions of East and West troops were preferable for the 
United States. For this idea to be useful, however, it would have to be the 
Americans and not the French who put it forward. Stewart agreed, 
commenting “we should not pass up any chance of doing so on a reciprocal 
basis.”96 The two Foreign Ministers agreed to examine this topic only 
between the two governments and exclude other NATO partners and West 
Germany in particular. This was when the study leading to the future MBFR 
began.
Although the proposal to study a possible reciprocal withdrawal came 
from the Americans, the British accepted it more enthusiastically. On the 
one hand, ideologically, the British leftist Labour government favoured 
detente policies. During 1966, for example, Stewart took the initiative, albeit 
in vain, to produce a draft “Declaration on Europe,” which contained 
statements on the mutual respect for sovereignty and on the virtues of 
increased East-West economic and cultural exchanges. This enterprise was 
however rejected by the East because the draft recognised neither the GDR 
nor Germany’s eastern borders.97 Yet, for the detente-oriented Wilson 
government, as mentioned above, the disarmament projects were also 
another attractive detente policy. Still more significantly, mutual force 
reductions would be helpful in ameliorating the worsening British balance of 
payments.98 Since the 1950s, the British government, along with the US 
government, had wanted to reduce the cost of maintaining their troops in 
Germany.99 There were two ways to cut down the burden, either to withdraw 
the troops or to demand that the West Germans cover the stationing costs.
95 Ke,liher, The Negotiations on M utual and Balanced Force Reductions, pp. 13*14.
96 TNA. FO 371/190712, an extract from the record of the conversation between Rusk and 
Stewart on 9 June 1966.
97 Hughes, “British policy towards Eastern Europe”, p. 121.
98 On British economic and financial problems in the 1960s, see for example, Sabine Lee, 
Victory in Europe- Britain and Germany Since 1945. Longman, 2001, pp. 102*04.
99 Hubert Zimmerman, “The Sour Fruits of Victory- Sterling and Security in Anglo-German 
Relations during the 1950s and 1960s”, Contemporary European History. 9/2 (2002).
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From political and strategic points of view, weakening the bond with the 
Continent and NATO’s military strength was considered highly undesirable? 
hence, the continuous demand for more money from the FRG government -  
the so-called ‘offset problem’. The idea of reciprocal withdrawal of East-West 
troops was immediately regarded as a way to alleviate the offset problem 
that had been a long-standing and bitter issue between the UK and the FRG, 
because the partial withdrawal of British forces from Germany would 
become more acceptable than it would be were it carried out unilaterally.100 
Indeed, Prime Minister Wilson quickly showed his interest in it.101 The 
combination of detente and the offset problem made a reciprocal withdrawal 
plan very attractive to the British government.
Yet, international financial speculation did not await the result of the 
study on mutual force withdrawals. The sterling crisis, which erupted in 
mid-1966, immediately forced Wilson to announce on 20 July 1966 that 
expenditure on British troops in Germany (the British Army of the Rhine or 
BAOR) “would be cut so that total foreign exchange costs were at a level 
covered by offset and other payments”.102 In the following month, the UK 
government officially informed the Council of Western European Union 
(WEU) that it was ready to withdraw a part of the 59,000 BAOR personnel. 
At the same time, the significance of reciprocal withdrawals became more 
important and clearer for the British.
For the Labour government, although the reasons for British troop 
withdrawals were exclusively economic, it was equally important to 
minimise political damage to relations with the FRG. In order to coax the 
West Germans, the British decided to promote mutual withdrawal 
arrangements as “an initial step towards wider military and political detente
100 TNA. FO 371/190712, Barnes to Arthur, 13.6.1966.
101 TNA. FO 371/190712, Palliser to the Foreign Office, 30.6.1966.
102 Quoted in Hubert Zimmerman, Money and Security- Troops. Monetary Policy, and West 
Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain. 1950-1971. Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, p. 189.
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in Europe.”103 London tried to persuade Bonn, arguing that they intended 
not to neutralise Germany but to contribute to detente by connecting their 
force reductions with those carried out on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
Tactically, however, the British were determined to “keep this card up our 
sleeve, or at least only let the tip of it appear,” in order primarily to 
concentrate on bilateral offset negotiations with the West Germans, in which 
Britain would try to extract as much money from them as possible.104 The 
time to consider showing more of the disarmament card, they thought, would 
be “after we have concluded our negotiations with the Germans and our 
financial position is no longer at risk.”105 However, this card was soon played 
by the Americans.
In the United State, President Johnson also had to consider more 
seriously the idea of reciprocal force withdrawals. On 31 August 1966, 
Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader in the Senate, took a 
concrete initiative, proffering a resolution which called for “a substantial 
reduction of US Forces permanently stationed in Europe.” 106 Facing 
pressure from Congress calling for a unilateral pullback of US forces in 
Europe, the White House favoured force reductions on the both sides.107 Five 
weeks later, on 7 October 1966, the US President made a famous speech on 
bridge-building, proclaiming loudly that “We w&nt the Soviet Union and the 
nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step by 
step with them as far as they are willing to advance.”108 In this speech, 
Johnson mentioned mutual force reductions as one of the steps. In order to 
counter the “Mansfield Resolution,” the US leader made public the idea of an 
eventual mutual-withdrawal bargain with the Soviets.
103 TNA. FO 800/959, Charlfont to the Secreatary of State, 16.8.1966.
104 TNA. FO 800/959, “Troop Reductions in Europe”, 19.8.1966.
103 Ibid.
106 Quoted in Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, p. 14. 
See also, Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 121-2.
107 Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson, FRUS 1964-1968. XIII. Doc. 198, 11.8.1966.
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Johnson’s speech of 7 October 1966 is worthy of further attention, 
because he also referred to the German question. Indeed, the President 
argued' “We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve 
the unification of Germany in the context of a larger, peaceful and 
prosperous Europe.”109 According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, an adviser to the 
US State Department’s Policy Planning Council, this speech “fundamentally 
reversed the post-war priorities of the United States in Europe,” because “[i]t 
said that reconciliation of the two halves of Europe was a necessary 
precondition for the eventual and rather distant reunification of 
Germany.”110 Actually, however, the Johnson administration still refused to 
recognise either East German sovereignty or the Oder-Neisse line, steps 
without which any multilateral European agreement was implausible 
because of Eastern antagonism against the Western non-recognition policy. 
Rather, what Johnson could do was to advance bilateral talks with the Soviet 
Union, much as his predecessor had done. In fact, in the autumn of 1966, the 
superpowers bilaterally thrashed out the broad outlines of a 
non-proliferation treaty.111 Eventually, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was 
signed on 1 July 1968 without West German participation. Again 
Superpower detente was possible because it advanced independently of the 
problems of German reunification and recognition of the GDR.
In the Erhard government, Johnson’s bridge-building speech was 
received as a sign that Washington no longer supported Bonn’s policy on 
unification.112 In fact, not only his policy, but also the Chancellor him self
109 Quoted in Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity,” p. 47. As regards Johnson’s “bridge 
building” poHcy, see also, Frank Costighola, “Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and “the End of 
the Cold War,” in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.) Lvndon B. Johnson 
Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy. 1963-1968. Cambridge University Press, 
1994, pp. 192-99.
110 Quoted in Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”, p. 47.
111 White, Britain. Detente, pp. 116-17. See also, Hal Brands, “Progress Unseen: U.S. Arms 
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was abandoned by the Americans.113 At the end of October 1966, Chancellor 
Erhard, who had lost America’s support for his foreign and financial policies, 
resigned after the Free Democratic Party withdrew from his cabinet.114 
After one month of political turmoil, a new government was born- a “Grand 
Coalition” led by Kurt Kiesinger of the CDU/CSU and Willy Brandt of the 
SPD. The appointment of Brandt, as the new Foreign Minister, became a 
further factor pushing NATO towards mutual force reductions. Indeed, from 
the outset, the SPD leader supported the idea of disarmament on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain. Soon after becoming Foreign Minister, on 14 December 
1966, Brandt raised the issue of step-bystep and mutual balanced force 
reductions at the Assembly of the WEU.115 Then, in the course of reviewing 
the future roles of the Alliance, West Germany together with the United 
Kingdom, led the discussion of NATO towards arms control and 
disarmament detente.
From the future MBFR point of view, the importance of the Harmel 
exercise which started in February 1967 lay in the Atlanticisation of the 
reciprocal withdrawal problem. When Johnson had mentioned the possibility 
of mutual retreat, he had probably imagined a bilateral -  or at most 
trilateral — process of pulling back US (plus possibly UK) and USSR forces 
stationed in Europe. The driving force would be “mutual example,” namely 
an unspoken understanding between the superpowers to withdraw troops 
when the forces of the other side retreated unilaterally. It would need no 
formal agreement,’ therefore it could be carried out without touching the 
German question. Through the “Future role of Alliance” study, however, the 
problem of mutual force reductions would become NATO’s multilateral 
project.
113 Quoted in Lee, Victory in Europe, p. 109.
114 Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson and Europe, pp. 115-331 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, pp. 
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From a very early stage of the Harmel study, British and West German 
governments made clear that they wanted the Alliance to discuss the issue of 
mutual and balanced force reductions. London suggested in a letter of 11 
February 1967 to the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, that the 
Atlantic Alliance should undertake to study “the prospects of maintaining 
the present balance of deterrence in Europe while lowering the level of forces 
maintained opposite each other by the parties to the North Atlantic and 
Warsaw Treaties.”116 On 15 February 1967, the FRG’s delegation to the 
special meeting of NATO Council, State Secretary of Foreign Ministry Karl 
Schutz also proposed to examine “the field of European security with special 
reference to the possibilities of gradual and balanced revision in force levels 
on both sides of the demarcation fine of Central Europe.”117 The Americans 
were reluctant to discuss disarmament problems in the study of the future 
task of the Alliance. The leader of the US delegation to the study, Deputy 
Under Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler, was concerned primarily with 
defence problems and stressed that disarmament must not proceed at the 
expense of Alliance security.118 Indeed, in his preliminary outline for the 
first discussion at the Sub-Group 3 - “General Questions of Defense Policy” - 
meeting on 18 April 1967, there was no mention of arms control and 
disarmament.119 It was the West Germans, however, who submitted a 
counter-amendment. They stressed detente, as well as deterrence, stating 
that “primary importance attaches to a non-proliferation treaty and, for 
instance, to a step-by-step, balanced reduction of forces on both sides of the
116 Letter from United Kingdom Delegation, 11.2.1967, NATO Archives document, 
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Iron Curtain”.120 Washington then reluctantly agreed to examine “What are 
the prospects for and risks of balanced force reductions?”121 Still more 
importantly, NATO Foreign Ministers in principle endorsed the idea of 
balanced force reductions at their biannual meeting in June 1967.122
The concept of mutual force reductions was then gradually transformed 
into a multilateral project. Although the US government did not renounce 
the idea of bilateral withdrawal, it was drawn into a multilateral framework. 
Existing economic and political pressures among some NATO members to 
reduce defence expenditure did not permit merely superpower troop 
reductions. It required studying how to achieve a balanced and lower force 
level of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.123 It was the British, supported by 
the West Germans, which took the lead in pressing for studies on balanced 
East/West reductions after the June 1967 NATO Ministerial meeting.124 
Eventually, the final Harmel Report of December 1967 confirmed the need 
for an active study of this subject. Moreover, from February 1968, the 
Atlantic Alliance launched the follow-up to the Harmel Exercise, in which 
mutual force reductions played a central role.125 Given a less tense 
East/West atmosphere and the pressures for budgetary defence cuts in some 
NATO countries, there was a fear that a chain reaction of unilateral force
120 Proposals by the German Delegation to US Draft, 5.5.1967, NATO Archives document, 
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reductions, which could lead to a collapse of the Alliance, might occur.126 In 
order to avoid this, it was necessary to examine the degree of force levels, the 
principles and the procedure for reductions as a whole. Hence, the reciprocal 
withdrawal idea was multilateralised.
This meant that East Germany would participate in future 
negotiations on mutual force reductions. Indeed, all six “models” of 
hypothetical mutual withdrawal, which were discussed in NATO’s followup 
exercise in early 1968, contained the GDR as a participant.127 If the West 
wanted to agree on balanced reductions of forces between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in the Central Europe, East German involvement would be 
unavoidable. No doubt, the GDR and its Warsaw Pact allies would have 
insisted on equal status of both Germanies as members of international 
society as a condition of reciprocal force reductions. If so, why did NATO 
publicly proposed mutual and balanced force reductions in the Reykjavik 
Signal of June 1968?
Interestingly, it was the Americans who first and enthusiastically 
asked their allies to adopt the Signal.128 Despite their early reluctance about 
multilateral troop cuts, on 25 May 1968 Washington proposed to its NATO 
partners that the Alliance issue a declaration for mutual force reductions.129 
This sudden US offer was surprising. Indeed, it was not a natural outcome of 
the Harmel Report. During March and April 1968, NATO had actually 
examined an “arms freeze in Europe” plan suggested by the Belgians as 
something to discuss at the next Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik.130 More
126 AAPD 1967. Dok. 313, Botschafter Knappstein, Washington, an M inisterialdirektor 
Ruete, 30.8.1967.
127 Muller, Politik und Biirokratie. p. 58.
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importantly, a study being undertaken in NATO on mutual and balanced 
force reductions was still at a very early stage.131 In practice, therefore, the 
West was not yet ready to make proposals on reciprocal troop cuts.132
The reason for the American proposal was, again, domestic pressure. 
From the spring of 1968, Senator Symington led the Senate to push for an 
amendment calling for a cut in U.S. troops in Europe to only 50,000. (At that 
time, there were more than 300,000 men stationed in Europe.)133 In order to 
contain Congressional demand for unilateral cuts, Johnson and Rusk sought 
NATO’s help to approve a mutual troop reduction appeal. They did so, 
however, in the expectation that NATO’s initiative would be rejected by the 
Eastern Bloc. Although, in their Bucharest Declaration of 1966, the Warsaw 
Pact countries had referred to the withdrawal of all foreign troops and 
reductions in forces in both Germanies, the Soviet Union seemed to have lost 
interest in disarmament from 1967. Reportedly, this was partly because the 
USSR government was under considerable pressure internally and from the 
North Vietnamese not to take any action which would make it easier for the 
US to withdraw troops from Europe for use in Vietnam.134 Such actions 
could also entail criticism from Communist China. In addition, events in 
Czechoslovakia, which will be described below, gave the Soviets good reasons 
to keep their troops in Central Europe. In fact, after Rusk had officially 
proposed that parallel troop reductions be made to Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin in January 1968, there was no reply from Moscow.135 The US State 
Secretary could, therefore, persuade his counterparts that; “[Rusk] doubted 
that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact colleagues would be particularly
Policy Overseas (hereafter DBPO). Series III, Volume I, p. 44, fn. 9.
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54
interested in holding discussions at this time. ... However, NATO agreement 
that any troop reductions should be mutual will help the US hold the line 
against demands for a unilateral force reduction.”136 This implied that, with 
a declaration, NATO could show an openness towards arms control and 
disarmament detente that might also serve to counter US domestic 
pressures without touching the German question at least for a time, because 
the Warsaw Pact supposedly could not give a positive response to the 
declaration and hence could not use the opportunity to ask for the 
recognition of the GDR.
All NATO governments except France supported the US proposal. 
Although Paris had accepted the Harmel Report, it had done so reluctantly. 
The General, who criticised the Atlantic Alliance, did not want to strengthen 
NATO’s consultation role. Nonetheless, when confronted with their partners’ 
strong desire to conclude the Harmel study at the Ministerial meeting in 
December 1967, France, which had already retreated from the Alliance’s 
military integrated command, could not reject NATO completely; therefore it 
reluctantly joined the final Report.137 The French government thus became 
less cooperative in the followup Harmel exercise. In particular, Paris 
dissociated itself from the discussions on reciprocal force reductions. For the 
French, the idea of multilateralised mutual troop reductions meant 
negotiations between two military alliances. Such bloc-to-bloc dialogues were 
totally contrary to de Gaulle’s detente aim- namely the dissolution of blocs 
through bilateral communication.138 Subsequently, through the 1970s, the 
French government continued to refuse to contemplate MBFR.
On 25 June 1968, the Fourteen NATO Foreign Ministers approved the 
Reykjavik Signal without France.139 For Washington, the French absence
136 Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS 1964-1968. XIII. Doc. 309, 6.6.1968. See also, TNA. 
FCO 41/180, Washington tel no. 1826 to FCO 11.6.1968.
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did not matter,* to refute critics in Congress was much more significant than 
winning French acceptance.140 Admitting that “the other part of Germany 
would have to be involved at some stage,” Brandt also accepted the 
Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.141 As argued above, 
however, NATO’s multilateral European detente proposal was mainly 
produced for US domestic purposes and not in the expectation of a reply from 
the Warsaw Pact.142 In this sense, the Reykjavik Signal was not a counter 
detente proposal in response to the East’s calling for a European security 
conference (ESC). Nonetheless, within a year, MBFR would become a 
counter proposal, and the relationship between an ESC and MBFR was to 
become one of the central issues in the European detente of the 1970s.
Despite appearances, the Harmel Report was not the genesis of detente 
in Europe. Firstly, as mentioned above, the Reykjavik Signal was aimed at 
the US Congress, not at the Warsaw Pact. Secondly and still more 
significantly, the Report did not contribute to the resolution of the German 
question, the structural problem blocking European reconciliation. Rather, 
the process of the Harmel study was a good opportunity for the West 
Germans to highlight their vital interests, convincing their allies of the 
importance of the German question for European security.143 In the course of 
discussions in the Harmel study sub-group 1 which was considering 
“East-West relations,” the German government repeated its traditional 
positions* the German nation’s right to self-determination, the responsibility 
of the Four Powers, and the non-recognition of the GDR.144 Despite the 
Grand Coalition leaders’ new steps, such as the normalisation of West 
German-Rumanian relations in January 1967, Bonn did not change its 
stance in the Harmel exercise. Smaller countries like Canada, the
140 Memorandum for the Record, FRUS 1964-1968. XIII. Doc. 313, 19.6.19681 TNA. FCO 
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144 Haftendorn, “The Adaption of the NATO Alliance”, p. 299.
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Netherlands, and Belgium criticised the FRG’s attitude in vain. London, 
which had responsibility together with Bonn for the Sub-Group 1, also 
opposed the Germans, but they were not able to achieve a breakthrough. In 
the absence of agreement, the report on the German question was in the end 
issued merely as a personal statement by the two chairmen of the Sub-Group 
l . 145 The Harmel study process demonstrated the isolation of what was 
perceived to be stubborn West Germany among its NATO partners. 
Nonetheless, the Harmel Report could offer little new on the German 
problem given that it was meant to be an exercise in Alliance solidarity and 
needed unanimous support. Although the Harmel Report highlighted 
detente, along with defence, it achieved little in paving the way towards 
multilateral European detente.146 As will be argued in chapter 3, this last 
would be possible only after the success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik involving the 
de facto recognition of the existence of the GDR.
Student Protests and the Origins of the Brezhnev Doctrine
In 1968, further challenges hit the two blocs, which would have considerable 
influence on multilateral European detente. In the West, student revolts 
spread from city to city in the first half of the year. In the East, 
Czechoslovakia’s movement to reform socialism was blocked by the Warsaw 
Pact’s military intervention. In order to understand the development of 
discussions on a European security conference analysed in the following 
chapters, the 1968 crises in both Eastern and Western camps will be briefly 
described in this section.
145 Ibid., pp. 300-021 Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity”, pp. 63-64.
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On 5 January 1968, due to a continued inability to deal with a 
long-standing economic crisis, unpopular Czechoslovakia leader Antonin 
Novotny was finally forced to resign. The reformist Slovak party leader, 
Alexander Dubcek took over the post of the first secretary of the 
Czechoslovakia Communist Party. He was a sincere communist, but he 
attempted to construct ‘Socialism with a human face.’ Soon the new leader 
suggested policies of economic as well as political reform, expanding freedom, 
such as encouraging public discussion, ending official press censorship, and 
limiting the powers of the secret police. He also attempted to strengthen 
links with West European countries, at the same time as he gradually 
removed Moscow’s representatives in his country.147
Dubcek’s reforms were strongly criticised not only by the Soviets but 
also more harshly by the East European partners. In particular, Polish 
leader Gomulka, who was irritated by the student protests of March 1968 in 
Warsaw, gave vent to his hostility, stating that “Hence it is appropriate to 
consider, within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty, the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces.”148 Fearing the possibility of a spillover into 
their countries, at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact summit in Dresden on 23 
March 1968, Gomulka and East German leader Walter Ulbricht condemned 
the events in Czechoslovakia as “counterrevolution.”149
Despite the increasing pressure from its Communist partners, on 5 
April 1968, the Czechoslovakia Communist Party adopted and published a 
very liberal “Action Programme,” a document mapping out comprehensive 
reform policies. The reform programme declared that it did not “wish to 
assert its leading role by bringing pressure to bear on society, but by serving
147 Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctorine,” in Carole Fink et 
al., (eds.), 1968- The World Transformed. New York- Cambridge University Press, 1998, 
pp.121-22)' Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet 
Foreign Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 18.
148 Quoted in Vojtech Mastny, “Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?”
Diplomatic History. 29/1 (2005), p. 156.
149 Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis,” p. 128.' Mark Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the 
Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretation,” Cold War International History 
Project Bulletin. Issue 3, 1993, p. 5.
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it devotedly with an eye to its free, progressive, socialist development.”150 In 
Czechoslovak newspapers and journals, lively discussions of political and 
social issues had begun. Unofficial political “clubs” sprang up all around the 
county, advocating the creation of non-communist parties.151 Spring was 
coming in Prague.
Carefully observing the Czechoslovakian situation, NATO countries 
adopted a cautious attitude. Although Dubcek’s reformist trend was 
undoubtedly welcomed, they were also deeply concerned about a Soviet 
reaction partly because they were afraid that the tragedy of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution would be repeated.152 It was thought that the West’s 
approach to Czechoslovakia might provoke a Soviet invasion. Caution was 
also necessary, because the West still wanted to improve its relations with 
the Eastern Bloc as a whole. Indeed, some NATO members genuinely 
expected reciprocal force reductions in the future, and probably more 
imperative, the day of concluding a Non-Proliferation Treaty seemed to be 
approaching. Not to irritate Moscow at a crucial stage was important for 
advancing arms control detente. Therefore, NATO adopted a wait-and-see 
approach towards the Prague Spring.153
At the same time, West European countries suffered their own 
domestic protests. Slower growth, industrial unrest, and political alienation 
were common problems across Western Europe at that time.154 More 
tangibly, the bloody Vietnam War provoked growing resentment all over the 
world, in particular among university students, the population of which had 
risen dramatically after the Second World War.155 Students then became 
leading protesters against governments’ social, economic, political and cold
150 Quated in J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War- The Great Powers and their Allies. London: 
Longman, 1994, p. 446.
151 Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis”, p. 122.
152 John G. McGinn, “The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s Response to the Prague 
Spring”, Journal of Cold War Studies. 1/3 (1999), pp. 121-2.
153 Ibid., pp. 122-23.
154 David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945. London: W.W. Norton, 
2001, p. 191.
155 Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 88-93.
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war policies. Some of the earliest mass student revolts in Western Europe 
erupted in Italy the winter of 1967-1968 at universities from Trento to Rome; 
by February 1968, these had spread to London and West Berlin, in which 
large-scale anti-Vietnam war demonstrations broke out.156 In April 1968, 
“the biggest and most violent protests in post war German history” exploded 
against the Federal Republic government’s “emergency laws”.157
The most striking of student protests was the French upheavals of May 
1968. First ignited at the new University of Nanterre, the dissident flame 
leaped to the centre of Paris, at the Sorbonne, where students clashed with 
police, and built barricades. The student protests proliferated in many other 
cities in France. Furthermore, industrial workers joined students, escalating 
the protest into a general strike on 22 May 1968. France was so paralyzed 
that de Gaulle escaped from Paris to Baden-Baden, Germany. By late June 
1968, the situation was returning to normal owing to huge concessions made 
by Georges Pompidou’s government.158 However, this series of student 
revolts had had a deep impact on Ministers. At the Reykjavik NATO 
Ministerial meeting of June 1968, for example, British Foreign Minister 
Michael Stewart’s speech included the following passage;
[...] we have not only a defence and deterren t function bu t a  function of 
promoting detente. But we have not only to do tha t; we have got to make it 
quite clear to the younger generation th a t th a t is w hat we are doing, because in 
fact to the critic, who looks a t the world and who says th a t it  is outrageous th a t 
m ankind should be thus divided and is inclined to blam e his own country for it, 
if  he is a citizen of a  NATO country, there is a good and valid answ er we can 
make to him. [...] ,[W]e shall, [...1, be increasingly in  a position to show him 
w hat we are now doing in a genuine search for detente; bu t it  will be necessary
156 Reynolds, One World Divisible, p. 190; Suri, Power and Protest, p. 180.
157 Reynolds, One World Divisible, p. 191; Suri, Power and Protest, p. 181.
158 On the events of May 1968 in France, Reynolds, One World Divisible, pp. 191-93; Suri, 
Power and Protest, pp. 186*94; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “May 1968 in France: The Rise and 
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to make this clear to the younger generation.159
At a later stage, with his conviction that NATO should be more forthcoming 
in order to attract support from the younger generation, the UK Secretary of 
State would try to lead the Atlantic Alliance to commit to the idea of 
multilateral East-West contacts.
At just about the same time, grass roots activity became more visible in 
Czechoslovakia. On 27 June 1968, the “Manifesto of 2,000 words” written by 
a famous writer and supported by many prominent intellectuals, was 
published in major newspapers. It boldly condemned the Communist Party 
and pleaded for citizens to advance reforms and democratisation. The 
reactions from ordinary Czech people were also clear. Letters supporting the 
Manifesto almost immediately arrived at media offices throughout the 
country.160 Power from below began to shake the Eastern Bloc.
The Two Thousand Words Manifesto markedly alarmed the Warsaw 
Pact leaders. For instance, Hungarian Communist leader Janos Kadar, who 
had been relatively moderate before June 1968, joined hard-liners, pledging 
to Brezhnev that, if necessary, Hungary would participate in a military 
occupation of Czechoslovakia.161 The Warsaw summit of 14-15 July 1968, 
then adopted the open “Warsaw Letter,” to the Czechs, stating that “We 
cannot, [...], agree that hostile forces push your country off the path of 
Socialism and cause the separation of Czechoslovakia from the Socialist 
Community of Nations. These are not any longer your concerns only. These 
are the common concerns of all Communist and Workers’ Parties and of all 
the nations joined in alliance, co-operation, and friendship.”162 This was an 
ultimatum, implying a threat to intervene in Czechoslovakia. From the end
159 TNA. FCO 41/182, Text of Secretary of State’s Statement in the General Debate on 23 
June. See also, AAPD 1968. Dok. 204, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Reykjavik, an das 
Auswartige Amt, 25.6.1968.
160 Suri, Power and Protest, pp. 200-03.
161 Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis”, p. 146.
162 Quoted in Wilfried Loth, “Moscow, Prague and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev 
Doctrine,” Cold War History. 1/2 (2001), p. 103.
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of July to mid August 1968, there were several vain talks between the 
Soviets and the Czechs. On 13 August 1968, an exhausted Dubcek told 
Brezhnev of his readiness to resign because he thought he could no longer 
stop the dynamism of reform, which implied for the Soviet leader that 
Czechoslovakia was spiralling out of the Communist Party leader’s 
control.163 On 17 August 1968, the Soviet Politburo decided to start the 
military operation ‘Danube’; three days later, Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces 
(except Rumania) crossed the Czech borders and occupied the country.164
The West’s response towards the Warsaw Pact’s military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia was mixed. The ingredients included surprise because 
NATO governments had not expected that military action would be taken, 
followed by strong anger at the brutality of the repression.165 In particular, 
the East’s justification for the intervention provoked further antipathy. The 
Brezhnev Doctrine, as it was dubbed in the West, claimed that “sovereignty 
and the right to self-determination of the Socialist countries were 
subordinated to the interests of the Socialist world system.”166 On the other 
hand, the NATO governments’ actual reactions were restrained. While they 
stopped ministerial level contact with the invading Eastern Bloc 
governments as a gesture of protest, the Western governments did not take 
harsh retaliatory moves such as economic sanctions. The US, Britain, and 
other NATO countries kept their reactions muted and before long returned to 
a “business as usual” approach towards the Warsaw Pact governments.167 
Probably, it was partly because they had thought from the start that if the 
Soviet Union had intervened in Czechoslovakia, the Western powers could 
have done nothing.168 It might also have been because many thought, 
though unvoiced, that pursuing detente rather than taking a confrontational
163 Ouimet, The Rise and Fall, pp. 31-32.
164 Ibid., pp. 34-35J Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis”, pp. 154-56.
165 Hughes, “British policy towards Eastern Europe”, pp. 124-26.
166 Quoted in Loth, “Moscow, Prague and Warsaw”, p. 104.
167 Hughes, “British policy towards Eastern Europe”, p. 131; Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson and 
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approach was still a practical way to stabilise not only East-West relations, 
but also the Western Bloc as well as the domestic integrity of each NATO 
country. In fact, despite the agreement by the Foreign Ministers of the 
Atlantic Alliance that detente should became “a long-term goal of NATO 
policy,”169 as will be argued in the following chapters, momentum for 
East/West rapprochement eventually leading up to multilateral European 
detente was to come sooner than had been expected.
169 Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, FRUS 1964-1968. 
XIII. Doc. 337, 16.11.1968.
Chapter 2- NATO’s Commitment to a European Security
Conference. January 1969 - May 1970
In 1969, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation celebrated its 20th 
anniversary. The year 1969 also saw important administrative changes in 
the Western Bloc, particularly in the United States, France and West 
Germany. A new US government was inaugurated in January 1969 with 
President Richard Nixon’s famous speech proclaiming the beginning of the 
“era of negotiation.” For Europe, 1969 was also the starting point of 
multilateral European detente. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact’s Budapest Appeal 
of March 1969 was the first step of the road leading to the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.1 One part of this chapter will analyse 
the Western reactions to the Eastern initiative. Then, after discussing the 
new French and FRG governments’ policy towards a European security 
conference, this chapter will illustrate how one of the most significant 
Western proposals — namely the call for “freer movement of people, ideas, 
and information” -  appeared in NATO’s Declaration on East-West relations. 
And finally, focusing on the British role and the importance of public opinion, 
the third part of this chapter will highlight the diplomacy among NATO 
countries, which culminated in their commitment to multilateral East/West 
contacts at the Rome NATO Ministerial meetings in May 1970. The period 
between March 1969 and May 1970 were therefore characterised by the first 
significant transformation of European detente with the proposal of “freer 
movement” designed to change the status quo, and by the first public 
statement by the Atlantic Alliance expressing a willingness to get involved 
with a multilateral project. The ground rules for East-West dialogue which 
had applied throughout the 1960s were hence significantly and rapidly
1 During 1969/70, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was 
generally referred to as the European security conference.
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re‘written in a twelve month period at the very end of the decade.
Western Reaction to the Budapest Appeal
The first half of 1969 saw three important steps towards the establishment 
of multilateral European detente. Firstly, the Warsaw Pact issued the 
so-called Budapest Appeal, which was one of the most direct origins of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Secondly, while 
suspicious of the Eastern initiative, NATO indirectly responded to it by 
embarking on the drafting of their own ‘list of concrete issues’ for East/West 
negotiations. And finally, Finland, a neutral country, emerged as a likely 
mediator between the two antagonistic alliances.
It was on 17 March 1969 that the concept of a European security 
conference re-emerged. About six months after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact members held a meeting of their Political 
Consultative Committee in Budapest and issued an appeal “to All European 
Countries”.2 In this Appeal, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
countries again proposed the convening of a European conference on security. 
As had been the case in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, they laid down 
the following points as necessary in order to safeguard European security- 
the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe including the Oder-Neisse 
line and the frontiers between the German Democratic Republic and the 
German Federal Republic, the recognition of East Germany, and a special 
status for West Berlin other than as a part of West Germany. Also, the 
Budapest Appeal did not refer to the offer made by NATO Ministers in 
Reykjavik in June 1968 to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact countries on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.
2 The text of the Budapest Appeal (extracts)- Michael Palmer, The prospects for a European 
Security Conference. London- Chatham House, PEP, 1971, pp.85-7.
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Moscow’s main motivation was still to consolidate the status quo in Europe.3 
Indeed, after the Sino-Soviet border skirmish in early March 1969, it had 
probably become even more important for Moscow to stabilise its Western 
front.4 Still, for the Soviets, recognition of the status quo meant recognition 
of the existence of East Germany. Thus, the GDR’s participation in an 
international conference was an important aim for the USSR, because this 
would indicate that the West accepted East Germany as a member of the 
international society. There was hence nothing new in the substance of the 
Budapest Appeal. However, the tone of the Appeal was less aggressive than 
the 1966 Bucharest Declaration. For example, it cautiously avoided 
propaganda criticism of the West Germany. It also no longer demanded the 
dismantlement of the two military alliances as a pre-condition for talks. 
While the Appeal did not mention the USA, the Soviets privately indicated 
their acceptance of American participation in such a conference. 5 
Nonetheless, the reactions of Western countries to the Budapest Appeal were 
divided, but understandably the majority was cautious or sceptical.
Many Ministers expressed their suspicions when they discussed the 
Budapest Appeal at the NATO Council of Minister meetings in Washington 
on 10-11 April 1969, which was also the 20th anniversary of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. For example, Michael Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, 
remarked that the Budapest declaration might be partly designed to 
undermine Western unity. He stressed, rather, the significance of the 
Alliance’s military build-up, which, he believed, was a sine qua non for
3 William Bundy, A Tangled Web- The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. 
New York- Hill and Wang, 1998, p. 247.
4 Sarotte stressed in her recent work that Soviet detente policy was strongly affected by the 
armed clash with China. M. E. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil- East Germany. Detente, and 
Ostpolitik. 1969-1973 (The New Cold War History), University of North Carolina Press, 
2001, esp. pp. 4, 21-3, 178.
5 The Digital National Security Archives (hereafter, DNSA), http7/nsarchive.chadwvck.com/. 
The Kissinger Transcripts-A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977, Memorandum 
of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, April 3, 1969, KT00014I Henry Kissinger,
White House Years. Little Brown, 1979, p. 414.
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improving East-West relations.6 The UK Foreign Office had argued that “the 
statement [namely, the Appeal] gives no ground for supposing that there is 
sufficient readiness on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries to move from 
unacceptable positions in regard to a conference or for a preliminary 
meeting ’^. Furthermore, the British criticized the Appeal for failing to make 
concrete proposals for a conference.7 Michel Debre, the French Foreign 
Minister, also saw the chances of success for a European Security Conference 
as low, and felt that at present no conference at all would be preferable to 
certain failure.8 The US State Secretary William Rogers did not hide his 
doubts either, stating that “[NATO] members might test Soviet intentions by 
seeing if the Russians were prepared to drop the idea of a single conference 
and were ready instead to accept the need for an evolutionary process.”9 The 
Belgian, Dutch, West German and other representatives were equally 
cautious about the initiative of the East.10
On the other hand, a few governments indicated their interest in the 
Warsaw Pact offer. Italian Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni, who was the 
leader of the Italian Socialist Party, welcomed the Eastern initiative. In his 
speech, the Italian suggested that a NATO proposal for a conference on 
pan-European security would be the best response to the Budapest 
Declaration. The Norwegian Foreign Minister also indicated his willingness 
to participate in such a security conference. Yet, their voices were too isolated 
to have an immediate effect.
NATO’s caution about a European security conference was therefore 
reflected in their agreements on this matter. At the NATO Council meeting, 
Ministers confirmed four basic principles on the issue* a conference should 
not be conditional, it should be well prepared, it should have a reasonable
6 TNA. FCO 41/411, Washington tel no.54 to FCO, 11.4.1969; AAPD 1969. Dok.121, 
Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswartige Amt, 11.4.1969.
7 TNA. FCO 41/538, tel no. 117, Stewart to UKDEL NATO, 18.3.1969.
8 Ibid. FCO 41/411, Washington tel no.54 to FCO, 11.4.1969.
s Ibid.
10 TNA. FCO 41/411, tel no.54 A Saving, Washington to FCO, 11.4.1969; AAPD 1969. 
Dok.121, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswartige Amt, 11.4.1969.
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prospect of resolving the major problems of European security, including the 
German question, and the United States and Canada should participate 
from the outset in the conference and all preparatory meetings.11 These 
principles would still be useful in opposing the Warsaw Pact initiative should 
they decide to turn it down, because the words ‘well prepared’ and 
‘reasonable prospect’ were so subjective. Moreover, NATO governments 
agreed, under strong American insistence in particular, not to include the 
words “the Budapest Appeal” in their final communique, implying that the 
West did not accept the Appeal. The communique therefore made no mention 
of any European security conference.12
Nevertheless, the West could not completely ignore the East’s initiative, 
as they had done before. There were two reasons for this. In the first place, 
the less offensive tone of the Budapest Appeal made it difficult to reject it out 
of hand, because the West feared that to do so would be to present the East 
with an easy propaganda victory. As argued in the previous chapter, this 
concern had increased with the 1968 student uprisings. Stewart told Rogers 
that “[i]t was difficult to justify to the younger generation the continued need 
for the Alliance if we appeared merely to say ‘no’ in response to a specific 
proposal.”13 Secondly, it was important for the NATO states to maintain 
their solidarity. Therefore, they had to take into consideration the fact that 
some governments wanted detente. The British and French Foreign 
Ministers thus suggested that NATO should not adopt a negative attitude 
towards the Budapest Appeal but instead seek to distinguish Soviet 
propaganda from the USSR’s genuine desire for negotiations.14 The FRG
11 TNA. FCO 41/411, tel no.54, Washington to FCO, 11.4.1969.
12 httpy/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c690410a.htm. Later, Italian Foreign Minister 
Nenni expressed some dissatisfaction with the NATO communique and in particular the 
absence of any specific mention of the Budapest appeal. TNA. FCO 41/411, Record of 
Conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the 
Italian Foreign M inister a t the Italian Embassy in Washington on Saturday, 12 April a t 10 
a.m.
13 Ibid. Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and the US Secretary of State, 12 April.
14 AAPD 1969. Dok.121, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswartige
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Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, who had been impressed by the Appeal’s less 
polemic tone,15 proposed that NATO should declare its readiness to work 
towards a conference on European security.16 Then Stewart suggested a 
study to see which issues could best be dealt through a conference.17 Fearing 
isolation in the Alliance, the US government followed the Europeans.18 As a 
consequence, in their final communique, the Ministers agreed to make a list 
of issues which “best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early 
resolution” for the purpose of illustrating NATO’s willingness to move 
towards detente.19 Thus, the drafting of the List became NATO’s small but 
first declared step towards a European security conference.
The Finnish M emorandum
After the exchange of the Budapest Appeal and NATO’s communique, the 
next important step towards a security conference in Europe was taken by a 
neutral country. On 5 May 1969, the Finnish Government sent a 
memorandum to all European states, the United States and Canada. In this 
memorandum, the Finns stated their willingness to act as hosts of a 
European security conference and any preparatory talks.20 Although an 
analysis of neutral and non-allied countries is beyond the scope of this study, 
their commitment to Cold War dialogue was a new and significant factor in
Amt, 11.4.1960.
15 AAPD 1969. Dok. 120, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswartige 
Amt, 11.4.1960.
16 TNA. FCO 41/411, tel no.54, Washington to FCO, 11.4.1969; Peter Becker, Die friihe 
KSZE-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland- Der Aufienpolitische Entscheidungs porzefi 
bis zur Unterzeichnung der Schlufiakte von Helsinki. Lit, 1992, pp. 133-34.
17 Brian White, Britain, detente and changing East-West relations. London- Routledge, 1992, 
p. 123.
18 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 414-15.
19 http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c690410a.htm
20 The text of the Aide-memoirs of the Finnish Government- Michael Palmer, The prospects. 
pp. 88-9; TNA. FCO 41/540, FCO tel no. 151 to UKDEL NATO, 5.5.1969.
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the 1970s European detente.21
Within the Atlantic Alliance, however, there was some suspicion that 
the Finnish offer might be a plot by Moscow. In fact, the Italian government 
received information from the Finnish Ambassador that the initiative was 
indeed taken in response to specific Soviet requests.22 Therefore, in spite of 
Nenni’s appreciation of the Budapest Appeal, the Italians were sceptical 
about the Finns’ initiative. Moreover, Austria, another neutral country, 
reportedly, had also been urged by the Soviets to take a similar step, but had 
refused.23 The Finns were initially reluctant to respond to the Soviet 
requests because of a lack of accommodation for such an international 
conference. After the Austrians refused, the Russians turned to Helsinki 
again.24 Later, on 7 June 1969, the Finnish President admitted to the 
British Ambassador that the Soviet Union would certainly keep up the 
pressure for a conference. He emphasized, however, that the Finnish 
government’s initiative was entirely its own.25
Italy’s suspicion was shared by many NATO countries. The British also 
suspected that the Finns’ proposal was launched at Soviet prompting. It was 
important for them, however, to avoid giving the impression that they were 
not prepared to hold such a conference in the future, as they believed that 
this would benefit Soviet propaganda. The British stance was, therefore, 
“simply to take note politely of the Finnish offer and say we shall bear it in 
mind”. Be that as it may, the British thought that the Finnish initiative 
would have no important effect.26 The Netherlands and Belgium agreed with 
Britain. More radically, the United States, supported by Italy and Turkey,
21 As regards the roles of neutral and non-allied countries, Thomas Fischer, “The Birth of 
the N+NA- Austrian and Swiss Foreign Policy in the CSCE,” a paper submitted for the 
Conference “At the Roots of the European Security System: Thirty Years Since the Helsinki 
Final Act” (Zurich, 8-10 September 2005).
22 TNA. FCO 41/540, Golds to Waterfield, 17.5.1969.
23 TNA. FCO 41/541, Paris to Brimelow, 28.5.1969.
24 TNA. FCO 41/541, ‘The Finnish Ambassador’s Call Tuesday. 3 June 4.30 p.m.’ 3.6.1969.
25 TNA. FOC 41/542, Helsinki tel no. 166 to FCO, 7.6.1969.
23 TNA. FCO 41/540, FCO tel no. 156 to UKDEL NATO, 7.5. 1969.
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strongly opposed any reply to the Finnish initiative.27
Reactions to the Finnish offer were divided. The West German 
government viewed the Finnish move favourably because the contents of the 
memorandum were generally similar to the West German view- the necessity 
of careful preparation for a security conference, and US and Canadian 
participation from the outset were both acknowledged.28 Norway, Denmark 
and Canada also perceived the British line as too negative.29 The French 
government saw an advantage in the interest of neutral countries in a 
European security conference, since possible participants in a conference 
should not be confined only to members of the two blocs.30 As a result, NATO 
decided not to respond to the Finnish memorandum, and individual 
governments, if they wanted, would reply to the Finns bilaterally and orally 
in fine with the Washington communique of April 1969.31 The influence of 
neutral countries was still limited at this very early stage.
Nonetheless, the Finnish approach was important in three ways. First 
of all, it offered the venue for a future security conference, though some 
Western countries would hesitate to accept Helsinki as a location for the 
conference. Secondly, it paved the way for the participation of neutral 
countries in such a conference. Finally, and more significantly, it appealed 
not only to European governments, but also to European public and 
Parliamentary opinion. In fact, public pressure would prove to be one of the 
most influential factors urging the West towards a European security 
conference.
27 Ibid.
28 AAPD 1969. Dok. 155, Ministerialdirektor Ruete an die Standige Vertretung bei der 
NATO in Brussel, 12.5.1969.
29 TNA. FCO 41/540, UKDEL NATO tel no.287 to FCO, 15.5.1969.
89 Ibid.
31 TNA. FCO 41/541, Davidson to Waterfield, 27.5.1969.
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List of Concrete Issues
In parallel with discussions on the Finnish memorandum, NATO began to 
produce a list of concrete issues in accordance with the mandate of the 
Washington NATO communique issued on 11 April 1969. This process was 
important because it kept the Atlantic Alliance committed to the preparation 
of multilateral European detente in some way or other, although not yet to a 
European security conference. It is true that with hindsight it becomes clear 
that, despite all the efforts of diplomats to. create a list of issues for 
East-West dialogue, they accomplished little that was to influence the final 
results of the CSCE. Therefore, there is no need to scrutinise the list-making 
process in great detail. However, it is worth looking at a few samples of 
national contributions to the list, since they reflected the detente policies of 
each country at this stage.32
De Gaulle’s France was still hostile to a multilateral European security 
conference, and in late April 1969, the French Ambassador in Moscow, Roger 
Seydoux, clearly informed the Russians of France’s firm objections to the 
whole idea. Mentioning the difficulties of the German question, he intimated 
the necessity of creating an atmosphere of detente on a bilateral basis. In a 
critical allusion to the Brezhnev doctrine, he also remarked that, in his 
Government’s view, detente implied that all countries in Europe should be
32 The list-making process was divided into two stages. The first, finishing in July 1969, was 
to create a comprehensive catalogue of issues. The second was to assign an order of priority 
to each item in the list of issues. The first stage began in mid-April 1969. About two weeks 
after the Spring NATO Council meeting, the NATO Secretary General suggested tha t the 
Senior Political Committee of NATO be instructed to draw up a list of issues. On 28 April 
1969, the opening Senior Political Committee meeting was held, where representatives 
agreed to put together a catalogue of issues for East/West negotiations. As regards procedure, 
they agreed that, in listing the issues, the Committee should use the following sections- (I) 
Political measures contributing to a reduction of tension, (II) Arms control and disarmament 
measures, (III) Cultural, economic and commercial issues, and (IV) Germany and Berlin. 
Some NATO states contributed their own ideas about issues for East/West negotiations. By 
the second meeting of the Senior Political Committee on 12 May 1969, the US, Britain, West 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands had submitted their own lists of issues. France also 
later tabled their list on 23 May 1969.
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free to choose their own foreign policy.33 A French paper on their list of 
issues tabled on 23 May 1969, reflected their preferences.34 At the top of the 
list, France placed a section concerning economic, cultural, scientific and 
technological affairs. In particular, the main French interest was in cultural 
co-operation between East and West.35 The French list stressed, however, 
that general economic and political problems between East and West should 
be tackled bilaterally. The French disliked any form of two-bloc dialogue. 
Moreover, the French listed ‘Codes of Good Conduct’ as an item on their fist, 
suggesting that it should include for instance, the respect of the principle of 
sovereignty, equality of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, etc. 
Clearly, this was a counter-proposal to the Brezhnev doctrine, which 
advocated limitation of sovereignty.
The West German contribution was also characterised by the 
significance it attached to the German question. In their paper, the Germans 
emphasised the importance of gradual steps when approaching the Eastern 
bloc.36 In the first category of “small steps”, the Federal Government 
included bila teral negotiations on the renunciation of force initiatives, which 
they were preparing in early 1969 and would officially propose to the Soviet 
Union on 3 July 1969.37 It was dangerous for them, therefore, if the item on 
the renunciation of the use of force was treated in the same way as other 
items. Bonn feared that, in the course of the list-making, NATO might 
undercut their bilateral initiatives with Moscow.38 Another significant 
element in the German paper was the insistence that a solution to the 
German and Berlin problem should be regarded as the final step. The list 
stated that such a solution could not be envisaged until other issues such as 
the renunciation of the use of force or mutual and balanced force reductions
33 TNA. FCO 41/539, Wilson to Giffard, 29.4.1969.
34 TNA. FCO 41/552, Delegation de la France au Conseil de L’Atlantique Nord, 23.5.1969.
35 TNA. FCO 41/554, Wilcock to Braithwaite, 14.8.1969.
36 TNA. FCO 41/552, Pemberton-Pigott to Waterfield, 13.5.1969.
37 AAPD 1969. Dok. 146, Aufzeinung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 6.5.1969; Ibid.. Dok. 
164, Bundesminister Brandt an Bundeskanzler Kiesinger, 20.5.1969.
38 AAPD 1969. Dok. 146, Aufzeinung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 6.5.1969.
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were settled with the East, and after a good atmosphere had been created.39 
Bonn’s position was also “ultra-cautious”.40 Indeed, Wilhelm Grewe, the 
FRG’s Ambassador to NATO, was sceptical about the convening of a 
European security conference.41 Foreign Minister Brandt’s position was 
much more moderate; he stated in a Western European Union (WEU) 
gathering in June 1969 that “the [Budapest] declaration was one of the most 
notable recent events in East/West relations and that, since it was issued, 
Moscow had moderated its polemics against the West”. However, Brandt was 
opposed to the holding of any early conference prior to the conclusion of a 
modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany. It was this that 
constituted the most significant ‘preparation’ for a conference, from the West 
German point of view.42 Even if a European security conference was 
desirable for European detente, the problem of East German participation 
would need to be solved bilaterally in advance.
The British list showed their general interests in ‘Arms control and
disarmament measures’, in particular in ‘Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions’ and some confidence-building measures.43 However, Britain’s 
importance was not reflected in the contents of its list, but in its performance 
in the NATO Senior Political Committee. Britain was the most active state 
working for the list-making process within NATO, although it was not in 
favour of paving the way to a European security conference. The British 
government did not intend to take any positive initiative with the Russians. 
They thought, however, that the West and Britain itself should not give a 
negative impression in response to the Budapest Declaration. There were 
advantages for them, therefore, in using NATO as a shop window for
39 TNA. FCO 41/552, PembertoirPigott to Waterfield, 13.5.1969.
4° TNA. FCO 41/552, PembertoirPigott to Waterfield, 29.5.1969.
41 Wilhelm Georg Grewe, Riickblenden 1976-1951. propylaen, 1979, p. 671.
42 Willy Brandt, People and Politics- the Years 1960-1975. Little Brown, 1978, p. 187.
43 The British fist contained three headings in the ‘Arms control and disarmament’ part: 
(l)'Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions’, (2)‘A Nuclear Freeze’ and (3) ‘Measures to 
Foster Confidence and Reduce Tension’including (a) Observation Posts, (b) Additional 
Observation Arrangements, (c) Advance Notification of Military Movements and 
Manoeuvres, and (d) Exchanges of Observers a t Military Manoevres.
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Western willingness to envisage East-West negotiations.44 The British thus 
worked hard within NATO to appeal to public opinion and Parliament and 
give the impression that the Alliance was not negative towards detente. 
Moreover, creating the list of issues together with NATO members was 
useful for the British, because, they believed, it would serve to channel West 
German interest in detente into “NATO rather than let it stimulate the 
Germans into closer ties with the French in the hope that this [might] help 
them open up a dialogue with Moscow.”45 With these motivations, London 
enthusiastically led discussions within NATO.
On 22 July 1969, the NATO Council adopted the provisional list of 
issues produced by the Senior Political Committee. Inevitably, the list had 
become rather long and something of a “hotch-potch” of member states’ pet 
items.46 Despite it covering a broad range of subjects, the British 
Ambassador in NATO, Bernard Burrows, noticed that there were few 
substantially new issues. Some of them had been tried before. Others had 
been discussed in other international organisations.47 Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that there were few items concerning human contact or human 
rights in the list of issues, except for the “Expansion of Tourism”.48 In fact, 
the British official documents on the list-drafting contain surprisingly few 
references to human rights issues. The agenda of “freer movement of people, 
ideas, and information” was to be one of the most important topics during the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the most significant 
achievement of the West in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The subject of 
human rights, however, still had not appeared during the list-making 
process. Instead, at first, the concern of NATO states seemed to lie in arms
44 TNA. FCO 41/539, Brimelow to Burrows, 26.4.1969.
«  Ibid.
46 TNA. FCO 41/553, Parsons to Pemberton*Pigott, 24.6.1969.
47 TNA. FCO 41/553, Burrows to Waterfield, 7.10.1969.
48 In Section IV, Germany and Berlin, there are a few items relevant to human contact, such 
as “improvements in travel facilities” or “exchange of books and journals, and newspapers”. 
However, they were aimed exclusively at relations between East and West Germany.
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control and disarmament issues.49
Pompidou's France
During the second half of 1969, two important administrative changes 
happened in Western Europe. In France, de Gaulle retreated from the 
political scene. The new President, George Pompidou would become an 
ardent supporter of the idea of a European Security Conference. In West 
Germany, the SPD’s leader, Willy Brandt, became Chancellor. He would start 
a new Ostpolitik and make it possible to advance towards multilateral 
European detente. However, the new government’s policies towards the 
concept of a European conference did not change at once — despite the 
long-term importance of the changes they carried out. Rather the French, the 
West German, as well as the US governments continued to pursue detente 
bilaterally. Instead, it was the British government among the big powers 
that would incline to multilateral dialogue and lead NATO in this direction.
While NATO was working on making a list of issues, there was a 
change of leadership in France. Following de Gaulle’s departure on 28 April 
1969, as a consequence of the rejection in a referendum of the proposals he 
had put forward for a constitutional reform, George Pompidou became the 
second President of the Fifth Republic on 15 June 1969. Pompidou had 
previously been de Gaulle’s Prime Minister from 1962 to 1968. He was a 
staunch Gaullist and inherited his predecessor’s detente policy. When West 
German Foreign Minister Brandt visited Paris on 4 July 1969, Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas, the new French Prime Minister, also stated dearly that in 
terms of East-West relations, French policy would stick to the lines laid down
49 Italian items included for instance ‘organic disarmament programme’ and ‘cut-off in the 
production of fissionable material for military purposes’. The Dutch paper was also 
interested in confidence-building measures. The Canadians supported these topics generally. 
TNA. FCO 41/552.
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by General de Gaulle.50 The initial French detente policy, therefore, was still 
aiming to improve the relationship with the USSR bilaterally and not to rush 
into multilateral, bloc-tcrbloc negotiations.
Immediately, the new French government tried to take the initiative to 
construct a privileged bilateral relationship with Moscow. On 4 July 1969, 
the French Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to tell the Soviet 
Government that they thought “[t]he idea of a European Security Conference, 
as advanced in March, could be a useful means of confronting different 
positions”.51 Ambassador Roger Seydoux insisted, however, that it was first 
necessary to improve the atmosphere of detente by means of bilateral contact. 
The aim of bilateral talks, he continued, was to determine what subjects 
might be discussed at such a conference and which subjects might best be 
dealt with bilaterally.52 The most remarkable point in the instructions he 
received from Paris was, however, that the French proposed to treat 
“questions relating to the protection of human rights, to the freer movement 
of people, ideas and information, and to the progress of cultural exchange,” 
along with the exchanges of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, at 
such a conference.53 This was probably the first time that the West had 
raised the issue of human rights in the context of a European security 
conference.54 Later, this was to become not only a French idea, but also 
NATO’s main proposal to the Eastern Bloc in the CSCE.
In any case, the French government was still negative towards
50 AAPD 1969. Dok. 222, Gesprach des Bundesministers Brandt m it M inisterprasident 
Chaban-Delmas in Paris, 4.7.1969.
51 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (hereafter MAE), Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 
277, circulaire no. 308, 4.7.1969. See also TNA. FCO 41/544, Brimelow to Giffard, Waterfield,
28.7.1969.
52 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 277, circulaire no. 308, 4.7.1969.
53 “les questions relatives a la protection des droits de l'homme, a la libre circulation des 
personnes, des idees et des informations, au progres des echanges culturels”. Ibid.
54 Daniel Thomas has argued tha t it was in the autumn of 1969 and the Belgian delegation 
to a meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union that firstly proposed “the freer movement of 
people, ideas, and information” as a substantive issue tha t could be addressed by a 
European security conference. Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect- International Norms. 
Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism. Princeton, NJ- Princeton University Press, 
2001, p .41. However, the 4th July French instruction was earlier than Thomas’ opinion.
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multilateral detente in Europe at this stage. The French Ambassador’s 
remarks reflected France’s tactical decision. By showing a degree of 
enthusiasm towards a European conference, they thought that they could 
strengthen bilateral contact with the USSR. At the same time, by insisting 
on a bilateral dialogue, France under Pompidou sought to postpone the 
convening of a security conference in Europe. Like General de Gaulle, 
President Pompidou at first disliked the idea of a European security 
conference. Later, the French leader clearly told William Rogers that France 
was opposed to a security conference.55 “The line they were taking about the 
need for bilateral exchanges before the holding of any conference,” Pompidou 
explained, “was primarily designed to ensure that the conference was 
postponed as long as possible.”56
In further exchanges between France and the USSR, Paris tried to 
maintain this approach. In October 1969, the French Foreign Minister, 
Maurice Schumann, visited Moscow. This was the first ministerial contact 
between Paris and Moscow in Pompidou’s Presidency and was therefore a 
significant opportunity to improve the bilateral relationship. After 
Schumann returned from Moscow, however, he concluded that the talks with 
the Soviets “were not very productive”.57 One of the reasons for this was that 
the arguments over a European conference had been so heated. In drafting 
the communique, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, had pressed 
the French to state that they were in favour of a European conference. The 
French categorically refused. As described above, Paris was still not 
prepared to accept a conference.58 The eventual words on the topic were
55 Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter AN), 5AG2 /1022, Entretien entre le President de la 
Republique et M. William Rogers, Secretaire d’E tat Aericain, le 8 decembre 1969, de 15 h. 15 
a 16 h. 40.
56 TNA. FCO 41/550, Palliser to Brimelow, 19.12.1969.
57 AAPD 1969. Dok. 299, Anm.8, p.1070.
58 TNA. FCO 33/532, Palliser to Brimelow, 17.10.1969; FCO 41/546, UKDEL NATO tel 
no.612 to FCO, 22.10.1969; AAPD 1969. p .1070, Anm.8; Marie-Pierre Rey has underlined 
tha t the final communique of franco-soviet Foreign Ministers talks showed Pompidou’s 
France’s willingness toward a European Security conference. However, his argument is 
dubious because he has not analyzed the tough drafting process of the communique between
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“extremely carefully phrased”, hence the tone became neutral.59 This 
experience, however, seemed to impress on the French the Kremlin’s 
eagerness to convene a European security conference. This implied that if 
France wanted to develop the Franco-Soviet special relationship, it would 
need to be more positive in regards to a European security conference. The 
French therefore concluded that they had little choice but to accept the idea 
of a conference in the long run. In fact, Pompidou himself reportedly 
admitted during his conversation in November 1969 with Manlio Brosio, the 
NATO Secretary General, that Paris had come to believe that “a conference 
on European Security was inevitable, perhaps not in 1970 but in 1971 or 
1972.”60
Brandt’s West Germany
Besides France, a significant governmental change took place in West 
Germany, which undoubtedly proved to be of great importance for the history 
of the Cold War. As a result of the September 1969 general election in the 
FRG, Willy Brandt became the first Social Democratic Chancellor. Although 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) lost some seats, it was still the 
leading party in the Federal Parliament.61 However, the new Brandt 
Government was born from the social (SPD) — liberal (FDP) coalition which 
held a slight majority in the Bundestag. This social-liberal Government was
the French and the Russians. Marie-Pierre Rey, “Georges Pompidou, rUnion sovietique et 
rEurope,” in Association Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Europe. Editions 
Complexe, 1995, pp.151-2.
59 TNA. FCO 41/546, UKDEL NATO tel no.612 to FCO, 22.10.1969. The communique stated 
that “Les deux ministres considerent que, dument preparee, une conference europeenne 
pourrait constituer une moyen e developper la cooperation entre tous les E tats europeens 
grance a leurs efforts communs, de mettre fin a la division de l’Europe en blocs, et par la de 
renforcer la securite et la paix. La France et l'Union Sovietique sont decidees a continuer 
d'echanger des vues a ce sujet entre elles ainsi qu’avec les autres pays interesses.”
60 TNA. FOC 1116/16, UKDEL NATO tel no.711 to FCO, 20.11.1969.
ei CDU/CSU won 242 seats, SPD 224, FDP 30.
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to launch enthusiastically its new Ostpolitik, which would open a door to the 
realisation of multilateral European detente. Understandably, Moscow was 
pleased to see the creation of the SPD-FDP alliance.62
In his famous inaugural speech of 28 October 1969, Chancellor Brandt 
spoke about the new government’s Ostpolitik,63 First and foremost, using 
the phrase “two German states in one German nation”, he recognized de 
facto the existence of the German Democratic Republic, although he firmly 
rejected de jure recognition. He also called for agreements on the 
renunciation of force with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states, and for a 
settlement of the problem of access rights to West Berlin on the basis of 
four-power negotiations. In addition, he announced his intention to accede to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - a long-standing Soviet demand. The 
German Federal Government actually signed the treaty one month later, on 
28 November 1969. The acceptance of the NPT was an obvious signal to 
Moscow that the Federal government was preparing to talk seriously with 
them on German questions.64
In regards to the idea of a security conference in Europe, the Federal 
government’s policy was unchanged for the time being. While Brandt’s SPD 
did not expect such a conference to occur, the FDP leader, Walter Scheel, and 
also Foreign Minister in the new Administration, had strongly supported a 
security conference between East and West in his election campaign.65 It 
was clear, however, that the new Chancellor held bilateral contacts with
62 Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow. Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. 
Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 151.
63 Ingo von Munch (ed.), Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland, vol.2, Stuttgart- Kroner, 
1974, pp.167*9.
64 While supporting Brandt’s new policies, the US, UK, and French governments were 
uneasy about his ways of pursuing O stpolitik and its long-term effects. See, Gottfried 
Niedhart, “Zustimmung und Irritationen- Die Westmachte und die deutsche Ostpolitik 
1969/70,” 2003, downloaded from the website “Ostpolitik and CSCE”.
h ttp V/w ww.ostpolitik.net/. See also, Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘L’attitude de Georges Pompidou 
face a l’Allemagne,’ in Association Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Eurone. 
Editions Complexe, 1995, pp.272-3.
65 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung- zur Aussennolitik der Bundesrepuhlik 
Deutschland. 1955-1982. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, p.428; David F. Patton, Cold War 
Politics in Postwar Germany. Macmillan, 1999, p. 69.
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Moscow and Eastern European governments to be a greater priority than a 
multilateral conference. In his speech, mentioning the Finnish Memorandum 
to which Bonn had replied on 12 September 1969,66 Brandt explained that 
Germany had not changed its policy on a European security conference, and 
emphasised that such a conference should be preceded by careful 
preparation.67 In his governmental declaration on 28 October 1969, a 
Security conference in Europe was evidently ranked below Ostpolitik with 
the USSR, Poland and the GDR.68
Within the Foreign Ministry of the FRG, however, a European security 
conference was evaluated positively. On 11 June 1969, Brandt still at that 
time Foreign Minister had ordered the creation of a working group on a 
“European Security Conference” within his Ministry. In late September 1969 
the working group drew up a paper on the subject.69 Accepting that the 
Warsaw Pact proposal for holding a European security conference was based 
on their own motivations, the study, however, stated that the West should 
not decide its position on the basis of such Eastern aims, but develop its own 
sense of purpose and support the idea of a security conference. As the name 
suggested, the paper underlined that this security conference would have to 
be instrumental in resolving real European security problems. More 
specifically, this conference would have to deal with measures mutually to 
protect European countries from the use and threat of force, and from 
political interference through violence. Therefore it concluded that “a 
European Security Conference could contribute to a European Security 
System”.70 The Auswartiges Am ts willingness to contemplate a security 
conference in Europe was to come to the fore after the conclusion of the 
Quadripartite Berlin Agreements in 1971. Meanwhile, the Eastern Bloc
66 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, et al. (eds.), Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Eurona (KSZE)- 
Analyse und Dokumentation. 1973-1978. Koln^ Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978, p. 152.
67 TNA. FCO 41/547, Bonn tel no. 1353 to FCO, 29.10.1969.
68 Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. p. 425.
69 AAPD 1969. Dok.301, Aufzeichnung des Planungsstabs, 24.9.1969.
79 Ibid.
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continued to call for its convention.
The Prague Declaration
Soon after the birth of the Brandt-Scheel government, the Warsaw Pact 
moved to put pressure on the West. On 30 and 31 October 1969, the Foreign 
Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states held meetings in Prague, and adopted 
another declaration in which they again called for an “All-European” 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe, to meet in Helsinki in the 
first half of 1970.71 The novel characteristic of the Prague Declaration lay in 
its proposal of two topics to be discussed at an all-European security 
conference- the safeguarding of security through agreements on the 
renunciation of force, and the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and 
technical relations among European states.72 These two topics were chosen 
because it seemed easy to agree on them, thereby increasing the chances of 
the conference being a success. Some Warsaw Pact countries had demanded 
a more ambitious agenda. The Poles, for instance, had proposed a collective 
European security treaty (territorial status quo, de jure recognition of the 
GDR and its borders) as an item for a conference.73 The East Germans were 
also aiming to be recognised by the conference. Moreover, the Rumanians 
had demanded the elimination of the existing blocs, the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from European countries, the abolition of foreign military 
bases, and the renunciation of the use of force.74 However, the Soviet 
suggestion of concentrating on the two items mentioned above was supported
71 The text of the Prague Declaration (extracts): Michael Palmer, The prospects, pp. 89*90.
72 TNA. FCO 41/547, Guidance Department, 31.10.1969; AAPD 1969, Dok.338, Anm.4, p. 
1198.
73 The Poles also attempted in vain to persuade their Alhes to include references to regional 
disarmament in the Prague Declaration. TNA. FCO 41/549, Waterfield to Bendall,
21.11.1969.
74 Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), A Cardboard Castle?- An Inside History of the 
Warsaw Pact. 1955*1991. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2005, p. 
348.
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by the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak sides, and these twin aims 
were finally adopted as the first objectives of any European conference.75
The Prague Declaration’s impact on the NATO states was limited. The 
NATO members had already anticipated the Warsaw Pact initiative. In early 
October 1969, the British FCO had obtained a report that the Eastern Bloc 
had been preparing in order to advance some issues for a European security 
conference. The report also accurately anticipated the two Warsaw Pact 
proposals mentioned above.76 Furthermore, the Prague Declaration was far 
from satisfactory to Western states. It contained no explicit indication that 
the Warsaw Pact was prepared to agree to United States and Canadian 
participation. Although the Declaration talked of preparations for a 
European conference, the suggested timetable with the conference due to 
begin in the first half of 1970 would not allow much scope for these. Moreover, 
the proposed agenda made no mention of the essential question of European 
security, particularly the German problem and MBFR. 77 For those 
governments which disliked the idea of a European security conference, 
therefore, it was not difficult to dismiss the contents of the Prague 
Declaration. However, they had to deal with the effect of the Declaration on 
public opinion.
Within a week of the Warsaw Pact Prague gathering, NATO held a 
meeting of deputy foreign Ministers. NATO members agreed that they 
should not be deflected by the Prague Declaration from their own study for 
East/West negotiations. They felt, however, that NATO should “not seem to 
its own public opinion to be lagging behind the Warsaw Pact in the search for 
detente”.78 Therefore, the British and West German representatives agreed
75 Ibid. See also, MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 277, Varsovie tel no. 1352-1353 to 
Paris, 19.11.1969.
76 TNA. FCO 41/556, FCO tel no.357 to UKDEL NATO, 18.10.1969.
77 TNA. FCO 41/548, Background note- The Warsaw Pact Declaration a t Prague, 31 October, 
undated.
7® Ibid.
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to pursue the Western proposal for balanced force reductions.79 At this stage, 
this disarmament agenda was the only appealing counter-proposal that was 
available to the West. Therefore there was wide agreement among NATO 
states on reiterating the MBFR offer.80
The Soviets’ position towards disarmament detente was still negative. 
When Mikhail Smirnovsky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, visited 
Stewart in order to obtain his reply to the Prague Declaration, the British 
Foreign Secretary countered by asking about the Soviet position on the idea 
of mutual force reductions. Smirnovsky’s answer was evasive, saying that 
“raising this question in connection with a conference could only seriously 
complicate and undermine the prospects of a successful and fruitful meeting”. 
He insisted that this regional disarmament problem “could only be 
considered once the sources of tension in Europe had been removed”.81 This 
was the first formal response from the Eastern Bloc to the Western initiative 
for MBFR since it had been launched as the “Reykjavik Signal” in June 1968. 
This Soviet attitude merely re-confirmed British mistrust of Russian 
motivations. The FCO concluded that Moscow had no intention of making 
concessions to the West, nor did it want the Conference to conduct serious 
negotiations on regional disarmament or Germany. London speculated that 
the Soviets’ main short-term aim was simply to convene an international 
conference and thereby enhance the status of East Germany without 
actually discussing European security problems at all.82
France and Berlin
79 AAPD 1969. Dok. 349, Staatssekretar Duckwitz, z.Z. Brussel, an das Auswartige Amt,
5.11.1969.
80 TNA. FCO 41/548, Background note- The Warsaw Pact Declaration at Prague, 31 October, 
undated.
81 TNA. FCO 41/548, FCO tel no. 971 to Moscow, 19.11.1969.
82 TNA. FCO 41/558, Thomson to Secretary of State, 24.11.1969.
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After Schumann’s October 1969 visit to Moscow and the issuing of the 
Warsaw Pact’s Prague Declaration, the French Foreign Ministry conducted a 
review of its policy towards a European security conference, in the process of 
which they developed a very important basic line, particularly concerning 
Berlin. In order fully to appreciate the importance of the new French policy, 
it is necessary briefly to recall the nature of the Berlin problem and the 
origins of the Berlin negotiations involving the USA, the USSR, Britain and 
France that were to begin in March 1970.
After the end of the Second World War, the capital of Germany had 
been occupied by the US, the UK, France and the USSR. Following the 
division of Germany, Berlin was also split into an Eastern and Western 
section. West Berlin was taken over by the three Western powers, and East 
Berlin was controlled by the Soviet Union. As a result, the legal status of 
Four Power occupation of the whole of Berlin became unclear. Moreover, 
access routes from West Germany to West Berlin became unstable. Berlin 
was located in the centre of East Germany and those who wanted to reach 
West Berlin had to go through the East German territory, but there was no 
legal guarantee of the access routes. The island in the middle of the GDR was 
vulnerable. After the 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall, the United States and 
the Soviet Union continued to discuss the status of Berlin in 1962, but they 
could not agree on a solution.83 Again, the problems in and around the city 
were left untouched until 1969.
It was the Nixon government that started to deal once more with the 
Berlin problem. Soon after Nixon’s inauguration, the so’called Berlin “mini 
crisis” broke out on 7 February 1969. Opposing the attempt by the members 
of the Bundestag to hold the elections of the West German President in West 
Berlin, East Berlin blocked the access of the FRG members of parliament 
into the city.84 The East German government strongly rejected the
83 van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, p. 5; J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War' The Great 
Powers and their Allies. London- Longman, 1994, pp. 221*4.
84 William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany. MIT Press, 1978,
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connections between West Germany and West Berlin. For the East Germans, 
the elections were a symbolic event showing the West Germans’ “illegal” 
political actions, because, for the East, the FRG had no legitimacy to act in 
this manner within the territory of Berlin. However, the West vehemently 
criticised the GDR’s behaviour. When Nixon met the Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoly Dobrynin for the first time on 17 February 1969, the US President 
expressed his deep concern that “[i]f the Berlin situation should deteriorate, 
Senate approval of the Non-proliferation Treaty would be much more 
difficult.”85 Probably thanks to Moscow’s restraint, East Berlin did not 
radicalise its attitude, and the elections of West Germany’s president were 
carried out on 5 March 1969 without trouble. However, the Berlin “mini 
crisis” clearly convinced both the United States and the Soviet Union to 
tackle the Berlin problem to avoid it becoming an obstacle to improved 
superpower relations. Nixon’s national security advisor Henry Kissinger 
established a secret dialogue with Dobrynin, and they exchanged views on 
the former German capital on the day after the elections.86 While the Soviet 
Ambassador stated that “the only concern of the Soviet Union was to prevent 
a change in the status quo in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe,” Kissinger 
stressed that “it was essential to get the access procedures to Berlin 
regularized.”87 During this conversation, Nixon’s national security adviser 
had the impression that Moscow’s attitude was “positive” to discussion of the 
Berlin question.88 Then, 20 days later, the US President sent a letter to
p. 165.
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Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, offering to begin negotiations on 
Berlin.89 At the same time, the American, British, French and German 
governments began intense consultations in Bonn to prepare for 
negotiations.90 The Berlin “mini crisis” and the problem of the ratification of 
the NPT made the Americans realise the necessity of settling the Berlin 
question before successful negotiations would take place.91
However, the new French President had a completely different idea. On 
10 July 1969, nearly one month after Pompidou’s victory in the presidential 
elections, Gromyko announced Moscow’s readiness to begin negotiations on 
Berlin, alongside SALT talks with Washington, and negotiations with Bonn 
on a renunciation-of-force agreement while at the same time repeating the 
Warsaw Pact’s call for an “all-European conference”.92 In response, however, 
Pompidou’s political adviser, Jean-Bernard Raimond, concluded that talks on 
Berlin would not bring positive results in the then current situation.93 The 
French President himself wrote on 3 October 1969 that “[w]e must not touch 
the status of Berlin,”94 and later explained to Nixon that negotiations on 
Berlin could only serve to reinforce Moscow’s position and accentuate the 
Soviet rights over West Berlin without obtaining greater Western rights over 
East Berlin.95 Yet, despite Pompidou’s misgivings, on 6 August 1969, the 
United States, Britain and France handed Aide Memoires to the Soviet
89 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time- Memoirs of a Diplomat. Athens' 
University of Georgia Press, 1998, p.281.
90 W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin- the Cold War struggle over Germany. Macmillan, 
1999, p. 226.
91 When Pompidou said tha t he could not understand why the Americans had offered the 
Soviets talks on Berlin, Kissinger answered untruthfully tha t it was because they had 
wanted to help the Christian Democratic Party in the FRG elections in the autumn. AN, 5 
AG 2 / 1022, Entretien entre le President de la Republiequ et M. Kissinger, Palais de l’Elysee 
■ le 4 aout 1969 de 15h35 a 17h. Probably, Kissinger had to tell a He in order to hide the 
existence of his secret dialogue with Dobrynin.
92 Sodaro, Moscow. Germany, p. 150.
93 AN, 5 AG 2 /1021, NOTE pour Monsieur le President de la Republique, 4.8.1969.
94 Georges*Henri Soutou, “La France et l’accord quadripartite sur Berlin du 3 septembre 
1971”, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, no.l, 2004, p. 50.
95 AN, 5 AG 2 /1022, Entretien entre le President Nixon et le President Pompidou a la 
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Foreign Ministry on talks concerning Berlin.96 Willingly or not, it became 
unavoidable for the three big Western powers to embark on negotiations on 
the divided city. It was in this context, in early November 1969, that the Quai 
d'Orsajts undertook a review of a European security conference.
For the French Foreign Ministry (and for others as well), the 
German/Berlin question was the most significant point which needed to be 
dealt with in a conference on European security. One of the focal points at a 
meeting in the Political Director’s room in the Quai d’Orsay on 8 November 
1969 was whether the German problem should be on the agenda of any 
conference.97 Although the Eastern Bloc had not mentioned the German 
problem in the Prague Declaration, East Germany would definitely 
participate in any conference which occurred, making it all but impossible to 
ignore the problem. On the other hand, if the German question became an 
ordre du jour,; it would be dealt with by all European countries, which had 
the undesirable implication for the French (and for the other Four Powers) of 
undermining their privileged status on Germany. Moreover, if the GDR had a 
seat in a European security conference, it would lead to the recognition of 
East Germany which, the French thought, would create a problem 
concerning Berlin, in particular the access routes to West Berlin which would 
officially fall under GDR sovereignty. For the French Foreign Ministry, 
French rights on Berlin were tremendously significant since they virtually 
constituted their only remaining claim to involvement in the regulation of 
the German question. It was hence very dangerous for the French to see the 
Berlin problem addressed in a multilateral European conference. Therefore, 
it was important for the West to make clear to the Soviet Union, before the 
opening of a conference, that a treaty on the non-use-of-force, while implying 
the inviolability of frontiers, would not prevent access to West Berlin. It was
96 AAPD 1969. Dok.255, DarhterlaB des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Blumenfeld,
5.8.1969.
97 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 277, Note, A/S: echange de vues concemant une 
eventuelle conference sur la securite europeenne (reunion chez le Directeur Politique, 8 
novembre), 20.11.1969.
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the Eastern Bloc that wanted a conference on European security. The 
officials of the Quai d’Orsay thought, therefore, that convening such a 
conference constituted a major concession on the Western side simply 
because East Germany would take part. Thus, they stressed that the French 
must demand compensation in return for their acceptance of a European 
security conference. As seen above, the Berlin problem was already going to 
be discussed amongst the Four Powers. It would therefore become possible 
for the French to make their acceptance of a conference dependent on the 
satisfaction of their demands on the Berlin question.98 Thus French Foreign 
Minister Schumann made his opinion clear before the US, the UK and West 
German foreign ministers on 3 December 1969 that the improvement of 
Berlin’s external connections could be a quid pro quo for the recognition of 
East Germany.99 Keen to maintain bilateral relations with Moscow and the 
East European capitals, and opposed to the multilateralisation of the 
East/West dialogue, Paris decided to make the resolution of the Berlin 
problem the most significant precondition for the increasingly inevitable 
convening of a European security conference.
The NATO declaration and the idea of freer movement
While France, West Germany and the United States wanted to slow the pace 
towards a multilateral European conference, Britain was more enthusiastic 
about making NATO appear positive about detente. Although the British 
were highly sceptical about the idea of an all-European conference, they 
pushed the Atlantic Alliance towards multilateral contact with the Warsaw 
Pact countries by firstly proposing a Declaration on East-West Relations,
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., Diner quadripartite du 3 decembre 1969 a l’Ambassade d’Allemagne a Bruxelles, 
Compte Rendu de l’Entretien des quatre Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, M. Schumann, 
M. Rogers, M. Stewart & M. Scheel.
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and secondly by trying to create an alternative framework for East/West 
communication. Diplomacy within the Alliance gradually accelerated in the 
run-up to the NATO Ministerial meetings scheduled for 4-5 December 1969.
In order to understand NATO’s gradual commitment to the idea of a 
European security conference, it is important to pay attention to the role of 
the British Secretary of State. Although high-ranking diplomats in the UK 
Foreign Office were fairly sceptical of the Eastern initiatives, Michael 
Stewart gradually saw the concept of a security conference in Europe in a 
positive light. At a meeting in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in July 
1969, he had agreed with the officials’ reluctance regarding a security 
conference.100 When he visited New York and Ottawa in September 1969, 
however, the British Foreign Secretary revealed a very positive attitude 
towards a European security conference during his conversation with the 
Canadians, remarking that “we should be in a position to examine seriously 
what a European Security Conference could usefully discuss”.101 When they 
learned of their Foreign Secretary’s statement, FCO officials were upset and 
commented that it was “going a good deal further than we, at official level, 
have so far advised or discussed with Ministers.”102 During his conversation 
with US Secretary of State Rogers on 22 September 1969, Stewart admitted 
that it was public opinion which had influenced him.103 Moreover, after he 
met the Polish vice Foreign Minister on 17 October 1969 and received 
confirmation that the Warsaw Pact would take a new initiative before 5 
November 1969,104 the British Foreign Secretary told FCO staff that “we 
should make a constructive reply to any initiatives from the East and that 
we should not allow the Warsaw Pact governments to go on taking the
100 TNA. FCO 41/544, Private Secretary to Brimelow, undated- FCO 41/544, Brimelow to 
Burrows, 28.7.1969.
101 TNA. FCO 41/544, Waterfield to Bendall, 17.9.1969.
102 Ibid.
103 TNA. FCO 41/546, Waterfield to Bendall, 2.10.1969.
104 TNA. FCO 41/556, FCO tel no.356 to UKDEL NATO, 18.10.1969.
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lead”.105 UK diplomats had to follow their political master’s line.
One of the British initiatives was a proposal of a Declaration on 
East-West Relations. France and West Germany progressively lost interest 
in the list-making exercise within NATO, their French and West German 
representatives in Brussels reiterating that the List of Issues was for the 
preparation of East-West negotiations rather than a European security 
conference.106 In contrast, the British were concerned with how the List of 
Issues could best be reflected in the communique of the NATO Ministerial 
meeting in December 1969.107 They thus drafted a communique using the 
List of Issues, but it was too long. The part of the statement on European 
security in the draft was hence detached from the communique, and issued 
as a separate statement, like the Reykjavik Signal of 1968.108 This reflected 
Stewart’s preference for appealing to public opinion and countering the 
Warsaw Pact’s initiative. On 7 November 1969, the United Kingdom 
presented its draft Declaration on East-West Relations to its NATO partners.
In hindsight, the British idea was transformed in a crucially significant 
way by the United States and France in the course of November 1969. 
Unfortunately, the UK draft Declaration contained nothing new. This was 
mainly because the List of Issues, which formed the basis of the British draft, 
did not include fresh ideas. It was America’s counter draft that contained the 
important phrase* “freer movement of people and information between East 
and West”.109 This move was a “bolt out of the blue {coup de theatre)” for 
other NATO members.110 As argued above, France had similar ideas. Indeed, 
at the very same time, the French Deputy Director of Political Affairs, 
Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, was discussing with the Yugoslavs during his visit to
105 TNA, FCO 41/556, FCO tel no.356 to UKDEL NATO, 18.10.1969.
106 TNA. FCO 41/554, Wilcock to Braithwaite, 14.8.1969; FCO 41/556, UKDEL NATO tel 
no.554 to FCO, 2.10.1969.
107 TNA. FCO 41/556, Davidson to Braithwaite, 25.9.1969. '
108 Ibid., FCO tel no. 352 to UKDEL NATO, 16.10.1969.
109 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 273b, NOTE A/s.* Session ministerielle de 
I’Alliance. Projet de communiqe americaine, 25.11.1969.
110 Ibid., Repan-Bruxelles tel no. 1694/1710 to Paris, 25.11.1969.
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Belgrade on 24-26 November 1969, the “probleme dinformation ou la libre 
circulation des idees e t des hommes”111 When he came back to Paris, on 27 
November 1969, France also presented another draft of the Declaration 
which modified the US phrase to “persons, ideas, and information would 
have the possibility of freer movement between East and West.” Jurgenseii 
was of the opinion that these words “could be a useful counter-proposition to 
make in any discussion of this subject, not least because it would tend to put 
the Russians on the defensive”.112 On 5 December 1969, NATO Foreign 
Ministers adopted the Declaration on the future development of relations 
between East and West, which included the final phrase “freer movement of 
people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West.”113 
Later this was to develop further into an important Western agenda item at 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the so-called “Basket 
H I ” 114 At the end of 1960s, this new idea that had the potential to overcome 
the status quo of a divided Europe appeared as an official Western proposal. 
In other words, European detente would work not only as a stabiliser, but 
also as a framework for transformation.
Standing Committee on East-West Relations and the Debate on 
Procedure
Another British initiative concerned the procedural aspect of any East-West 
negotiation. It started as an abortive suggestion that, a ‘Standing Committee
111 Ibid., Circulaire no. 484, 2.12.1969.
112 TNA. FCO 41/550, Palliser to Brimelow, 27.11.1969.
113 The full paragraph including this phrase is as follows- “Allied governments consider tha t 
not only economic and technical but also cultural exchanges between interested countries 
can bring m utual benefit and understanding. In these fields more could be achieved by freer 
movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West.” 
http-//www.nato.int/docu/comm/comm6069.htm#69
114 Victor-Yves Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Detentela CSCE. d'Helsinki a Vienne. 
1973-1989. E. Bruylant, 1989, pp. 271-3.
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on East-West Relations’ be established. Unlike the idea of the Declaration 
which was welcomed by NATO members, Britain’s proposal on procedure 
was highly unpopular. The project of a Standing Committee on East-West 
Relations (SCEWR) would hence not take shape in the end. Nevertheless, 
there are two reasons for examining it here. Firstly, procedure was critically 
significant for the success of the CSCE and it was London’s initiative that 
ignited debate on this question within NATO. Secondly and more 
importantly in the context of this chapter, the concept of a SCEWR acted as a 
catalyst driving Britain to lead the Atlantic Alliance towards a commitment 
to a multilateral European conference.
It is worth stressing that the British invented the idea of a Standing 
Committee not because they favoured a European security conference, but 
because they did not want it. While the study of the issues for East/West 
negotiations was reaching its conclusion within NATO, the study of the 
procedure for East/West talks had begun within the British government. The 
Foreign Office gradually felt pressure to convene a conference on the Warsaw 
Pact’s terms. In order to avoid the format of a conference, the British 
preferred the idea of a Standing Committee, which came from the British 
Embassy to NATO in Brussels. The British permanent delegation to NATO 
reported to the FCO that some NATO countries considered that the Atlantic 
organisation should be more positive towards the European security 
conference than the British position had been. The problem for them was 
that “[t]he lack of a procedural alternative to the Warsaw Pact proposal for 
an early Conference was leading an increasing number of members of the 
Alliance to accept implicitly that we would have to have a conference sooner 
rather than later”.115 The UK representative to NATO, therefore, invented 
the idea of a Standing Committee as a counter-proposal, and concluded that 
“the sooner we launch the Standing Committee idea here the better”.116 
Foreign Secretary Stewart, who was looking for a way of appealing to public
115 TNA. FCO 41/558, Waterfield to Bendall, 20.11.1969.
116 Ibid.
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opinion and resisting Eastern pressures, very much welcomed the new 
initiative, stating that a Standing Committee concept “seemed to provide the 
most hopeful and constructive method of moving forward”.117 The staff of the 
Foreign Office were then asked to develop this idea before putting it to 
Britain’s NATO partners.
According to the FCO memorandum a Standing Committee would have 
several advantages compared with the Warsaw Pact conference proposed. 
First and foremost, the West could impress public opinion with their 
constructive intent, and take the initiative in East*West talks. Secondly, by 
offering a Standing Committee, they could relieve the pressure for a 
“Conference”, which would demand huge results. Instead, they believed, a 
standing committee would only need to attain limited outcomes, at least in 
the early stages. Thirdly, in the Standing Committee the West could probe 
Soviet intentions. Finally, such a Committee could allow U.S./Canadian 
participation.118 For the FCO, presentation was the most important aspect. 
They thought that NATO Ministers should include an announcement about 
the proposed Committee in their December Declaration.119 Because the 
British were still strongly sceptical about East/West talks, the key aim for 
London behind this suggestion was not to advance East/West dialogue, but to 
fend off the Warsaw Pact initiative.
When Stewart met his American, French and West German 
counterparts on 3 December 1969, he faced strong opposition to the idea of a 
Standing Committee from the French Foreign Minister in particular. 
Schumann said frankly that he did not like the British idea.120 From the 
French point of view, the British proposal was dangerous “because it might
117 TNA. FO 1116/15, Waterfield to Burrows, 29.10.1969.
118 TNA. FCO 41/558, A Standing Committee on East-West Relations Preliminary 
Memorandum by F.C.O. officials, undated.
119 TNA. FCO 41/558, Waterfield to Burrows, 29.10.1969.
120 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 277, Diner quadripartite du 3 decembre 1969 a 
lAmbassade d’Allemagne a Bruxelles, Compte Rendu de l’Entretien des quatre Ministres 
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give the impression of preparations for a conference between [the] blocs”.121 
Instead, Schumann said that France was open to the idea of a conference 
that would also include neutral and non-aligned countries. He stressed that 
the conference should not lead to the consolidation of Blocs.122 Paris thought 
that the participation of neutral and non-aligned countries in a conference 
would serve to blur the image of bloc-to-bloc negotiations. By the same logic, 
they turned down the British initiative.123 The FRG Foreign Minister Scheel 
also hesitated to support Stewart and stressed the necessity to study the 
SCEWR beforehand in a working group.124 In consultative talks between 
British and West German Foreign Ministry officials on 21 November 1969, 
the Germans had already insisted that before the idea was made public, it 
was desirable to reach agreement on some difficult questions that the 
Standing Committee would have to confront, including the participation of 
East Germany.125 For the Federal Republic, bilateral regulation of the 
intra-German question would have to precede any multilateral East/West 
negotiation. Although the British had been aware of the East German 
participation problem, they had been unable to persuade the West Germans.
Faced with French and West German opposition, the British Foreign 
Secretary refrained from proposing a Standing Committee to other partners 
at the NATO Ministerial meetings on 4-5 December, 1969. Instead, in his 
speech, he suggested that NATO Ministers recognise that procedural issues 
merited closer examination and that they establish a working group to 
consider what sort of arrangements might best serve East/West talks.126 
This diluted British proposal again faced strong French opposition. With the
121 TNA. FCO 41/418, tel no. 766, UKDEL NATO to FCO, 5.12.1969.
122 Ibid.; AAPD 1969. Dok. 388, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z.Z. Brussel, an das Auswartige 
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Berlin problem in mind, Schumann retorted that “None of us have intention 
to be engaged in the way which lead to a conference on European security 
without a certain number of guarantee that we don’t have for the present.”127 
Stewart did not retreat however, arguing that “if NATO countries are asked 
[by the Soviets], ‘Well, if you don’t want to go to a conference in the way you 
have been invited to at Prague, what do you want to do?’,” the NATO 
countries would be wiser if they consulted among themselves before 
replying.128 The Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Canada and Belgium all 
supported Stewart, and suggested to Schumann that merely beginning to 
study procedure within NATO would be sensible. The French Foreign 
Minister eventually accepted a sentence stating that “Ministers recognized 
that procedure merited closer examination”.129 British Foreign Secretary 
Stewart regarded this as a French concession in the interests of Alliance 
unity.130 Stewart’s proposal to study procedure was then included in the 
Declaration, and he succeeded in securing a foothold in NATO to sell his idea 
of a Standing Committee on East-West Relations.
Predictably, the debates on procedure within the NATO Council started 
with a British initiative. Secretary of State Stewart clung to the idea of a 
SCEWR and made it public during debates on foreign policy in the House of 
Commons on 9 December 1969 without consulting with his Western 
partners.131 Shortly thereafter, a British aide-memoire, suggesting that a 
Standing Commission was an alternative to a Conference on Soviet terms, 
was circulated within the NATO Council.132 Stewart’s preoccupation was
127 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961*1970, carton 273b, Verbatim Extract of Statements made at the 
Meeting of the Council held on Friday, 5th December 1969 in the course of discussion on the 
Press Communique and Declaration.
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still that if NATO’s attitude was deemed to be negative it might lose the 
support of young people. 133 Stewart also felt pressure from his Labour party 
colleagues and public opinion. He told William Rogers that there was a good 
deal of interest in East-West relaxation in parliament, especially in his own 
party, at the Labour party conference and also at meetings in his 
constituency.134 Indeed, he had to be particularly careful to respect this 
because general elections in the UK were scheduled for June 1970. The 
SCEWR project thus became an important tool for him to demonstrate his 
positive approach towards detente, avoiding the criticism that Britain was 
trapped by the Soviet all-European conference proposal.
However, this British concept of a Standing Commission was 
highly unpopular within the Atlantic Alliance. The French and the West 
Germans had doubts about it as they had shown at the Brussels Ministerial 
meeting and the Americans were indifferent to the UK’s initiative. When 
Wilson and Stewart visited Washington in January 1970 and the British 
Foreign Secretary explained his idea of a SCEWR, Rogers coolly replied that 
“There is no problem here [the United State] with public opinion.”135 For 
President Nixon, there was no difference between a conference and a 
standing commission -  both were equally to be avoided. As he put it- “I have 
one fundamental understanding concerning any conference. A conference in 
and of itself helps them [the Soviets]»’ a conference in and of itself does not 
help us.”136 In addition, Italian opposition to a Standing Commission was 
even stronger than that of the French and the Americans. After Aldo Moro 
had become the new Italian Foreign Minister in August 1969, Rome began to 
oppose a European Security Conference generally and was therefore 
unwilling to discuss any procedures which might lead to the convening of a
133 TNA. FCO 41/740, Brimelow to Redaway, 3.2.1970.
134 Ibid, Rocord of Conversation between Stewart and Rogers on 27 January 1970. 
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Conference. An Italian official criticised a procedural study including the UK 
proposal as “premature”, and urged the study of the substance of European 
security instead.137 The Italian government preferred the idea of MBFR to a 
conference, as will be discussed below. To a lesser extent, the Dutch, the 
Greeks and the Turks shared Italian thinking.138
There was another group which did not support the British concept, for 
almost totally opposite reasons. The Belgians, the Norwegians and the 
Danish were reluctant to accept a Standing Commission because it was 
presented as an alternative to a Conference on European Security. They 
thought that a well-prepared conference would serve to improve European 
security. They said therefore that they could support the establishment of a 
Standing Commission only if it would lead to a conference.139
Faced with a lack of backing from its Alliance partners, the British 
government was again forced to retreat. A Standing Commission was 
supported by only a few governments- Canada, Luxembourg and Iceland.140 
And even amongst these, the Canadians wanted to connect the British 
initiative with the calling of a European Conference, thereby undermining 
Britain’s intentions. In the end, the British Foreign Office recommended that 
Britain should tactically adopt a “soft sell” approach to a Standing 
Commission. Secretary of State Stewart had to accept the recommendation, 
though he still hoped that a positive step forward might be taken at the 
NATO Ministerial Meeting in May 1970.141
Even though the British withdrew their proposal tentatively, 
discussions within NATO on the procedural dimension continued in general
137 TNA. FCO 41/558, Braithwaite to Waterfield, 27.1.1970. See also, MAE, Serie Pactes 
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terms.142 From these debates, two important trends appeared. One was a 
Canadian-French line, which was to result in the French idea of a 
three-stage conference. Another was a partnership between the British and 
the Belgians -  a core coalition that would do much to make NATO more 
forthcoming towards detente.
Canada’s idea on procedure was the inverse of the British Standing 
Commission proposal. The Canadians wanted a European security 
conference on condition that the Eastern bloc also accepted the subsequent 
establishment of a Standing Commission, though the British had presented 
its idea as an alternative to a conference.143 In other words, the Canadian 
government wished to make a conference a permanent institution, not a once 
and for all conference.144
The French, who would formulate a very important procedural concept 
that would be accepted by the all participants in the CSCE, were firstly 
stimulated by the Canadian idea.145 Although France was opposed to the 
study of procedure, the French Foreign Ministry developed its own ideas 
because the head of the Ministry, Maurice Schumann, personally believed it 
was a plain fact that “a conference would take place - the Soviet proposal had
142 On 2 February 1970, following a Canadian suggestion, the NATO Council decided to 
discuss the procedural dimension more generally a t its Senior Political Committee (SPC). 
Each NATO member contributed their own papers and the SPC examined them until 16 
April 1970.
143 Ibid., FCO 41/747, Canada’s paper, 24.2.1970.
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gone too far for this to be otherwise” and such sentiment and political 
judgement were generally shared in the government, though his officials still 
thought the Soviet proposal was risky and President Pompidou was also very 
suspicious of it.146 The importance of the French formula will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 5. Here it is sufficient to sketch the Quai d’Orsajfs 
tentative idea that after a preparatory conference, which would be convened 
to reach agreement on the agenda for the main conference, a subsequent 
conference, or possibly a series of conferences, would be organised by a 
standing body or secretariat to deal with other questions of relevance to 
European security.147 This idea would subsequently be fleshed out and 
would go on to play an significant role in making the CSCE substantial.
Another important source of procedural thinking was Belgium, which 
put forward a number of ideas confluent with the British line. In March 1970, 
the Belgian representative in NATO proposed a more open idea on procedure, 
namely the holding of an open meeting (to include the East Germans and 
neutral countries) at ambassadorial level to explore the possibilities of and 
prepare for East-West negotiations without preconditions, for example, on 
progress in other negotiations such as the Berlin talks.148 While the 
Belgians wanted an East-West conference to be convened as a result, they 
deliberately made their proposed procedure vague in order to make it 
acceptable to all their Atlantic partners* the open meeting was not 
necessarily presented as a preparation for a conference. The British thought 
this could be developed into a SCWER.149 The Belgian proposal suited the 
British stance, because it was not directly linked to a European security 
conference. Britain thus attempted to form a united front with the 
Belgians.150 From mid-March 1970, the UK representative in NATO 
approached the Belgian Ambassador and, as will be argued below, they
146 TNA. FCO 41/747, Marshall to Giffard, 4.3.1970.
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148 Ibid., FCO 41/747, Wilcock to Braithwaite, 6.3.1970.
149 Ibid., FCO 41/747, FCO tel no. 90 to UKDEL NATO, 14.3.1970.
150 Ibid., FCO 41/748, Burrows to Waterfield, 12.3.1970; Waterfield to Brimelow, 24.3.1970.
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developed a joint draft communique incorporating their ideas.
On the Belgian side, the British approach was welcomed. Belgian 
Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel felt it necessary that NATO take the 
initiative in the approaching Ministerial meeting in May 1970. When he met 
the UK Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, George Thomson, on 11 March 
1970, Harmel insisted that:
The Allies could not afford in May not to take a public and positive step forward 
on procedures for collective negotiation and on force reductions, in order to 
make it clear, especially to the young, tha t we are not the obstacles to progress. 
Failure to make positive proposals would undermine our credibility in East and 
West.151
Moreover, the Belgian Foreign Minister also felt that smaller countries had 
to do something to improve European security:
We could not afford to leave European security to be settled by the American 
and Russians in SALT, or by the Germans in their bilaterals. European security, 
including the German question, was a m atter for the Alliance as a whole.152
In fact, the Strategic Arms Limitation talks between the superpowers had 
been underway since November 1969. The FRG government had also 
embarked on its new Ostpolitik, firstly by establishing a secret back channel 
between Bonn and Moscow.153 In late January 1970, it sent Egon Bahr, the
151 Ibid., FCO 41/747, Brussels tel no. 118 to FCO, 12.3.1970.
152 Ibid.
153 The first important step the Federal Chancellor took was his secret letter of 19 
November 1969 to Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin. (AAPD 1969. Dok. 370.) The Soviets’ 
reaction was also highly secret. On 21 December 1969, a visitor from the USSR attempted to 
initiate contact with Egon Bahr. The visitor introduced himself as being sent by Yuri 
Andropov, the head of the KGB, who had a direct connection with Leonid Brezhnev, and 
conveyed Moscow’s message that the Soviet government was prepared to negotiate seriously 
with Bonn. The messenger mentioned Brandt’s secret letter to Kosygin, which convinced 
Bahr that he was trustworthy because the existence of the letter was known to only four top 
persons in the Federal government. As a result, a secret and direct back*channel between 
Bonn and Moscow was established a t the highest level. AAPD 1969. Dok. 412, Aufzeichnung
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state secretary of the Chancellor’s Office and Brandt’s loyal aide, to Moscow 
as the main negotiator with the Russians for a non-use-of-force agreement 
and broader problems including the German question and the existing 
borders. In addition, in February 1970, Bonn began to negotiate with 
Warsaw as well. Seeing these developments, Harmel probably thought that 
he also had to commit and contribute to European detente, even if smaller 
countries had neither the cards to bargain directly with the Soviet Union nor 
responsibility for the German question.
The first half of 1970 saw the beginnings of further negotiations. On 26 
March 1970, the representatives of the USA, Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union got together in Berlin to discuss the status of the divided city. Three 
meetings were held in two months, but they made little progress. The 
sessions were still in their exploratory phase, taking the form of an exchange 
of set speeches.154 High-level German-German meetings also took place, 
although they were no more fruitful. Brandt met his East German opposite 
number Willi Stoph twice, in Erfurt on 19 March 1970 and in Kassel on 21 
May 1970. Their meetings became deadlocked on a fundamental point. While 
the GDR leader demanded full recognition of East Germany first and 
foremost, Brandt rejected legal recognition as his closest aide had done in 
Moscow.155 Moreover, after the Erfurt meeting in particular, the Soviets 
directed the East Germans not to make progress at the second 
German-German session, because Moscow was worried about uncontrollable 
results.156 Therefore, during the first half of 1970, these meetings between 
East and West were still not producing visible outcomes. Nevertheless, the
des Staatssekretars Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, 24.12.1969 ; Vjaceslav Keworkow, P er 
geheime Kanal: Moskau. der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik. Rowohlt, 1995, pp.50*9; M. E. 
Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil: East Germany. Detente, and Ostpolitik. 1969-1973. 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp.33*4; W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin- the 
Cold War struggle over Germany. Macmillan, 1999, pp. 228*29.
154 TNA. FCO 33/1153, ‘Report on the Four-Power Talks on Berlin’, undated.
155 Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil. pp.48*51, 60*3.
156 At Erfurt, Brandt received a feverish welcome from the inhabitants of the city. This was 
more than the Eastern authorities had expected, and they therefore failed to control the 
people. As a result, the Soviet leadership intervened in the German-German talks and tried 
to regain it control. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p. 55.
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opening of Ostpolitik; the Quadripartite negotiations on Berlin, the 
German-German Summits as well as SALT, created an atmosphere of 
detente. The era of negotiation seemed be starting to flourish.
German Initiative on MBFR
For the Western side, the May 1970 NATO Ministerial meetings in Rome 
were the first major mile-stone on the road to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. In an atmosphere of relaxation created by the 
'beginning of several negotiations, the NATO ministers would decide to 
present their commitment to the idea of a European conference, albeit 
conditionally. At the same time they would issue a Declaration on mutual 
force reductions. Before exploring the diplomacy which preceded the Rome 
Ministerial meetings, it is therefore necessary to analyse the debates on 
MBFR within NATO, paying attention to West Germany’s initiative on this 
topic. The discussions about mutual reductions of force were also significant 
not only because MBFR was NATO’s important counter-proposal, but also 
because they were to be intertwined with the dispute over procedures 
leading up to the final communique of the NATO Ministerial meeting.
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions was a less easy project for the 
West than had been expected. Throughout 1969, NATO had publicly 
continued to present its commitment to MBFR in its communiques. However, 
the more the NATO military experts studied this issue, the clearer it became 
that the MBFR negotiations would not be easy.157 Although, NATO’s MBFR
157 After the Brussels NATO meeting in December 1969, a working group was set up within 
NATO to carry forward a further study of the issues involved in the various approaches to 
the MBFR problem including the task of creating force reduction models following the US 
suggestion. It was carried on a t the three meetings of the MBFR working group held from 22 
January 1970 to 3 March 1970. As for the account of the five models of the MBFR working 
group, see Martin Muller, Politik und Biirokratie- die MBFR-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik 
Deutschland zwischen 1967 und 1973. Nomos, 1988, pp.63-66. See also, MAE, Serie Pactes 
1961-1970, carton 274, NOTE a.s.- reduction mutuelle et equilibree des forces, 22.5.1970.
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working group produced one symmetrical (or equal percentage) force 
reduction model and four asymmetrical models, symmetric troop reductions 
were assessed as liable to damage Western security given the numerical 
advantage of the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces, while asymmetric force 
reductions were regarded as unacceptable to the Soviet Union.158 In short, 
no models satisfied both negotiability and security.
As a consequence, the NATO countries took different stances. The 
Canadians and the Danish, concerned about negotiability, believed that the 
symmetrical model would offer the best approach because they thought it 
would be a model on which both East and West could start negotiations. The 
Danish representative was afraid that if the Alliance presented 
asymmetrical models, the East and the public would view NATO as being 
negative towards MBFR.159 Even though they were aware that symmetrical 
force reductions would endanger NATO’s security, the Italians, the Belgians 
and the Dutch also worried about the problem of negotiability, and were 
therefore unhappy about the asymmetrical models developed by the working 
group.160 On the other hand, the British and the Turks were interested in 
security and presentational value, and therefore neglected the negotiability 
of the force reduction models strongly favouring the asymmetrical models. 
British Foreign Secretary Stewart was assertive, remarking that “If a 
proposal based on equal security really is ‘non-negotiable’ (and we do not 
know this for certain) that is the Russians’ fault, not ours.”161 France 
continued adamantly to oppose the very idea of MBFR.162 The US 
government was unable to take a clear stance on this question because of the
158 Ibid.
159 TNA. FCO 41/682, Wilcock to Alexander, 5.3.1970; UKDEL NATO tel no. 131 to FCO,
6.3.1970.
160 Ibid. On 28 February 1970, the Italians submitted to the working group on MBFRs an 
original paper on MBFR which, according to them, contained asymmetrical models 
overcoming the dilemma between negotiability and security. Ibid, FCO 41/682, Waterfield to 
Brimelow, 24.3.1970.
161 Ibid, FCO 41/682, Waterfield to Brimelow, 24.3.1970.
162 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 278, Paris tel no. 202/210 to Repan Bruxelles,
30.4.1970.
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division of opinion within the Nixon administration.
It was West Germany that acted most enthusiastically on the mutual 
force reduction problem. Faced with confusion in NATO, the German 
Ambassador to NATO, Wilhelm Grewe, urged his Foreign Ministry to take 
the initiative on this topic. On 27 February 1970, he sent a telegram to the 
Auswartige Amt, underlining his concern that the process of model-making 
by military experts would stifle MBFR’s political value and suggesting that it 
was time for NATO to renew the MBFR ‘Signal’ made at Reykjavik in July 
1968 in order for the issue to come to the fore of political discussion again.163 
More importantly, the Ambassador also recommended connecting the issue of 
force reductions to a European security conference by making it the principal 
subject at the conference.164 His idea was soon picked up at Ministerial level 
in Bonn.
It was Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt who led the political 
arguments about MBFR within the Brandt government.165 Since the 
governmental change in the FRG in October 1969 and Schmidt’s emergence 
as Defence Minister, there was a marked change of thinking within his 
Ministry on MBFR and his officials were now under firm instructions to play 
a positive part in working towards as agreement.166 According to the 
analysis by the British Embassy in Bonn, the reasons why Schmidt was so 
devoted towards arms limitations were threefold- firstly, his personal 
interest in mutual force reductions; secondly, his SPD party’s interest in 
disarmament generally,' and finally, his sense of rivalry with the Federal 
Foreign Ministry and the Chancellor’s Office, because he had been cut out of 
the implementation of the new government’s Ostpolitik..1^ 1 Following the
163 AAPD 1970. Dok. 80, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amet,
27.2.1970.
164 Ibid.
165 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung. p. 536. Schmidt had a direct connection 
with Grewe. The Defence Minister, reportedly, discussed MBFR with the Ambassador in 
early February 1970. TNA. FC041/681, Bonn tel no. 131 to FCO, 10.2.1970.
166 TNA. FCO 41/681, Bonn tel no. 131 to FCO, 10.2.1970.
167 Ibid.
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Defence Minister’s initiative, the Foreign and Defence Ministries submitted 
a joint paper on this topic to the Federal National Security Council on 6 
March 1970. This paper reflected Grewe’s suggestion mentioned above, 
proposing to make the subject of mutual balanced force reductions the 
central topic of a security conference in Europe.168 At the Security Council, 
the arguments that MBFR would be a counter proposal to the Soviet 
Conference initiative and would also be a supporting initiative to lessen US 
congressional pressure for a unilateral reduction in American troops in 
Europe, were accepted.169 This joint paper was adopted and Schmidt’s line 
was endorsed as official Federal German policy.170
With the support of the governmental decision, Defence Minister 
Schmidt firstly sounded out his most important partners* the British and 
Americans. On 24 March 1970, Schmidt visited London and met his 
counterpart, Denis Healey, in order to obtain cooperation on the balanced 
reduction of troops. The German Defence Minister insisted that “it would be 
essential to make a much more explicit and credible signal to the Warsaw 
Pact at the Rome meeting.” While stressing the necessity of starting from a 
sound negotiating position and not presenting a substantive proposal at this 
stage, the British Defence Secretary replied that a renewed call for MBFR 
could be valuable as a counter to the Soviet demand for a European security 
conference. In the end, they agreed to keep in close touch on the development 
of the work on force reductions.171 Though the British Defence Ministry was 
sceptical about MBFR, Schmidt had thus obtained conditional support from
168 AAPD 1970. Dok. 83, Vorlage des Auswartigen Amts und des Bundesministeriums der 
Verteidigung fur den Bundessicherheitsrat, 2.3.1970.
169 AAPD 1970. Dok.94, Aufzeichnung des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretars Dahrendorf,
6.3.1970.
170 According to British archival information, the Chancellor’s Office wanted a more 
“nuanced” line on a European security conference, because the Soviets’ conference proposal 
was a useful card for advancing Ostpolitik. (TNA. FCO 41/684, Bonn tel no. 508 to FCO,
5.5.1970.) Brandt and Bahr might well worry about the possibility tha t if MBFR, which the 
Russians disliked, was incorporated into a conference, Moscow might abandon the whole 
idea of a security conference, thereby depriving the FRG of a valuable card.
171 TNA. DEFE 13/691, Record of Discussion between the Defence Secretary and Herr 
Helmut Schmidt, 24.3.1970.
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Healey.
Bonn also succeeded in gaining very minimal consent from Washington. 
When Schmidt and Brandt visited Washington in early April 1970, the 
reactions of the American leader on MBFR matters were mixed. US 
Secretary of State Rogers positively welcomed Schmidt’s idea of appealing for 
a renewed MBFR proposal at the Rome NATO meeting. On the other hand, 
the US Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird, put forward the opinion that the 
West was not prepared to negotiate with the Eastern Bloc on the 
disarmament of conventional forces and that MBFR would be against 
America’s negotiating position on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. On 
the Presidential side, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor to the 
President, replied that the White House had not considered this topic 
thoroughly, but was not enthusiastic about Schmidt’s idea.172 It was clear 
that there was no agreed policy on MBFR in the Nixon government. However, 
when the Chancellor met the US President on 10 April 1970, Nixon, 
although highly unsympathetic, did not oppose the idea of a renewed MBFR 
signal, and told Brandt that it could be used but “only as propaganda”.173 
The American leader tried to avoid being too negative towards his German 
partner, although he could not be positive given the division of opinion 
within the Administration. In any case, it did appear that Nixon had 
indicated a minimal acceptance of the West German initiative, provided that 
it did not involve anything substantial. Thanks to this backing by 
Washington and London, however conditional, the FRG government was able 
to table its proposal within NATO.
Soon after Brandt’s return home, the West Germans submitted a paper 
on MBFR to the NATO Council on 16 April 1970, attaching a draft
172 AAPD 1970. Dok. 146, Gesprache des Bundesministers Schmidt in Washington, 7.4.1970. 
In fact, Kissinger and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a member of White House Staff and National 
Security Council Staff, were sceptical because they believed that the Russians could not 
withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe and therefore tha t there was no scope for 
negotiations of m utual reductions. TNA. FCO 41/684, Waterfield to Alexander, 4.5.1970.
173 AAPD 1970. Dok. 153, Aufzeichnung des Bundeskanzelers Brandt, 11.4.1970.
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Declaration on this subject. Avoiding mention of force reduction models 
which could be interpreted as a substantive proposal, the draft Declaration 
focused on the criteria for mutual disarmament and called upon Eastern 
countries to hold exploratory talks.174 Within this paper, the Germans 
formally proposed to combine MBFR with a European security conference or 
conferences, illustrating that at the first conference, participants would 
adopt MBFR as a main issue and establish a working group. Then it would 
tackle this topic in detail and draw up concrete proposals which would be 
presented at a second conference. The draft Declaration on a renewed MBFR 
signal, which was written to be attached to the communique of the Rome 
NATO meeting in May 1970, and called upon the Warsaw Pact countries to 
hold exploratory talks on mutual forces reductions, was Germany’s main tool 
to raise the question of MBFR with the Eastern Bloc and public opinion. 
Thus, with the new West German government’s initiative, the Western 
proposal for disarmament detente came to the fore again, along with other 
East-West negotiations in the early 1970s. At the same time, the relationship 
between a European security conference and MBFR would become one of the 
contentious points within the Atlantic Alliance.
NATO Ministerial Meetings in Rome
In retrospect, the spring 1970 meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers were the 
watershed in the establishment of multilateral European detente. It is hence 
unsurprising that the disputes before and during the meetings were most 
heated, complex, and confusing. Although each government took a different 
stance towards East/West relations, the principal controversy was between a 
UK-Belgium coalition which wanted a communique which included a
174 As regards the criteria, see, Christoph Bluth, “Detente and Conventional Arms Control- 
West German Policy Priorities and the origins of MBFR,” German Politics. 8/1 (1999), p. 193.
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proposal for starting multilateral dialogue, and the stance of the United 
States and France that insisted on the continuation of bilateral talks.
The permanent NATO Council meeting on 16 April 1970 was the 
starting point of a dynamic NATO diplomacy towards its Rome Ministerial 
meeting scheduled for 26-27 May 1970. First of all, as mentioned above, the 
German delegation submitted the draft Declaration of MBFR. Although 
Greece, Turkey and Portugal were reluctant to discuss this, and the United 
States was less than enthusiastic, this German initiative was welcomed by 
most member states other than France. However, Washington and Paris 
were strongly opposed to Bonn’s idea that mutual force reductions would be 
an agenda item of a European security conference- the Americans disliked a 
ESC and the French disliked MBFR and thus both opposed any linkage 
between the two. Secondly, the Belgian delegation presented a framework for 
the Communique that would be published after the May 1970 Ministerial 
meeting.
The tone of the Belgian framework was forthcoming and constructive, 
but the content was highly controversial. There were two significant points. 
Firstly, the Belgians transformed in masterly fashion the conference agenda 
proposed by the Eastern bloc in the Prague Declaration of October 1969, 
re-arranging it to suit Western tastes. The Belgian representative suggested 
three sets of substantive subjects for East/West talks- Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions, the renunciation of force expanded into a code of good 
conduct, and finally the expansion of the item on economic and technical 
contacts to include problems of human relations.175 The last two items were 
an enlarged version of what the East had presented. For many NATO 
partners, this was a welcome suggestion. Yet, for others, like the Americans, 
it sounded unpleasant because it implied the acceptance of the Warsaw 
Pact’s proposal for a multilateral conference. Therefore the latter insisted
175 TNA. FCO 41/7481, UKDEL NATO tel no. 204 to FCO, 6.4.1970; AAPD 1970. Dok. 166, 
Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Austwartige Amt, 17.4.1970.
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that only MBFR should be a topic of East/West negotiations.176
Another aspect of Brussels’ suggestion was more contentious. Andre de 
Staercke, the Belgian Ambassador to NATO, proposed to include in the 
communique an announcement of immediate and unconditional multilateral 
preliminary negotiation at the ambassadorial level. Many official 
representatives, including American, French, West German, Italian, Dutch, 
Turk, Greek, and Portuguese representatives, were strongly against 
proclaiming the start of multilateral negotiations, because they thought that 
there had still been no substantive progress since the previous December in 
the ongoing bilateral talks on SALT, between Bonn and Moscow, Warsaw and 
East Berlin, and in the Berlin Four Power talks. 177 Among these 
representatives, the Americans and the French were the most vehemently 
against any reference in the communique to any form of multilateral 
negotiations.178 US Ambassador Robert Ellsworth criticised the Belgian idea 
as “the conference for the conference” and rejected it.179 The French also 
argued that it would be dangerous to start a new conversation when talks 
were still at such a preliminary stage on Germany and Berlin, and that any 
reference to a multilateral approach would erroneously imply their approval 
of bloc-to-bloc negotiations.180 For Paris, bilateral approaches were still 
appropriate for exchanges with the Eastern Bloc.
On the other hand, the British, Belgians, Canadians, Danish, 
Norwegians, Icelanders, and Luxembourgers supported multilateral 
negotiations. Britain and Belgium in particular led this group. As argued 
above, Britain had already been working with Belgium since mid-March
176 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 274, Repan-Bruxelles tel no. 958/966 to Paris,
21.5.1970.
177 Ibid.
178 AAPD 1970. Dok. 166, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Austwartige Amt, 
17.4.1970; TNA, FCO 41/748, UKDEL NATO tel no. 204 to FCO, 6.4.19701 UKDEL NATO tel 
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12.5.1970.
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1970. As a result, after the Belgians presented their draft framework on 16 
April 1970, London and Brussels jointly drafted a communique for the May 
1970 NATO Ministerial meeting.181 In the draft paper, the British concept of 
a Standing Commission was skilfully inserted as one of the possible forms of 
permanent machinery for East/West exploratory multilateral talks. The 
British and Belgians began to sell their proposals to other NATO partners 
hand in hand, but their starting position within the Atlantic Alliance was 
undoubtedly weak.
The UK government also attempted to bring West Germany on side 
through MBFR matters. The British prepared their own draft Declaration on 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which adapted much of the line 
taken by West Germany’s draft, but amended it to suit the Anglo-Belgian 
draft communique.182 Supporting Germany’s idea of a separate Declaration 
on MBFR and fulfilling FRG’s demands, the British draft also suggested 
offering multilateral exploratory talks immediately after the May 1970 
NATO meeting. London hoped to hold such exploratory negotiations on 
mutual force reductions in a Standing Commission.183
The West Germans, however, preferred to begin their exploration of the 
possibility of real negotiations on force reductions bilaterally, although they 
wanted to connect MBFR with a European Security Conference when the 
latter was held.184 They generally opposed any multilateralisation of detente 
before their new Ostpolitik had been concluded. This stance was shown in a 
Planning Staff paper, arguing that the Europeanisation (that is 
multilateralisation) of the German question would reduce Bonn’s freedom of 
diplomatic action because, firstly, East Berlin would use a multilateral
181 TNA. FCO 41/747, UKDEL NATO tel no. 221 to FCO, 24.4.1970; UKDEL NATO tel no. 
226 to FCO, 25.4.1970.
182 Ibid., FCO 41/684, Draft Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,
29.4.1970.
183 The British Foreign Office had already developed the idea to connect the concept of a 
Standing Commission with MBFR from late March 1970. TNA. FCO 41/682, Waterfield to 
Brimelow, 24.3.1970.
184 Ibid., UKDEL NATO tel no. 204 to FCO, 16.4.1970.
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conference as the forum for its peace offensive, and, secondly, the 
participants of such a conference would have a say on the German question, 
even if they had no direct involvement in this problem. The paper 
recommended, therefore, that the FRG should not enter into discussion of 
the substance of a European security conference or its procedural problems 
at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting.185 The Auswartige Am t was 
“positive on principle” towards a Conference on European security, because 
they saw it as “a suitable means to maintain peace, to relax East-West 
relations, and to overcome intra-German confrontations.”186 They thought, 
however, that first of all they should wait for the results of the Quadripartite 
Berlin talks, inner-German negotiations and bilateral talks in Moscow and 
Warsaw.187 Therefore, it was totally unacceptable for the West German 
Foreign Ministry to launch multilateral talks immediately, even if they were 
exploratory and at a low level.
Soon after the Anglo-Belgian draft communique and the British draft 
Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions were submitted,188 
the US government also tabled its own draft communique on 4 May 1970. 
The American counter-proposal was not substantially different from the final 
communique of the December 1969 NATO Ministerial meetings, in other 
words it was far from forthcoming.189 The Canadian Ambassador at NATO 
described it as a “formula of inaction.”190 There were thus two draft 
communiques, which were so different that Manlio Brosio, the NATO 
Secretary General, lamented the situation, saying that it might be 
impossible to reach a compromise between the two texts.191 However, this
185 AAPD 1970. Dok. 197, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Oncken, 5.5.1970.
186 Politisches Archiv, Auswaertiges Amt, Berlin, B-40, Bd. 185, Konferenz iiber die 
Sicherheit Europas (KSE), Sachstand, 15.5.1970.
“ 7 Ibid.
188 One can find the text of the Anglo-Belgian draft communique and the British draft 
Declaration on MBFR in the file of TNA. FCO 41/626.
189 TNA. FCO 41/626, Ellsworth to Brosio, 4.5.1970.
190 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 274, Repan-Bruxelles tel no. 758/766 to Paris,
12.5.1970.
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negative American draft proved totally counterproductive and actually 
further stimulated the pre-Rome Council diplomacy.
After the two draft communiques appeared, some countries began to 
show signs of changing their positions. Firstly, the Netherlands gradually 
moved towards the Anglo-Belgian position, although they were not 
immediately in a position to accept it in full. The Dutch government was 
dissatisfied with the American draft, because they believed it was important 
that NATO should be seen by European public opinion to be taking a 
forthcoming and constructive approach to detente.192 To the surprise of 
Bernard Burrow, the UK Ambassador at NATO, by mid-May 1970, the 
Greeks had also rallied to the British-Belgian draft text.193
The Canadians also changed their minds and came to regard the 
Anglo-Belgian draft communique as “ideal but unattainable,” because they 
thought the Americans would never accept it. In vain, the British delegate at 
NATO asked his Canadian counterpart to support the Anglo-Belgian text 
and put pressure upon the US government.194 Rather, on 11 May 1970, the 
Canadian government circulated a new draft Declaration on the mutual 
reduction of forces in order, according to the Canadian delegation, to 
persuade the reluctant Americans to go as far as they could. There were two 
points on which the Canadian paper differed from the Anglo-Belgian text. To 
begin with, Ottawa tried to make MBFR the only subject for a new initiative 
at the Rome meeting,' and then it suggested that Italy, the country chairing 
the May 1970 NATO meeting, could explore the possibility of negotiation on 
this topic with the East on behalf of the Alliance, instead of summoning a 
multilateral exploratory meeting, which the Americans still hated.195 
Interestingly, the Canadian draft paper also prompted a further change.
192 Ibid., Washington tel no. 1448 to FCO, 12.5.1970; FCO 41/749, UKDEL NATO tel no. 256 
to FCO, 6.5.1970.
193 TNA. FCO 41/628, Ministerial Meeting in Rome 26-27 May, Note for Secretary of State’s 
Meeting on 18 May Present Position and Tactics, 16.5.1970.
194 TNA. FCO 41/749, UKDEL NATO tel no. 256 to FCO, 6.5.1970.
195 Ibid., FCO 41/684, Pemberton-Pigott to Waterfield, 11.5.1970.
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The third important shift of position was brought about by the FRG, 
because Bonn disliked the second point of the Canadian proposal. The 
Germans were loath to give the Italians a prominent role in East-West 
negotiations, probably because they were worried that the MBFR talks 
would be less easy for them to controlled and hence would be more liable to 
interfere with their Ostpolitik. Instead, the Federal government preferred 
the British idea that Italy would just officially inform the Warsaw Pact of the 
contents of NATO’s communique and Declaration on their behalf through 
diplomatic channels but without any soundings being taken.196 Although 
West Germany and the Chancellor’s Office in particular were still reluctant 
to accept the reference to “multilateral exploratory discussions” in a MBFR 
Declaration, the Canadian contribution served to push the FRG towards the 
Anglo-Belgian side.197
Meanwhile, the British strenuously pursued their diplomatic activity. 
In particular, Stewart, who was desperately keen to appeal to public opinion 
because of the approaching elections, made extraordinary efforts and showed 
great firmness. To start with, he agreed with his Foreign Office staff not to 
make any substantial compromises at official level during NATO Council 
consultations, despite pressures in the Council and from the General 
Secretariat to work out compromises before the Ministerial meeting.198 By 
mid-May 1970, therefore, the discussion amongst the permanent 
representatives in Brussels had come to an impasse.199 Instead, Stewart 
decided to persuade the US Secretary of State directly, partly because the 
UK Foreign Office knew that Rogers was interested in MBFR and therefore 
more flexible than other US leaders.200 However, when Stewart visited 
Washington on 15 May 1970, the US Secretary of State was still adamant
196 Ibid., FCO 41/684, Bonn tel no. 545 to FCO, 13.5.1970.
^  Ibid.
198 Ibid., FCO 41/626, Waterfield to Brimelow, 8.5.1970
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and stressed that he wanted to continue bilateral contacts.201 The 
ministerial face-to-face conversation did not provide a breakthrough. The UK 
Foreign Secretary had also sent a letter to the FRG Defence Minister 
Schmidt, and received a promising reply on 12 May 1970. Schmidt, stating 
that it was necessary to arrive at a meaningful common statement in the 
communique of the ministerial meeting, welcomed the Anglo-Belgian draft 
and agreed in principle with the presentation of the “procedural issues” at 
the Rome NATO meeting.202 As a result, the Foreign Office believed that the 
West Germans would be the most useful partner and attached great 
importance to German support.203 Within a week, Anglo-German officials 
met and reached almost complete agreement on a fine which they would 
follow in the May 1970 meeting. The Germans gave general support to the 
Anglo/Belgian text, but, despite Schmidt’s agreement, Foreign Minister 
Scheel and the Auswartiges A m t still resisted the use of the word 
“multilateral” in the communique.204 Nonetheless, a FCO official noted that 
“The Anglo-Belgian-German front would be pretty strong.”205
In addition, the Italians seemed inclined to adopt a constructive stance 
towards the Anglo-Belgian line. When Moro met Schumann on 20 May 
1970, the Italian Foreign Minister firstly stressed that Italy was in favour of 
a detente policy. In particular, he underlined the significance of offering 
mutual and balanced force reductions because, according to him, along with 
the reduction of military costs, MBFR would have a big psychological effect, 
would be a factor in detente and would be a counter-weight to fight against 
America’s tendency towards unilateral force withdrawals. As regards a 
European security conference, Moro expressed his mistrust of Moscow’s 
motivation and insisted that such a conference should be developed gradually.
201 Ibid., FCO 41/627, Washington tel no. 1492 to FCO, 15.5.1970.
202 Ibid., FCO 41/685, Jaffray to Deputy Under Secretary, 14.5.1970.
203 Ibid., FCO tel no. 177 to UKDEL NATO, 14.5.1970.
204 Ibid., Bonn tel no. 570 to FCO, 19.5.1970; FCO 41/628, Anglo-German talks, Bonn 19th 
May, 1970.
205 Ibid., untitled document written by the Western Organisation Department, 16.5.1970.
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As a result, the Italian Foreign Minister opposed the Anglo-Belgian rush to 
multilateral talks. However, while Moro did not think that the British 
Standing Commission idea was a good solution, he also considered that he 
had to respond to public opinion and an introductory exploration of the 
problems would be necessary.206
During the conversation with Moro, Schumann clarified his position 
towards the idea of European security conference. In the first place, he 
admitted that “he had been hesitated for a long time but changed his mind 
because he saw in such a conference a possible opportunity for the Eastern 
countries to get out of the hold of the Soviet Union and maintain their 
national personality.”207 The French Foreign Minister explained that his 
conviction was reinforced by the conversations he had had with the 
politicians of Eastern countries. However, Schumann warned that one 
should not thoughtlessly embark upon a project of a conference on European 
security. He still thought that “the consecration of the status of Berlin” was 
“the real key of detente” and this was the pre-condition for the French to 
accept the convening of the conference.208 “Eventually,” he concluded, “the 
problem of the conference on security is the problem of approach- we want 
this conference but under conditions.”209 For the French, therefore, the 
tendency of the many NATO governments inclining to the Anglo-Belgian 
concept was dangerous. Paris was afraid that France, at worst, might have to 
dissociate itself from the essential part of a communique, if, for example, it 
contained an element leading to a conference or even multilateral 
negotiations immediately before the conclusion of the Quadripartite Berlin 
talks which had begun just two month before. Hence the Quai d’Orsay felt 
that France would have to “lead a game” at the Ministerial meeting in order
206 MAE, Serie Europe 1961-1970, Italie, carton 401, Entretiens entre M. Maurice 
Schumann et M. Aldo Moro, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d’ltalie (Paris, les 19 et 20 mai 
1970)- Compte-rendu de la seance de travail du mercredi 20 mai, 26.5.1970.
297 Ibid.
2°s Ibid.
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to avoid such a worst-case scenario.210
The Declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions was in the 
end adopted with few problems by all NATO countries except France.211 The 
French, the strongest opponent of the concept of MBFR, dissociated 
themselves from the Declaration. Furthermore, on French insistence, the 
paragraph on MBFR in the final communique of the Ministerial meeting, 
was separated from that on the issues of a European security conference, 
implying that mutual reductions of troops would not necessarily be on the 
agenda of such a conference.212 While the West German request for an 
independent Declaration on force reductions was thus fulfilled, the FRG had 
to moderate its desire for a clear statement connecting MBFR and a 
European security conference and content itself with a more ambiguous 
phrase in the face of the vehement opposition from France and the USA.
At the meeting of NATO Ministers in Rome, it became clearer that most 
Ministers wanted a constructive communique. Many of them thought that 
NATO should pay heed to public opinion and especially the younger 
generation, by demonstrating NATO’s political as well as military 
importance and its openness towards detente.213 Even the US State 
Secretary Rogers said in his speech that “the communique of the present 
meeting should go considerably further than before in showing a desire to 
negotiate. Our response should be clearly positive and forthcoming.”214 The 
Americans did not so much as mention procedure.215 Eventually, the 
forward-looking basic line of the Anglo-Belgian draft was accepted.
However, opinions were divided on the most controversial point- an
210 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 274, NOTE a/s • Prochaine session ministerielle du 
Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord (26-27 mai 1970), 22.5.1970.
211 As regards the text of the Declaration on MBFR, 
http-//www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c700526b.htm
212 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961*1970, carton 274, a.s. Reunion Ministerielle du Conseil 
Atlantique, 3.6.1970.
213 AAPD 1970. Dok. 240, Staatssekretar Duckwitz, z.Z. Rom, an das Auswartige Amt,
27.5.1970.
214 TNA. FCO 41/628, Rome tel no. 489 to FCO, 26.5.1970.
215 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 274, Rome tel no. 1066/1079 to Paris, 26.5.1970.
117
offer of an immediate start of multilateral exploratory talks without 
preconditions. At the Rome meetings, only the Danish, the Dutch, the 
Luxembourgers, and the Norwegians were still supportive of the 
UK-Belgium initiative. Others favoured the continuation of bilateral 
contacts. Indeed, West German Foreign Minister Scheel warned in his 
speech that “the Federal Republic’s talks with Eastern countries and the 
Quadripartite talks in Berlin should not be hampered by fitting them 
prematurely into a multilateral framework.”216 Faced with this situation, 
Stewart was finally forced to admit the link between the results of the 
German and Berlin talks and the opening of multilateral negotiations. Yet, 
the desire of the UK Foreign Secretary to offer “multilateral exploratory 
conversations” was unchanged.217 He clung to the multilateralisation of 
East/West dialogue. It was France, because it placed a high value on 
bilateralism, which until the very last moment opposed this and attempted 
to take out the word “multilateral.” At the very end of the meeting, the 
French, British and Belgian delegations worked out the following paragraph 
(paragraph 15 of the communique)-218
In so far as progress is recorded as a result of these talks and in the on-going 
talks -  in particular on Germany and Berlin — the Allied Governments state 
that they would be ready to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested 
governments. One of the main purposes of such contacts would be to explore 
when it will be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences on 
European security and co-operation. The establishment of a permanent body 
could be envisaged as one means, among others, of embarking upon 
multilateral negotiations in due course.219
Even though this was conditional and the wording very precise, the NATO
216 TNA. FCO 41/628, Rome tel no. 489 to FCO, 26.5.1970.
217 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 274, a.s. Reunion Ministerielle de Rome.
Discussion du communique, 4.6.1970.
219 Ibid.
219 http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c700526a.htm
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Foreign Ministers had finally made public their commitment to multilateral 
negotiations leading to a European security conference.
The final communique was surprisingly constructive. Given the 
marked reluctance of the Americans, the French and the West Germans to 
move to a multilateral phase of East/West negotiations, Britain, and in 
particular Stewart, had had to play a prominent leadership role within 
NATO. However unpopular the idea of a Standing Commission was, the 
British Foreign Secretary tenaciously led the Atlantic Alliance towards a 
positive stance towards multilateral European detente. In a sense, the 
British unintentionally contributed to pushing the West towards the CSCE, 
because they had disliked the idea of a European security conference and 
had invented the concept of a SCEWR as an alternative to a conference. 
However, British diplomacy alone is not a sufficient explanation for the 
results of the May 1970 NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome. More 
significantly, the preoccupation of many Ministers with the necessity to 
appeal to public opinion, and the younger generation in particular, combined 
with the growing atmosphere of relaxation arising from the start of 
Ostpolitik, the opening of the Quadripartite talks on Berlin, the 
German-German summits, and the launch of SALT played an undeniably 
important role in making NATO’s stance more forthcoming. The British 
initiative and Ministers’ concern about public opinion drove the West 
towards making a commitment to a multilateral East/West conference.
The commitment was conditional, however, and the next two chapters 
will therefore focus on the conditions. In other words, they will discuss the 
developments around a European security conference and inter-relationship 
between the CSCE, MBFR and Berlin.
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Chapter 3- IncreaBing priority of an ESC. June-December, 1970
With the May 1970 NATO Rome Communique and the Declaration of 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the West thought that it had gained 
the initiative. The Atlantic Alliance had appealed for a positive Western 
stance towards detente, in particular proposing mutual reductions of forces 
as well as presenting its commitment to the idea of a European security 
conference on condition that progress was recorded “in the on-going-talks -  
in particular on Germany and Berlin.”1 As British Foreign Secretary 
Stewart explained, “if, as I hope, the neutrals react favourably to the 
proposal, this could make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to be 
uncooperative”, and “if the Warsaw Pact rejects our proposals, it will be 
clear to public opinion that it is they and not we who are blocking 
progress.”2
Within six months of the Rome gathering, the attitude of NATO 
governments would harden remarkably. This change in the Western stance 
can be explained by two aspects. Firstly, one of the reasons for the Atlantic 
Alliance’s negative attitude at the end of 1970 was NATO’s inability to 
present a further forthcoming position on disarmament matters. The 
Warsaw Pact’s reply to the NATO Rome communique came promptly in 
June 1970 with a proposal for reductions of foreign troops in Central Europe 
in connection with an all-European conference. The East for the first time 
since 1967 indicated their interest in force reductions. This chapter must 
therefore begin by examining the reactions of the West, in particular 
concentrating to the MBFR project and an ESC. It will also highlight the 
division of Western opinion and the postponement of NATO’s decision on the
1 See Chapter 2.
2 The National Archives (Public Record Office)(hereafter TNA). FCO 41/631, FCO tel no. 
491 to Moscow, 28.5.1970; Documents on British Policy Overseas Ser. Ill, Vol.I, Britain and  
the Soviet Union, 1968-72 (hereafter, DBPO, III, I), p.238.
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question of mutual force reductions.
The second and more decisive reason for NATO’s shift to a more 
conservative attitude was the stalemate over the Berlin negotiations. The 
latter half of 1970 saw a very important development in the German 
question- the conclusion of Moscow talks between West Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The signing of the Moscow Treaty implied the de facto 
recognition of the GDR by the FRG; for Bonn it was modus vivendi but a 
crucial solution of the German question. The ratification of the Moscow 
Treaty was, however, finked to the settlement of the Berlin negotiations. 
Together with its linkage to a conference on European security, the Berlin 
problem became the central subject of detente in Europe. Yet, the 
Quadripartite Berlin talks made little progress in 1970. As a result, NATO 
took a very conservative position at the December 1970 Ministerial meeting.
While NATO was taking a tough fine, the French government and the 
President in particular became more favourable to the idea of a European 
security conference. Indeed, at the December 1970 NATO Ministerial 
gathering, France insisted on making a Berlin settlement the only 
precondition for a European security conference. In order to understand why 
the French adopted such an attitude, it is necessary to examine the 
inclination of Paris towards a multilateral European conference. France 
would eventually become the champion of taking multilateral European 
detente forward.
The British government also stopped opposing the ESC project. The 
new Conservative government, after winning the general election in June 
1970, adopted different policy priorities on a European security conference 
and MBFR than its predecessor. Unlike the Labour government, the Heath 
government disliked disarmament, and instead it would begin to regard a 
multilateral European conference as a lesser evil. The final six months of 
1970 would therefore be characterised by two trends- on the one hand NATO 
hardening its attitude, but on the other hand, France and Britain were more
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favourable to a conference on European security.
The Budapest Memorandum and force reductions
Following the forthcoming NATO communique of May 1970, the Warsaw 
Pact also responded in a positive fashion and moved slightly closer to the 
Western position, in particular on disarmament detente. On 21-22 June 
1970, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet and East European communist 
countries gathered in Hungary’s capital, and issued the so-called Budapest 
Memorandum. The Warsaw Pact’s response was well-thought out; it looked 
forthcoming, but the East stuck to its basic positions.3 Three points in the 
Memorandum are worth being mentioned. To begin with, by calling once 
again for a European security conference, the Eastern countries for the first 
time publicly accepted the participation of North American countries in it, 
something which had only been suggested informally to the West up to that 
point. In return, they did not forget to insist upon East Germany’s 
participation in a multilateral conference. Secondly, in regards to the 
agenda of the Conference, the Eastern countries agreed to discuss not only 
trade, economic, scientific and technical relations, but also cultural aspects 
of East/West relations including the problem of the human environment. 
However, they cautiously avoided referring to the “free movement of people 
and ideas.” 4 These two points gave the Budapest Memorandum a 
cooperative flavour. However, the third point was more significant.
Indeed, the Warsaw Pact indicated its interest in force reductions in
3 Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit undE ntspannung'zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 1955-1982, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, pp.444-445; Ljubivoje Achimovic, 
Problems o f Security and Cooperation in  Europe, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands; 
Rockville, Md., USA- Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981, p. 91.
4 The words in the Budapest Memorandum were ambiguous, and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko and other East Europeans confirmed later tha t they were opposed to the inclusion 
of this on the agenda of the conference. TNA. FCO 41/635, Fielding to Braithwaite,
8.7.1970.
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Europe.5 It was the first time since 1967 that the Eastern countries had 
formally suggested in public a disarmament project. Yet this was a very 
limited and conditional acceptance. The East offered reductions only for 
foreign troops, namely American and Soviet troops stationed in Central 
Europe, and did not include the indigenous forces of European states. In 
other words, while consenting to the West’s disarmament idea, the Russians 
attempted to make it manageable by reducing it to the sole superpowers. 
The Warsaw Pact also suggested that the talks on force reductions should be 
discussed in an “organ” that would be established by a European Conference. 
Skilfully grasping the West’s proposal in its Rome Communique for the 
establishment of a permanent body, the East suggested that the preparatory 
negotiations on MBFR would start only after the convention of a Conference. 
Exploiting NATO’s insistence on force reductions and a permanent body, the 
Warsaw Pact made a clever response through the Budapest Memorandum to 
push the West towards the organisation of a conference on European 
security.6 Therefore, NATO governments had to consider how to answer the 
East’s proposal for foreign force reductions, because it was one of the key 
factors that would characterise the next phase of East-West relations.
Yet, the Western bloc did not reply favourably to the East’s new stance 
on disarmament, partly because it caused divisions within the Western 
Alliance. While the US State Department and West Germany believed that 
starting conventional force reductions of foreign troops in Central Europe 
was an attractive idea, others like the Netherlands considered that this was
5 Reportedly, the opinions on force reductions among Communist governments were not 
unanimous. According to a Polish source via Belgium, which was revealed about 8 months 
later, the Rumanians, Hungarians and Poles had been the key players in Budapest in June 
1970 in getting force reductions into the Budapest Memorandum. On the other hand, the 
East Germans had been against any mention of force reductions. The Soviets had then 
mediated between the two sides, proposing the compromise Warsaw Pact position which 
eventually emerged. TNA. FCO 41/828, 2.3.1971, G rattan to Alexander.
6 Politisches Archiv, Auswaertiges Amt (hereafter PAAA), Berlin, B-40, Bd. 184, 
Aufzeichnung, Betr. Konferenz uber die Sicherheit Europas (KSE), hier: Kommunique der 
Konferenz der Aussenminister des Warschauer Pakts vom 21./22. Juni 1970 in Budapest, 
24.6.1970>* MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 278, Repan-Bruxelles tel no. 1196/1208,
1.7.1970.
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an unacceptable proposal. Another important reason was the change of 
British government, which led London’s policy on disarmament to become 
more negative. Finally, the Nixon government was cautious and shied away 
from taking a clear stance on MBFR. In the end, the Atlantic Alliance would 
not be able to take a further initiative on the problem of force reductions.
The American assessment and attitude towards the Budapest 
Memorandum were ambivalent. On the one hand, Washington was one of 
the Western governments that expressed its strong scepticism about the 
Warsaw Pact initiative. The US permanent representative to NATO, for 
instance, described the Memorandum “a trick for splitting the Alliance.”7 
On the other hand, the US Department of State was tempted by one 
element in the Memorandum* namely, the reductions of foreign forces.8 
Indeed, the Department saw in the reply from the Eastern Bloc a good 
chance to counter the persistent congressional pressure for unilateral US 
troop reductions. Although there was no agreed plan on how and by how 
much to reduce forces in Europe, this did not matter much to the State 
Department. When one British foreign official indicated to Martin 
Hillenbrand, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the US State 
Department, that there could be a danger that the Soviet Union would agree 
to MBFR before NATO had sufficiently clarified its own stance, he replied 
that: “even if the Russians did agree to discuss force reductions, there would 
be little danger. The experience of the lead up to SALT had shown the 
Americans that it was possible to play the Russians along for a considerable 
time before it was necessary to get down to brass tacks.”9 This remark 
clearly indicates that what the Americans thought it was more important to 
just start negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries, rather than 
conclude an agreement on disarmament, in order to demonstrate to the US
7 A kten zur Auswartigen Politik der Bundesrepublik D eutschland (hereafter, AAPD) 1970, 
R. Oldenbourg, 1999, Dok. 290, Gesandter Boss, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt,
1.7.1970.
8 TNA. FCO 41/687, Crowe to Braithwaite, 22.9.1970.
9 TNA. FCO 41/685, Braithwaite to Bendall, undated.
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Congress that they were negotiating with the ‘enemy’ and therefore could 
not reduce their troops unilaterally. It was thus not a problem for the 
Americans to start bilateral force reduction talks with the USSR because 
they thought they could easily control the speed of the negotiations.
One of the significant problems for the US government was, however, 
the connection between MBFR and a European security conference, since 
they saw little if any advantage in the latter. The Rome NATO Ministerial 
Meeting of May 1970 had illustrated the Alliance’s positive stance towards 
“multilateral preparatory discussions” and this had irritated the United 
States.10 Above all, the Warsaw Pact insisted in its Budapest Memorandum 
that it would be prepared to discuss the subject of force reductions only after 
the holding of a Conference. The Americans therefore tried to separate the 
two issues by suggesting a new forum in which MBFR would be discussed, 
implying that force reductions should be negotiated not in a Conference but 
in another forum, preferably before convening a Conference.11 By proposing 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions as an independent agenda item, the 
Department of State thought that it would be “a useful concrete alternative 
to a CES (Conference on European Security) — or if not alternative, a useful 
device for slowing down consideration of and progress towards it.”12 
Furthermore, the British Foreign Office observed that- “the Americans seem 
to believe that, by insisting on MBFR discussions separately from, and 
before, a conference, the latter can be postponed indefinitely.”13 In any case, 
for the United States, force reductions had to come first.
In contrast to the United States, West Germany seemed more 
receptive to the positive parts of the Eastern response to the West, though 
its examination of the Budapest Memorandum was as cautious as that of 
America. The FRG Foreign Ministry regarded the Soviet move as essentially
10 TNA. FCO 41/685, Waterfield to Bendall, 7.7.1970.
11 TNA. FCO 41/685, Wilcock to Alexander, 3.7.1970.
12 TNA. FCO 41/687, Crowe to Alexander, 25.9.1970.
13 TNA. FCO 41/687, Braithwaite to Cable, 20.10.1970.
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tactical- “to counter the NATO Communique and to further the prospects of 
a conference.”14 The Germans thought that by accepting mutual force 
reductions only in principle, the Soviets were attempting to make the 
convention of a European security conference more likely. Despite this 
evaluation, however, Chancellor Brandt publicly welcomed the 
Memorandum.15 Bonn’s representative to NATO also deemed the Warsaw 
Pact initiative as “a step in the right direction.”16 The reason for this 
positive attitude was, predictably, because the Eastern Bloc had shown the 
first official interest, albeit limited, in the idea of mutual force reductions. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the West German government was one of 
the most enthusiastic supporters of the disarmament project, and in order to 
study this subject more intensively, the Auswartiges Am t established an 
ad-hoc working group for MBFR on 10 July 1970.17 At the first meeting of 
the working group, Hellmuth Roth, the Assistant Under-Secretary 
supervising the Disarmament Department and the Chair of the group, 
explained the importance of force reductions in a broader context, that 
MBFR were composed of political, military and economic elements, and that 
therefore it should not be seen exclusively from a military point of view. He 
then stressed that- “MBFR is a complex edifice with the main goal of 
achieving a starting-base for a further initiative through negotiations over 
force reductions. MBFR was an important element on the road to a durable 
peace settlement.”18 Even if the East’s intention was mostly tactical, the 
Budapest Memorandum was of value to the West Germans as they sought to 
implement MBFR.
14 TNA. FCO 41/636, O'Neill to Braithwaite, 2.7.1970. This German’s view was also shared 
by the British Foreign Office.
15 Brandt was the only Western leader who welcomed the Budapest Memorandum in public. 
Against this, other NATO countries indirectly complained, stressing tha t each Alliance 
partner should withhold to public its opinion on it until NATO would reach a t a united 
evaluation of the Memorandum. The West German representative to NATO felt th a t this 
was unmistakably aimed a t his government. A A P D 1970, Dok.290, Gesandter Boss, Brussel 
(NATO), an das Auswartige Amt, 1.7.1970.
16 Ibid.
17 AAPD 1970, Dok. 303, Aufzeichnung des Legationsrats Ederer, 10.7.1970.
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This policy was indeed confirmed at the highest level of the Brandt 
government. On 16 October 1970, the Federal National Security Council 
(Bundessicherheitsrai) met and discussed MBFR. The Auswartiges Am t and 
the Federal Defence Ministry jointly prepared a memorandum on Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions, in which they recommended that the 
concept contained in the Budapest memorandum should be exploited 
politically- namely they argued that in order to develop the MBFR project, 
they should accept the Warsaw Pact’s offer to discuss the reduction of 
“foreign forces” only as a first step.19 During the Grand Coalition era of the 
late 1960s, the withdrawal of superpower forces from Europe had been 
totally unacceptable for the CDU/CSU/SPD government. By contrast, the 
SPD/FDP could accept foreign force reductions as a first stage if it would 
lead to mutual force reductions including indigenous troops in Central 
Europe. In addition, there would be a benefit for the FRG in the reduction of 
superpower troop s in Europe, because it could potentially avoid the GDR’s 
participation in multilateral negotiations on disarmament detente until an 
inner-German agreement was concluded, if only the US-USSR talks had 
gone ahead at that time. The negotiations for normalising relations between 
East and West Germanies had already begun. By addressing superpower 
disarmament first and postponing multilateral force reduction talks to a 
later stage, it could delay East Germany’ entry into international society 
and the recognition of its formal status, which the FRG wanted to avoid 
until after the conclusion of a German-German accord. Thus, Bonn could 
gain time for its bilateral negotiations with East Berlin. Considering these 
factors, the joint recommendation was approved as Federal Germany’s basic 
position.
Without doubt, the West Germans thought that a European security 
conference could be a good lever for pulling the Soviets into disarmament
18 Ibid.
19 AAPD 1970, Dok. 452, Vorlage des Auswartigen Amts und des Bundesministeriums der 
Verteidigung fur den Bundessicherheitsrat, 5.10.1970.
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detente in Europe. As discussed in chapter 2, the FRG government wanted 
to connect mutual force reductions and an ESC in order to secure the 
Warsaw Pact’s commitment to the project to reduce force levels. However, 
Bonn also noticed that Washington wanted to start MBFR alone, and before 
a Conference. The joint memorandum drafted by the FRG’s Foreign and 
Defence Ministries therefore proposed a new formula- “We are principally of 
the opinion that MBFR is a separate and independent subject that can be 
dealt with independently of a conference on security in Europe. On the other 
hand, we maintain that any ESC will also have to deal with the subject of 
mutual balanced force reductions.”20 This new German definition of 
MBFR/ESC relations was a compromise and covered both the West German 
and American positions. The Auswartiges Am t officials had carefully 
consulted about it beforehand with their counterparts in Washington, and 
the new formula had been accepted by the US government.21 The 
convergence of views with the Americans at this stage delighted the West 
Germans- a German document reported that “obviously, the United States 
have largely gotten closer towards [West German] opinion of relations 
between MBFR and a European Security Conference.” 22 As will be 
discussed in chapter 6, however, Bonn would later be forced to retreat from 
this position.
Since 1967, Britain had been a very good partner of West Germany in 
its quest to pursue disarmament detente. In the course of the latter half of 
1970, however, this changed. The general elections in June 1970 saw a 
surprise victory for the Conservative Party. In particular, the new 
administration, headed by Edward Heath, was more preoccupied with 
defence than detente. Certainly, even in the first few months of the Heath 
government, the Foreign Office still thought that the subject of mutual force 
reductions was NATO’s most important proposal. The FO and in particular
20 Ibid.
21 AAPD 1970, Dok. 428, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Ruth, 14.9.1970.
v 22 Ibid.
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new Ministers came to oppose this, however, after a new study on European 
security emerged. On 16 September 1970, the new report prepared by the 
Planning Staff and Western Organisation Department in the British 
Foreign Office, was completed and handed to the new Secretary of State, 
Alec Douglas-Home. This study paper then became a guiding text for British 
European security policy in general, and its policies towards a European 
security conference and MBFR in particular.23
The analysis of MBFR at the official level was basically the same as 
that of NATO, but its policy recommendation was more prudent. The 
Foreign Office study argued that- “Reductions in NATO’s conventional force 
levels, unless accompanied by very greatly disproportionate reductions on 
the Warsaw Pact side, will almost inevitably impair NATO’s relative 
position” because NATO’s conventional forces were already at the minimum 
level and because the Warsaw Pact had a geographical advantage in that 
any Soviet forces which had been withdrawn could come back to the 
European theatre faster than repatriated US troops. Asymmetrical force 
reductions were, however, unlikely to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The 
British paper confirmed that, in the MBFR project, negotiability and 
security were incompatible. “Recognising that the concept of MBFRs is full 
of difficulties and is unlikely to bring NATO many benefits,” the document 
continued, “it might seem that the UK should argue that the subject be 
dropped for the time being.” “This is not now, however, a realistic option,” 
because British partners, especially West Germany and America, were 
strong supporters of the force reduction initiative, and the Alliance had 
already adopted a position publicly. The paper recommended, therefore, that 
in order to pursue less dangerous disarmament, the West should gain 
“token” troop reductions from the Soviet Union.24 In short, British officials
23 This study contained three documents' (l) the general situation,' (2) Mutual and 
Balanced force Reduction,' and (3) a European security conference- tactics. TNA. FCO 
41/744, Bendall to Permanent Under*Secreatary, Private Secretary, 16.9.1970. As regards 
the three papers, see also DBPO, III, I, pp.262-3.
24 TNA. FCO 41/744, Bendall to Private Secretary, “European Security Paper 2. Mutual
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still preferred to keep any force reduction project at a minimum level in 
order to maintain the solidarity of the alliance and for the sake of public 
consistency.
Yet, on defence matters, Ministers were sterner than foreign officials. 
The Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home rejected the proposal of “token” 
reductions. Rather, he preferred “the line that only real security has any 
interest for the allies and that we should begin to run this line in NATO 
circles/’25 In other words, the Secretary of State ordered his officials to take 
a very firm stance on military security rather than embrace dangerous 
disarmament, even of a "token" variety. New Defence Secretary Lord 
Carrington and his Ministry also disliked the idea of mutual force 
reductions. When he and Douglas-Home met with the US State Secretary 
Rogers on 3 October 1970, Carrington made his view clear, stating that “he 
had the gravest misgivings on military grounds about the idea of force 
reductions.”26 The British conservative government then firmly retreated 
from the MBFR concept. Indeed, in order to put the brake on the rush into 
force reduction talks, on 13 October 1971, the Foreign Office instructed its 
delegation to NATO to insist to its Alliance partners that the NATO studies 
of MBFR should be done thoroughly and completely. This implied that the 
arguments on force reductions would be contained within the Alliance and 
the start of negotiations on that subject between the two blocs would be 
prevented at least for a time.27 London’s position on MBFR became much 
closer to that of Paris, which disliked disarmament detente, and further 
away from that of Bonn and Brussels.28 This also meant that “the
and Balanced Force Reductions”, 16.9.1970.
25 TNA. FCO 41/746, Graham to Bendall, 28.9.1970. As regards the Secretary of State’s 
comments on the papers, see DBPO, III, I, p.264.
26 TNA. FCO 41/687, “Extract from the conversation between the Secretary of State and 
Rogers”
27 TNA. FCO 41/687, Bendall to Penberton-Pigott, 13.10.1970.
28 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (hereafter MAE), Serie Europe 1966*1970, 
carton 2031, NOTE A/S. Conference europeenne et redution equilibree des forces,
23.10.1970. As regards the French reluctance to adopt military detente, see also, Michael 
Meimeth, Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre- Zwischen S ta tus quo und
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Anglo-Belgian-German front” that had appeared in May 1970 broke up.29 
As a result, the pro-disarmament detente camp in NATO became 
remarkably weaker.
Within NATO, therefore, it was the West Germans with the highest 
level of decisiveness, not the British, that tried to lead discussions on MBFR. 
Not surprisingly, Bonn’s new formula for relations between MBFR and an 
ESC, namely that MBFR could be discussed separately, but must be 
addressed in any conference on European security, was generally accepted 
in the Alliance, because it was well designed to be acceptable for both those 
who wanted to separate MBFR and a Conference and those who wanted to 
link them.30 This West German idea served to hide the potential conflict 
within NATO about the relationship between MBFR and an ESC. For some, 
such as the Belgians, MBFR was the only original and substantial element 
of the Western position.31 Therefore, it was important for them to 
incorporate the force reduction project in a conference on European security. 
Although NATO had already proposed the concept of “freer movement”, it 
was regarded by policymakers as just a counter-proposal to put the East on 
the defensive and not something of much substance. Many interviews have 
confirmed that Western diplomats did not expect the elements of “freer 
movement” to have a great impact in the Eastern Bloc.32 By contrast, the 
disarmament proposal was more concrete and substantial. However, for 
others, like the French, the Turkish, the Greek, and now the British, MBFR 
was seen as dangerous for European security. Therefore, it should be 
abandoned, or at least it should be separated from a Conference in order to
ffiedlichem  Wandel. D ieAra Georges Pompidou und Valery Giscard d ’Estaing,
Baden-Baden 1990, pp. 173*187.
29 TNA. FCO 41/746, Cable to Daunt, 16.11.1970. As for the “Anglo-Belgian-German front,” 
see chapter 2.
30 TNA. FCO 41/688, Pemberton-Pigott to Cable, 30.10.1970.
31 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 278, Repan-Bruxelle, tel no. 1610/1620, to Paris,
15.10.1970.
32 Daniel C. Thomas, The H elsinki E ffect-International Norms, H um an Rights, and the 
Demise o f Communism  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.1435 Robert 
Spencer, “Canada and the Origins of the CSCE,” in Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada and the
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be controlled independently. Yet, the new German formula made it possible 
to postpone the contention between the two sides on how to treat military 
aspects in a European security conference.
Another aspect of Bonn’s position, namely its insistence on regarding 
the reductions of “foreign forces” as a first step was, however, far more 
controversial. This German position was welcomed by Italy, Canada, 
Denmark, and Norway. The Italians agreed that priority should be given to 
the further study of “foreign forces” reductions. Canada was of the stronger 
opinion that NATO had to say something positive at its December 
Ministerial Meeting about the Warsaw Pact offer on foreign forces, in order 
not to “altogether close the door on MBFR.”33 The Netherlands, Turkey and 
Greece, however, opposed the German idea of accepting a discussion of 
foreign forces as a first step. The Dutch in particular saw a great risk in it, 
warning that “MBFR, as we had known it, would be pushed out of any 
discussions,” if superpowers bilaterally agreed on force withdrawals as a 
first step. The Hague was afraid that there would not be a next step.34 
Rather it thought that balanced force reductions should be undertaken 
multilaterally from the outset. The division of opinion in NATO made it 
difficult for the West to take a new initiative on MBFR.
Finally, this trend was accelerated by American indecisiveness on this 
matter. The enthusiasm of the State Department for mutual and balanced 
force reductions was curbed by the superior decision-making body: the 
National Security Council (NSC). The State Department had expected that 
the US government would consider the idea of proposing a 10% reduction of 
both American and Soviet forces in Europe. US diplomats had thought that 
this would not have any significant effects on European security, but would 
have a political impact in countering Congressional pressures.35 At the 19
Conference on Security and Cooperation in  Europe, University of Tront, 1984, p. 90.
33 TNA. FCO 41/687, Grattan to Alexander, 6.11.1970.
34 Ibid.
35 TNA. FCO 41/687, Crowe to Braithwaite, 10.11.1970; TNA. FCO 41/687, Meeting of 
British and American Officials in London on 19 November 1970.
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November 1970 NSC meeting, in which the MBFR problem was considered 
for the first time at the top level, however, the American leaders agreed to 
postpone a final decision on MBFR. Kissinger recommended continuing to 
study models of the asymmetrical reductions or “trade-off packages,” namely 
different types of cuts including not only conventional forces but also tactical 
nuclear weapons and tactical aircraft.36 This meant that the studies would 
take more time because of the complexity of the mixed package models, and 
that the 10% model was temporarily shelved. Secretary of State Rogers also 
argued at the meeting that the Soviets were not thinking about negotiations 
on force reductions, and stressed that “We should not decide anything on 
MBFR now.” 37 Consequently, the US government would not push its 
partners on this subject at the NATO Ministerial meeting. Therefore, 
although some NATO governments considered the Warsaw Pact’s initiative 
as a positive step, the Atlantic Alliance decided not to answer with a new 
proposal. Moreover, it was the log-jam of the Quadripartite Berlin talks that 
made the West’s attitude towards the East less forthcoming than it might 
otherwise have been.
Ostpolitik and Four Power B erlin Negotiations in 1970
While NATO governments discussed MBFR, negotiations on the German 
and Berlin problems continued in the latter half of 1970. The conclusion of 
the Moscow Treaty between Bonn and Moscow on 12 August 1970 was the 
most significant development, and also a historic moment in Cold War 
history. The importance of the Treaty in this study’s context is twofold. In 
the first place, West Germany’s de facto recognition of East Germany within 
the agreement between the FRG and the Soviet Union was crucial. The
36 The Digital National Security Archives (hereafter, DNSA), Kissinger’s Transcripts, 
Memorandum of Conversation, KT00211, 19.11.1970.
37 Ibid.
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negotiations, which had begun in Moscow in January 1970 between the 
State Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Egon Bahr, and the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, had been nominally for a non-use of force accord 
between the two countries.38 The talks were not limited to this, however; 
they were extended to working out the guidelines for the FRG’s relations 
with the Eastern Bloc in general, because Bonn intended to conclude 
follow-up treaties with other Warsaw Pact governments, in particular with 
East Berlin. It was vitally important for the Brandt government, therefore, 
to reach agreement first with Moscow before negotiating with the satellite 
countries. The relationship between the two Germanies and the recognition 
of existing borders were thus vital issues in the Moscow negotiations.
West Germany’s aim was to make the Soviet Union recognise the 
special -relationship between the FRG and the GDR. Bonn was ready to 
accept the equal status of the two Germanies. However, West Germany 
could not recognise East Germany in terms of international law, because it 
would mean the recognition of the permanent division of Germany, which 
was incompatible with the FRG’s constitution, the Basic Law, which 
identified German reunification as a fundamental objective. Even if the 
Brandt government had legally recognised East Berlin, the Parliament of 
the Constitutional Court of West Germany would have rejected it. Bahr 
insisted therefore on the importance of de facto recognition of the GDR as a 
modus vivendi in a treaty. De jure recognition was out of the question.39 For 
Bahr, the idea of a European security conference, which the Soviets wanted 
to hold, was a useful lever for the West Germans to achieve Moscow’s 
agreement, because “There [would] be no ESC without the Federal
38 For detailed and archival-based examination of the Moscow negotiations, see Werner 
Link, “Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags im Lichte neuer Archivalien,” 
Vierteljahrshefte fu r  Zeitgeschichte 49/2, 2001; Carsten Tessmer, ‘“Thinking the 
Unthinkable’ to ‘Make the Impossible Possible’: Ostpolitik, Intra-German Policy, and the 
Moscow Treaty, 1969-1970,” German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, Bulletin 
Supplement 1, 2004 “American Detente and German Ostpolitik, 1969—1972,” downloaded 
from: http://www.ghi-dc.org/bulletinS04_supp/bulletinS04_supp.index.html.
39 AAPD 1969, Dok. 412, Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretars Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt,
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Republic.”40
The more controversial problem in the Moscow talks, was Bahr’s 
proposal to send a letter to the Soviet government. In order to confirm the 
modus vivendi, over East German recognition, the State Secretary wanted 
to send a letter to the Russians, stating that the treaty was compatible with 
the FRG’s aim of German reunification. From the outset, Moscow seemed 
ready to accept Bonn’s insistence on non-legal recognition, though Gromyko 
had demanded the full-legal recognition of East Germany at an early stage 
in the negotiations. In fact, as early, as March 1969, the Soviet Ambassador 
in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, had made it clear to Kissinger that the 
Soviets did not care about the formal recognition of the GDR.41 However, 
Gromyko vehemently opposed Bahr’s suggestion for an exchange of letters.42 
For the Soviet Foreign Minister, the mention of reunification was 
unacceptable because Moscow’s official policy since 1955 had been the 
maintenance of two Germanies. It was the backchannel between Bonn and 
Moscow that served to break the impasse. On 21 May 1970, Yuri Andropov, 
the head of the KGB and the master of the secret channel on the Soviet side, 
directly convinced Brezhnev of the necessity of sufficient accommodation on 
the question of German unity. With new instructions from the top, Gromyko 
agreed to accept a letter from the Federal German government.43 After 
further negotiations between Scheel and Gromyko in July-August 1970, the 
two Foreign Ministers, together with Brandt and Soviet Prime Minister 
Kosygin, finally signed the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970.44
4.12.1969.
40 AAPD 1970, Dok. 8, Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretars Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt,
14.1.1970.
41 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, Lunch, March 3, 
KT00009, 6.3.1969.
42 AAPD 1970, Dok. 104, Gesprach des Staatssekretars Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, mit dem 
sowjetischen AuBenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 10.5.1970.
43 Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War'A H istory o f Detente, 1950-1991, Palgrave,
2002, p.108.
44 According to Sarotte, there were three major reasons for the Kremlin’s enthusiasm for 
the Moscow Treaty: firstly, the stabilisation on the USSR’s European “front” by the 
agreement on the status quo in Europe, in worrying about a China threat! secondly,
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Within the Treaty, along with mutual renunciation of force, Bonn and 
Moscow agreed to respect the “inviolability” of the existing frontiers. By this 
stipulation, the Brandt government de facto recognised the existence of the 
GDR and the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s Western border. At the same time, 
the West Germans accepted the equality of the FRG and the GDR. Yet, with 
Brandt’s letter, which was sent on the day of the signing, the Chancellor was 
able to make clear that, from the Federal German point of view, the Moscow 
Treaty was compatible with the Basic Law and its aim of future 
reunification. Thanks to the backchannel between Bonn and Moscow, the 
two governments were able to reach mutual acceptance of the reality of two 
Germanies.
Although the Moscow Treaty was in essence the confirmation of the 
status quo in Europe, it was vitally important for paving the way towards 
multilateral detente. As argued in chapter 1, the realisation of multilateral 
detente in any form had been prevented by the German question throughout 
the 1960s. Thanks to the Moscow Treaty, the German problem was given a 
provisional solution- the de facto recognition of East Germany.45 With this 
settlement, the FRG could in principle accept the participation on equal 
status of the GDR in a multilateral conference. The Treaty indicated that 
Moscow would not demand the de jure recognition of East Berlin in 
multilateral conferences. Brandt expected the Bonn-Moscow Treaty would 
lead to disarmament detente through MBFR.46 However, the West Germans 
did not rush into a European security conference. The German-German 
negotiations were still far from complete, and Bonn thought that the 
convention of a multilateral conference before the conclusion of
economic benefits expected by the good relations with West Germany! thirdly, its hope for 
the FRG’s inclination toward neutrality. M. E. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil- E ast 
Germany, Detente, and Ostpohtik, 1969-1973, University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp. 
69*70.
45 Needless to say, the true settlement of the German question for West Germany was 
German reunification and a peace treaty between a unified Germany and its former 
enemies.
46 Tessmer, “Thinking the Unthinkable,” p. 61.
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inner-German talks would work to East Berlin’s advantage. Moreover, in 
order to reach agreement with the GDR, the Brandt government had to 
solve the problem of Berlin- the divided city within East Germany.
The Quadripartite Berlin Talks in 1970
The second significance of the Moscow Treaty was the linkage between the 
Treaty and the Quadripartite Berlin negotiations. As discussed in chapter 2, 
the West, the French in particular, had already made the progress of 
German and Berlin talks a precondition for the opening of multilateral 
preparations for a European security conference. In addition, the West 
Germans also made the settlement of the Berlin problem the precondition of 
the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Scheel had made this clear during his 
negotiations with Gromyko,47 and after the signing of the Treaty, Brandt 
also made this point in public in his interview with Newsweek; underlining 
the link between a “satisfactory” settlement of the Berlin problem and 
ratification of the Treaty.48 This connection was dubbed the “Junktim” As a 
result of these linkages, the Berlin question became the very centre of the 
whole detente process in Europe. It was the United States, Britain, France 
and the Soviet Union, not East and West Germany, let alone smaller 
countries, however, that had the prerogatives and responsibility with regard 
to Berlin,* hence the FRG (and the GDR) could only participate indirectly in 
the formal Quadripartite talks. Understanding the process of European 
detente thus needs an understanding of the problem of Berlin and of the 
Four-Power diplomacy in dealing with the city.
The Berlin question was highly complex and took much longer to be 
settled than the Moscow negotiations. Although there were many problem
47 See for example, AAPD 1970, Dok. 335, Gesprach des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem 
sowjetischen AuBenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 27.7.1970.
48 Honore M. Catudal, The Diplomacy o f the Quadripartite Agreem ent on Berlin: A  New  
Era in  East-W est Politics, Berlin Verlag, 1978, p. 118.
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areas to be solved in order to achieve a final Berlin agreement, three points 
were most fundamental.49 The first problem was the definition of the status 
of Berlin. While the US, France and the UK argued that the Four-Power 
responsibility for Berlin covered all the city, the Soviet Union insisted that 
the negotiations and a final agreement on Berlin must be limited to the 
Western Sectors, because, according to the USSR, the Soviet Sector had 
already been delegated to East German sovereignty. Yet, the Western Three 
did not recognise the GDR as a member of international society,' hence, they 
could not accept Moscow’s stance. In particular, the three Western 
governments were afraid that full diplomatic recognition of the GDR would 
erode the Allied legal position in Berlin.50 The basic positions of East and 
West on the status of Berlin were completely incompatible.
The second major contention on Berlin was the problem of access to 
West Berlin, which the Western Three regarded as the most important issue. 
The West contended that rights of access were included in the Four-Power 
prerogatives to the city; therefore all access to it must be free from 
restrictions. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, countered that only the 
military access of the Allies to West Berlin was included and, thus, civilian 
access had to be controlled by the GDR authorities because the transit 
routes were through the East German territory. The third crucial problem 
was the relationship between West Germany and West Berlin or the 
problem of Federal presence. From the Western point of view, and for the 
West Germans in particular, the connections between the FRG and the 
Western Sectors were vital for people living in West Berlin, an isolated 
island in communist territory. For a long time, however, the USSR and East
49 Political scientist Honore Catudal has pointed out ten major problem areas in the Berlin 
negotiations, which demonstrates how complex the talks were: (a) the status of Berlin; (b) 
recognition of the GDR; (c) relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic; (d) 
FRG representation of West Berlin abroad; (e) visits by West Berliners to East Berlin and 
East Germany; (f) access to Berlin; (g) the question of exclaves,' (h) improvements in 
external communication,' (i) increased Soviet presence in West Berlin,' and (j) the 
consultation mechanism. Ibid., p. 233.
50 Ibid., pp. 245-6.
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Germany strongly contended that West Berlin was “an independent political 
entity” existing under Four-Power status. The presence of West Germany in 
West Berlin was hence considered “illegal” by the East.51 Resolution of 
these three controversial and difficult points were essential for concluding 
an agreement on Berlin among the “Big Four.” Yet the still more significant 
reasons why the negotiations on Berlin, which had begun in March 1970, 
made little progress in their first year, was the reluctance of the Western 
Three to allow an early conclusion and Moscow’s hesitation about making 
substantial concessions that would damage the integrity of the official 
Soviet position concerning Berlin and East Germany.
It was the Russians who .first indicated willingness to compromise. At 
the early stage of the Berlin negotiations, both sides had fruitlessly 
continued to reiterate their basic stances and presented them “without even 
a hint of willingness to compromise.”52 After the conclusion of the Moscow 
Treaty, however, Moscow evidently took a positive position in order to allow 
the Quadripartite talks to advance. When Brandt visited Moscow for the 
signing of the Treaty on 12 August 1970 and emphasised the Junktim 
between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and the Berlin negotiations, 
Brezhnev replied to the Chancellor that he did not exclude the possibility of 
reaching a solution of the Berlin problem acceptable to all concerned, but he 
also warned that it would depend on whether giving the impression that the 
USSR was being subjected to pressure could be avoided.53 More clearly, 
three weeks after the signing, Pyotr Abrasimov, the Soviet Ambassador in 
East Berlin and the USSR negotiator of the Quadripartite talks, reportedly 
asked his American counterpart, Kenneth Rush, to accelerate the 
negotiations.54 Abrasimov also approached the French Ambassador, Jean
51 David M. Keithly, Breakthrough in  the O stpolitik’ the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, 
Westview Press, 1986, p. 120.
52 Quoted in Sarotte, Deeding With the Devil, p. 72.
53 AAPD 1970, Dok. 388, Gesprach des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit dem Generalsekretar 
des ZK der KpdSU, Breschnew, in Moskau, 12.8.1970.
54 Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), 5 AG 2 / 1009, NOTE a.s. E tat des negociations
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Sauvagnargues, and pressed him to agree to draw up a bilateral 
Franco/Soviet paper on the possible shape of a new Berlin agreement, 
although the French Ambassador declined.55 Still more importantly, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister made a more concrete proposal when he met with 
the US President Nixon on 22 October 1970. Having assured his host that 
the Soviet Union had no intention of weakening the status of the Allied 
powers in West Berlin, Gromyko indicated that the Soviet government was 
ready to find a favourable solution to the access problem. At the same time, 
while implying Moscow’s acceptance of economic, cultural and financial 
links between the FRG and West Berlin, he demanded the curtailment of 
West German political activities in the Western Sectors and listed FRG 
activities not to be permitted in West Berlin, such as meetings of the West 
German Bundestag in Berlin, meetings of various Bundestag committees, 
and the activities of the West German Chancellor in West Berlin.56 In 
retrospect, the proposal of a deal which exchanged the acceptance of 
unrestricted access to West Berlin for a reduction in the FRG’s political links 
with the city would become the basis for the final agreement on Berlin. 
However, the negotiations did not accelerate as the Russians had expected.
The Western Three did not want to hasten the Quadripartite talks. In 
particular, the United States and Britain were not going to make 
compromises so as to reach an early conclusion. They thought that their 
negotiating position was stronger, and they had no incentive to rush into an 
agreement. Rather, they wanted to keep controlling the pace of the 
development of detente.57 In replying to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Nixon
quadripartites sur Berlin -addendum-, 16.9.1970.
55 TNA. FCO 41/744, Mallaby to the Western Organisation Department, 9.10.1970. As 
regards the Soviet approach to the French, see also AAPD 1970\ Dok. 453, Aufzeichnung 
des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse van Well, 7.10.1970; Georges-Henri Soutou, “La 
France et 1’accord quadripartite sur Berlin du 3 septembre 1971,” revue d ’histoire 
diplomatique, no.l, 2004, p. 60; Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p. 74.
56 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [between Nixon and 
Gromyko], KT00202, 22.10.1970.
57 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [Meeting of the National 
Security Council], KT00198, 14.10.1970.
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stressed that “the umbilical cord between the city and the FRG could not be 
cut.”58 Without rejecting Gromyko’s proposal, the US President however 
presented a tough stance* “We could not agree to eliminating all political 
ties for the simple reason that we could not sell this to the FRG any more 
than the FRG could sell this to its own people.”59 In fact, Nixon had lost his 
incentive to settle the Berlin problem in the latter half of 1970, as the White 
House’s decision — National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 91 -  
clearly stated that “the President considers the present arrangement to be 
an adequate basis for fulfilling our obligations. A new four power agreement 
is, therefore, not an essential requirement in terms of our interest or our 
policy.”60 Although, as described in the previous chapter, it had been Nixon 
who had originally shown an interest in the Berlin problem in early 1969, 
after 20 months of his presidency, the US President seemed to have grown 
accustomed to the existing Berlin situation. Indeed, NSDM 91 illustrated 
Washington’s intention to make few concessions. US Secretary of State 
Rogers also told British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home on 3 October 1970 
that- “the Russians were anxious that the Soviet/German treaty should be 
ratified, and they knew that the Federal German government want this. 
This was therefore a good time for the West to get something concrete in 
return.”61 To put it another way, the Americans understood that they were 
in a strong position in respect to the Soviets in the Berlin talks,* they 
therefore decided to take a stance of just waiting for Moscow’s surrender.
The British position was close to the one of the Americans.62 When the 
Soviet side showed a clear desire to accelerate the negotiations at the end of 
September 1970, the Foreign Office instructed the British Ambassador,
58 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [between Nixon and 
Gromyko], KT00202, 22.10.1970.
59 Ibid.
60 DNSA, Presidential Directives, National Security Decision Memorandum [91: United 
States Policy on Germany and Berlin], PD01229, 6.11.1970.
61 TNA. FCO 41/687, Extract from the conversation between the Secretary of State and 
Rogers, [3.10.1970].
62 Catudal, The Diplomacy o f the Quadripartite, p. 98.
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Roger Jackling, to oppose any move towards intensive negotiations.63 When 
Gromyko visited London on 27 October 1970, Douglas-Home’s attitude was 
very reserved on Berlin matters.64 Relations between Britain and the USSR 
had worsened anyway because of the Soviets’ espionage activities in the 
United Kingdom.65 Partly because of this, London also continued to take a 
hardline stance in the Quadripartite talks. As Jackling put it* “The best 
Allied tactic seems to be to stand fast and insist that Soviet concessions are 
inadequate.”66 Although the West Germans as well as the Russians wanted 
to move quickly, the Americans and the British kept putting a brake on the 
Berlin negotiations.
Compared with the United States and Britain, France, and the Quai 
d’Orsay in particular, was ready to give some ground on Berlin.67 For Paris, 
the relations between the FRG and West Berlin were less important than 
the problem of access and the Four-Power prerogatives on the city. The 
French tended to stress the separation between Bonn and West Berlin more 
than the Americans or the British and were therefore reluctant to 
emphasize even the non-political ties between the two.68 However, the 
French President did not want to quicken the tempo of the talks. He thought 
that “Brandt went too fast.”69When Foreign Minister Schumann proposed to 
make public the French positions on the Berlin matters, for example, 
Pompidou rejected the idea and instead instructed Schumann to wait and 
explore Moscow’s intentions. “After seeing [the Soviet] reactions,” he 
continued, “we will see what we have to do.”70
63 DBPO, III; I, Doc. 52, fn. 7, pp. 265-6.
64 Ibid., Doc. 53, Record of conversation between Sir A. Douglas-Home and Mr. Gromyko at 
the Foreign & Commonwealth Office a t 11 a.m. on Tuesday, 27 October 1970.
65 See Geraint Hughes, ‘“Giving the Russians a Bloody Nose’-l Operation Foot and Soviet 
Espionage in the United Kingdom, 1964-71,” Cold War History, vol. 6, no. 2, 2006.
66 DBPO, III, I, Doc. 55, fn. 15, p. 284.
67 Catudal, The Diplomacy o f the Quadripartite, pp. 97-98.
68 DNSA, Presidential Directives II, Four Power Negotiations on Berlin, PR00688,
18.1.1971.
69 Eric Roussel, Georges Pompidou 1911-1974, Nouvelle edition, revue, augumentee, etablie 
d ’apres les archives du quinquennat (1969-1974), J.C. Lattes, 1994, p. 404.
70 AN, 5 AG 2 / 1009, Annotation du President, 2.11.1970.
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Another significant point concerning the French was their mistrust of 
the Germans, which led to an important French procedural proposal. As 
early as September 1969, Pompidou’s diplomatic advisor, Jean-Bernard 
Raimond, had already pointed out a dangerous effect of the FRG’s detente 
policy, arguing that* “the foundations of the presence of three Allies in West 
Berlin could be called into question if the recognition of ‘reality’ went too far. 
Even if the Bonn government succeeded in controlling its rapprochement 
policy with the East, the juridical and political balance in Berlin, which is 
fragile, would be at risk of being shaken.”71 The East German declaration of 
its willingness to resume German-German talks at expert level on 29 
October 1970 increased French anxiety that the GDR and the USSR might 
attempt to make an agreement on Berlin between the two Germanies and 
not amongst the Four-Powers, and then present the British, Americans and 
French with a fait accompli. 72 Schumann then warned Scheel on 2 
November 1970 that “the Four-Power negotiations should not be emptied by 
German expert talks.”73 The French were not solely concerned with the 
East, but also with the West Germans. They worried that the Brandt 
government might make unacceptable concessions on Berlin so as to obtain 
the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Indeed, Raimond wrote to Pompidou 
on 2 November 1970, cautioning that “probably, one must envisage a rapid 
sliding of the Bonn government towards new concessions on Berlin.”74 
When the French President met his American counterpart on 12 November 
1970, Pompidou also emphasised his doubts about the ability of the West
71 AN, 5 AG 2 /1009, Note pour Monsieur le President de la Republique, 8.9.1969.
72 A recent study has revealed tha t it was the Soviets tha t suggested the East Germans 
resume inner-German talks in October 1970. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p. 85. 
According to Sarotte, East Berlin hoped tha t “the German-German accord would stand on 
its own and that the Soviet Union, in its dealings with the three Western powers, would 
merely take official note of it,” though Gromyko did not respond directly to the GDR’s 
concerns. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p .102.
73 AAPD 1970, Dok. 506, Gesprach des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem franzosischen 
Auhenminister Schumann in Paris, 2.11.1970.
74 AN, 5 AG 2 /1009, Note pour Monsieur le President de la Republique, 2.11.1970.
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Germans to stand firm.75 For the French, therefore, it was imperative to 
keep control of the developments relating to the Berlin question in order to 
retain their rights on the city.
Hence the procedure by which to deal with the Berlin problem became 
highly significant for the French government. Indeed, Paris contrived a 
three-stage process to complete an agreement on Berlin,76 which is also 
significant because, as will be argued in the next chapter, it would affect the 
process towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The 
first stage of the procedure was the Four-Power negotiations on and around 
Berlin, which would establish basic principles for the city. The second stage 
was to be a more detailed and technical arrangement on transit between the 
two Germanies, the negotiations between the FRG and the GDR being 
conducted according to a mandate prepared by the Big-Four. And the third 
stage would be the signing of a final protocol by the Four Powers, which 
would tie up the whole package and bring into force the first stage 
Quadripartite Agreement, together with the second stage inner-German 
arrangement. By dividing the level of negotiations into two, namely the 
Big-Four level and two-Germany level, the French tried to exclude the 
Germans from the first main talks concerning the Allied prerogative on 
Berlin. According to this procedure, the Germans would have a space for 
negotiations only within the principles agreed by the Four-Powers; hence, 
the latter would be able to maintain their basic rights on Berlin. In addition, 
the Final Quadripartite Protocol would work as the confirmation of the 
Big-Four’s superiority over the two Germanies and Berlin. The Bonn 
government had to accept the procedure because it had no legal basis on 
which to deal with the problems of the divided city.77 Bonn had connected
75 AN, 5 AG 2 /1022, Entretien entre le President Pompidou et le President Nixon, 
12.11.1970”
76 Andreas Wilkens, Der unstete Nachbar' Frankreich, die deutsche O stpolitik und die 
Berliner Vier-Machte-Verhandlungen 1969-1974, R. Oldenbourg, 1990, p. 140; Soutou, “La 
France et l’accord quadripartite,” p. 61.
77 AAPD 1970, Dok. 506, Gesprach des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem franzosischen
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the Berlin agreement to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. If the Berlin 
negotiations had failed, the Moscow Treaty would automatically have been 
aborted -  a development which might have brought down the Brandt 
government. However, they could not be directly involved in the 
quadripartite talks, and, with this procedure, they could only be involved in 
a limited way. This was a major dilemma for Bonn.
Moscow also seemed to be facing something of a dilemma. Although 
the Soviets had indicated their readiness to improve access procedures, they 
could not meet the Allied requirements for the inclusion of agreed specific 
additional improvements in a Four Power agreement without weakening 
their traditional position that there were no quadripartite responsibilities 
over access and undermining GDR claims to sovereignty over the access 
routes. 78 Indeed, the Soviets insisted at the 16 November 1970 
Quadripartite meeting that “there were no such thing as four-power 
agreements about [transit] and that an agreement with the GDR would be 
unavoidable.”79 The Western Three could not accept such a position because 
they did not recognise East Germany as a sovereign state capable of 
negotiating in its own right. The Allies also insisted that the problem of 
access should be solved first, but the Soviet Union wanted Western 
concessions on the problem of the relations between the FRG and West 
Berlin before this. Moreover, the Soviet negotiators continued to contend 
that Allied jurisdiction applied only to West Berlin.80 As a result, 1970 saw 
little development in the Berlin negotiations. Although the Soviets had 
indicated their forthcoming attitude and had suggested a way to advance 
the Four-Power talks, they would not compromise on some vital points. The 
Soviet stance made it easier for the Americans, the British, and the French 
to maintain a tough fine because they did not want a rapid conclusion and
AuBenminister Schumann in Paris, 2.11.1970.
78 DBPO, I I I  I, Doc. 55, fn. 15, p. 283.
79 Quoted in Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p. 73.
80 Catudal, The Diplomacy o f the Quadripartite, p. 125.
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they thought that they were in a stronger position in the negotiations. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, the situation would move only through the 
informal channels between Washington, Moscow and Bonn. Until they could 
reach a settlement, therefore, what other NATO members and those who 
wanted multilateral detente in particular could do was highly restricted.
The December 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting
Six months earlier, in May 1970, NATO ministers had taken a forthcoming 
attitude to a conference on European security and disarmament detente 
with the MBFR declaration. At their last meeting in Rome, Ministers had 
agreed that- “In so far as progress is recorded as a result of these talks and 
in the on-going talks - in particular on Germany and Berlin - the Allied 
Governments state that they would be ready to enter into multilateral 
contacts with all interested governments.” Although some NATO 
governments wanted to maintain a positive stance towards detente either 
on multilateral talks or on disarmament, six months later, the stance of the 
Atlantic Alliance had become rather negative. The lack of progress in the 
Quadripartite Berlin negotiations in particular hardened the attitude of 
NATO ministers at their semi-annual meeting, because the Berlin 
negotiations were regarded as a test case of the Soviets’ sincerity towards 
detente.
Some smaller countries wanted to continue NATO’s positive 
presentation at its December 1970 meeting. At preliminary discussions of 
the North Atlantic Council, representatives from Belgium, Denmark and 
Norway recommended that the Alliance adopt a positive attitude on 
East-West negotiations in order to keep the initiative on detente. They still 
wished in vain that a last-minute advance might be made in the Four-Power
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talks on the status of Berlin.81 The Danish representative even insisted on 
18 November 1970 that “unless developments during the next two weeks 
were very negative there should be a step forward.”82 Moreover, in order to 
push the West towards an ESC, the Finnish government sent the 
governments concerned a new aide-memoire on 24 November 1970, asking 
NATO and other governments to instruct their heads of mission in Helsinki 
to consult with the Finns about multilateral gatherings.83
A few NATO members also looked forward to positive developments in 
MBFR matters. When the Foreign Ministers gathered in Brussels on 3-4 
December 1970, for example, Italian Foreign Minister Moro was the 
strongest supporter of the view that NATO should take a new initiative on 
MBFR. He thus proposed to invite the Warsaw Pact countries to take part in 
multilateral talks on this issue.84 Canadian Foreign Minister Sharp also 
indicated his interest in the Warsaw Pact’s proposal for the reduction of 
foreign forces as “an important indicator of their willingness to come to grips 
with the problem of European security.”85 The FRG Foreign Minister Scheel 
made a positive statement on balanced reduction of forces too. At the same 
time, however, he did not believe that the Alliance should “enter into 
multilateral contacts, whether on MBFR or general questions for a 
conference.”86 The Bonn government had come to place more emphasis on 
its bilateral negotiations and the Berlin questions than on disarmament 
detente.
The USA and Britain had also agreed that NATO should be 
conservative at the next NATO Ministerial meeting.87 Moreover, they were 
confident that they could fend off pressures from the smaller countries. The
81 TNA. FCO 41/746, UKDEL NATO tel no. 614 to FCO, 12.11.1970.
82 TNA. FCO 41/746, UKDEL NATO tel no. 627 to FCO, 18.11.1970.
83 MAE, Serie Pactes 1961-1970, carton 278, circulaire no. 373, 24.11.1970. see also, AAPD  
1971, Dok. 11, fn. 14, p. 43.
84 TNA. FCO 41/638, UKDEL NATO tel no.683 to FCO, 3.12.1970.
85 Quoted in Spencer, “Canada and the Origins of the CSCE,” p. 59.
86 TNA. FCO 41/638, UKDEL NATO tel no. 682 to FCO, 3.12.1970.
87 TNA. FCO 41/746, Record of a meeting between Mr Nairne and Mr Bendall and Mr
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US Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hillenbrand believed that 
“other NATO countries would be guided by our own presumably negative 
assessment of the Berlin negotiations.”88 This remark demonstrated that 
the Berlin question, an issue which was addressed exclusively within the 
West by America, Britain, France and West Germany, was a useful 
instrument for the United States to control their smaller partners. Holding 
the reins of the Berlin negotiations enabled the Western Three to restrain 
other Alliance members. The Belgians were well aware of this situation and, 
with Canadian support, complained that “the three Western powers should 
consult NATO before each fresh round in the Berlin talks.”89 Yet, faced with 
the Four-Power prerogative on Berlin, smaller countries were impotent.
It was thus the Americans and the British in particular that prevented 
the Atlantic Alliance from making any headway. As described above, the US 
government had already decided not to take the initiative on MBFR at the 
NSC meeting of 19 November 1970. Hence State Secretary Rogers just 
stated that “We should reaffirm the policy stated at Rome.”90 Still more 
importantly, one of the most significant reasons for the muted statement on 
MBFR in the December 1970 Communique was the caution of British 
Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home. He believed that the military 
disadvantages involved in the MBFR project were more significant than its 
political advantages. At the NATO meeting, therefore, Douglas-Home 
warned his partners not to enter into any negotiation without a 
pre-established united negotiating position. “Therefore for the time being we 
should continue our own technical studies and explore bilaterally the views 
of Warsaw Pact countries,” he suggested.91 The opinion that foreign force 
reductions could be a “first step” towards MBFR was also opposed by many
Springsteen in the State Department at 9 30 am on 25 November 1970.
88 Ibid.
89 TNA. FCO 41/746, Cable to Daunt, 16.11.1970. The Belgians reiterated this criticism in 
February 1971. A A P D 1971, Dok. 73, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das 
Auswartige Amt, 23.2.1971.
99 Ibid.
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NATO members. Eventually, the NATO Ministers simply “re-emphasized 
the importance they attach to mutual and balanced force reductions as a 
means of reducing tensions and lessening the military confrontation in 
Europe and recalled the Declarations on this question issued at Reykjavik 
in 1968 and at Rome earlier this year.”92 The change in the British 
government’s position undoubtedly contributed to the low-key tone of this 
Communique.
Still more notable at the Brussels NATO meeting was the new French 
initiative. Before his colleagues, French Foreign Minister Schumann 
strongly contended that the Berlin settlement should be the only condition 
for the multilateralisation of East-West talks, arguing that “it was essential 
not to make questions other than Berlin pre-conditions for a European 
Security Conference. To do so would diminish the scope of our efforts and 
would not help the Federal Republic’s Ostpotitik”93 As will be discussed 
below, this was the first concrete indication that Paris had become more 
proactive towards the idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.
The new French initiative met opposition, however, and Schumann 
was forced to compromise. While the majority of participating Ministers did 
not oppose the French suggestion, the United States and the Netherlands 
firmly insisted on the importance of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; 
therefore they were not be able to accept the French Foreign Minister’s 
proposal to make the Berlin agreement the only prerequisite for a 
multilateral conference.94 In the end, the final phrase of the Communique 
read as follows*
91 Ibid.
92 httpV/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c701203a.htm
93 TNA. FCO 41/638, UKDEL NATO tel no. 685 to FCO, 4.12.1970; A A P D 1970, Dok. 586, 
Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt, 4.12.1970.
94 AAPD 1970, Dok. 586, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt,
4.12.1970.
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[Ministers] affirmed the readiness of the ir governments, as soon as the talks 
on Berlin have reached a satisfactory conclusion and in so far as the other 
on-going ta lks are proceeding favorably, to en ter into m ultilateral contacts 
w ith all interested governments to explore when it would be possible to 
convene a conference, or a series of conferences, on security and co-operation 
in Europe.95
Although this wording reflected France’s preference to underline the 
significance of Berlin as opposed to other negotiations, it also contained the 
reference to “on-going talks” that could be interpreted variously as a 
reference to SALT, the German-German talks, etc. More importantly, 
however, compared with the sentences in the Rome Communique of 27 May 
1970 that “In so far as progress is recorded as a result of these talks and in 
the on-going talks - in particular on Germany and Berlin,” the NATO 
Ministers now used a stronger expression in the Brussels Communique; 
namely “satisfactory conclusion of Berlin agreement,” -  a formula which had 
first been employed by Brandt. In the end, Paris accepted this compromise 
at the December 1970 meeting.
As a result of the strong expression on the Berlin negotiations as well 
as “on-going talks” and the repetition of a MBFR proposal, the Brussels 
Communique in December 1970 appeared rather conservative. Foreign 
Ministers agreed to it “in a short time and without major controversies.”96 
The major reason for this was undoubtedly that the Quadripartite Berlin 
negotiations had achieved little. All NATO members recognised the 
importance of Berlin in European detente; hence, most of them except 
Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Norway, could easily concur with the 
distinctly cautious stance towards the East.97 Although, thanks to the 
signing of the Moscow Treaty, the latter half of 1970 saw a decisive step
95 http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c701203a.htm
96 AAPD 1970, Dok. 586, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt, 
4.12.19701 see also, TNA. FCO 41/638, UKDEL NATO tel no. 686 to FCO, 4.12.1970.
97 AAPD 1970, Dok. 586, Botschafter Grewe, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt,
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towards multilateral European detente, the Berlin problem still remained to 
be solved. On this point, the West had no intention of retreating.
The French Inclination towards a European Security Conference
Yet, 1970 also witnessed positive developments leading towards multilateral 
European detente. Firstly, by explaining why France insisted at the 
December NATO Ministerial gathering on making a Berlin agreement the 
only pre-condition for a European security conference, this section will show 
how the French had become a more positive supporter of the idea of a 
security conference in Europe than they had been before. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Foreign Minister Schumann had already begun to incline 
towards the concept of a Conference. However, President Pompidou, who 
had been very suspicious of the Soviet proposal in the first half of 1970,98 
also gradually accepted it during the second half of 1970. Consequently, 
France would become one of the champions of the idea of an ESC among 
Western countries. Pompidou changed his mind for a variety of reasons. For 
a start, Jacques Andreani, a French diplomat, points to the deterioration of 
US-French relations.99 At that time, the two countries were opposed on 
Middle Eastern issues. While the Americans supported Israel, the French 
backed Arab countries. When Pompidou visited the United States in 
February/March 1970, the American people, and US Jews in particular, 
vehemently protested against the French President’s attitude on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. This culminated in Chicago, on 28 February 1970, 
when an excited man spat at Pompidou’s face. This incident gave the leader
4.12.1970.
98 See, for example, the attached document entitled “French Views on a European Security 
Conference,” undated, to TNA. FCO 41/747, Marshall to Giffard, 4.3.1970
99 Garret Martin’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 15 February 2006.
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of France a very bad impression of the Americans.100 The French delivery of 
Mirage fighter aircrafts to Libya also exasperated America.101 The clash of 
interests between Washington and Paris partly explains why the latter 
sought closer relations with Moscow.102 And in order to establish better ties 
with the USSR a change in the French attitude towards an ESC was useful.
The second reason was the success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. In 
preparation for Pompidou’s official visit to Moscow scheduled in October 
1970, the Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay,; Herve Alphand, and the 
French Ambassador to Moscow, Roger Seydoux, at first considered accepting 
Brezhnev’s proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship and a non-aggression 
pact between France and the USSR. After the signing of the Moscow Treaty, 
however, they lost interest in such treaties. The French President himself 
also opposed the Kremlin’s suggestion, noting on 28 September 1970 that 
“they [the Soviets] have to understand that I absolutely do not want the 
word ‘treaty’; [...] I don’t want to look like I am running after Brandt.”103 
Yet, the French leader wanted to maintain good relations with the Soviet 
Union. When he was in Moscow, therefore, Pompidou agreed with the 
Russians to institutionalise regular political consultations at the Foreign 
Minister as well at the highest official levels. The idea of a European 
security conference was considered to be one of the most promising and 
constructive agenda issues, within such bilateral consultations. Still more 
importantly, the French President sought a way of restoring France’s
100 Roussel, Georges Pompidou, pp. 365*66.
101 Garret M artin’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 15 February 2006. See also, 
Yves-Henri Nouailhat, “Les divergences entre la France et les Etats*Unis face au conflit 
israero-arabe de 1967 a 1973,” Relations Internationales, no. 119, 2004, p. 337.
102 As regards the overview of the French-US relations in Pompidou era, see Georges-Henri 
Soutou, “Le President Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-TJnis et l’Europe,’ Journal o f 
European Integration History, Vol.6, No.2, 20001 Maurice Vaisse, “Les ‘relations speciales’ 
fraonc-americaines au temps de Richard Nixon et Georges Pompidou,” Relations 
Internationales, no. 119, 2004. Both articles pay attention to the more positive aspects of 
the relations, in particular in military cooperation between the French and US 
governments.
103 Marie-Pierre Rey, “Georges Pompidou, l’Union sovietique et l’Europe,” in Association 
Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou e t PEurope, Editions Complexe, 1995, pp. 155*56.
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original role in an era of detente.104 Given that Brandt pursued his Eastern 
Policy and Nixon the SALT negotiations with the Soviets, Pompidou thought 
that the French could play a leading role in the convening of an ESC.
Finally, Pompidou’s change of mind seems also to have been caused by 
the arguments of pro-detente supporters within the French government. In 
particular, Gaullist “detentists” such as Herve Alphand, Roger Seydoux, and 
Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann helped push the President into 
adopting a cooperative attitude towards the Soviet Union.105 Shortly before 
the Franco-Soviet summit in Moscow, Pompidou privately told a journalist 
on 13 October 1970 that “Between you and me, [...], if I accepted the 
conference on European security, this would be an attempt to give a little air 
to the satellites. The Rumanians, in particular, very much desire to see this 
conference held.”106 This was the logic that Schumann had in mind.107 The 
visit of the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu, to Paris in June 1970 
had perhaps convinced Pompidou that his Foreign Minister’s opinion was 
plausible. As he claimed later in March 1972 when he met British Prime 
Minister Heath, Pompidou regarded a European security conference as a 
chance to spread “the virus of the liberty” in the Eastern bloc. He told Heath 
that “this is a bet, but it has chances to be progressively won.”108 Although 
the French leader was still sceptical about the Kremlin’s motivations in 
proposing the Conference, he was clearly affected by the detente supporters 
around him.
France then faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the French 
government increasingly took a positive attitude towards the idea of a 
European security conference. On the other hand, the convening of such a
104 A note written by Pompidou’s diplomatic advisor indirectly indicates tha t pursuing a 
European security conference was thought as French foreign policy initiative. AN, 5 AG 2 / 
1018, NOTE pour Monsieur le President de la Republique, 8.6.1972.
105 Garret M artin’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 15 February 2006.
106 Roussel, Georges Pompidou, pp. 403-404.
107 See chapter 2.
108 “c’est la un pari, mais il a  des chances d’etre progressivement gagne.” AN, 
5AG2/1014, Troisieme tete a tete entre M onsieur Pompidou et M onsieur H eath  a
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conference was dependent on the improvement of the Berlin situation, 
which was, as described above, in a dead end. For the French, however, the 
Berlin question was so important that it was not easy to make concessions 
to the Soviets, in particular on such vital points as the problem of transit. 
Consequently, Paris was to take a new approach at the NATO Ministerial 
meeting in Brussels.
Making Berlin the only pre-condition for a European security 
conference was a way to solve the dilemma. On the one hand, with this 
initiative, France expected to encourage concessions from the Soviet Union 
in the Quadripartite negotiations. In order to impress and put pressure on 
Moscow to break the deadlock at the Berlin talks without corresponding 
compromises on the Western side, the French government tried to make it 
clear that the Berlin problem was the most important barrier to an ESC. On 
the other hand, Schumann made an ESC more likely by abstaining from 
increasing the number of conditions.109 By doing so, France could pursue 
both the conclusion of the Berlin talks and the convening of a European 
security conference. And the French could do so because they had less or no 
interest in other subjects, such as MBFR, SALT or even the inner-German 
negotiations. As described above, Paris eventually came to terms with the 
US and Dutch insistence on the importance of “on-going talks.” However, 
this agreement was also the starting point of conflict between France and 
America over the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from
1971.
A Change of British Policy Priorities
Behind the scenes of the logjam of the Berlin negotiations, Britain also
Chequers Court, le 18 m ars 1972, de 10 h. 30 a 13 h, 19.3.1972.
109 MAE, Serie Europe 1966-1970, carton 2031, Paris tel. to Moscou, Varsovie, Bucarest, 
Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Repan, Washington, London, Bonn and Berlin, 4.12.1970.
154
stepped closer, albeit less enthusiastically, towards the idea of a European 
security conference. This was the result of a change of priorities in the 
British Foreign Office within six months of the new government taking 
office, in particular an adverse change of priorities between a European 
security conference and MBFR. Soon after Alec Douglas-Home became the 
Foreign Secretary, he retreated from his predecessor’s idea of the Standing 
Committee, which had been proposed as an alternative to a European 
security conference. On 7 July 1970, the Foreign Secretary told FCO officials 
that-
I have always been rather attracted to the idea of the security conference as a 
platform for Yugoslavia, Rumania, etc. But it will be no good without 
something solid for discussion. That might be the Standing Machinery for 
which there is something to be said and we might argue or insist tha t 
“thinning out” should be its first business. I therefore think we should move 
gradually towards multilateral exploratory contacts.110
Compared with the former Secretary of State Stewart, however, 
Douglas-Home was not enthusiastic about detente with the East. Rather, 
the new Secretary of State saw an ESC as a useful tool to divide the 
opposite bloc. In addition to that, he thought that Britain had no major issue 
area which could be settled with the Soviet Union, and therefore it could not 
take the initiative. In Douglas-Home’s view, “[tlhere is nothing we can give 
the Russians which is comparable in value to them to the French partial 
withdrawal from NATO and the West German acceptance of the European 
status quo. Nor is Britain a super-power like the USA.”111 Moreover, at the 
beginning of the new government, the Foreign Office still opposed the idea 
of a conference on European security.
Yet, the evaluation of an ESC concept within the Foreign Office
110 TNA. FCO 41/743, Graham to WOD, 8.7.1970.
111 DBPO, III, I, p. 310.
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gradually changed. Firstly, an internal study on European security, which 
had been conducted by the Planning Staff and the Western Organisation 
Department in the Foreign Office and submitted to the Secretary of State in 
September 1970, confirmed the inevitability of the convening of an 
East-West conference, stating that “it cannot be ignored that proposals for a 
‘European Security Conference’ have now acquired a certain political 
momentum, and that there would be complications, both between the 
Western Allies and vis-a-vis public opinion, if HMG were now to argue 
publicly that no such conference is necessary.”112 Secondly, the study 
concluded that, while a European security conference would not serve UK or 
Western interests, it would be unlikely to harm seriously them.113 In other 
words, the Foreign Office began to think that a Conference would be less 
dangerous if it was sufficiently well prepared, though still not attractive. 
This became Britain’s basic perception of the project of an ESC from 1971 
onwards.
By the end of January 1971, furthermore, Britain reviewed their whole 
position towards a European security conference and MBFR in order to be 
more consistent. The British viewed the French inclination towards the idea 
of an ESC in a serious light, and anticipated that Schumann’s proposal at 
the December 1970 NATO Ministerial meeting to reach a satisfactory 
conclusion of the Berlin talks as the only precondition to progress towards a 
conference, would be accepted by other members of the Alliance including 
West Germany. In the light of this trend, UK diplomats now thought that 
Britain should not oppose its partners preferring a multilateral European 
conference because such a conference would not be harmful for the West.114 
Moreover, as argued above, the British had already regarded the concept of 
mutual force reductions as dangerous for Western security. Therefore, “if we
112 TNA. FCO 41/744, Bendall to Private Secretary, “European Security- Paper 3. A 
European Security Conference- Tactics”, 16.9.1970.
Ibid.
ii4 TNA. FCO 41/882, Cable to Peck, 25.1.1971.
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have to make ourselves unpopular with some members of the Alliance by 
pouring cold water on the idea of MBFR, there is no reason why we should 
make matters worse by also opposing a European Security Conference,” a 
UK foreign official suggested.115 Eventually, in an instruction to the British 
delegation to NATO, the Foreign Office completely changed the order of 
priority between an ESC and MBFR;
because we have come to regard ta lks on MBFR as potentially dangerous, our 
earlier view th a t they would be a suitable quid pro quo for our agreem ent to a 
European security conference and our other earlier idea th a t offering 
discussions on MBFR might be a way of delaying the conference, have both 
lost th e ir appeal to us a t official level. On the contrary, a conference m ight be a 
lesser evil th a n  the discussion of MBFR.116
London had thus totally reversed its whole European security policy — 
supporting a ESC, albeit without enthusiasm, and opposing MBFR -  
because of the perception of dangerous disarmament detente together with a 
harmless conference project to which many other NATO members were 
tilting.
This shift of Britain’s position also meant the convergence of British 
and French policy priorities on the CSCE and MBFR. France had been 
opposed to disarmament detente for a long time and had recently begun to 
be more positive towards a European security conference. The order of 
British priorities came to coincide with that of France, though London was 
far less keen about an ESC and cared more about the solidarity of the 
Atlantic Alliance than Paris. This also meant that the new British stance 
would come into collision with that of America, which disliked a European 
security conference, and favoured more the idea of mutual force reductions. 
The British were well aware of this possibility. They therefore tried to
115 Ibid. See also, DBPO, III, I, p. 315.
116 TNA. FCO 41/882, Cable to Peck, 25.1.1971.
157
appear as open-minded as possible.117 As will be argued in chapter 6, 
however, the potential British-French partnership, based on a growing 
policy consensus, was to be one of the significant foundations for the central 
role which the Europeans were to play in the preparation for the CSCE from
1972.
In conclusion, there were three important developments in the period 
covered in this chapter. Firstly, the Warsaw Pact began to indicate its 
acceptance of a force reduction project, though it was still highly conditional. 
Secondly, the signing of the Moscow Treaty undoubtedly represented a 
significant advance for the German question, and hence for multilateral 
European detente. Finally, the French government became more 
enthusiastic about the idea of a multilateral European conference, and the 
British government decided to treat it pragmatically and constructively. 
However, mainly because of the stalemated Berlin talks, which was now 
linked not only with an ESC but also with the ratification of the Moscow 
Treaty, NATO’s public stance towards the East became severe. The Berlin 
question became a central issue in European detente, namely, without a 
resolution of this problem, all further East-West rapprochements in Europe 
would be blocked. The next chapter will therefore focus on the problem of 
the divided German city and its relations with the CSCE and MBFR.
117 Ibid.
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Chanter 4: Berlin. MBFR. and n European Security Conference.
1971
Without doubt, Brandt wanted progress in the Berlin talks. He had been 
disappointed by the fruitless results of the first nine months of negotiations. 
While he had been able to successfully conclude the Warsaw Treaty with 
Poland on 7 December 1970, the last Ambassadorial meeting of the year on a 
Berlin agreement on 10 December 1970 had finished without tangible 
progress and the negotiations had gone into the Christmas recess. In order to 
make advances in the situation, the Chancellor wrote identical letters to 
Nixon, Heath and Pompidou on 12 December 1970, proposing that the Berlin 
talks should be given a “conference-like character.”1 The FRG leader’s 
recommendation was regarded as quite vague and even the German 
Embassies in London and Paris were not able to give any elucidation of it.2 
However, pressure from Bonn on the Western Three to take a further 
initiative was apparent. This chapter will begin with the French President’s 
reply to this letter.
By mid-1971, NATO would return to take a positive attitude on 
East-West relations. There were three factors behind this. Firstly, West 
Germany agreed with French opinion mentioned in the last chapter that the 
Berlin settlement should be the only pre-condition for the opening of 
multilateral preparatory talks for a European security conference. In other 
words, the FRG government dropped other pre-conditions, in particular the 
conclusion of the on-going German-German talks. In order to understand the 
reason for Bonn’s concession to Paris, it is necessary to scrutinise Pompidou’s 
response to Brandt’s letter and the reactions of the West German leaders.
The second part of this chapter will describe the other two reasons-
1 AAPD 1970. Dok. 600, Bundeskanzler Brandt an Premierminister Heath, 15.12.1970. See 
also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 800,' Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit. K. Blessing, 1996, p. 
354.
2 TNA. FO 1042/302, Paris tel no. 1279 to FCO, 17.12.1970.
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progress in the Berlin negotiations and Brezhnev’s general acceptance of the 
West’s force reduction proposal. In particular, it will pay attention to how the 
impasse of the Berlin talks was broken, and demonstrate the importance of 
the West German role in the secret negotiations between Washington and 
Moscow. With Bonn’s compromise with Paris, the breakthrough in the Berlin 
talks, and the Soviets’ new attitude towards MBFR, the Atlantic Alliance 
issued a forthcoming communique at its Lisbon Ministerial meeting in June 
1971.
After the Lisbon meeting, there seemed a chance that a conference on 
European security might have been held earlier than it actually was. London 
took an initiative connecting an ESC and MBFR in order to postpone the 
beginning of the negotiations about the latter, because the British disliked 
the idea of mutual force reductions. As the third part of this chapter will 
demonstrate, this British approach gained much support; hence multilateral 
preparations for a conference might have begun after the conclusion of the 
Berlin problem.
However, this possibility vanished because of Moscow’s counter 
initiative, the so-called reverse Junktim connecting the ratification of the 
Moscow Treaty and the signing of the final Berlin protocol. In order to grasp 
its implication for multilateral European detente, the final part of this 
chapter will examine the Western reactions to the reverse linkage and the 
disputes among the big powers about when multilateral preparations for an 
ESC would start. In the end, the reverse Junktim was interpreted by the 
West as the postponement of the “satisfactory” conclusion of the Berlin talks, 
because the final Berlin protocol was not to be signed until the Moscow 
Treaty was ratified in the West German parliament; as a result, the 
convention of a conference would also be suspended for a time.
Franco- German Partnership?
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At the beginning of 1971, the FRG leaders came to terms with the French 
position on the relations between a European security conference and the 
Berlin/German problem. The West Germans needed French help to settle the 
Berlin question, which had become the precondition for the success of 
Ostpolitik. For that, Brandt and Scheel had to deflect Pompidou’s anger, 
which had been caused by the Franco-German controversy over European 
monetary integration. Brandt’s letter cited in the opening paragraph of this 
chapter had added fuel to the fire.
Although the tone was polite and friendly, Pompidou’s reply to Brandt’s 
message -  sent on 21 December 1970 -  was discouraging and wholly 
non-committal about the Chancellor’s proposal to give the Berlin talks a 
“conference-like character.” It merely suggested that this could be discussed 
when Brandt visited Paris on 25/26 January 1971.3 According to the French 
President’s diplomatic advisor, Jean-Bernard Raimond, Pompidou took an 
unfavourable view of Brandt’s proposal partly because, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, the French leader disliked being involved in the Berlin question 
and therefore was annoyed by the pressure from West Germany. For 
Pompidou, moreover, it seemed unwise to show Western willingness to 
accelerate the Berlin talks when the Soviets had still not made enough 
concessions.4 Interestingly, however, discord between Paris and Bonn over 
monetary integration had also particularly influenced Pompidou’s attitude.
The French leader’s irritation towards Brandt’s letter was clearly 
expressed in his brief instructions about the Berlin problem, which he gave 
to Raimond on 23 December 1970 -  the day after Pompidou sent his reply to 
the Chancellor*
3 TNA. FO 1042/302, Paris tel no. 1290 to FCO, 19.12.1970; Andreas Wilkens, “Accords et 
disaccords. La France, l’Ostpolitik et la question allemande 1969*1974”, in La Republique 
Democratique Allem ande e t l ’Occident. Ed by Ulrich Pfeil. Paris' Publications de l’lnstitu t 
Allemand, 2000, p. 372.
4 TNA. FO 1042/302, Paris tel no. 1279 to FCO, 17.12.1970; TNA. FO 1042/302, Paris tel no. 
1290 to FCO, 19.12.1970.
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I have had enough of Berlin. Let us take a step back and let the Americans 
break loose. We compromised ourselves excessively in Brussels.5
The sharp analysis of the British Minister at the UK Embassy in Paris, 
Michael Palliser, surprisingly corresponded to and thus explained the 
meaning of this brief and somewhat mysterious remark (especially the final 
sentence). In his dispatch to Deputy Under-Secretary Thomas Brimelow, 
Palliser examined the attitude of the French President towards the 
Chancellor’s proposal, and pointed out the importance of antagonism 
between France and the FRG over economic and monetary union (EMU) in 
explaining Pompidou’s exasperation.6 The creation of European economic 
and monetary union had been proposed at the EC summit in The Hague in 
December 1969 and had been studied in the committee chaired by Pierre 
Werner, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, which produced the so-called 
Werner Plan in October 1970. EC Ministers then began to discuss the Plan 
from November 1970.7 French and German policies towards economic and 
monetary union were fundamentally at odds. The antagonism between the 
two culminated at the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels on 
14/15 December 1970 chaired by the German Economic and Financial 
Minister Karl Schiller.8 According to the UK Minister in Paris, Pompidou 
believed that what the Germans had done at the meeting was unfair. The 
French President reportedly thought that “the Germans [had] made a
5 “J ’en ai assez de Berlin. Mettons-nous en reserve et laissons les Americains se dechainer. 
Nous nous sommes compromis a l’exces a Bruxelles.” AN, 5 AG 2 / 1009, Instructions du 
President de la Republique pour Monsieur Raimond, 23.12.1970.
6 TNA. FO 1042/302, Palliser to Brimelow, 21.12.1970.
7 As regards European economic and monetary union, see Gerard Bossuat, “Le president 
Georges Pompidou et les tentatives d’Union economique et monetaire,” in Association 
Geroges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Europe. Editions Complexe, 1995,' Robert Frank, 
“Pompidou, le franc et l’Europe 1969-1974,” in ibid.,' Andreas Wilkens, “Westpolitik, 
Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monerary Union. Germany’s European Policy 
in the Brandt Era (1969-1974)”, Journal of European Integration Historv.5/1 (1999).
8 Haig Simonian, The Privileged Partnership' Franco-German Relations in the European 
Community. 1969-1984. Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 90.
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deliberate set at the French during these discussions and seemed to take 
French readiness to make certain concessions as an indication that if they 
pushed hard enough the French would give way completely.”9 Pompidou’s 
swift and discouraging response to Brandt’s letter — a step taken without 
consultation with Schumann and other senior officials in the Quai d’Orsay 10 
-  was a result of the personal resentment of the French President at Bonn’s 
way of conducting monetary integration matters.
The importance of this episode lies in the fact that it would lead to the 
German leaders’ inclination towards France on relations between the Berlin 
question and CSCE matters. Probably aware of Pompidou’s animosity to the 
recent approach of West Germany, Brandt and Scheel made two concessions 
when they visited Paris in late January 1971. Firstly, on economic and 
monetary union, the Chancellor accepted that EMU should have a strictly 
inter-governmental character, something which the French President, who 
disliked the supra-nationality contained in the Werner Plan, had strongly 
demanded in a speech made four days before the Paris-Bonn summit.11 The 
point is that this compromise was made because the FRG leader needed 
French support for his Ostpolitik and the Berlin problem.12 The backing of 
France, which had the prerogatives and responsibility with regard to the 
German and Berlin questions, was indispensable for the success of Brandt’s 
Eastern policy. For Brandt, Westpolitik was the cornerstone of Ostpolitik,13 
Still more significant in the context of this study was Bonn’s concession 
on the relationship between a European security conference and the Berlin 
negotiations. At the 25 January 1971 biannual Franco-German consultation, 
the West Germans also accepted the French insistence that a satisfactory
9 TNA. FO 1042/302, Palliser to Brimelow, 21.12.1970.
10 At th a t time, Schumann was in Morocco together with the Director of Political Affairs 
Jacques de Beaumarchais. Under State Secretary Herve Alphand was in Washington.
11 AAPD 1971. Dok. 27, Gespach des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit Staatsprasident Pompidou 
in Paris, 25.1.1971.
12 Simonian, The Privileged Partnership, pp. 91-92.
13 B randt, Willy, People and Politics- the Years 1960-1975. Little, Brown, 1978, p. 154, 
254.
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Berlin agreement should be the only prerequisite for the opening of 
preparatory talks for an ESC.14 This implied that the Federal German 
government had dropped the conclusion of an inner-German agreement as a 
precondition for CSCE preparations. Washington and London were surprised 
by this and interpreted it as Bonn’s surrender to pressure from Paris.15 As 
Petri Hakkarainen points out, one reason for the compromise made by the 
FRG was because Brandt and Bahr had thought that the CSCE ‘card’ for 
extracting concessions from the Soviet Union had already served its major 
purpose in the FRG-USSR negotiations leading to the Moscow Treaty.16 Yet, 
an equally significant reason for Bonn’s concession was to allay Pompidou’s 
indignation in order to gain his support for advancing the Berlin 
negotiations, which was the sine qua non for the ratification of the Moscow 
Treaty. By accepting the French position that the settlement of the Berlin 
question was the only prerequisite for the start of multilateral preparations 
for an ESC, Brandt and Scheel attempted to avoid Pompidou becoming too 
negative about the negotiations on the divided city. Given that, as the French 
President’s instruction quoted above demonstrated, Pompidou considered 
the Berlin talks and the question of European monetary integration -  the 
cause of his resentment -  together, it was understandable why the West 
German leaders, who desperately wanted the conclusion of the Quadripartite 
negotiations, went “unnecessarily far to meet French desires.”17 As a result, 
thanks to their approach to the French positions, Bonn and Paris seemingly 
came to take the same position on CSCE matters at the beginning of 1971. 
And it would serve for NATO, at the next Ministerial gathering in Lisbon, to 
demonstrate its positive stance towards the idea of a multilateral European
14 AAPD 1971. Dok. 29, Deutsch-franzosische Konsultationsbesprechnung in Paris,
25.1.1971.
15 Petri Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement: The Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, 1969-72”, in 
Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nunlist (eds.), At the Roots of European 
Security: The Earlv Helsinki Process Revisited. 1969-1975 (forthcoming, 2007).
16 Ibid.
17 Quoted in Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement.”
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conference by dropping the pre-condition of “on-going” talks.
Yet, Franco-German cooperation did not go well during much of 1971, 
though West German Ministers tried to maintain good relations between the 
two countries on multilateral European detente. Certainly, at Ministerial 
level, the FRG agreed not to insist on inner-German progress as a 
prerequisite for the CSCE. At an official level and hence at a practical level, 
however, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, the West German 
Foreign Ministry, which was unhappy about the compromise made by Brandt 
and Scheel in Paris, would attempt to postpone the start of preparatory talks 
for an ESC for as long as possible, in order to gain time for the 
German-German negotiations. The German foreign officials thought that the 
participation of the GDR in a multilateral conference would be a 
disadvantage for the FRG in the inner-German talks. Therefore they disliked 
the French preference for an early opening of such a conference. Rather, the 
A uswartiges Am t  would incline towards the Americans whose attitude to the 
idea of an ESC was highly negative. As a result, Franco-German cooperation, 
in particular within the framework of European political cooperation 
established in October 1970, did not work well in 1971. Its development had 
to wait until the beginning of 1972 when a compromise between Paris and 
Bonn on the procedural problems of the CSCE was made.
The Breakthrough of the Berlin talks
Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union secretly began to 
prepare for a stage on which the Berlin problem — now becoming the central 
issue of the whole European detente process — was to be resolved. However, 
the real key player on the stage was not the superpowers but West Germany.
The US-Soviet Backchannel a t Work
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Since the publication of Kissinger’s memoirs in 1979, it has been well-known 
that the real negotiations on the Berlin problem were conducted through the 
Washington-Moscow backchannel and among three key figures' Kenneth 
Rush, Egon Bahr, and Valentin Falin, the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn.18 
Although, as argued in chapter 2, the secret channel between Kissinger and 
Dobrynin had been established in early 1969, it had produced few 
eye-catching results in its first two years of existence. In order to make the 
channel operational, both sides had to change their stances. On the 
American side, West German pressure for advancing the Berlin negotiations 
was important in bringing about this change.
In particular, Brandt’s letter of 12 December 1970 had a positive effect 
on the Americans, though it worked negatively on the French President. 
Immediately after sending the letter, the Chancellor also dispatched Bahr 
and State Secretary Horst Ehmke, the head of the Chancellery, to 
Washington on 21 December 1970, presumably because the FRG leader 
knew that it was the Americans who took the toughest stance on the Berlin 
question. Ehmke’s trip had a double purpose* to dispel America’s doubt about 
Ostpolitik, and to urge further progress in the Berlin negotiations.19 In order 
not to give the Americans a false impression that Bonn was carelessly 
rushing into a resolution of the Berlin question, the State Secretary chose his 
words carefully. Referring to Brandt’s letter proposing a continuous 
conference for the Berlin problem, he emphasised the necessity of the 
“intensification,” rather than “acceleration,” of the Quadripartite talks, and 
reiterated that “the Western Powers must not wait too long lest the Soviets 
lose interest in reaching an agreement.”20 Although the Americans rejected
18 Henry Kissinger, White House Years. Little Brown, 1979, pp. 800*833.
19 Andreas Wilkens, Per unstete Nachbar- Frankreich. die deutsche Ostpolitik und die 
Berliner Vier*Machte*Verhandlungen 1969*1974. R. Oldenbourg, 1990, p. 144.
20 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation, KT00220, 21.12.1970. As 
regards the Ehmke/Kissinger conversation, see also AAPD 1970. Dok. 610, Botschafter 
Pauls, Washington, an das Auswartige Amt, 22.12.19701 Stephan Fuchs,
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a move into a conference-type of negotiation, when Kissinger met Bahr on 
the same day, Nixon’s national security advisor gave his support for the 
intensification of the Berlin talks.21 Clearly the West German approach had 
an influence on Kissinger. Evidence of this is the National Security Study 
Memorandum 111 which he wrote to the US Secretary of State and others 
eight days later, asking them to “review the four-power negotiations in 
Berlin and the alternatives [the US] might adopt in the next phase.”22 This 
memorandum indicated a change in the Americans’ stance towards the 
Berlin talks, when compared to the NSDM 91 of 6 November 1970, which, as 
argued in the last chapter, had indicated little interest in advancing the 
negotiations. By the end of 1970, Washington was ready to move forward on 
the Berlin question.
Of still more importance was the change on the Soviet side. On the one 
hand, the Soviet Union vehemently protested against NATO’s December 
Final Communique, especially paragraph 10 about the “Berlin pre-condition” 
and the reference to “the other on-going talks.” Soviet Ambassadors in West 
European capitals visited each Foreign Ministry almost simultaneously at 
the end of December 1970 and complained that the West made the convening 
of a European security conference too conditional.23 Furthermore, the 
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, at their gathering in Bucharest on 19
“Dreiecksverhaltnisse sind immer kompliziert”- Kissinger. Bahr und die Ostpolitik. 
Hamburg- Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1999, p. 110.
21 Andreas Wilkens, “Accords et disaccords”, p. 372.
22 DNSA, Presidential Directives, NSSM 111, Study of Four Power Negotiations on Berlin 
and Implications of Ostpolitik, PD01411, 29.12.1970. As a reference for the memorandum, 
Brandt’s letter was mentioned. This indicated that the Chancellor’s approach influenced the 
US attitude to the Berlin problem.
23 TNA. FCO 41/638, Bonn tel no. 1576 to FCO, 30.12.1970; Ibid., Paris tel no.1310 to FCO,
31.12.1970. Perhaps in order to split the Western bloc, the Soviets varied their language of 
accusation. To smaller NATO countries, they insisted tha t the linkage between a Conference 
and the Berlin question would prevent the development of detente. To the USA, however, 
they complained tha t the Americans forced its smaller Allies to follow Washington’s policy. 
NATO’s Political Committee concluded, therefore, that Moscow attempted to cause a 
division of opinion within the Alliance. AAPD 1971. Dok. 11, Gesandter Boss, Brussel 
(NATO), an das Auswartige Amt, 12.1.1971.
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February 1971, publicly denounced the final communique.24 On the other 
hand, Moscow decided to seek an improvement in its relations with 
Washington at the very end of December 1970.
It was Gromyko and Andropov who took the initiative in the Kremlin 
according to Dobrynin’s memoirs.25 The two drafted a memorandum on 
Soviet-American relations and submitted it to the Politburo. While stressing 
the maintenance of Soviet military capabilities to convince “American ruling 
circles that it is in the most vital national interest of the United States” to 
avoid the dangers of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, at the 
same time Gromyko and Andropov emphasised the necessity of reaching 
agreements with the United States.26 In other words, in order to pursue an 
agreement with the Americans, the Russians also had to underline the 
necessity of military power. In addition, one of the important reasons that 
the Soviet leadership approved the memorandum advocating a change of 
policy towards America was a US-USSR summit, about which Kissinger and 
Dobrynin had exchanged their opinions throughout 1970. At the end of 1970, 
the Politburo agreed to use the summit ‘card’ to improve superpower 
relations, because they thought that it was the Americans who wanted such 
a meeting, and hence Moscow would be able to play a diplomatic game with 
Washington.27
Understandably, the Berlin problem was the first topic that the Soviet 
Union tried to solve with the United States, because if a Berlin agreement 
had been concluded, it would have paved the way to the ratification of the 
Moscow and Warsaw Treaties as well as the convention of a European 
security conference. Indeed, on 6 January 1971, the Soviets sent a signal via 
Dobrynin’s note on Berlin to Kissinger. Although the Soviet note accused
24 Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands; Rockville, Md., USA: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981, p. 95.
25 Anatoliy Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War 
Presidents (1962-1986). Random House, 1995, p. 214.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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Nixon of not committing seriously to the question of the divided city, 
Moscow’s message indicated a change in the Soviet stance on this issue as 
Kissinger correctly noticed.28 Then Kissinger, who had already agreed with 
Bahr to intensify the Berlin talks, met Dobrynin on 9 January 1971, and 
suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that they discuss the Berlin problem 
through the confidential backchannel. Nixon’s security advisor also stressed 
that he had to consult with Bahr in parallel with the Kissinger/Dobrynin 
dialogues. 29 This would lead to the establishment of the secret 
US-USSR-FRG triangle that would be central to the drafting of the Berlin 
agreement. For the Russians, the negotiations through the backchannel 
were very useful because they could offer clandestine concessions that might 
be opposed by their East European partners, and East Germany in 
particular, before the final agreement on Berlin was reached. As will be 
briefly argued below, however, the channel also gave Kissinger great room 
for manoeuvre to control the pace of the negotiations. In fact, Nixon and 
Kissinger had decided to link the Berlin negotiations to progress in SALT 
and at the same time they were exploring the possibilities of an American 
opening to China.30 The superpower and US-USSR-China triangular 
diplomacy would delay the conclusion of a Berlin agreement, and the 
progress of European detente in general.
28 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 801-802.
29 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Information Memorandum [on Meeting with Dobrynin, 
January 9, 1971], KT00227, 1.25.1971. Kissinger dispatched his personal staff to Bonn, on 
27 January 1971 -  soon afterthe  Pompidou-Brandt summit meeting mentioned above —, in 
order to ask Bahr to visit Washington to arrange procedures for the backchannel 
negotiations on Berlin. Bahr then visited Washington on 31 January 1971. David C. Geyer, 
“The Missing Link: Henry Kissinger and the Back-Channel Negotiations on Berlin,” 
German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, Bulletin Supplement 1, 2004 “American 
Detente and German Ostpolitik, 1969-1972,” p. 82, downloaded from: 
http://www.ghi-dc.org/bulletinS04_supp/bulletinS04_supp.index.html. See also, CD-ROM 
The Rise of Detente. Memorandum for the President from Kissinger: Meeting with Egon 
Bahr, January 31, 1971, 4.2.1971; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 802-803.
30 Ibid.. p. 802. As regards the US approach to China, see Chris Connolly, “The American 
Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War,
1968*72,” Cold War History. 5/4 (2005), pp. 514*15; Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: 
Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp.79-82, 105-09.
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Deadlock
In terms of the Berlin talks, the secret channel between the superpowers was 
important in at least two ways. Firstly, it made more direct West German 
participation in the dialogues possible. As this section will argue, the 
existence of the US-Soviet backchannel did not of itself suffice to break the 
impasse of the problematic Berlin negotiations? it immediately reached a 
deadlock. Instead, the most significant point was Bonn’s direct commitment. 
As argued in chapter 3, the FRG was excluded from the formal Quadripartite 
talks because the Four Powers not West Germany had the legal right to deal 
with the problems of the city, though the West Germans could take part in 
the Bonn Group, a consultation framework composed of America, France, 
Britain and West Germany for discussing the German and Berlin problems. 
Through the backchannel, however, Bahr could convey his or Brandt’s 
opinions more directly to Kissinger and use more flexible tactics than could 
have been adopted in the Bonn Group because of opposition from Paris, 
London or the Foreign Ministry of the FRG. Kissinger also respected Bonn’s 
views, confirming, when he met Bahr on 31 January 1971, that “we would 
not make any move that had not been approved by the FRG,” at the same 
time emphasising that “it was essential to avoid the slightest leak” about the 
confidential consultations. 31 And Bahr’s commitment to the 
Washington-Moscow talks would become a key to breaking the deadlock.
The second significance of the secret channel was that the Soviets could 
present a further concession on the transit problem. In the course of 1970, in 
the formal talks, the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin had maintained that 
the problem of access to and from West Berlin should be negotiated with 
East Germany because the routes were on the territory under the GDR’s 
sovereignty, and had insisted on first discussing the issue of the West
31 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Memorandum for the President from Kissinger* Meeting 
with Egon Bahr, January 31, 1971, 4.2.1971.
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German presence in West Berlin. On 10 February 1971, however, Dobrynin 
suggested a compromise to Kissinger. While keeping the basic stance on East 
German sovereignty, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington proposed the 
face-saving idea that the USSR would unilaterally declare its willingness to 
shoulder the responsibility for the access problem.32 In other words, a 
unilateral declaration implied that the Soviet government would not violate 
the GDR’s sovereign status; but the Soviets would guarantee their 
commitment to the transit problem and indicated that they were ready to 
discuss it with the West (and initially in confidence with Washington) in 
parallel with the problem of the FRG’s presence. This was a highly welcome 
step forward for Kissinger. He then began to exchange opinions with 
Dobrynin.33
Yet the bilateral backchannel negotiations soon reached a deadlock 
because both sides stuck rigidly to their initial positions. To begin with, 
responding to Dobrynin’s request, Kissinger on 26 February 1971 produced a 
document outlining a set of access procedures. The Western Three had 
already submitted a draft Berlin agreement on 5 February 1971 in the 
formal Quadripartite talks. Kissinger’s document had been drafted with 
Bahr’s and Rush’s help with reference to the Western Three draft, but also 
including some Soviet phraseology.34 However, there was no reaction from 
the Soviet side for nearly three weeks, perhaps because Kissinger made few 
concessions on the Federal presence.35 When the Soviet Ambassador met 
Nixon’s national security advisor on 15 March 1971, Dobrynin demanded 
that Kissinger make a compromise on the Federal presence, or, as a new
32 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, February 10, 1971, 
KT00235, 22.2.1971; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 825*26.
33 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin February 16 and 22, 
1971, KT00239, 27.2.1971.
34 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 826; CD-ROM The Rise of Detente, letter from Kissinger 
to Bahr via special channel, 22.2.1971; AAPD 1971. Dok. 75, Staatssekretar Bahr, 
Bundeskanzleramt, an den Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Prasidenten, Kissinger,
25.2.1971. As regards the Western draft of 5 February 1971, see AAPD 1971. Dok. 52, 
Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse van Well, 8.2.1971.
35 Geyer, “The Missing Link,” p. 84.
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proposal, accept some Soviet presence in West Berlin before accepting the 
Western insistence on access procedures.36 At the same time, the Soviets 
wrote their own draft agreement on Berlin, which was handed to the 
Americans on 18 March 1971, and then formally submitted at the 
Four-Power meeting on 26 March 1971. The Soviet counter-draft was 
disappointing and “very far from what could be accepted by the Western 
side.”37 The reason for the hardening of Moscow’s position was probably 
partly because the Russians thought that it was now Washington’s turn to 
present something new. It was also because the Soviet leadership believed 
that Nixon wanted Summit meetings with Brezhnev and would hence make 
more concessions in order to secure this. Indeed, from the outset of the 
intensification of the superpower backchannel talks from January 1971, 
Dobrynin had reiterated that the United States and the Soviet Union should 
try to achieve a Berlin agreement before the Summit.38 No doubt Moscow 
was counting upon the usefulness of the Summit card.
Kissinger did not move, though. He flatly replied to the Soviet 
Ambassador that “it was impossible to make further progress [on Federal 
presence].”39 The main reason for the Western stubbornness was the 
internal political situation in West Germany. As Ambassador Rush reported, 
Brandt had to agree with the opposition leader Rainer Barzel not to make 
any concession on the problem of the West German connection with West 
Berlin at least at that time, and the CDU/CSU in general as well as even 
some of Brandt’s cabinet members such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher were also 
hardliners on the issue. Bahr therefore confirmed to Rush that concessions
36 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, March 15, 1971, 
KT00248, 18.3.19715 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 826.
37 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Memorandum for Kissinger from Sonnenfeldt [Subject- 
Berlin^ Soviets Table a Counter draft Agreement], 27.3.1971. See also, AAPD 1971. Dok. 110, 
Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors von Staden, 29.3.1971; Honore Marc Catudal, The 
Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: A New Era in East-West Politics. 
Berlin Verlag, 1978, pp.159-62.
38 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, My January 23 Conversation with Dobrynin, KT00229,
27.1.1971.
39 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, March 15, 1971, 
KT00248, 18.3.1971.
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on a Federal presence did not seem to be politically possible at that time.40 
As regards Dobrynin’s new suggestion on the Soviet presence in the Western 
Sectors, Kissinger rejected the establishment of a Soviet consulate that had 
diplomatic status. All that he could suggest instead to Dobrynin was an 
increase in Soviet commercial offices.41 Lamenting the impasse, the Soviet 
Ambassador complained that- “even in this channel we rather stubbornly 
clung to our position.”42 “[I]n any event all the channel guaranteed was 
greater speed, not greater concessions,” Kissinger coldly retorted.43 In the 
end, both the Americans and the Russians could not present further concrete 
suggestions. Washington (and Bonn) could not indicate a further concession 
on a Federal presence before the Soviets accepted the Western proposal on 
the transit principles. Moscow meanwhile waited for some kind of 
compromise from the West, believing that these would be the price of their 
agreement to a summit meeting. Even in the secret consultations, the Berlin 
problem reached a deadlock.
Berlin and Disarmament
Perhaps in order indirectly to escape from the deadlock and put pressure on 
the West, the Soviet leader presented a new position on a different issue. In 
his speech at a meeting of the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, on 30 
March 1971, Brezhnev aired his positive attitude towards disarmament, 
stating that* “We stand for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in 
areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all, in 
Central Europe.”44 The General Secretary’s remarks were not limited to 
foreign force reductions as proposed in the Budapest Memorandum of June
40 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Telegram from Rush to Kissinger, 16.3.1971.
41 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, My Recent Conversations with Dobrynin, KT00255, 
30.3.1971
42 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Memorandum of Conversation, 25.3.1971.
43 Ibid.
44 Quoted in John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. 
The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe. Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 25.
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1970. Rather, Brezhnev indicated a willingness to accept NATO’s proposal 
for disarmament of conventional forces in Europe, including both foreign and 
indigenous troops. Subsequent Soviet attitudes towards the MBFR 
negotiations suggest that Moscow was not necessarily serious about real 
force reductions. Rather, the aim of Brezhnev’s speech was tactical to place 
pressure on NATO countries to be more forthcoming on the Berlin question 
or a European security conference by exploring the West’s disarmament 
proposal. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the smaller countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance seemed to be stimulated by the new Soviet initiative.
While the true negotiations were being conducted via the backchannel 
in Washington, the official Quadripartite talks in Berlin predictably made 
little progress throughout the winter and early spring of 1971. 
Ambassadorial Four-Power meetings resumed in January 1971, and on 5 
February 1971 the Western Three tabled a draft Berlin agreement to the 
Soviets. Initially, this was welcomed as a basis for further discussions.45 Yet, 
before long, Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov criticised it as “something of a 
maximal demand made for tactical reasons” and by the meeting on 9 March 
1971 they “showed no readiness to move on any point of substance.”46 Also, 
the Allies’ strategy was to wait for Soviet concessions on an access agreement 
first, and then discuss the Federal presence. The Soviet Ambassador in 
Berlin never accepted such a procedural order. Instead, on 26 March 1971, he 
presented the counter-draft agreement mentioned above, which was less 
forthcoming from the Western point of view. No one was ready to make 
substantial concessions at the formal meetings.
Among NATO governments, therefore, pessimism about the prospect of 
a Berlin agreement was widespread. As early as on 25 January 1971, at a 
Franco/German summit meeting, Pompidou had expressed his gloomy view, 
saying that he did not believe the Russians were prepared to make a bold
45 AAPD 1971. Dok. 52, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse van Well,
8.2.1971.
46 DBPO. III. I . Doc. 64, fn. 3, p. 328.
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compromise on the Berlin problem.47 When the 26 March 1971 Soviet draft 
on a Berlin agreement was made available to all other NATO governments, 
they realised how seriously the Quadripartite talks were deadlocked. As the 
Canadian representative to NATO put it “any question of a* [Berlin] 
settlement in the near future seemed very unlikely.”48 Others led by the 
Belgian representative, also noted that “the chances of failure in the Berlin 
talks are considerable.”49 The bleak atmosphere in the Western bloc was 
such that the British representative reported to London his concern that 
some members of the Alliance might want to abandon the “Berlin 
pre-condition”, if it seemed that a breakdown in the Berlin talks might 
endanger the holding of a European security conference.50
Fearing a complete standstill of the detente process, Belgian Foreign 
Minister Harmel, tried to find a way out of the impasse caused by the 
difficulties of the Berlin problem. Belgium and other NATO members agreed 
with the importance of the divided city in Germany, and remained committed 
to the position that there would be no progress on a conference on European 
security without a Berlin settlement.51 Harmel instead proposed another 
idea, asking at the WEU Ministerial meeting in The Hague on 19 April 1971, 
whether the West would be prepared to consider discussions with the 
Warsaw Pact on MBFR quite separate from a security conference.52 The 
Belgian Foreign Minister was undoubtedly encouraged by Brezhnev’s 30 
March 1971 speech to the 24th Congress of the CPSU calling for negotiations 
on armed force reductions in Central Europe. The Dutch Foreign Minister 
also found Harmel’s suggestion “interesting,” and Luns too hoped that NATO
47 AAPD 1971. Dok. 31, “Gesprach des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit Staatsprasident 
Pompidou in Paris”, 25.1.1971.
48 TNA. FCO 41/885, Peck to Wiggin, 8.4.1971.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 As regards the Belgian position, see, for example, PAAA, B-40, Bd. 186, Konferenz uber 
Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Belgische Haltung, April 1971.
52 TNA. FCO 41/829, TNA. FCO tel no. 318 to Bonn, 20.4.1971.
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would consider it in the Lisbon NATO Ministerial Meetings in June 1971.53 
The stalemate in the Berlin talks had clearly pushed smaller countries that 
had no right to participate in the negotiations on the divided city, further 
towards disarmament detente.
It was West Germany, however, that most strongly opposed the Belgian 
suggestion of multilateralising the MBFR negotiations. Although mutual 
force reductions still remained an important issue for Bonn, it had begun to 
think that it was dangerous to rush into negotiations at this stage, partly 
because up to that time all troops-reduction models produced from a military 
point of view failed to envisage acceptance by the Warsaw Pact countries.54 
As Scheel told Heath, the FRG Foreign Minister thought that MBFR could 
be discussed at a European security conference, but not until the NATO 
members had worked out their position in detail.55 Yet, it was mainly 
because of Berlin and East Germany. As the West Germans put it*
[Mlultilateral exploratory talks on MBFR should await the outcome of the 
Berlin talks, which were a test of Soviet attitudes on all subjects!, ...,] because 
NATO must not allow the Soviet Union to out-flank the Berlin talks via MBFR, 
and because of the problem of GDR participation.56
The FRG government had interpreted the reasons for the new Brezhnev 
initiative on force reductions as a tactic to bypass the “Berlin pre-condition” 
attached to the holding of European security conference. Bonn thought that 
by agreeing to MBFR, Moscow attempted to establish a multilateral 
conference on the reduction of armed forces without reference to the Berlin 
problem and to obtain one of the same advantages as it hoped to obtain 
through an ESC, namely the GDR’s participation as an
56 Ibid.
54 AAPD 1971. Dok. 91, Aufzeichnung des Botschaftsrats Sonksen, Washington, 12.3.1971.
55 TNA. PREM 15/1522, Record of the Prime Minister's meeting with Herr Walter Scheel, 
German Minister for Foreign Affairs a t 11.30 a.m. on Friday 5 February 1971 a t 10 Downing 
Street, 5.2.1971.
56 TNA. FCO 41/806, UKDEL NATO tel no. 152 to FCO, 4.5.1971.
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internationally-recognised sovereign state.57 From the West German point 
of view, therefore, Belgium seemed to have fallen into the Soviet trap.
Breakthrough
Meanwhile, there was a crucial breakthrough regarding Berlin. This was due 
to Egon Bahr who proposed a new idea. He had become worried about the 
deadlock in the backchannel talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin, when 
the State Secretary in the Chancellor’s office received the Soviet draft 
agreement on Berlin on 26 March 1971 from Soviet diplomat Falin, not only 
because the contents of the draft were disappointing, but also because Falin 
expressed doubts about the American will to conclude a Berlin agreement. 
Although Bahr rebutted the Soviet diplomat’s misgiving, he felt that he had 
to take an initiative, because the West Germans feared that Moscow would 
lose interest in a Berlin settlement.58 Then, when he visited the United 
States in late April 1971, Bahr suggested to Kissinger that “juridical 
questions be put aside and that efforts be concentrated on finding a way of 
bringing about pragmatic improvements.”59 He had for instance noticed that 
the Soviets were prepared to make practical compromises on the access 
problem.60 Brandt’s right-hand man therefore calculated that if Moscow was 
willing to make enough concessions on access, the Brandt government could 
sell a Berlin agreement even if the West had to make some compromises on 
the Federal presence a later stage.61 The problem was how to encourage the
57 AAPD 1971. Dok. 161, RunderlaC des Staatssekretars Frank, 10.5.19715 TNA. FCO 
41/829, Braithwaite to Pembeton-Pigott, 26.4.1971.
58 AAPD 1971. Dok. 109, Staatssekretar Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, an den 
Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Prasidenten, Kissinger, 26.3.1971.
59 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [between Kissinger and 
Bahr]' The Berlin Negotiations (Part I of II), KT0Q262, 22.4.1971. See also, Kissinger, White 
House Years, p. 828.
60 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [between Kissinger and 
Bahr]: The Berlin Negotiations (Part I of II), KT00262, 22.4.1971.
61 In mid-March 1971, Rush and Bahr had already discussed what possible concessions 
might eventually be made with regard to the Federal presence, and agreed tha t “some 
means of limiting Bundestag committee and Franktionen meetings might in time be found
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Soviets to make initial concessions on access.
The importance of Bahr’s suggestion was twofold. Firstly, by dropping 
legal justifications for both sides’ positions on Berlin, it could be possible to 
solve or shelve the most difficult part of the draft agreement on the status of 
Berlin -  an issue over which the juridical points of view of the two sides were 
completely incompatible. His idea could halt fruitless disputes over the 
status of the divided city, and it would make it possible to regulate the issue 
of access procedures pragmatically.62 Secondly, Bahr’s proposal gave 
Kissinger a new card to break the deadlock. He welcomed Bahr’s approach 
and was able to present it to Dobrynin as a new step, without compromising 
on the question of a Federal presence, a highly controversial problem in the 
domestic politics of the FRG.63 Moscow also accepted the German initiative 
on 3 May 1971, perhaps because there was a new approach from the West.64 
The negotiations in the backchannel had come to a standstill because neither 
side was willing to present the next card. Both sides had waited for the other 
side to begin making concessions. Bahr broke the impasse.
Bahr’s approach also provided a new forum- the Group of Three. In 
order to find a way out of the stalemate, Kissinger had initially proposed 
bilateral private meetings between Rush and, firstly Abrassimov, the Soviet 
Ambassador in Berlin, and then Falin who was to be appointed as the 
Ambassador to Bonn.65 However, it was the Soviet side that, when it 
accepted Bahr’s approach, also proposed “to conduct in Bonn confidential 
meetings of the USSR, US and FRG representatives.”66 Perhaps the
and tha t it might be possible to establish a single Federal republic office representing the 
twenty-odd FRG ministerial offices of the republic now in West Berlin.” Bahr confirmed, 
however, tha t “a t present this does not seem to be politically possible ” CD-ROM The Rise of 
Detente. Telegram from Rush to Kissinger, 16.3.1971.
62 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit. p. 360.
63 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Message from Kissinger for Rush via special channel,
23.4.1971.
64 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Message from Kissinger to Rush via back channel,
3.5.1971.
65 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 827. DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Meeting with 
Ambassador Dobrynin, April 26, 1971, KT00268, 28.4.1971.
66 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Message from Kissinger to Rush via back channel,
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Russians had judged that it would be useful for them to include Bahr who 
might serve as a mediator between Rush and Falin. The three then met in 
Bonn for the first time on 10 May 1971.67 They began covert consultations on 
the basis of a draft written by Bahr that contained juridically neutral 
formulations and stated only the obligations and responsibilities of both 
sides.68 According to Sarotte, there is no formal document recording the 
drafting process in the Group of Three, but it clearly produced results which 
were then reflected at the twentieth round of Quadripartite talks on 25 May 
1971.69 Before May 1971, the gap between the Western and Soviet drafts on 
Berlin had still been hopelessly wide. By the end of May 1971, significant 
progress had been made “with agreement on common language for more 
than half a draft working paper.”70 This was outstandingly good news for the 
forthcoming June 1971 NATO Ministerial meeting.71
3.5.1971.
67 AAPD 1971. Dok. 163, Staatssekretar Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, an den 
Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Prasidenten, Kissinger, 11.5.1971. Shortly before, on 
the other side of the Iron Curtain, Moscow consented to the resignation of Walter Ulbricht 
who had been the East German leader for more than 20 years. He had possessed significant 
power in the GDR, and had therefore often been a difficult person for the Soviet Union to 
deal with. On 3 May 1971, Ulbricht was forced to resign due to pressure from within the 
SED and from the Kremlin. His replacement was Erich Honecker, who obeyed Moscow’s 
directions more willingly than Ulbricht, which thus meant tha t East Germany became more 
manageable for the Soviet Union during the detente process. Sarotte, Dealing With the 
Devil, pp.109*111.
68 Bahr had handed over his draft agreement on Berlin when he had seen Kissinger on 25 
April 1971.
69 Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, p. 119.
70 DBPO. III. I. Doc. 67, note 10, p. 346,' See also AAPD 1971. Dok. 190, Aufzeichning des 
Vortragenden Legationsrats Blech, 27.5.1971.
71 Catudal has concisely summarised the situation of official Berlin negotiations at the end 
of May 1971 after the 20th Ambassadorial meeting as follows^ “Subsequently, in three days of 
intensive conversations a t the experts’ level, the first common draft accord was concluded. 
This text outlined a t length those points of common agreement; all issues tha t remained 
unresolved were put in footnotes or in brackets. The result of this major effort revealed that 
substantial progress had been made on the key matters of West German presence in West 
Berlin, access to the city, its ties with the Federal Republic, representation of West Berlin 
abroad and communications across the Wall.” Catudal, The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite. 
p. 170.
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The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon* 3-4 June 1971
The most important subjects discussed at the Lisbon NATO Ministerial 
Meeting on 3-4 June 1971 were, thus, the pre-conditions for a multilateral 
preparatory conference for an ESC, in particular a satisfactory Berlin 
agreement, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Indeed, Brezhnev 
had, again and more clearly, announced his interest in armed force 
reductions in his speech for the 50th Anniversary of the Georgian Republic in 
TifLis on 14 May 1971, stressing the need “to start negotiations.”72 It had 
been the NATO side that had proposed MBFR unconditionally in the 1968 
Reykjavik Signal and again in the 1970 Rome Communique. The West 
therefore could not ignore the Soviet Union’s clear response.
In the event, a Canadian idea provided the West with a helpful way to 
reply to the Soviets, and was welcomed by a majority of the Allied partners. 
At a NATO Council meeting on 18 May 1971, the Canadian representative to 
NATO had suggested to his colleagues that one NATO representative be 
appointed to conduct MBFR exploration on behalf of the Alliance as a whole. 
The main advantage of this idea for the West was that this would postpone 
the problem of GDR participation in multilateral negotiations.73 Predictably, 
for the Belgians, the Dutch, the Italians, and the Scandinavians, who had 
been strong supporters of disarmament detente from the outset and had 
pressed for the inclusion of positive words in the MBFR section of a final 
Communique, the Canadian initiative was acceptable. Even more crucially, 
the US State Department was more enthusiastic because pressure from 
Congress to reduce the number of US troops in Europe had reached a critical 
stage. On 11 May 1971, Senator Mike Mansfield again introduced a new
72 Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, pp. 25-26,' AAPD 
1971. Dok. 179, fn. 3, p. 810.
73 TNA. FCO 41/829, UKDEL NATO tel no. 183 to FCO, 18.5.1971. See also, Robert Spencer, 
“Canada and the Origins of the CSCE,” in Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada and the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. University of Tront, 1984, p. 65.
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proposal asking for a 50 per cent reduction in US forces in Europe.74 The 
Brezhnev speech in Tiflis gave the Americans a chance to exploit the new 
Soviet stance in order to evade this pressure.75 The Department of State, 
therefore, had a strong incentive to take a more positive stance towards 
MBFR at the Lisbon NATO Meeting.76 The West Germans, who were keen to 
see disarmament, also thought that- “In Lisbon we should take a positive 
attitude but without committing ourselves to multilateral talks.”77 The 
Canadian idea was compatible with their desires.
Even the British, who had become one of strong opponents of force 
reductions, could not allow themselves to be too negative on this issue. They 
were afraid that if they took a rigid line, they would be ignored. Furthermore, 
the British government had feared that- “the Americans may be tempted to 
‘bilateralise’ the discussions [with the Russians -  something which Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko had hinted Moscow would like], if [the 
Americans] think their Allies are being too stuffy.”78 In particular, the UK 
Defence Secretary Carrington was very concerned that the Americans might 
go off on their own and do a bilateral deal with the USSR about MBFR.79 In 
order to avoid such US/USSR bilateralism over MBFR, the British had to 
show a positive attitude to some extent at least.
Thus, the idea of appointing a NATO representative in order to probe
74 Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, pp.25-27.
75 TNA. FCO 41/830, Bridges to Wiggin, 21.5.1971.
76 The White House was more prudent about MBFR. The National Security Decision 
Memorandum 108 dated 21 May 1971 stated tha t “We should clearly distinguish between (l) 
diplomatic explorations, which can be pursued at this time,' and (2) the first phase of formal 
negotiations, which we will not begin until further preparations are accomplished.”
CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Kissinger to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, National Security Decision Memorandum 108, Subject- Guidance on M utual and 
Balanced Force Reductions, 21.5.1971.
77 AAPD 1971. Dok. 161, RunderlaB des Staatssekretars Frank, 10.5.1971,' TNA. FCO 
41/829, UKDEL NATO tel no. 175 to FCO, 17.5.1971.
78 TNA. FCO 41/829, FCO tel no. 152 to UKDEL NATO, 18.5.1971.
79 Before the Lisbon Meeting, Carrington sent a letter to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home 
and gave him a warning about superpower conduct of the force reduction problem. (TNA. 
FCO 41/830, the Secretary of State for Defence to Douglas-Home, 28.5.1971.) The Italian 
government was similarly concerned about US/USSR bilateralism over MBFR, and 
conveyed this directly to the US government. TNA. FCO 41/829, Washington tel no. 1867 to 
FCO, 28.5.1971.
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the Eastern bloc’s attitude towards MBFRs was appealing for many NATO 
governments in order to give a response to the Brezhnev speech in positive 
fashion, while at the same time avoiding the problem of the GDR’s 
participation. Ministers then agreed this line in general, and four months 
later, at the special Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on 5 October 1971, 
the Atlantic Alliance appointed the Secretary-General of NATO, Manlio 
Brosio, as an “explorer” to visit the USSR and other Eastern countries, to 
probe the possibility of MBFR negotiations.80
At the Lisbon Ministerial meeting, the French again demanded that 
the final communique be “a little more forthcoming than last time towards a 
CES [conference on European security],” and asked for the reference to 
“on-going talks” to be dropped in order to make the convention of a 
Conference less conditional.81 For Paris, the addition of “on-going talks” as a 
pre-condition for an ESC also reduced the significance of the Berlin condition. 
As the British cynically observed: “if the pre-condition of other on-going talks 
fell through, there would be no tears shed in Paris.”82 Although the 
German-German question was still important for the West Germans, as 
discussed above, the FRG leaders had already given their support to the 
French position for political reasons.
France gained support from most of the smaller countries as well. The 
Belgians and Canadians had already insisted that NATO should remove any 
ambiguity over “on-going talks.”83 The Italian Foreign Minister also stood by 
Schumann. In the course of early 1971, Moro, who had opposed the idea of an 
ESC during 1970, had become more positive to it largely because of domestic 
politics and in particular the need to obtain support from the Italian
80 AAPD 1971. Dok.348, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Mertes,
14.10.1971,' TNA. FCO 41/838, UKDEL NATO tel no. 468 to FCO, 7.10.1971; M artin Muller. 
Politik und Burokratie- die MBFR-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland zwischen 1967 
und 1973. Nomos, 1988, pp. 151-54.
81 TNA. FCO 41/807, Paris tel no. 666 to FCO, 26.5.1971.
82 TNA. FCO 41/806, UKDEL NATO tel no. 155 to FCO, 6.5.1971.
83 TNA. FCO 41/806, Peck to Bridge, 28.4.1971.
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Communist Party.84 As a result, he contended that “the only precondition for 
a European Security Conference which should be retained by NATO should 
be Berlin.”85 The Danish, the Luxemburgers and the Norwegians also sided 
with this argument.86 Clearly, there was a general sense that the Alliance 
should push the Soviets more on the Berlin issue than on any other.
Only the Americans, the British and the Dutch opposed this trend. For 
Washington, the SALT negotiations were still one of the greatest concerns; 
therefore they were keen to retain the precondition of “on going talks.”87 The 
British also regarded the phrase as “conveniently general and flexible.” 
Furthermore, they saw it as a useful way of meeting the West German 
foreign officials’ preoccupation that a move to a Conference should not take 
place until there was some clarification of the inner-German relationship, 
which was also an issue in another set of “on-going talks.”88 However, their 
opinions were in a minority at the Ministerial meeting. The development of 
Berlin talks had created a different atmosphere from the previous NATO 
Ministerial meeting in December 1970, in which Anglo-American 
conservative opinion had been accepted by the other Alliance members.
Despite Anglo/American/Dutch resistance, the reference to on-going 
talks was finally dropped. Certainly, the Anglo-Saxons thought that, even if 
the words disappeared, “in practice it [was] generally recognised that any 
changes for the worse in the international situation would inevitably affect 
the prospects for the East-West multilateral talks.”89 Furthermore, they 
could also derive some satisfaction from a final communique in which the 
relationship between Berlin and a Conference was described less directly 
than the French wished. Paris had wanted stronger language such as, “’as
84 PAAA, B-40, Bd. 190, Italiensche Haltung zur KSE, 17.3.1971; MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - 
juin 1976, carton 2921, Note by Arnaud, 17.4.1971.
85 TNA. FCO 41/806, Bridges to Brimelow, 5.5.1971.
86 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2921, memo written by Tine. Objet- session 
ministerielle ■ question de Berlin, 4.6.1971.
TNA. FCO 41/807, UKDEL NATO tel no. 184 to FCO, 18.5.1971.
88 TNA. FCO 41/806, FCO tel no. 124 to UKDEL NATO, 30.4.1971.
89 TNA. FCO 41/808, Lisbon tel no. 262 to FCO, 3.6.1971.
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soon as satisfactory progress has been made in the Berlin negotiations’ 
multilateral preparation could begin.”90 Although the final words in the 
communique were softened, in order to appeal public opinion,91 as some 
Ministers insisted, the only official condition to multilateral talks for a 
European security conference now became the satisfactory conclusion of a 
Berlin agreement. In the communique, NATO Ministers stressed their hope 
that “before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached 
a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead 
to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be 
undertaken.”92
Linking MBFR to a Conference on European Security
After the Lisbon NATO Ministerial meeting, preliminary talks on a 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) might have begun 
earlier than was actually the case owing to a new British initiative. The 
Western project of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions had been tabled 
as a counter-proposal. Brezhnev’s speech calling for starting negotiations 
about disarmament and the rise of smaller countries’ enthusiasm for MBFR 
also seemed to accelerate East-West relations towards armed force 
reductions. Britain, which considered the disarmament project as dangerous 
for Western security, however, was worried by this situation. When it seemed 
that troop reductions in Europe were unavoidable, the British attempted to 
delay the start of MBFR negotiations by linking it with a European security 
conference. Indeed, the UK Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home insisted that 
force reductions should be discussed in a body set up by a CSCE in order to
90 TNA. FCO 41/807, Paris tel no. 666 to FCO, 26.5.1971.
91 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2921, memo written by Tine. Objet: session 
ministerielle - question de Berlin, 4.6.1971.
92 The Lisbon Final Communique. http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c710603a.htm
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postpone MBFR for as long as possible by pushing it behind the conference.93 
With this idea, the MBFR negotiations were to start after a conference on 
European security, -  a lesser evil for Britain — which would also take place 
after the conclusion of a Berlin agreement. For the defence-oriented British 
Secretary of State, the coupling of CSCE and MBFR would be a reasonable 
way to postpone the beginning of conventional disarmament in Europe.
The British Foreign Office was also influenced by the arguments of 
smaller countries. Following up the agreement at the June 1971 Ministerial 
gathering, the NATO Senior Political Committee (SPC) intensified its study 
of MBFR. Among many points which needed to be discussed, the question of 
the forum for MBFR negotiations was an important issue. And, at a SPC 
meeting, Belgium and Canada aired their views about the connection 
between MBFR and a CSCE. The Belgian representative, for instance, 
postulated a scenario that: “If a Berlin settlement was reached before 
explorations on MBFR were completed, then MBFR would clearly feature at 
an ESC.”94 The Canadian representative also suggested that, in order to 
satisfy some NATO and neutral countries which would not be directly 
involved in force reduction negotiations, a wider grouping should be provided 
in the context of a conference on European security.95
Agreeing with the Canadian opinion in particular, the British saw two 
more advantages in the idea of remitting the study of MBFR to an organ set 
up at a European security conference. Firstly, by postponing MBFR talks 
until after a CSCE, the West could avoid the problem of East German 
participation in multilateral negotiations at least until the conclusion of the 
talks on Berlin. Secondly, UK diplomats hoped that the link between a CSCE 
and MBFR would solve the problem of French participation in force
93 TNA. FCO 41/833, Braithwaite to Bridges, 15.7.1971," ibid., Record of Conversation 
between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the French Ambassador in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Tuesday 22 June, 1971 at 10.50 am," DNSA, 
Presidential Directives, Part II, Information Memorandum, MBFR and CES, PR00901,
20.9.1971.
94 TNA. FCO 41/832, Davidson to Braithwaite, 9.7.1971.
93 Ibid.
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reduction talks.96 The French had repeatedly made it clear that they were 
not willing to be associated with MBFR talks on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but they 
repeatedly displayed their growing interest in an all-European Conference. 
To maintain the Alliance’s solidarity -  the top priority of British foreign 
policy -  the idea of involving France in MBFR talks via a conference on 
European security was highly attractive. While the French and British 
shared the view that MBFR could be dangerous for Western security, London, 
unlike Paris, thought that the negotiations on MBFR were politically 
inevitable because of American eagerness for them.97 Therefore, it would 
also be an advantage for the British to oppose, or at least reduce the risk of, 
MBFR together with the French from within the negotiations. The proposed 
CSCE/MBFR link was thus the only device for Britain to dispose of both the 
Berlin and French problems simultaneously.98
The major source of difficulty for this attempt to establish a 
CSCE/MBFR connection was expected to be opposition from Washington. 
Postponing MBFR talks until after the holding of a Conference might not 
meet the American domestic political timetable because the US State 
Department in particular wanted to start talks on force reductions as early 
as possible, in order to allay domestic pressure demanding withdrawal of US 
troops in Europe.99 Indeed, Mansfield’s amendment calling for such force 
reductions was already on the table. To wait until a European security 
conferece had been convened might thus be too slow for the USA.
The first chance to probe American thinking on this subject came on 22 
July 1971, when Anglo-American official talks were held in Washington. The 
British side argued on the one hand that- “It was difficult to see any solution 
[to the GDR participation problem] except to postpone MBFR talks until at 
least after a Berlin and possibly also a German modus vivendi”100 On the
96 TNA. FCO 41/833, Braithwaite to Bridges, 15.7.1971.
97 TNA. FCO 41/888, FCO tel no. 659 to Paris, 27.9.1971.
99 Ibid.
99 TNA. FCO 41/833, Braithwaite to Bridges, 15.7.1971.
100 TNA. FCO 41/834, Anglo-US Talks on MBFR in the State Department on 22 July, 1971
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other hand, they stressed the advantages of treating MBFR in a forum set up 
by a conference on European security, insisting that- “Possibly the only way 
to solve this problem over the French would be to combine MBFRs with a 
CES, or perhaps to make MBFRs dependent on a prior CES”.101 Although 
Martin Hillenbrand, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the US 
Department of State, agreed with much of the British argument, he 
expressed American concern that the Berlin negotiations would thereby 
continue more slowly. Certainly, the Assistant Secretary did not reject the 
British idea, stating that were the Berlin talks to be satisfactorily concluded 
by the end of 1971, “the MBFR and CES negotiating tracks would tend to 
merge and MBFR talks would be assimilated into the European Security 
talks.” But he described this scenario as the most optimistic hypothesis.102
In fact, at that time, the formal Quadripartite talks were again 
stagnant because Kissinger had stopped the backchannel negotiations. As 
early as May 1971 when the Group of Three talks had begun, Nixon's 
national security advisor had advised Rush “to avoid being stampeded into 
too rapid a pace,” in order to “keep the Berlin talks and SALT in some sort of 
balance.”103 This was despite Brandt’s wish for speedy negotiaitons.104 
Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger had wanted to use their China card more 
effectively. They had already received an invitation from the People’s 
Republic of China on 27 April 1971, and Kissinger was going to make a 
clandestine trip to Peking in early July 1971. Although Dobrynin pushed 
Kissinger with the Summit card, the latter instructed Rush that- “It is 
imperative that you do not come to a final agreement until after July 15 for 
reasons that will become apparent to you.”105 Without progress in the secret
at 10.15 AM.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Message from Kissinger to Rush via Special Channel,
24.5.1971.
104 AAPD 1971.Dok. 185, Staatssekretar Bahr, Bundeskanzleramt, an den 
Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Prasidenten, Kissinger, 24.5.1971.
105 Quoted in Geyer, “The Missing Link,” p. 89; Kissinger, White House Years, p. 829.
187
negotiations, there would be no advance in the formal Quadripartite talks. 
When the Anglo-US talks were held on 22 July 1971, therefore, the official 
Berlin negotiations at the Ambassadorial level were still in limbo. Thus, 
Hillenbrand could not be so optimistic.
Yet, the development of the Berlin talks from August 1971 made the 
Americans view the British proposal of linking MBFR and a conference on 
European security more favourably. After Nixon’s announcement on 15 July 
1971 of his visit to the PRC for China-US summit meetings the following 
spring, in other words after Moscow’s summit card had been offset by 
Washington’s China card, the secret talks resumed and the Group of Three 
reached tentative agreement on 28 July 1971 at an informal level.106 This 
was followed by what Rush termed the “final phase,” with sequential 
Ambassadorial meetings taking place from 10 August 1971 onwards until 
midnight on 18/19 August 1971 when, after fourteen hours of marathon 
drafting, the four Ambassadors in Berlin completed the provisional Berlin 
agreement.107 As a result, the US Department of State gradually began to 
regard the British proposal of linking the mutual force reduction project and 
a Conference as an appealing idea.108 Indeed, US State Secretary Rogers 
confirmed this inclination in his press conference on 3 September 1971, 
stating that- “we are prepared to consider both [a CSCE and MBFR]. 
Whether they might take place at one time or separately has not been 
determined. We would be willing to consider either possibility.”109
France and West Germany also indicated their acceptance of the 
British suggestion. Predictably, the French were very encouraged by the 
results of the Quadripartite talks and they felt the need to do something by
106 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Telegram from Rush to Kissinger, 29.7.1971.
107 TNA. PREM 15/396, MacGlashan to Unwin, 19.8.1971; DBPO. III. I. Doc. 70, fn. 7, p. 
361; Ibid., p .376. See also, Catudal, The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite, pp. 174-77.
108 A number of reports from the British Embassy in Washington suggest th a t the 
Americans were finding the idea of combining a security Conference and MBFR talks 
increasingly attractive. See, Ibid., Crowe to Braithwaite, 18.8.1971; Crowe to Braithwaite, 
19.8.1971; Cape to Bridges, 26.8.1971; Butler to Bridges, 3.9.1971.
109 Ibid., Braithwaite to Bridges, 7.9.1971.
188
way of preparations for a European security conference.110 Reportedly, at the 
French Council of Ministers meeting on 1 September 1971, the French 
leaders decided to be more active in favour of a multilateral conference.111 
As a first public reaction, after the meeting, the spokesman of the Council 
announced that the French government was interested in the communique 
issued by the Finnish government on 24 August 1971 which had stated that 
the conclusion of the Berlin agreement would open the door to the 
multilateral preparatory phase for a conference on security and cooperation 
in Europe.112 The French enthusiasm also clearly affected their attitude 
towards the British approach. On 8 September 1971, Jean Jurgensen, the 
Deputy Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, told the British 
Minister in Paris, Michael Palliser, that the French thought that MBFR 
should be discussed in a permanent body set up by a European security 
conference in the hope that they “went on a very long time and became 
increasingly bogged down.”113 Although the French disliked disarmament 
detente, they thought that if a CSCE was to be held as soon as the Berlin 
agreement was concluded, they could accept the connection between a 
Conference and MBFR, and the latter could be aborted after the Conference.
The Federal German Chancellor also shared with the British policy. At 
first, the West Germans, at least at an official level, were hesitant about 
connecting a CSCE and MBFR. However, Brandt still maintained the FRG’s 
basic fine of a CSCE/MBFR link, which had been formulated eleven months 
before at the Federal Security Council. When he visited the Soviet Union and 
met Brezhnev at his summer residence at Oreanda on 17 September 1971, 
the Chancellor suggested the same idea as the British proposed, namely 
connecting MBFR with a European security conference, in order to persuade 
the Soviet leader of the significance of force reductions in Europe. The Soviet
110 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2922, Note pour le Ministre, 30.8.1971.
111 TNA. FCO 41/887, Simp son-Orlebar to Braithwaite, 6.9.1971.
112 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2922, Circulaire no 317, 1.9.1971.
113 TNA. FCO 41/836, Simp son-Orlebar to Bridges, 8.9.1971.
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General Secretary replied by stressing fhe importance of accelerating the 
process towards a Conference, and not surprisingly agreed with the idea of 
treating the issue of force reductions within a committee set up by the 
Conference, because this had originally been proposed by the Warsaw Pact in 
the Budapest Memorandum of June 1970.114
The US Department of State, France, and West Germany as well as the 
Soviet Union were thus lending their support to the British proposal for 
linking a conference on European security and MBFR. Although the White 
House disliked the idea of a European security conference, and in principle 
insisted on keeping MBFR and a CSCE separate,115 Washington might have 
been forced to concur with the British had it found itself totally isolated in 
NATO. This would have been quite likely given that the smaller countries 
would probably have rallied to the UK position. As will be discussed below, 
however, due to Soviet’s counter proposal on the Berlin problem, the British 
initiative would vanish into the void.
The First Quadripartite Agreement and the Reverse Junktim
The Quadripartite Agreement was signed in Berlin on 3 September 1971.116 
For the Western Bloc, however, this was still not a “satisfactory” conclusion.
114 AAPD 1971. Dok. 311, Gesprach des Bundeskanklers Brandt mit dem Generalsekretar 
des ZK der KpdSU, Breschnew, in Oreanda, 17.9.1971.
115 For example, CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Kissinger to the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense, National Security Decision Memorandum 108, Subject: Guidance on 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 21.5.1971.
116 Because of translation problems a t the final stage in September 1971, the official version 
of the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement was written only in English, French and Russian, 
and the German version was excluded in the end. Sarotte, Dealing With the Devil, pp. 
121*122. Probably because of this experience, the West Germans began to make great efforts 
to make German an official language in the future CSCE. Indeed, this was the top priority of 
the Auswartiges Am e’s policy in discussions within NATO and with the Soviet Union in the 
course of late 1971 to 1972. As regards the importance of the German language in the CSCE, 
see Kristina Spohr-Readman, “National Interests and the Power o f‘Language’: West 
German Diplomacy and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972*1975”, 
Journal of Strategic Studies. 29/6 (2006).
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As described in the last chapter, the Berlin negotiation was envisaged in 
three stages. The first stage was a Four Power agreement on the principles 
in and around Berlin, which was now concluded. The second stage was a 
detailed arrangement on transit between the two Germanys. The final stage 
would be a signing of a protocol by the Four Powers. From the Western point 
of view, and in particular for the United States, Britain and West Germany, 
the completion of all these three stages would constitute a “satisfactory” 
settlement of the Berlin question. France, a keen supporter of a multilateral 
European conference, opposed this interpretation. Yet, by the end of 1971, 
the Washington-London-Bonn opinion was confirmed because of a Soviet 
counter-linkage proposal.
This new Soviet stance was called the “reverse Junktim .” When Brandt 
visited Moscow in mid-September 1971, the Soviet General Secretary 
stressed, at the end of their conversation on 17 September 1971, the fact that 
the Soviet side had made a lot of concessions on the Berlin Agreement, and 
they did so for the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties.117 The implication of 
Brezhnev’s final remarks seemed not to have been well understood by the 
West Germans at that time. It was at the meeting between the FRG and 
Soviet Foreign Ministers on 27 September 1971 in New York that Moscow’s 
intention was elucidated. In his conversation with Scheel, Gromyko revealed 
the new Soviet policy of establishing a connection between the ratification of 
the Moscow Treaty and the signing of the final protocol on Berlin.118 To 
counter Bonn’s Junktim — the link between a “satisfactory” settlement of the 
Berlin talks and ratification of the Moscow Treaty -  and NATO’s Berlin 
pre-condition for a CSCE, the Russians made another linkage, insisting that 
they would withhold the signature of the final Berlin protocol until the 
ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Bundestag. Presumably, Moscow
117 AAPD 1971. Dok. 311, Gesprach des Bundeskanklers Brandt mit dem Generalsekretar 
des ZK der KpdSU, Breschnew, in Oreanda, 17.9.1971.
118 AAPD 1971. Dok. 323, Ministerialdirektor von Staden, z.Z. New York, an das Auswartige 
Amt, 27.9.1971.
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feared the possibility that, while they made substantial concessions on the 
Berlin question, the Moscow Treaty, which the Soviets desperately wanted to 
put into effect, might have been rejected by the West German Assembly, in 
which the governmental parties enjoyed only a slight majority.119 In order to 
secure the Treaty, the Soviets took the final phase of the Berlin talks 
hostage.
This counter-linkage was a “bombshell” for the West,120 and its 
implication was serious for multilateral European detente. First of all, it 
meant that a conference on European security would be postponed for the 
indefinite future. NATO’s Berlin pre-condition was that the West would not 
agree to hold a Conference before a “satisfactory” conclusion of the Berlin 
question, namely the completion of the three stages. According to the 
“reverse Junktim ” however, the final stage would be fulfilled after the 
ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Before the ratification, of course, 
discussion and examination of the Treaty in the Bundestag were needed, and 
they were expected to start after the signing of the Final Quadripartite 
Protocol (FQP). Without an agreement on Berlin before examinations of the 
Treaty began in the Bundestag, Hillenbrand worried that “it was very 
doubtful whether Brandt could get the Moscow Treaty ratified at all.”121 In 
other words, while the Soviet Union demanded the ratification of the Moscow 
Treaty first for the FQP, the West and the Bonn government in particular 
needed the FQP so as to secure the ratification of the Moscow Treaty in the 
Assembly. Therefore, it became difficult to foresee when the Berlin problem 
would be settled; this in turn meant that it became highly obscure when a 
European security conference would be convened.
However, the French government wanted to start the preparations for a 
CSCE regardless of the reverse Junktim. When Brezhnev visited Paris in 
October 1971, the French President disregard the USSR’s counter linkage
119 Catudal, The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite, pp. 199-200.
120 TNA. FCO 41/837, Washington tel no. 3235 to FCO, 29.9.1971.
121 Ibid.
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and told his guest that the multilateral phase of preparatory talks should 
open at Helsinki in the shortest possible time.122 Pompidou reportedly said 
that “nothing stand in the way” of the opening of multilateral preparations 
for a Conference.123 Then Paris begun to insist that the multilateral phase 
should start as soon as the inner-German phase of the Berlin talks was 
complete (stage 2), and before the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and the 
signing of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin (stage 3). By taking this 
stance, the French attempted to avoid Moscow’s reverse Junktim affecting a 
CSCE.
Despite the Soviet counter linkage, British and West German Ministers 
were not at first opposed to the French position immediately. Officials in the 
UK Foreign Ministry thought that NATO had no need to rush into 
multilateral preparation for a CSCE, and stressed that the satisfactory 
conclusion of the Berlin agreement meant the signing of the FQP.124 
However, the British Secretary of State indicated on 6 November 1971 that 
he was considering accepting the French policy.125 About one week later 
when French Foreign Minister Schumann visited London on 12 November 
1971, Douglas-Home agreed that, once stage 2 of the Berlin agreement had 
been concluded, there would be no insuperable objection from the British 
point of view to an early move to a multilateral preparatory discussion about 
a conference on European security, on condition that the West German 
government was willing to it.126 For the British, a CSCE itself had already 
become less dangerous. Rather, of much more importance were the solidarity 
of the Atlantic Alliance and the interests of Britain’s partners. Therefore,
122 AN, 5 AG 2 /1018, Second tete-a- tete entre le President de la Republique et Monsieur 
Brejnev, le 26 octobre 1971, Elysee, 16 h. 50 a 20 h. 15; TNA. FCO 41/890, Paris Tel No. 1279 
to FCO, 26.10.1971.
123 TNA. FCO 41/891, Bonn Tel No. 1377, 27.10.1971; AAPD 1971. Dok. 354, Gesandter 
Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Paris, an das Auswartige Amt, 19.10.1971.
124 TNA. FCO 41/894, Bridges to Private Secretary, 26.11.1971;
125 PAAA, B*28, Bd. 1572, Betr.-Ausserungen BM iiber zeitlichen Zusammenhang zwischen 
Berlin-Regelung und Beginn m ultilateraler KSE-Vorbereitung sowie iiber “Gegenjunktim” 
in Bracciano am 6.11.1971, 9.11.1971.
126 TNA. FCO 41/894, Bridges to Private Secretary, 26.11.1971.
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Douglas-Home cared about the opinions of both Paris and Bonn.
West Germany was also ready to accept the French line. The FRG 
Foreign Ministry thought that multilateral preparation for a Conference 
could start after the second stage Berlin talks between the two Germanies 
had finished if that was the wish of the majority in NATO: but such 
preparation should not be concluded until the Bundestag had ratified the 
Moscow Treaty.127 In other words, even if preparatory talks began, the West 
Germans intended not to agree to enter into a Conference itself if the 
Moscow Treaty was still not ratified. With this formula, the FRG attempted 
to control the pace of multilateral European detente. Before concurring with 
Paris, Bonn had to prove Moscow’s intention again. Indeed, when Scheel met 
Schumann on 19 November 1971, the FRG Foreign Minister suggested that 
NATO would be able to take a flexible attitude on the timing of the beginning 
of preparatory talks as the French wished, if the Soviets would indicate their 
flexibility about the reverse Junktim .128
The USSR remained stubborn, however. It thus made the FRG 
inflexible. Soon after Scheel met Schumann, the West German Foreign 
Minister flew to the Soviet capital on 25 November 1971, and had several 
conversations with Soviet leaders until 30 November 1971. Scheel attempted 
to persuade the Soviets to be less obstinate on the reverse Junktim, but 
Gromyko did not change his opinion that the Final Quadripartite Protocol on 
Berlin would be signed when the Moscow Treaty was ratified.129 This Soviet 
attitude clearly affected the West German decision on 3 December 1971 to 
oppose the beginning of multilateral preparations for a CSCE in advance of
127 AAPD 1971. Dok. 412, Ministerialdirektor von Staden an die Standige Vertretung bei der 
NATO in Brussel, 23.11.1971,' TNA. FCO 41/893, Paris Tel No. 1429 to FCO, 17.11.1971.
128 MAE, Serie Secretariat General, Entretiens et Messages, 1956-1971^ Compte Rendu de 
l’Entretien entre M. Schumann et M. Scheel a Paris, le 19 novembre 1971, Seance d 
l'apes-midi, 25.11.1971,' AAPD 1971, Dok. 403, Gespach des Bundesministers Scheel mit 
dem franzosischen AuBenminister Schumann in Paris, 19.11.1971.
129 AAPD 1971. Dok. 416, Gesprach des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem sowjetischen 
AuBenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 28.11.1971; Ibid., Dok. 417, Gesprach des 
Bundesministers Scheel mit dem sowjetischen AuBenminister Gromyko in Moskau,
28.11.1971.
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the signing of the Final Quadripartite Protocol. Gunther van Well, the head 
of the German Question Department in the Auswartiges Amt, explained to 
his NATO partners that, in order to obtain parliamentary approval in Bonn 
for the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, they thought it was important not 
to start multilateral preparations, in which the GDR would participate, 
because this would introduce further negative factors whilst the difficult 
parliamentary process was going on.130 If the Soviet Union had not 
advocated its reverse Junktim , the Final Quadripartite Protocol would have 
been signed soon after the second stage of inner-German talks on Berlin 
before or during the parliamentary ratification process. The conclusion of 
FQP would therefore have positive effects in the Bundestag discussions. 
Because of Gromyko’s reluctance to soften his attitude on the reverse 
Junktim, however, the West German government could not move towards a 
Conference before the Berlin question was settled, in order not to give a 
further bad impression to their parliament.
In the end, France was isolated. When the French, American, British 
and West German Foreign Ministers had a dinner meeting on 8 December 
1971 -  immediately before the Ministerial NATO Council meeting in 
Brussels —, Schumann tried in vain to persuade his counterparts to 
announce that NATO was now prepared to begin multilateral preparations 
for a Conference.131 US State Secretary Rogers did not change the American 
position, which had been authorised at the National Security Council 
meeting held on 1 December 1971, that the West should not agree with 
moving towards a CSCE before the signing of the FQP.132 Rogers firmly 
opposed Schumann’s idea, saying that “If we agreed to start multilateral
13° TNA. FCO 41/894, Bonn Tel No. 1606 to FCO, 4.12.1971.
131 As regards the record of the Quadripartite Dinner conversations, see AAPD 1971. Dok. 
436, Ministerialdirigent van Well, z.Z. Brussel, an Bundeskanzler Brandt, z.Z. Oslo, 
9 .12 .1971TNA. FCO 41/810, Record of a Conversation at the Quadripartite Dinner in the 
German Embassy, Brussels, a t 9 p.m. on 8 December 1971, 8.12.1971.
132 DNSA, Kissinger’s Transcripts, NSC Meeting-December 1, 1971 on MBFR and CES, 
KT00396, 1.12.19715 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, Presidential Guidance on 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference [NSDM 142], PR00138,
2.12.1971.
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preparations before the FQP this would mean that we had give in to the 
Russians.”133 Scheel and Douglas-Home, who had intimated their support to 
Schumann before, also took the US Secretary of State’s side. Under strong 
American and German pressure, at the Brussels Ministerial meeting on 9-10 
December 1971, other NATO Ministers also generally agreed to the US 
insistence, in return for the inclusion in the final communique of wording to 
committing the Alliance to accept the Finnish Government’s offer of Helsinki 
as the site for CSCE preparation, to which the Americans had long hesitated 
to agree.134 The Soviets’ reverse Junktim proposal gave strong justification 
of the American line. Thus the French argument was not convincing to 
others.
Soviet adherence to the reverse Junktim also scuppered the British 
proposal to fink MBFR and a conference on European security because it 
destroyed the optimistic scenario of the Berlin talks being satisfactorily 
concluded by the end of 1971. The MBFR/CSCE link ceased to be attractive 
to the Americans, because the Junktim in reverse would suspend any 
progress towards a Conference, thereby automatically postponing the linked 
force reduction talks too. In order to hold the discussions on force reductions 
as early as possible, it would thus become convenient for the US government
133 TNA. FCO 41/810, Record of a Conversation at the Quadripartite Dinner in the German 
Embassy, Brussels, a t 9 p.m. on 8 December 1971, 8.12.1971.
134 All bu t the US favoured accepting in principle the F innish invitation to hold 
m ultilateral discussions in Helsinki. France, who lost on the tim ing dispute, in 
particular, joined by the Scandinavians, strongly argued for approval Helsinki now and 
for language th a t would give impression preparations for meeting in Finland would 
proceed promptly. (TNA. FCO 41/809, Telegram from the US D epartm ent of S tate, dated
11.12.1971.) Only US Secretary of S tate Rogers tenaciously opposed to any endorsem ent 
of H elsinki as the venue of a Conference. The Americans had been unpleasant of the 
Finns who had sent the m emorandum to the GDR and the FRG despite the absence of 
diplomatic relations w ith either. He had to accept a compromise to some extent, however. 
In  the end, NATO said in its communique th a t the Alliance “took note” of the invitation 
of the F innish Government, and “appreciated” its initiative, m entioning th a t “they 
[NATO Foreign M inisters] will keep in touch w ith the F innish Government in  order to 
consult on th is m atter”. (As regards the tex t of the final communique of NATO Council 
in  Brussels in December 1971, h ttp  7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49'95/c711209a.htm). 
Although th is was not formal approval and left the final decision to be taken, the 
Americans were forced to show its  moral support to Helsinki’s initiative.
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to de-link MBFR and a European security conference. Indeed, after the 1 
December 1971 NSC meeting, US Secretary of State Rogers made it clear in 
a speech that the US government did not support the concept of the agenda 
of an ESC including MBFR.135 Again, the relationship between the mutual 
reduction of forces and a Conference became blurred, and an opportunity to 
give the Nixon administration an incentive to hold a CSCE at an earlier 
stage was lost.
The era of negotiations was an era of linkages. Issues and projects 
between East and West were connected implicitly and explicitly. In particular, 
as this chapter has illustrated, the relations between the Berlin question, 
MBFR, and a CSCE were inseparably linked. Or, rather, each government 
attempted to connect these subjects to each other by applying various 
conditions, in order to develop negotiations and produce results which would 
be in their own national interests. Certainly, 1971 saw a vital advance on 
European detente mainly because of the signing of the Quadripartite Berlin 
Agreement. However, a multilateral European conference -  a subject which 
was regarded as relatively less important than the Berlin problem or the 
Moscow Treaty — was in the end put aside by the big powers. In the 
meantime, however, the West was working significant issues which would 
characterise the CSCE. These issues will be considered in the next chapter.
135 Christoph Bluth, The Two Germanvs and Military Security in Europe. Palgrave, 
Hardback, 2002, p. 139.
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Chapter 5* Emergence of European Political Cooperation,
1971-1972
Western pre-diplomacy on the road to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe should be analysed on two levels -  firstly, as argued 
in the previous two chapters, the developments and disputes around the 
project of a multilateral European conference (in particular, the German and 
Berlin questions as well as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) and, 
secondly, the preparation and debates within the Western Bloc about the 
agenda and procedure for the CSCE. This chapter will consider thus second 
level of analysis. Before the West governments embarked upon a conference, 
they wanted to prepare a common position on procedural questions and six 
issues  ^the principles governing relations between states; economic, scientific, 
and technical cooperation; human environment; freer movement of peoples, 
ideas and information; MBFR; and possible machinery for future 
East’West-relations. However, to discuss in detail each item is not the 
purpose of this chapter.1 Instead, in order to look at the dynamics of intra 
Western diplomacy, three essential themes that characterised the CSCE will 
be highlighted.
This chapter will begin by considering the first half of 1971 when 
differences of French and American policy orientation towards a European 
security conference became more apparent. While the Americans still 
strongly disapproved of the idea of a CSCE, the French had become a 
champion of it. Above all, the confrontation between the two countries was 
reflected in their different opinions about how to proceed towards and how to 
organise a conference. Therefore the first part of this chapter will explore the 
procedural problems concerning a CSCE. Indeed, such problems were
1 As regards discussions about these subjects, see for example^ Robert Spencer, “Canada and 
the Origins of the CSCE,” in Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada and the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. University of Tront, 1984, pp. 64-72.
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amongst the main issues that divided the Western bloc and prevented 
cooperation among EC countries during 1971.
One of the major reasons that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE 
was celebrated is that it contained a clause about human rights, a principle 
which had not previously been agreed in the context of East-West conflicts. 
Yet, such a clause was not a Western proposal from the outset. How and why 
did it come to the fore in discussions among NATO governments? The second 
part of this chapter will deal with this question by examining the Western 
debates about two significant agenda items -  the principles governing 
relations between states and the item of freer movement of people, ideas and 
information.
The third important topic of this chapter is European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), which had been established in November 1970 by EC 
members as a consultation framework for coordinating foreign policies. It is 
also well-known that EPC played an active role in the preparatory talks for 
the CSCE and at the conference proper. Yet, EC cooperation did not work 
well from the beginning. Therefore, focusing again on the question of CSCE 
procedure, the final section of this chapter will analyse how EPC developed 
the basis of cooperation for a multilateral European conference.
Procedure for a Conference on European Security
The most prominent dispute in NATO in 1971 was over procedure. Although 
the problem of how to organise the conference has been paid less attention so 
far, it was a very important issue. Firstly, the Western idea of procedure for 
the conference, which was initially proposed by France, was vital in making 
the CSCE meaningful and constructive. By contrast, the preferred Soviet 
idea of procedure — brief preparation and a short conference in which the 
principles of the renunciation of force and the inviolability of frontiers would
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be agreed — would have restricted substantial discussion between East and 
West; it would have thus merely served to consolidate the status quo. 
Secondly, the procedural problem was a fundamental point in debates among 
Western governments, and is one of the most significant issues for 
understanding the pre-conference diplomacy in the Western Bloc. Without 
knowledge of this problem, it is difficult to understand, for example, how 
European Political Cooperation became a decisive player in multilateral 
European detente.
The principal axis of confrontation was between Paris and Washington. 
The French and the Americans advocated significantly different procedures 
for preparing for and conducting a Conference on European Security. On the 
one hand, the United States preferred long and intensive preparatory 
negotiations and a brief one-off conference at Foreign Minister level. In order 
to make the preparatory talks as long as possible, the US government 
proposed dividing the multilateral phase of preparation for a CSCE in two- 
the exploratory and preparatory phases. According to this American concept, 
the exploratory phase would be informal and would be used by officials to 
discuss the conference agenda. If the agenda and other technical problems 
were successfully agreed, then they would move on to the preparatory phase. 
This would see officials working on substantive issues, such as the text of a 
declaration on principles between states, to the point where Ministers would 
need to do little more than endorse at the Conference itself the work which 
had already been done.2 The essence of this US idea was that before a 
ministerial level Conference could convene, detailed preparing work needed 
to have been done. The Americans insisted that such lengthy preparation 
would enable the NATO countries to maintain full control over the process. 
For Washington, according to a British document, it was important that “If it 
appeared at any point during the preparatory proceedings that the prospects 
of a conference achieving worthwhile results were minimal, it would be
2 TNA. FCO 41/884, US Delegation. Procesures, 6.4.1971.
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possible to break off the process.”3 In other words, the Americans wanted 
retain the possibility of putting a stop to multilateral European detente.
French procedural ideas were the total opposite of America’s. The 
French government wanted a short preparatory phase and a long three-stage 
conference. As discussed in chapter 3, Paris had become an enthusiastic 
supporter of the idea of a multilateral European conference. The French thus 
wanted to begin multilateral preparations for a conference as soon as 
possible after the conclusion of the FRG-GDR negotiation phase of the Berlin 
talks. At the same time, they did not want to deprive the conference itself of 
substantive role. France therefore preferred a relatively brief preparatory 
stage, in which heads of missions in Helsinki would merely arrange agenda 
items and procedural matters and would not discuss substantive matters. In 
addition, the Quai d’Orsay developed the concept of a single conference in 
three phases- first a Foreign Ministers’ meeting would take place, in which 
Ministers would express their ideas and opinions freely — a highly important 
point for the French because Paris wanted each government to behave 
independently of its bloc — and a number of working committees would be 
established. The second stage would be composed of intensive negotiations at 
the committee level, in which substantial agenda items would be discussed. 
And finally, the Ministers would meet again to approve the work of their 
officials.4 Compared with the American proposal on procedure, the point of 
the French proposal was that the main negotiations of the Conference would 
be conducted after the first ministerial meeting. By this means, France 
sought a rapid opening of a constructive European conference.
The different procedural ideas emanating from France and the United 
States clearly reflected the two governments’ different attitude towards a 
CSCE and European detente in general. As already argued, the Americans 
disliked the idea of a European security conference and they were more
3 TNA. FCO 41/890, Procedure for a Conference on European Security- US Views, undated.
4 TNA. FCO 41/891, Delegation de la France. Questions de Procedure concernant de la 
deroulement de la conference sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe, 21.10.1971.
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suspicious of Moscow’s motivation than other NATO countries. Therefore 
Washington wanted to leave room to break off the Conference should it go 
wrong. They thought that it would be easier to call if off during the 
exploratory/preparatory stages than at a ministerial meeting. A longer 
preliminary phase would thus be favourable for the Americans, allowing 
more time for the West to test Soviet sincerity. Moreover, exposing Soviet 
wickedness through longer exploratory/preparatory phases would serve to 
dampen any euphoria bought about by a CSCE and would be helpful in 
reducing Congressional pressure on the US government to withdraw troops 
from Europe unilaterally.5 In the US view, such euphoria would also deprive 
the European members of NATO the incentive to strengthen their defence 
arrangements and shoulder more of the common defence burden.6 In other 
words, this US thinking logically implied that some tensions in Europe were 
implicitly preferable for the Americans so as both to maintain US forces on 
the Continent and encourage the West Europeans to make more effort 
towards for their own defence.. According to Washington, the French 
procedural idea would lead to an uncontrolled rush towards a Conference, 
and an unjustified wave of euphoria.7 For this reason they did not want an 
early start for the conference.
Naturally, France strongly opposed the US policy. At NATO’s Senior 
Political Committee meeting on 28 April 1971, the French delegate conveyed 
his government’s clear opposition to any distinction between the exploratory 
and preparatory phases of preliminary discussions.8 Paris complained that 
the US idea of lengthy exploratory/preparatory phases could produce 
interminable arguments, and make Western public opinion believe that the 
West was trying to avoid a Conference altogether. In the French view, the 
American concept of multilateral preparation could produce interminable
5 TNA. FCO 41/1069, a US document dated 14 March 1971 given to Brimelow by Galloway 
of the US Embassy.
6 TNA. FCO 41/890, Procedure for a Conference on European Security- US Views, undated.
7 Ibid.
8 TNA. FCO 41/885, G rattan to MacDonald, 29.4.1971.
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argument on points of substance which could have the effect of indefinitely 
postponing the conference itself.0 For the French, the American concept was 
too negative and “unrealistic” by contrast, they though that their idea of 
procedure was more pragmatic and publicly appealing.10
The row over procedure between America and France also divided the 
members of NATO. When the French concept on this subject emerged, the 
Danes and the Norwegians broadly supported the French approach.11 In 
private, the British also sympathised with the French line.12 They had 
ceased to oppose the idea of a CSCE and thought that once a East/West 
multilateral preparation for a Conference had started it would not be at all 
easy for the West to break off the exchanges.13 London thus regarded the 
idea of a three-stage conference as sensible in general.14 Indeed, when the 
British Secretary of State met the French ambassador in London on 22 June 
1971, Douglas-Home agreed with the French idea that the preparatory work 
for the conference should be brief. UK support was to be important for the 
eventual adoption of the French procedural proposals, and it would also help 
the establishment of an agreed European policy towards a CSCE. However, 
British Foreign Office officials preferred a longer preparatory phase because 
it would give more time to the FRG to conclude the inner-German 
negotiations before a multilateral conference began. In addition, they did not 
want to add fuel to the controversy in the Alliance. Moreover, they felt that it 
was unnecessary to make concrete NATO’s position on procedure for the time 
being.15 In consultations within the Atlantic Alliance, therefore, London did 
not give its clear support to the French idea of a three-stage conference. On 
the other hand, other NATO members could not accept a shorter preparation 
period. The Turks and the Greeks as well as the Dutch and the West
9 TNA. PREM 15/1522, Paris tel no. 1109 to FCO, 17.9.1971.
10 TNA. FCO 41/885, SPC Report on East-WestNegotiations, undated.
11 TNA. FCO 41/893, Lever to Braithwaite, 5.11.1971.
12 TNA. FCO 41/888, Bridge to Pemberton Pigott, 23.9.1971.
13 TNA. FCO 41/890, Procedure for a Conference on European Security- US Views, undated.
14 TNA. FCO 41/888, Bridges to Wiggin, 23.9.1971.
15 TNA. FCO 41/891, FCO tel no. 366 to UKDEL NATO, 27.10.1971.
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Germans in particular favoured the US idea of long and careful preliminary 
talks, and they insisted that all preparation must be thoroughly done before 
a conference at Ministerial level was convened. Opinions within the Atlantic 
Alliance were thus divided and it could not agree on procedural matters 
during 1971.
Of still more significance for the main argument of this chapter was 
that at first the French position was not supported by other EC members. 
The EC Six — France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg -  had decided at the December 1969 Hague Summit to examine 
ways of establishing a new political consultation framework among 
Community member states. Indeed, at the Summit meeting, FRG Chancellor 
Brandt had identified the Warsaw Pact proposal of holding a security 
conference as an issue which the EC countries should discuss in the 
framework of any foreign policy coordination mechanism.16 After intensive 
negotiations, the Six agreed in November 1970 to institutionalise their 
political consultations and chose the CSCE as one of the first tasks for them 
to tackle.17 Moreover, EPC set up a working group on a CSCE on 1 March 
1971.18 The French government then chose the subject of procedure and 
produced a working report on the issue for the first discussion in the working 
group.19 From the late 1960s, the Quai d’Or say had not placed a high value 
on consultations within NATO.20 Given their disagreement with the
16 Peter Becker, Die friihe KSZE-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland- Per 
Aufienpolitische Entscheidungs porzefi bis zur Unterzeichnung der Schlufiakte von Helsinki. 
Lit, 1992, p. 124.
17 AAPD 1970. Dok. 564, RunderlaB des Ministerialdirektors von Staden, 23.11.1970; Simon 
Nuttall, European Political Co-operation. Oxford- OUP, 1992, p. 55.
18 Hanns-Jurgen Kusters, “Die aufienpolitische Zusammenarbeit der Neun und die KSZE,” 
in Helga Hafterndorn, u.a., (Hrsg.), Verwaltete Aufienpolitik. Sicherheits- und
entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse Bonn, Koln, 1978, p. 87; Gotz Von Groll,
‘The Nine a t the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,’ in David Allen, 
Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), European Political Cooperation- Towards a 
Foreign Policy for Western Europe. Butterworth Scientific, 1982, p. 63.
19 TNA. FCO 41/883, Palliser to Cable, 5.3.1971; MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 
2921, circulaire no. 119, 8.4.1971.
20 When Mr. Andreani was nominated as the French deputy representative to NATO, the 
General Secretary of the French Foreign Ministry, Herve Alphand, told him tha t “you go to
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Americans on procedural issues, the French might have expected to obtain 
support from other EC governments. Yet, EPC did not produce the expected 
results during 1971 mainly because of German and Dutch reluctance to 
cooperate.
West Germany disliked the French procedural concept for different 
reasons from that of the US. As argued in the last chapter, the FRG leaders 
had attempted to maintain good relations with Pompidou, by agreeing with 
the French insistence that the resolution of the Berlin problem should be the 
only pre-condition for the opening of multilateral preparations for a CSCE. 
However, at the Auswartiges Am t level, foreign officials were dissatisfied 
with ministers’ concessions to France, because it implied that a conference 
might be held earlier -  as indeed the French wanted. The inner-German 
negotiations were still on the table. The FRG Foreign Ministry was of the 
strong opinion that, before a European security conference, in which East 
Germany would inevitably participate, took place, the problem of the 
relationship between the two Germanies had to be resolved. Therefore, Bonn 
preferred America’s longer preparatory phase concept to the rival French 
idea. Prolonged and comprehensive preparation was in West Germany’s 
interests since it would delay the opening of the conference itself.21 Moreover, 
FRG officials were also afraid of French dominance in EPC. They thought 
that Paris wanted to strengthen the French position within the European 
consultation machineJ therefore Bonn thought that it should take care not to 
offend America and to act as a spokesman of American opinions within 
EPC.22 Although, as will be discussed below, Bonn’s attitude towards Paris 
would gradually change, West Germany had more than enough reasons not 
to be cooperative at the outset of EPC consultations.
NATO, namely, you will have a complete vacation for three years, because there is nothing to 
do there ” Garret M artin’s interview with Jacques Andreani, 15 February 2006.
21 PAAA, B-40, Bd. 187, Aufzeichnung. Betr.- KSE; hier- Verfahrensfragen, 4.10.1971,' TNA. 
FCO 41/888, Palliser to Simpson-Orlebar, 24.9.1971.
22 PAAA, B-40, Bd. 189, Sachstand. Thema- KSE - franzosische und deutsche Haltungi 
Koordination durch die Sechs, 16.2.1971; MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2921, 
Paris tel nos. 190-193 a Repan-Bruzelles, 8.4.1971; AAPD 1971. Dok. 128, Anm. 3, p. 612.
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The Netherlands was also highly uncooperative among EC members. 
The Dutch had for a long time been a determined rival of the French within 
the European Community.23 Indeed, it had been The Hague that had 
frustrated de Gaulle’s European Political Union project, the so-called 
Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s.24 Moreover, the Dutch government had 
been highly negative about the idea of political cooperation as soon as it had 
been raised again by the Germans in 1969.25 Within EPC, the Dutch thus 
argued forcefully that the main discussions about the preparation for and 
handling of a European security conference should take place in NATO, 
thereby effectively blocked any agreement in EPC.26 Furthermore the Dutch 
delegation in NATO was instructed by The Hague to isolate France in 
NATO’s Senior Political Committee discussions.27 The Dutch thus opposed 
France’s procedural ideas and ardently supported America’s long preparation 
approach. The Italian, Belgian and Luxembourg Foreign Ministers also 
hesitated, initially at least, to accept the French idea that preparations for a 
CSCE should confine themselves to a quick agreement on the agenda.28 In 
the end, throughout 1971, the procedural problem and FRG and Dutch 
attitudes prevented EPC from speaking with “one voice” on the subject of the 
CSCE.29 As a result of the division of opinions in EPC, an Italian diplomat 
commented that, “the discussions in the Political Committee of the Six had
23 N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s- Negotiating the 
Oaullist Challenge. London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 64-5, 158-160.
24 Jeffrey W. Vanke, “An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959*62”. 
Cold War History. 2/1 (2001).
25 Anjo Harryvan and Jan  van der Harst, “Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands and 
the Hague Conference of December 1969”. Journal of European Integration History. 9/2 
(2003).
26 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2921, circulaire no. 119, 8.4.1971J TNA. FCO 
41/888, Palliser to Simpson-Orlebar, 24.9.1971.
27 TNA. FCO 41/885, G rattan to MacDonald, 29.4.1971.
28 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 3791, NOTE. a.s. Discussion relative a la 
Conference europeenne sur la securite et la cooperation en Europe au cours de la reunion 
des ministres des affaires etrangeres des Six, 12.5.1971.
29 TNA. FCO 41/888, Palliser to Simpson-Orlebar, 24.9.197L MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 
1976, carton 2922, Note. a.s. Rapport du Comite politique sur la CSCE, 30.10.197L' AAPD 
1971. Dok. 409, Aufzeichnung des Ministerial direktors von Staden, 22.11.1971.
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been [of] very little use.”30
The Principles Governing Relations between States
The second important consideration of this chapter is the emergence of 
human rights as a major subject for discussion within a CSCE. It has been 
regarded as the most important aspect of the CSCE that the principle of 
human rights, along with the issue of freer movement of people, ideas and 
information (the so-called Basket Three), were incorporated in the final 
result of the conference, and these two have often been dealt with together.31 
After all, it would appear likely that the principle of human rights and the 
freer movement item were closely related. However, the origins of the two 
were different. The origins of the freer movement issue have already been 
discussed in chapter 2. This chapter thus explores how the principle of 
human rights emerged in the context of a European security conference. 
Indeed, as a British document reveals, it was West Germany that first 
proposed the inclusion of human rights as one of the principles governing 
relations between states which would be agreed at a CSCE.32 Interestingly, 
as will be argued below, the FRG government was also highly cautious about 
pushing the freer movement question intensively at a conference on 
European security. The focal point is thus why Bonn advocated the principle 
of human rights, despite its reluctance on the subject of freer movement. In 
order to understand this question, this section will illustrate first that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine rather than human rights was the central issue in the 
discussions in NATO about the principles governing relations between states. 
Initially, human rights were not necessarily regarded by the West as a
30 TNA. FCO 41/888, Rhodes to Braithwaite, 24.9.1971.
31 For example, Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect' International Norms. Human 
Rights, and the Demise of Communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
32 TNA. FCO 41/1043, Lever to Ramsay, 21.4.1972.
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principle governing relations between states. This section will then consider 
the Western debates about freer movement of people, ideas and information. 
Disputes about this subject amongst NATO governments generated the 
human rights clause.
When the Warsaw Pact had called for an all-European Conference in 
1969, it had proposed to discuss renunciation-of-force agreements together 
with economic and technological cooperation. According to an analysis in 
NATO, there were two basic Soviet objectives behind this' firstly, the 
Western recognition of present frontiers, particularly those of the GDR and 
of the territory acquired by the USSR as a consequence of the second world 
war,* secondly, the Western acceptance of the political status quo in Central 
and Eastern Europe -  an implicit acknowledgement of the Soviet sphere of 
control over Warsaw Pact countries. The West therefore strongly suspected 
that the Soviets would use a conference to obtain a tacit acknowledgement of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, a recognition of their right and obligation to 
intervene in a socialist country in order to restore the regime of socialism.33 
In order to avoid falling into this Soviet trap, the West had to use a European 
security conference to challenge this concept of limited sovereignty.
NATO countries thus wanted to criticise the doctrine and make its 
application more difficult. NATO’s counter-proposal published in the final 
communique of the May 1970 NATO Council in which it was suggested that 
a conference should discuss “the principles which should govern relations 
between States”, was a way to avoid recognising the status quo in terms of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine. By flanking the renunciation of the use of force with 
principles such as “sovereign equality” and “non-interference and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state,” the West tried to 
demonstrate its opposition to the doctrine.34 For instance, the principle of 
sovereign equality implied that the USSR had no right of intervention in the
33 TNA. FCO 41/884, Helman to Newton, 31.3.1971.
34 James E. Goodby, Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations. 
Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 54.
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domestic affairs of other Warsaw Pact countries -  thus contradicting the 
Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition, the West insisted that it was not only these 
principles which should be emphasised, but their application; as a result, it 
was important that such principles should be applied to any state, regardless 
of its  political or social system .35 The NATO governments, however, thought 
that the Soviets would never renounce the Doctrine, even if they publicly 
admitted the principles of state sovereignty and non-use-of-force.36 Moreover, 
a British paper on the Brezhnev Doctrine warned against giving Western 
public opinion “the impression that the Alliance expected to be able to use a 
Conference to kill the doctrine,” because it would “cause subsequent 
disappointment, as well as criticism of NATO’s handling of the doctrine at 
the conference.”37 While it was politically difficult for the West to recognise 
the status quo and the Brezhnev Doctrine, Western governments also 
realised that there was no way quickly to change the status quo and prevent 
the application of the Doctrine.
NATO’s position towards the Brezhnev Doctrine was also weakened by 
another factor. Some NATO members suggested that the West should seek a 
treatylike agreement in a CSCE, because a treaty would be more legally 
binding than a mere declaration! this would therefore be more embarrassing 
for the Russians in relation to the Brezhnev doctrine. The Americans firmly 
opposed such a course, however, because a treaty would need ratification in 
Congress, which might have demanded unilateral reductions of US troops in 
Europe as a condition for the ratification of a treaty signed by governments 
in a CSCE.38 West Germany also disliked the idea that a conference should 
culminate in to a treaty. One of the most significant points for the FRG 
concerning a European security conference was that such a conference
35 DBPO. III. I . doc. 62, The Brezhnev Doctrine and a European Security Conference,
[16].3.1971.
36 Ibid.; TNA. FCO 41/884, the US paper entitled “principles governing relations between 
states,” 31.3.1971.
37 DBPO. III. I. doc. 62, The Brezhnev Doctrine and a European Security Conference,
[16],3.1971, p. 320.
38 TNA. FCO 41/884, G rattan to Braithwaite, 25.3.1971.
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should not be a kind of a peace conference.39 Bonn had insisted that the final 
boundaries of Germany were to be confirmed by a peace treaty. It was 
therefore important that a multilateral European conference including East 
Germany must not conclude with any treaty recognising the GDR and the 
borders between two Germanies since this might be deemed to constitute a 
peace treaty. Britain and other countries also thought that a treaty was 
premature at this stage of East/West relations.40 As a result, NATO agreed 
to make a draft declaration on principles, not a treaty. But by so doing and by 
rejecting a treaty, Western governments were unilaterally giving up a way of 
putting the Soviet Union under stronger legal constraints.
The contents of any draft declaration were also controversial. In the 
drafting process which began in the latter half of 1971, it became clear that 
there was a basic divergence in the Western bloc about the question of which 
principles should be included in a declaration. This agenda item was a way 
to regulate politically European international relations and create a stable 
system in the European theatre. The disputes in NATO on this subject 
sharply reflected the divergent opinions of how much the West could promote 
detente in Europe. On the one hand, the Americans, who did not want 
euphoria in Europe, insisted that a declaration should restrict itself simply 
to contradicting the Brezhnev doctrine, thus concentrating on the principles 
of the equality of sovereign states and non-intervention. This US approach 
was supported by and large by the West Germans. On the other hand, the 
Scandinavians, backed by the Italians and the Belgians, emphasised that the 
declaration should include reference to other principles, such as cooperation 
or disarmament, in order to make the tone of a declaration milder and not to 
be too provocative towards the Soviets.41 NATO governments thus failed to
39 AAPD 1971. Dok. 366, RunderlaO des Staatssekretars Frank, 25.10.1971.
40 AAPD 1971. Dok. 386, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Dahlhoff, 
8.11.1971; TNA. FCO 41/889, Ramsay to Pembaerton-Pigott, 15.10.1971.
41 TNA. FCO 41/893, UK Delegation to NATO, Conference on European Security and 
Co-operation- Negotiating Approaches,” 17.11.1971; MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, 
carton 2923, De Rose to Schumann. A/s' Principes regissant les relations entre Etats,
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agree on the text of a draft declaration and the controversy about the content 
of a declaration would not be settled until the multilateral preparatory talks 
for the CSCE had begun.
However, the most important point here is that as late as October 1971, 
the term ‘human rights’ did not feature at all in discussions within NATO 
about the principles governing state relations. It was only in early November 
1971 that the West Germans for the first time proposed “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms should be universally respected by states,” as one of 
the principles.42 In order to explain the reason for Bonn’s initiative, it is 
necessary to examine the debates about the freer movement issue.
Human Rights and the Freer Movement of People. Information and 
Ideas
Another agenda item the Warsaw Pact had proposed in October 1969 had 
been economic, technical and scientific cooperation. NATO had again made a 
counter-proposal, insisting that the Eastern proposal should be extended to 
cultural exchanges including freer movement of people, ideas, and 
information. Since then, the freer movement of people, ideas, and 
information had become the most important Western proposal. Indeed, when 
intensive study on freer movement of people, ideas and information started 
in March 1971 and the French and the Americans contributed substantial 
papers on this topic, these contributions were largely complementary.43 No 
NATO governments opposed this agenda item, and at first there was 
seemingly no significant controversy in consultations within NATO about
23.2.1972.
42 TNA. FCO 41/1065, German Delegation. Draft Declaration on Principles Governing 
Relations between States, 5.11.1971.
43 These French and American papers are held in TNA. FCO 41/896. The NATO document 
which was produced by the amalgamation of these papers was destroyed and has not 
survived in the UK National Archive (PRO).
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this subject.
However, the Western governments’ potentially divergent attitude 
towards a conference on European security also surfaced over this subject. 
While all NATO governments agreed on the importance of this topic in a 
CSCE, they had different opinions about how far they should go in 
demanding concessions from the East. The West well understood that the 
Warsaw Pact would be highly reluctant to make concessions in these fields, 
where the West had much to gain. The American and Dutch representatives 
in Brussels therefore stressed that their authorities regarded the freedom of 
exchanges a strong Western card and therefore quite a significant subject.44 
In particular, the US government, which wanted to make a maximalist claim, 
suggested prioritising the most difficult items for the East, such as jamming 
foreign broadcasts or travel restrictions.45
West Germany, however, preferred a progressive approach. While 
accepting the importance of the freer movement agenda, the FRG regarded 
its completion as a long-term goal. For Bonn, “an intensification of an 
exchange of people can only be obtained step by step.”46 This did not mean 
that the West Germans undervalued this subject. On the contrary, it was 
highly significant for them because of their Ostpolitik and 
Deutschlandpolitik. They thought, however, that human contacts between 
the FRG and the GDR had to be improved steadily even if progress was slow 
and gradual. Maximum demands on freer movement would encounter strong 
opposition from Moscow?* this in turn might raise the possibility of the whole 
agenda item of freer movement being dropped or of the whole CSCE ending 
up in failure. By contrast, the FRG Foreign Ministry thought that 
“agreements in the [CSCE] framework can have favourable repercussions on 
the implementation of human improvements in Germany.”47 Moreover,
44 TNA. FCO 41/896, Poter to MacDonald, 8.4.1971.
45 TNA. FCO 41/896, Poter to Braithwaite, 11.8.1971.
46 AAPD 1971. Dok.313, Ministerialdirigent Diesel an die Standige Vertretung bei der 
NATO in Brussel, 17.9.1971.
47 Petri Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement: The Federal Republic of Germany
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piecemeal progress on human contacts between the two Germanies was also 
domestically significant for the Bonn government so as to counter opponents 
of O s tp o li t ik Brandt and Scheel had to demonstrate that their Eastern 
policy was leading to some real improvements, especially in the ease of 
movement between the two Germanies. Hence, the West Germans badly 
needed to avoid a radical approach.
The French, supported by the Canadians, also took a similar line. The 
French representative in NATO suggested that the items of freer movement 
of people, ideas and information should be divided into two categories, 
primary and secondary, and insisted that “we [the West] should seek to 
create a favourable climate for the CES by first raising those items which 
were unlikely to cause difficulty to the other side.”49
However, West German and French attitudes were strongly opposed by 
the US and Britain. In particular the Germans clashed forcefully with the 
Americans. The US State Department viewed Bonn’s approach of postponing 
difficult subjects to a later stage as a serious tactical error, which could 
jeopardize allied positions.50 The British also felt that they should not throw 
away their strongest cards and that the question of whether or not a demand 
would be acceptable to the East was not the reason for avoiding the issue.51 
Indeed, the UK Foreign Office had calculated that “Obviously the West is in 
a fairly commanding position here and has little to lose by playing as hard as 
it can for considerable concessions from the East.”52 Furthermore, Prime 
Minister Heath had become a keen supporter of the freer movement agenda, 
arguing that “it would be possible to put the Russians on the defensive such 
as freedom of information and freedom of movement in the interests of better
and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, 1969-72,” in 
Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nunlist (eds.), At the Roots of European 
Security- The Early Helsinki Process Revisited. 1969-1975 (forthcoming, 2007).
48 TNA. FCO 28/1678, Luxembourg tel no. 86 to FCO, 29.2.1972.
49 TNA. FCO 41/897, UKDEL NATO Tel no. 457 to FCO, 30.9.1971.
50 Goodby, Europe Undivided, p. 58; Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement.”
51 TNA. FCO 41/897, Ramsay to Porter, 24.9.1971.
52 TNA. FCO 41/896, Ramsay to Poter, 2.9.1971.
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European relations.”53 It was in this situation that the Brandt government 
brought up the principle of human rights.
Why did the West Germans insist on human rights as a principle at 
this stage? The answer is that, for them, the human rights principle was an 
alternative to the issue of freer movement. A FRG paper on freer movement 
of people, ideas and information clearly stated that-
Independently of th is concrete inclusion in the various fields of substance, a 
basic statem ent reflecting the outstanding importance of the principle of freer 
movement should be included in an East-W est declaration of principle in which 
freedom of movement is presented as a practical example of the realization of 
the generally-recognized hum an rights and basic freedom of the individual.54
Bonn thought that the spirit of freer movement should be attained through a 
general principle of human rights and basic freedom of the individual, 
instead of through a concentration of the more concrete and provocative field 
of freer movement. In other words, West Germany considered that the 
human rights principle which was couched in general terms would be less 
provocative and hence more acceptable to the East than the detailed 
contents of the freer movement agenda item. The principle would also serve 
as an agreed long-term goal of freer movement. Thus, by proposing human 
rights as an alternative, the Bonn government attempted to persuade 
Washington and London to retreat from their radical position on freer 
movement. This was the origin of the human rights clause in the declaration 
of principles governing relations between states. In cold war history, the 
emergence of the human rights norm in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE 
was an innovative incident. It was to encourage dissidents as well as
53 TNA. PREM 15/1522, Moon to McCluney, 27.8.1971.
54 TNA. FCO 28/1679, German Delegation. Conference on security and cooperation in 
Europe - freer movement of people, ideas and information, 7.4.1972; Bundesarchiv Kobrenz, 
Bundeskanzleramt files, B136/6419, Konferenz fur Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in 
Europa. Grossere Freiziigigkeit fur Menschen, Ideen und Informationen, 17.5.1972.
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ordinary people in the Warsaw Pact countries. However, the process giving 
birth to the principle of human rights indicated that it was not necessarily 
expected to affect East-West relations immediately. West Germany’s major 
aim was to moderate the Western attitude on freer movement, in order to 
maintain the enduring success of its Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik.
On the freer movement subject, Paris and Bonn built up an effective 
partnership. During the first half of 1972, West Germany’s insistence on the 
inclusion of the principle of human rights and basic freedom of the individual 
in a declaration was accepted by NATO governments in general, albeit 
without great enthusiasm particularly on the part of the French.55 However, 
the controversy within the Alliance over freer movement continued 
throughout 1972. Yet, the debates were essentially reduced to a dispute over 
the title of the agenda item,' the US, the UK and the Netherlands thus clung 
to the phrase “freer movement of people, ideas and information,” whereas the 
FRG suggested a softer formula such as “improvement in communication.”56 
Paris also supported Bonn by proposing another milder heading — 
“development of contacts among people and the diffusion of information,” -  
although the Quai d’Orsay explained that it wanted to change the title only 
out of tactical considerations, without modifying the contents of any 
agreement on freer movement.57 Yet, the French privately thought that 
they should content themselves with underlining their interests in cultural 
exchange and human contacts, and they should not entertain exaggerated 
hopes from the agenda item of freer movement.58 These French attitudes 
were closer to that of the FRG. They were undoubtedly helpful for the 
gradual development of Franco-German cooperation in European Political 
Cooperation. In order for EPC fully to play an important role in the
55 TNA. FCO 41/1043, Lever to Ramsay, 21.4.1972.
56 PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 109304, Sondersprechzettel. Thema- Freer movement of people, 
ideas and information, 29.5.1972; Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement.”
57 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2923, Paris tel nos. 418*22 to London,
9.3.1972.
58 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 * juin 1976, carton 2923, NOTE. A.s. * CSCE elements de 
discussion, 17.2.1972; Ibid, Alphand to Bruxelles (OTAN), 10.4.1972.
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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, however, the different 
opinions between Bonn and Paris over the procedural problem had to be 
settled.
Towards Unity in European Political Cooperation
It has been widely believed that the EC countries played a significant role in 
the preparations for the CSCE and in the Conference itself, through their 
consultation framework of foreign policy, European Political Cooperation.59 
However, as argued above, EPC did not work effectively during 1971. 
Therefore it is important to examine how the members of the Common 
Market developed their cooperation concerning the CSCE. The breakthrough 
was a rapprochement between France and West Germany on the procedural 
problem. After the signing of the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement of 3 
September 1971, the possibility of the convening of a European security 
conference significantly increased. Both West German and French 
governments needed each other to realise their own policies. Paris wanted 
Bonn’s support over procedural matters. Bonn wanted Paris’s backing about 
the problem of freer movement. Therefore, both sides gradually exchanged 
concessions after the Berlin Agreement.
59 For instance, Schwerin, von Otto Graf, “Die Solidaritat der EG-Staaten in der KSZE,” 
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Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse. Bonn, Koln, 1978;
Philippe de Schoutheete, “La Conference sur la Securite et la Cooperation en Europe,” in 
Philippe de Schoutheete, La cooperation politique europeenne. Bruxelles' Editions Labor, 
1980; Gotz von Groll, ‘The Nine at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/ in 
David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), European Political 
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Michael, “Britain and European Political Cooperation in the CSCE,” in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), 
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The initial step was for the West German government to show the first 
sign of change in its policy on the procedure for a CSCE. As described above, 
the FRG’s opinion on freer movement had been strongly opposed by the US 
and Britain. In order to strengthen their position, therefore, the West 
Germans sought the backing of fellow EC members and in particular of the 
French, who had indicated that the opinion of Paris on freer movement was 
closer to that of Bonn. In order to restore Franco-German cooperation in EPC, 
however, they had to narrow the difference of opinion between the two 
governments over the procedural problem. Indeed, in September 1971, the 
Germans hinted to the Quai d’Orsay that they had begun to consider 
France’s concept of a three-stage conference. However, they also stressed 
that Bonn preferred that a preparatory phase should continue for several 
months.60 It was still difficult for the Germans to accept the French idea of a 
shorter preparation phase, because the German-German talks were still 
on-going.
The Brandt government then attempted to persuade France and other 
EPC members, albeit unsuccessfully, with a new initiative. This began with 
an idea aired by the Chancellor. When Brandt met Brezhnev in Oreanda in 
September 1971, the FRG leader suggested the holding of a pre-conference 
( Vorkonferenz) before a CSCE met at Ministerial level.61 The German 
Foreign Ministry seized upon Brandt’s idea and used it to advance 
reconciliation between Bonn and Paris (and Washington) over the procedural 
question. The idea of the Auswartiges Am t was that, firstly, multilateral 
exploratory talks at Ambassadorial level would be held in Helsinki; then a 
pre-conference at a State Secretary or vice Foreign Minister level would take
60 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2922, circulaire no. 344, 23.9.1971.
61 AAPD 1971. Dok. 311, Gesprach des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit dem Generalsekretar 
des ZK der KPdSU, Breschnew, in Oreanda, 17.9.1971. The exchanges of opinion between 
Brandt and Brezhnev about the idea of Vorkonferenz did not advance. Brandt thought that 
pre-conference and preparatory talks for a CSCE were different forums, but Brezhnev, 
accepting the idea, tried to give a twist to it, interpreting a Vorkonferenz as the preparatory 
phase. Therefore the Chancellor stopped discussing it further and changed the topic of their 
conversation.
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place; and finally a European security conference at a Ministerial level would 
be convened.62 This new concept respected Bonn’s interests and was close to 
Washington’s idea, because, in essence, it suggested a longer 
explanatory/preparatory phase. However, the West Germans explained to 
the French that by upgrading Ambassadorial meetings to deputy Foreign 
Minister level at a certain point during the preparatory phase, it would be 
able to give the impression that the preparatory talks were developing.63 
Moreover, they tried to sell their idea at the 7 October 1971 meeting of EPC’s 
working group for a CSCE, arguing that the Vorkonferenz concept conformed 
to the French three-stage approach.64 In the end, Bonn’s new initiative was 
rejected by Paris and other EC governments in late 1971 because they 
considered that a pre-conference would not be needed for a CSCE.65 The 
efforts made by West Germany to advance cooperation with France, however, 
did not come to nothing, because the French side also tried to meet the 
Germans half-way.
France also invented a new idea for obtaining support from its EPC 
partners. It had been , clear that EC members and in particular West 
Germany opposed the French opinion that a preparatory phase for a CSCE 
should be brief. The French realised that they had to modify this point if they 
were to secure other aspects of their procedural ideas. By autumn 1971, they 
had thus begun to retreat from their original position that a preparatory 
phase should decide only agenda items and should not touch on the 
substance of them. At the Franco-German study group meeting on 1 October 
1971, Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, the Deputy Director of Political Affairs at the 
Quai d’Orsay; indicated to the Germans that multilateral preparatory talks 
would tackle the contents of a conference to some extent, but he also
62 PAAA, B-40, Bd. 187, Aufzeichinung. Betr." KSE; hier- Verfahrensfragen, 4.10.1971.
63 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2922, Paris tel nos. 1317/1320 to Bonn,
5.10.1971.
64 Ibid., Paris tel nos. 1342-45 to Bonn, 11.10.1971.
65 PAAA, B-40, Bd. 193, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Sitzung des Unterausschusses KSE des 
Politisches Komitees der Sechs in Brussel, 15.12.1971.
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emphasised that such talks should not be so thorough as to create a situation 
in which Foreign Ministers would only sign a completed text at the 
conference itself.66
Of still more significance was a new French proposal made first at the 
CSCE sub-committee meeting of EPC on 10/11 December 1971, that a 
mandate for the committees -  political and security, cultural, and economic 
committees -  to be set up by the Conference should be drawn up during the 
preparatory work, and they would be endorsed by the Foreign Ministers at 
the first multilateral Ministerial conference.67 This French idea meant that 
a preparatory phase would be very substantial but the three-stage 
conference that followed would also be important. In fact, it was to serve to 
fix the direction of negotiations in a CSCE in a favourable manner for the 
West. Drafting terms of reference for a conference also meant that the period 
of preparation would be longer than in the original, French approach. 
Therefore, by January 1972, West Germany dropped their Vorkonference 
idea, and accepted the French idea of a three-stage conference.68 Consenting 
to begin multilateral preparations for a CSCE in line with the French 
concept, the FRG thought to link the preparatory phase with the FRG-GDR 
negotiations,' if East Berlin stonewalled in bilateral negotiations, Bonn 
would not finish a mandate-drafting process in preparatory talks until the 
inner-German negotiations were settled.69 Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg 
also supported France, and the French procedural concept for a CSCE 
prevailed in EPC. Thanks to the settlement of the procedural question, 
French and West German positions on a European security conference 
converged except on the problem of relations between MBFR and a CSCE.
66 PAAA, B*40, Bd. 190, Vermerk. Betr.: Sitzung der deutsch-franzosischen Studiengruppe 
in Bonn am 1. Oktober 1971, hier- Behandlung des Themas KSE, 4.10.1971.
67 PAAA, B*40, Bd. 193, Aufzeichnung. Betr.- Sitzung des Unterausschusses KSE des 
Politisches Komitees der Sechs in Brussel, 15.12.1971.
68 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2923, NOTE. A/S- Evolution recente 
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This Franco-German rapprochement was to serve as a basis for the 
development of cooperation amongst the West European group.
In particular, Bonn’s acceptance of the French idea of a three-stage 
procedure was crucially significant, not only for Franco-German cooperation, 
but also for cooperation among EC partners. As argued above, within NATO, 
the controversy on the procedural question between France and the United 
States was acute; thus, studies on the CSCE within the Atlantic Alliance 
could not sufficiently deal with the contents of a preparatory phase. The 
large gap between opinions on procedures stymied NATO’s attempts to make 
concrete and detailed preparations for the pre-conference stage. EPC was 
different. While the Dutch still supported the American line, the majority 
within the political consultation machinery agreed with the French 
approach.70 This made it possible for them to discuss a CSCE on the basis of 
the 3-stage procedure by adopting it as a “working hypothesis.”71 Based on 
the “working hypothesis”, the members of the European Community could 
practically develop their studies on the Multilateral Preparatory Talks 
(MPT). The most significant point is that, thanks to the well-prepared EPC 
work on procedures, the European political consultation group was able to 
take an initiative in the MPT. And the success of it was to encourage EPC 
members to advance further cooperation during the CSCE negotiations. In 
this sense, procedural matters were highly important for understanding the 
development of European Political Cooperation.
Of additional importance were three factors which made cooperation in 
EPC easier than in NATO. Firstly, meetings in EPC were conducted, not by 
permanent representatives as in the Atlantic Alliance, but by delegations 
from each capital. These were not bound by rigid instructions, and thus were 
able to discuss problems freely and in a spirit of give and take.72 A second 
factor was that EPC was a fairly homogeneous group of opinions, because
7° TNA. FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Brimelow, 10.2.1972.
71 TNA. FCO 41/1065, Staples to Braithwaite, 19.7.1972.
72 TNA. FCO 41/1052, Braithwaite to Tickell, 1.3.1972.
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there were no extreme views to the right or left, such as those of the 
Americans and the Scandinavians.73 Progress was thus much easier to 
achieve. Finally, not only West Germany, but also other member countries 
still viewed EPC in a positive light. As a Dutch official observed in January 
1972, “although this process of political consultation wasted a lot of time and 
had not yet produced concrete results, there was a general feeling in the 
member countries that it was the fore-runner of a closer relationship, which 
might really involve effective coordination, and that this made it worth 
while.”74 These factors made it possible for the political consultation 
committees to work in a businesslike way, thereby accumulating 
encouraging results.
The only uncooperative country among the EPC members was the 
Netherlands. The Dutch were still opposed to the French idea of a 3-stage 
procedure of the CSCE and were determined to be a faithful supporter of the 
American view of procedure during the first half of 1972. However, by late 
autumn that year, Amsterdam accepted the French approach and became 
more cooperative in the political consultations framework. There were four 
reasons which explain the change of the Dutch attitude. First and foremost, 
the Netherlands’ taking over the Presidency of the Council of the EC was 
important. It meant that the Dutch automatically became the chair-country 
of EPC meetings. Undoubtedly, this role required them to adopt a more 
conciliatory position so as to be able to coordinate different opinions. 
Therefore Amsterdam could not continue to be as rigid about one of the key 
factors for cooperation in EPC- the procedural problem.
The second reason for the Netherlands’ change of position was the 
British participation in EPC discussions. One of the major excuses for the 
uncooperative attitude adopted by the Dutch in EPC during 1971 had been 
the absence of the British. They had defended their attitude, arguing that
Ibid.
74 TNA. FCO 41/1052, Faber to Mason, 7.1.1972.
221
political consultations were quite useless if the British were not included.75 
Yet, after the negotiations for the UK’s entry into the EC were successfully 
concluded, Britain was permitted to join EPC talks from February 1972. The 
Dutch thus lost one of the best justifications for their uncooperative attitude. 
Moreover, as argued before, British policies toward a CSCE were in general 
closer to the French ones. Indeed, in September 1972, the UK government 
made it publicly clear that it officially accepted France’s 
three-stage-conference procedure.76 London’s participation in the EC’s 
political consultations therefore increased the extent of Amsterdam’s 
isolation. As the Chair of EPC discussions, it would be difficult for the 
Netherlands to maintain its isolated stance.
Thirdly, the modification of America’s attitude towards a CSCE may 
also have been a factor in the Netherlands’ change of attitude. Another 
concern for the Dutch was the probability of the widening gap between the 
EPC group and NATO. When the EPC Foreign Ministers met in Luxemburg 
on 27 May 1972, for example, Dutch Foreign Minister Norbert Schmelzer 
energetically stressed his preoccupation with the relationship between EPC 
and NATO.77 In order to prevent a situation in which the Europeans found 
themselves lined up against the Americans, Amsterdam had made efforts to 
speak for Washington in EPC meetings. By the summer of 1972, however, 
the US government was inclined to take a more reconciliatory approach to 
the Europeans over the CSCE. By then, the Wliite House had concluded that 
the results of a CSCE could be predicted and that they were not likely to be 
important. For instance, one memorandum written by Kissinger’s staff 
argued that a declaration of principles would be an amalgam of platitudes,’ 
some minimal restraints might be adopted on military movement,' the 
agenda item of freer movement would be hailed as an important beginning,
75 TNA. FCO 41/888, Rhodes to Braithwaite, 24.9.1971.
76 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 * juin 1976, carton 2922, circulaire no. 400, 9.9.1972.
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but nothing much would change, because the East would parry with a 
general promise.78 The key aspects of European security, such as SALT, 
MBFR and German-German negotiations, were and would continue to be 
handled independently of a European security conference. In particular, as 
will be explored further in the next chapter, the United States was able 
successfully to separate MBFR from a CSCE during 1972; thus, for 
Washington, a multilateral European conference had been reduced at most 
to “a symbolic act, more important for its psychological atmospherics than its 
content.” The memorandum then recommended that-
The main issue for the United States, therefore, is one of alliance management 
ra ther than East* West bargaining or debating:
-  we must come out of this exercise with a minimum of illusions and a 
maximum of allied unity.
-  this means being willing to defer to a European consensus in NATO.79
Once the Americans began to move towards the French line on the procedure 
of a European Security Conference, Dutch intransigence on this matter in 
the EPC meetings would have significantly lost its meaning. It is still not 
clear how much the Dutch government noticed the gradual modification of 
the US position towards Western Europe over the CSCE. However, the trend 
was clearly shifting towards France’s approach which had gained the 
support of the majority. In such a situation the Dutch found themselves 
pushed back towards the mainstream of EC members.
Finally, a personal factor also made it easy for the Netherlands to be 
constructive about European cooperation. The former Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Joseph Luns, was a famous hardliner towards the Soviet bloc. 
However, new Foreign Minister Schmelzer, who had succeeded Luns in July 
1971, was more sympathetic to detente and political cooperation in Europe
78 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Memorandum for Kissinger from Sonnenfeldt. Subject:
(CSCE) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 25.8.1972.
79 Ibid.
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than his predecessor.80 Although compared with other Alliance partners, the 
Netherlands was still a hardliner and the transition from Luns to Schmelzer 
did not bring about immediate noticeable policy changes, the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry under Schmelzer was able to adjust relatively smoothly to majority 
opinions and was able to be more cooperative and flexible than hitherto.
The Dutch concession on the procedural problem finally paved the way 
for EPC’s common approach to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks for a 
CSCE. At the political consultation meeting of the sub-committee on the 
CSCE on 5/6 October 1972, the Netherlands at last agreed to the French 
formula of a three-stage procedure, on condition that the final decision on 
this question was made in NATO.81 There still remained some controversial 
points such as the extent to which the substance of agenda items should be 
discussed in the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, and the “freer movement” 
agenda.82 However, thanks to the Netherlands’ concession, the EPC 
members reached a significant agreement which would make it possible for 
the political consultation group to push ahead with its preparations and play 
a leading role in the MPT. And, finally, EPC Foreign Ministers approved two 
basic documents prepared by the CSCE sub-committee and the ad hoc Group 
for a CSCE during their meeting in The Hague on 20/21 November 1972.83
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In addition, EPC countries had already agreed during their discussions that 
they would continue to consult during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks at 
Helsinki.84 As a result, EPC was to become a frontline base in Helsinki 
during the MPT.
1972 saw the emergence of the most important elements concerning the 
CSCE. When the East had proposed an all-European conference, the form of 
such a conference had been highly vague. By the end of 1972, by contrast, the 
French procedural idea -  a set of preparatory talks in which a mandate for a 
conference was to be drafted and a three-stage conference — was about to be 
accepted by other Western partners. While the agenda item of freer 
movement of people, ideas and information (the so-called Basket III) had 
appeared as early as 1969, the human rights clause in the declaration of 
principles governing relations between states (the Basket I) was proposed by 
West Germany in 1971 and accepted in 1972 by its NATO partners. Political 
cooperation amongst EC members, which had not worked well during 1971, 
advanced remarkably well in 1972. As this chapter has shown, the Western 
bloc was not monolithic. On the contrary, there were numerous controversies 
among NATO governments. Nonetheless, they steadily developed ideas 
concerning the CSCE, and prepared ways of making the conference 
meaningful and constructive, thereby transforming the quality of 
multilateral European detente. Yet, there are two more important elements 
to be put in place- the timing of the opening of the Multilateral Preparatory 
Talks, and the relationship between a CSCE and MBFR or military aspects
41/1055, Butler to Tickell, 8.11.1972.)
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of the conference. The next chapter will explore how these two issues affected 
multilateral European detente.
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Chapter 6- The Battle for a Good Start. January 1972 — July 1973
Detente in Europe had developed on three pillars- status quo detente, 
economic and cultural detente and disarmament detente. While the first two 
had clearly been reflected in the idea of a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the third pillar had been embodied as the MBFR 
proposal. However, in late 1971, the relationship between CSCE and MBFR 
was still controversial and divided opinion in the Western bloc. While some 
like West Germany, Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands were enthusiastic 
supporters of MBFR, others such as Britain, France, Greece and Turkey 
opposed conventional force reductions. Some wanted to connect a CSCE and 
MBFR. Others desired to separate the two. Yet, after the signing of the 
Quadripartite Berlin Agreement on 3 September 1971, NATO members felt 
the necessity to settle the question over the CSCE/MBFR relationship, 
because it seemed almost inevitable that a multilateral European conference 
would be held. Should a conference on European security deal with military 
aspects or not?
As is well known, the military issue to be discussed at the European 
security conference was the introduction of so-called Confidence Building 
Measures (CBM). The first part of this chapter will therefore explore how the 
concept of confidence building measures came to the fore, and how as a result 
of consultations within the Atlantic Alliance, CBM became the only military 
agenda item in the CSCE. As will be demonstrated, this result was in 
essence a retreat from fully-fledged disarmament detente.
This will lead logically to the further examination of the relationship 
between CSCE and MBFR. Indeed, in order to understand how the subject of 
mutual force reductions became separated from a CSCE, the second part of 
this chapter will pay attention to the American idea of the parallelism of 
CSCE/MBFR talks. With this new concept, the United States, a strong
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advocator of a complete split between the two, would attempt to persuade the 
Soviet Union to commit itself to the MBFR project irrespective of the fate of 
the Conference. The separation of MBFR from a CSCE by parallelism meant 
a quasi-death of the possibility of conventional force reductions in Europe, 
because the West had few means other than a CSCE -  Moscow’s desideratum 
-  to urge the Warsaw Pact countries to accept asymmetrical disarmament -  
the only substantial way to reduce military levels in Europe acceptable to the 
West. Although the Soviets also disliked treating disarmament matters in a 
CSCE, the idea of parallelism was, however, not attractive enough to force 
Moscow to fix the opening date of MBFR exploration. Therefore, this part of 
the chapter will also demonstrate that there was a secret agreement between 
the superpowers behind the timetable of CSCE/MBFR which Kissinger and 
the Soviet leaders agreed in autumn 1972.
The third part will then turn to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks 
(MPT) for a CSCE, the opening of which was permitted once the Soviets gave 
their consent to the start of MBFR exploratory talks. The result of the MPT -  
the so-called Final Recommendations or the Blue Book -  was a significant 
success for the West, laying the foundations which would make the CSCE 
itself constructive and fruitful. Although the positive prospect of 
disarmament detente had virtually disappeared, NATO and EPC members 
could successfully incorporate the principle of human rights and the agenda 
item of human contacts into the Final Recommendations. This section will 
thus ask how the Western bloc was able to obtain such favourable results in 
the MPT.
Returning to the CSCE/MBFR question, the final part of this chapter 
will analyse the resistance of non-superpower countries to the US/USSR 
agreement attempting to fix a deadline for the conclusion of a CSCE. The 
superpowers had agreed to complete a CSCE by autumn 1973 and to begin 
MBFR one month after that. This meant that the duration of the Conference 
would be considerably shortened, and that its contents would thereby risk
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becoming superficial -  totally unacceptable to the West Europeans and the 
Canadians. Faced with their vehement opposition, the Americans and the 
Soviets were in the end forced to back down. As a result, the effective time 
limit on the CSCE disappeared, thus allowing the Final Recommendations -  
the West’s great success -  to develop into the Helsinki Final Act without 
significant dilution.
Retreating to Confidence Building Measures
By 1972, the development of disarmament detente in Europe had 
significantly slowed down. Most Western Allies had gradually recognised by 
then that, given the force levels of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, mutual and 
symmetrical force reductions would be of no advantage to Western security 
in military terms. It also seemed highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would 
be content to disarm more Eastern divisions than Western divisions. In fact, 
Moscow would later call for “equal reductions” of forces.1 Even the countries 
most enthusiastic about MBFR -  West Germany and Belgium -  had 
acknowledged that conventional disarmament was militarily less attractive 
at the then present force balance between East and West. Politically, 
however, it was still appealing for West Europeans; and thus many 
politicians did not want to renounce the idea of MBFR.
Indeed, the FRG and Belgian governments advocated a gradual 
approach towards eventual force reductions. The West Germans, for example, 
assumed that the first stage of the disarmament talks should be an 
East-West negotiation about a declaration of MBFR principles; this would be 
followed by talks on the various constraints on the movement and 
reinforcement of troops in Europe; and it would only be after these
1 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe- Forty Years of German Foreign Policy. 
Yale University Press, 1989, p. 100.
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preliminary discussions had been completed that actual force reductions 
would be negotiated.2 They also insisted on connecting MBFR and a CSCE, 
in order to bind the Eastern bloc, which desperately wanted the latter, to the 
idea of force reductions. Although Brezhnev had promised to start MBFR 
negotiations, the West was afraid that once a Conference began, the Soviets 
would not engage seriously with MBFR. Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel, 
thus, proposed at the December 1971 NATO Ministerial Meeting that 
“certain military aspects of security” -  for example, constraints on troop 
movement — be initially discussed in a CSCE, and that MBFR negotiations 
should begin at a later stage in a separate but parallel forum restricted to 
those countries with troops in Central Europe.3 Brussels demanded that 
some of the elements of MBFR be included in a CSCE agenda in order to 
ensure that the disarmament project survived. Harmel’s proposal was 
generally supported by the FRG and other NATO Ministers, with the 
exception of the French Foreign Minister.4 It was clear, however, that the 
prospect of disarmament detente in the near future had been significantly 
watered-down to “collateral constraints” to accompany force reductions in 
MBFR. Furthermore, Washington was keen to cut substantial links between 
a CSCE and MBFR.
The United States had developed a different idea about a European 
security conference. After the signing of the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement, 
the State Department had intensively worked on reviewing US CSCE policy, 
assuming that the movement toward a Conference could not now be
2 TNA. FCO 41/810, Brief no. 3, Background, The Work of the Political Committee, undated 
(November 1971),' AAPD 1972. Dok. 28, Gesprach des Bundeskanzlers Brandt mit 
Staatsprasident Pompidou in Paris, 10.2.1972.
3 TNA. FCO 41/894, UKDEL NATO Tel No. 578 to FCO, 29.11.1971,' ib id ., Lever to Bridges, 
1.12.1971; TNA. FCO 41/809, UKDEL NATO Tel no. 625 to FCO, 9.12.1971; AAPD 1971. 
Dok. 439, Botschafter Krapf, Brussel (NATO), an das Auswartige Amt, 10.12.1971.
4 The final communique of the December 1971 NATO Ministerial meeting thus stated in 
general fashion tha t “These Ministers emphasized the importance they attach to measures 
which would reduce the dangers of military confrontation and thus enhance security in 
Europe. They noted tha t a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should deal 
with these aspects in a suitable manner.” 
http7/www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c711209a.htm
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stopped.5 Although, as repeatedly argued in the previous chapters, the 
Americans had disliked the idea of a European security conference, they had 
begun to search for a way in which they would be able to use a Conference for 
some US long-term interests. The Department of State thus proposed a “New 
Approach,” which was presented in its study paper submitted on 3 November 
1971, attempting to regard a CSCE as “a step toward maintaining a US role 
in Europe.” It suggested two main ideas. The first one was “increased 
emphasis on permanent machinery to provide an institutional framework 
involving the US intimately in a long-term process of East-West negotiation 
of issues of security and cooperation.”6 This concept of permanent machinery 
was, however, to be strongly opposed by many EPC countries because they 
thought that such a continuing institution would be exploited by the East to 
impede the progress of European integration.7 The White House too seemed 
not to be interested in this first idea. By contrast, Kissinger and his staff did 
take note of the second major idea of the “New Approach”: an initiative to 
add weight to issues of security by borrowing some measures of the collateral 
constraints from MBFR.8
As a result, the United States could accept the phrase “certain military 
aspects of security,” which was incorporated into the final communique of the 
December 1971 NATO Ministerial meeting, but its aim was different from 
that of Belgium or the FRG.9 The National Security Council preferred a 
stricter approach on this subject. Although the proposal of the Department of 
State was closer to Belgium’s one, the White House and the Department of 
Defense wanted definite separation between a CSCE and MBFR. Therefore,
5 On 2 October 1971, Nixon ordered “to examine all the issues related to a conference on 
European security.” DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part I, NSSM 1381 European Security 
Conference, PD01442, 2.10.1971. See also, James E. Goodby, Europe Undivided- The New 
Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations. Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 58-9.
6 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, Response to NSSM-138, PR00910, 3.11.1971.
7 TNA. FCO 41/1052, Luxembourg tel no. 86 to FCO, 29.2.1972. In general, NATO 
governments also had serious reservations about establishing any permanent organ. DBPO. 
III. II. p. 78, footnote 18.
8 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, SRG Meeting on European Security Conference, 
PR00911, 18.11.1971.
9 See footnote no. 4.
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Washington categorically opposed the idea of the CSCE being used to draw 
up a declaration on MBFR principles, and proposed to other NATO partners 
that the CSCE discuss only “collateral constraints” such as advance 
notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchange of observers 
at military manoeuvres and the establishment of observation posts.10 The 
Americans believed that these general and collateral measures -  soon to be 
called “confidence building measures” for CSCE purposes — would have no 
direct influence on the actual negotiations on force reductions. More 
importantly, they thought that these constraints would have marginal value 
from a military point of view.11 Rather, they attempted to give a military 
flavour to a CSCE, in order to placate its allies who insisted that a security 
conference in Europe should deal with m ilitary aspects and thus demanded a 
connection between the CSCE and MBFR.12 As the US deputy director of the 
Office of the Secretary General of NATO in 1970-73, John Maresca, put it 
later, “The United States supported the confidence-building measures 
concept more for reasons of allied solidarity than because of anticipated 
military or arms control benefits.”13
In the end, the idea of “confidence building measures” became the only 
military content of the CSCE. A majority of NATO members wanted a 
definite and official link between the CSCE and MBFR, not merely a very 
tenuous one. For the Dutch, Belgians and others, the purpose of a 
CSCE/MBFR link was to use the Russians’ desire for the former as a lever to 
get them negotiating about the latter.14 The West Germans in particular 
prepared and presented a concrete example of a “Joint Declaration on MBFR
10 TNA. FCO 41/1039, U.S. Delegation, Consideration of Stabilization measures (“Collateral 
Constraints”) in the CSCE context, 1.2.19725 TNA. FCO 41/998, U.S. Mission to NATO, 
MBFR and CSCE: A Proposed Relationship, 13.4.1972.
11 John J. Maresca, To Helsinki—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
1973-1975. Duke University Press, 1985, p. 169.
12 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, MBFR and CSCE, PR00918, 3.20.1972.
13 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 169.
14 TNA. FCO 41/1046, Braithwaite to Thomson, 17.7.1972.
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Principles,” in order to press their partners to discuss it.15 For the Greeks, 
Turks and Italians, it was a matter of their security. Although the area 
affected by MBFR was limited to Central Europe, these Mediterranean 
countries were particularly worried that conventional force reductions in 
Central Europe would have harmful side effects in the southern flank, 
because they believed that the Western Alliance’s military strategy was 
designed as a whole.16 Even the British, who disliked conventional 
disarmament but prioritised the unity of the Atlantic Alliance, thought that 
some sort of link between a CSCE and MBFR might be desirable in order to 
satisfy countries not directly involved in MBFR negotiations.17 However, the 
French adamantly opposed the whole concept of MBFR, although, at a later 
stage, they would accept the confidence building measures concept that 
would be unconnected with MBFR, and thereby not affect the military 
situation in Europe.18 As Pompidou said to Heath on 19 March 1972, “the 
French Government had always maintained that the question of MBFR
15 TNA. FCO 41/1041, German Delegation, Re.: Joint Declaration on MBFR Principles, 
23.2.1972; M artin Muller, Politik und Burokratie: die MBFR-Politik der Bundesrepuhlik 
Deutschland zwischen 1967 und 1973. Nomos, 1988, pp. 178-79. The MBFR Principles 
proposed by Bonn included, for example: “all reduction measures should be so balanced tha t 
they do not operate a t any stage to the military disadvantage of any one states or group of 
states and tha t undiminished security is ensured equally for all parties.”
16 TNA. FCO 41/999, Wiggin to Thomson, 16.5.1972.
17 TNA. FCO 41/998, Tickell to Thomson, 18.4.1972. Britain tried to reconcile different 
positions in the NATO Alliance. The British conciliatory scheme linking MBFR to a CSCE 
was to set up a security commission in the Conference at a Ministerial level to negotiate a 
declaration and agreement on some confidence building measures. This commission would 
set up a sub-group to negotiate substantial MBFR, and the group would consist of only those 
countries in Central Europe whose forces were directly involved. Through this procedure, 
the British thought they could mollify those countries not directly involved. The nub of 
London’s idea was, however, that the CSCE should not have authority over MBFR. (TNA. 
FCO 41/1045, British paper on “Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)”, 19.6.1972.) Unfortunately for 
Britain, no one was satisfied with this proposal. (MAE, Europe 1971 - juin 1976, vol. 2924, 
Rose a Europe Orientale, 27.7.1972.) The UK delegation to NATO lamented “In short, our 
proposals are likely to be shot at from almost every side.” (TNA. FCO 41/1046, Thomson to 
Tickell, 11.7.1972.)
18 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2923, Paris tel no. 111-116 to Repan Bruxelles,
23.5.1972 ; AN, 5 AG 2 / 1011, Premier entretien entre M. Pompidou et le Chancelier Brandt, 
a Bonn, le 3 juillet 1972 11 h -13 h 10, 3.7.1972. See also Georges-Henri Soutou, T/Alliance 
Incertaine: Les Rapports Politico-Strategiques Franco-Allemands 1954-1996. Fayard, 1996, 
p. 336.
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should be kept outside the framework of the Security Conference- the latter 
should be concerned with the political and human conditions necessary for 
the creation of security in Europe and not with problems of relative 
disarmament.”19 Not only Washington, but also Paris thus refused any 
connection between CSCE and MBFR. Moreover, the Americans and the 
Soviets advanced a fait accompli about the procedural relationship between 
the two projects, which would force other NATO governments to be satisfied 
with only confidence building measures being included in a CSCE.
CSCE/MBFR Parallelism and the Superpower Hidden Bargain
From the US perspective, the key objective was to obtain a commitment from 
the USSR to begin exploratory discussions of MBFR before the CSCE had 
concluded its work.20 It is conventional wisdom that Kissinger was 
interested in the mutual force reduction project only to resist Congressional 
pressure for the unilateral withdrawal of US troops in Europe.21 However, 
this had not necessarily been his opinion from the outset. In fact, Kissinger 
had clearly argued in autumn 1971 that “I’m not in favor of getting into 
discussions [about MBFR] with the Soviets to try to placate Congress.”22 
Rather, it was State Secretary Rogers and the Department of State who had 
insisted upon the usefulness of MBFR to counter this pressure. Yet, by the 
end of 1971, the White House accepted this thinking and moved more 
actively on this subject. US domestic pressure for force reductions remained 
intense. Although Senator Mansfield’s November 1971 effort to force an
19 PREM 15/904, Record of conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of 
the French Republic a t Chequers at 10.30 a.m. on Sunday, 19 March 1972, 22.3.1972.
20 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, NSDM 162- Presidential Guidance on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference, PR00154, 5.4.1972.
21 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation- American-Soviet Relations from Nixon 
to Reagan. Rev. ed., Brookings Institution, 1994, pp. 132-33.
22 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Minutes [Verification Panel Meeting on MBFR], KT00353,
21.9.1971.
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amendment calling for a 60,000 cut through the Senate was defeated, the 
margin became smaller than a similar amendment tabled in May 1971. 
Moreover, the upcoming US/Soviet summit, which, after the 15 July 1971 
announcement about the US President’s visit to Beijing, the USSR had 
proposed to take place in May or June 1972,23 was also a highly significant 
factor which pushed Nixon and Kissinger to commit to the MBFR issue more 
directly. In order to obtain Moscow’s agreement to fix the opening date of 
MBFR negotiations, Washington was first to propose the idea of parallelism 
of CSCE/MBFR talks and, then secretly to concur with a sequential 
CSCE/MBFR timetable.
For Nixon and Kissinger, their direct encounter with the Soviet leaders 
would be a crucial opportunity to move MBFR forward in return for the US 
commitment to a CSCE. The German-German transit talks on Berlin had 
already concluded on 17 December 1971. If the West German Parliament 
ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, the Final Quadripartite Protocol 
would he signed; then the West would have to set a date for beginning the 
multilateral preparations for a CSCE. However, the Soviets had continued to 
refuse to talk to the former NATO Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, who 
had been authorised by the Atlantic Alliance in October 1971 to explore a 
possible basis for MBFR with the USSR, because, for Moscow, a 
representative of NATO meant that the dialogue would become a “bloc to 
bloc” negotiation.24 Also there was little that was new about disarmament in 
the resolution issued at the Communist Party leaders’ meeting of 25-26 
January 1972 in Prague.25 It was clear that the Warsaw Pact would not 
agree to mutual force reduction talks, unless NATO took another approach
23 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 310.
24 AAPD 1971. Dok. 416, Gesprach des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem sowijetischen 
AuBenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 28.11.1971; AAPD 1972. Dok. 32, Gesandter Boss, 
Brussel (NATO), an das Ausartige Amt, 15.2.1972; Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und 
Entspannung- zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1955-1982. Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, pp. 554-56.
25 As regards the text of the 26 January 1972 resolution of the Prague meeting of the 
Political Consultative Committee,
http7/www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection 3/PCC docs/1972/1972 9.pdf
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on this subject. In brief, MBFR matters were procedurally deadlocked. This 
indicated that the preparatory talks for a CSCE would begin without a clear 
agreement on MBFR. Although Kissinger did not want immediate force 
reductions in Europe, he thought that progress towards MBFR should be 
maintained so as to resist future Mansfield resolutions. Indeed, the White 
House expected that, while there would be no problem about Congress in 
1972, the US government in 1973 would have to hold off Congressional 
pressure demanding unilateral withdrawal of US troops from Europe.26 
Moreover, it was highly desirable for Washington to advance MBFR in 
parallel with a CSCE in order to separate these two projects more 
substantially. Otherwise, Moscow might continue to eschew MBFR, and 
NATO members might become more demanding about a CSCE/MBFR link. 
Therefore, if the Americans wanted to keep MBFR and at the same time 
isolate it from a European security conference, “exploring MBFR at the 
summit [was] preferable and almost unavoidable.”27
At the US/USSR summit, however, Nixon would have only limited 
success regarding MBFR. Just five days before he flew to Moscow, the 
Eastern Treaties between Bonn and Moscow had successfully been ratified in 
West Germany on 17 May 1972 owing to the abstention of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentarians. Without doubt, this served to make the atmosphere before 
the meeting between the leaders of the superpowers favourable. Nixon and 
Brezhnev were also able to sign the SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaties, which was the central subject at the summit.28 Yet, as regards a 
CSCE and MBFR, the Soviet leader was a tough negotiator and the US 
President’s scope to obtain concessions from Brezhnev was limited; although 
Nixon made clear that the US government was ready to accept a European 
security conference in general, he also stressed it was impossible to hold it in 
1973 because of the presidential elections. Nixon wished to slow down
26 TNA. FCO 41/1002, Thomson to Wiggin, 20.9.1972.
27 DNSA, Presidential Directives, Part II, MBFR and CSCE, PR00918, 20.3.1972.
28 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 335*38.
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progress towards a European security conference as far as possible, but 
further delay was of course far less appealing to the Kremlin. Then, when 
Nixon suggested that “there be parallel discussions on force reductions, 
going forward at the same time as the discussions on the European 
conference,” Brezhnev was initially sceptical, arguing that “it perhaps should 
not be done in parallel fashion. Perhaps it was better to get the European 
conference subjects out of the way and then move on to force reductions.”29 
Faced with Nixon’s objection that “if we waited until the end of the 
conference we might never get to force reductions,” the Soviet General 
Secretary finally but vaguely replied that “the discussions could be 
conducted in parallel but in different bodies.”30 Nixon did thus succeed in 
securing Brezhnev’s agreement to the idea of parallelism in principle. 
However, he could not set a date for opening the multilateral preparation for 
MBFR. Nor did the Joint American-Soviet Communique mention parallelism. 
It merely stated that “Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as 
practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations 
on this subject [MBFR] in a special forum”31 The concrete details of the 
parallelism concept were also left to Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. The questions of when the preparatory talks for the CSCE and 
MBFR would begin and how the two discussions would progress in parallel 
had to be solved later.
Parallelism, together with the confidence building measures concept, 
was a decisive factor in breaking the connection between CSCE and MBFR. 
Although many Ministers asked for a clear and effective CSCE/MBFR link at 
the Bonn NATO meeting on 30-31 May 1972, they agreed that multilateral 
explorations for MBFR would be undertaken either before or in parallel with
29 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, European Problems, Memorandum of Conversation 
[between Nixon and Brezhnev], KT00495, 24.5.1972.
so Ibid.
31 Emphasis added. John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on M utual and Balanced Force 
Reductions. The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe. Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 31.
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the multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference.32 After this gathering, 
the United States and the Soviet Union made no further concessions on this 
issue. For Moscow, if it was to accept the idea of parallelism, a CSCE and 
MBFR would have to be clearly separated. For Washington, such separation 
was highly welcome too.33 The superpowers’ interests coincided. Soon after 
the NATO Ministerial meeting in Bonn, the West German Foreign Ministry 
also began to acknowledge that if a CSCE and MBFR were to develop in 
parallel, the degree of substantive linkage between the two could be 
flexible.34 Indeed, in the course of the regular Franco-German consultations, 
the FRG Foreign Minister Scheel confirmed his acceptance of parallelism 
and of the absence of organisational connections between CSCE and 
MBFR.35 Smaller and neutral countries would continue to call in vain for 
linkage between the two. Eventually, the participating countries would have 
to content themselves with the confidence building measures unconnected 
with MBFR and the principles governing relations between states including 
the renunciation of the use of force. It is difficult to argue what would have 
actually happened if a binding connection between CSCE and MBFR had 
been established. However, it is clear that, once parallelism was accepted, 
the West lost a possible lever which might have forced the Soviets to make a 
compromise over disarmament in favour of Western security — namely 
considerably larger force cuts by the Warsaw Pact than by NATO. The MBFR 
negotiations were thus doomed to deadlock.
By the summer of 1972, fixing the opening date of MBFR exploratory 
talks became imperative for America. To begin with, Finland proposed to 
start Multilateral Preparatory Talks in Helsinki from 22 November 1972 — a 
date which fitted well with the US presidential elections (7 November
32 AAPD 1972. Dok. 159, RunderlaB des Ministerialdirektors von Staden, 2.6.1972; TNA. 
FCO 41/969, Bonn tel no. 741 to FCO, 31.5.1972.
33 Moreover, the Americans insisted on dividing the venues for the negotiations,' while CSCE 
preparations would be held in Helsinki, a MBFR exploration would take place in Vienna.
34 AAPD 1972. Dok. 189, Aufzeichnung des Botschaters Roth, 27.6.1972.
35 AAPD 1972. Dok. 199, Aufzeichnung des Votragenden Legationsrats Steger, 7.7.1972.
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1972).36 The ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on 17 May 
1972, the SALT Agreement and the ABM Treaty on 29 May 1972, the 31 May 
1972 NATO Communique in which the Atlantic Alliance was publicly 
committed to enter into the MPT for a CSCE in Helsinki, and the signing of 
the Final Quadripartite Protocol on 3 June 1972, all encouraged the Finns in 
July 1972 to invite East and West European, North American and 
nonalignment/neutral countries to the Multilateral Preparatory Talks. 
Before accepting the Finnish invitation, however, the NATO countries and 
America in particular had to make clear the relationship between CSCE and 
MBFR.37 In addition, despite the agreement at the Moscow summit, the 
Soviets began to show their misgivings about parallelism.38 When Gromyko 
visited Brussels in July 1972, the Belgians gained the impression that the 
Russians did not hope to establish parallelism between MBFR and a CSCE.39 
Therefore, before Kissinger’s trip to Moscow to followup on the 
Nixon/Brezhnev summit -  scheduled in September 1972—, Washington felt 
that it needed “some sign that [Moscow would] enter into MBFR exploration” 
including “an indication of Soviet timing and the modalities of the MBFR 
explorations.”40 Then Kissinger met Dobrynin on 5 September 1972 and 
proposed the following programme*
if  we were prepared to agree to a European Security Conference on November 
22, they would be prepared for MBFR exploratory discussions by the end of 
January. And if  then the European Security Conference would take place 
during the sum m er of 1973, the MBFR conference would take place in the fall
36 John van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe- the Soviet Union and the West since 1953. Duke 
University Press, 1991, p. 321.
37 After the Bonn NATO Council meeting in May 1972, this topic was extensively debated 
among Western Allies. For example, see MAE, Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2924, Rose a 
Service des pactes et du desarmement, 11.7.1972. Yet, it was the superpowers that had a 
decisive influence on this problem.
38 MAE, Europe 1971 - juin 1976, carton 2924, Washington tel no. 5756-70 to Paris,
25.8.1972.
39 Vincent Dujardin, Pierre HarmeP Biographie. Brussels’ Le Cri, 2005, p. 512.
40 CD-ROM The Rise of Detente. Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger. From- Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt, Subject- Relaunching MBFR, 25.8.1972.
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of 1973.41
In order to make it easy for the Soviets to accept a fixed timetable, as 
illustrated in this proposal, the Americans made a concession  ^ the MBFR 
discussions would not have to start on the same date as a European security 
conference. This concession was to be of great significance and would later 
become a controversial issue between the United States and its NATO 
partners.
The importance of Kissinger’s September 1972 visit to Moscow did not 
only he in Brezhnev’s confirmation of the timetable suggested by the 
Americans, but in a secret agreement between the superpowers. The most 
important point was that they agreed when a CSCE would be concluded. 
Brezhnev stressed that “We are prepared to enter into these [MBFR] 
consultations with a view to holding a conference after the completion o f the 
European Security Conference.”42 Kissinger replied;
The actual [MBFR] conference should be a fter  the com pletion o f CSCE  if  it s ta rts  
a t the end of June, the MBFR conference could be about the end of Septem ber ** 
somewhere in September*October. If  these principles are agreeable we will then  
agree to the November 22 starting  date for CSCE preparations.43
“Let us agree,” the Soviet leader consented. Clearly Kissinger and Brezhnev 
confirmed that the CSCE would start at the end of June 1973 and finish 
before September-October 1973 when the MBFR conference would start. The 
superpowers agreed not only when the CSCE and MBFR would begin, but 
also when the European security conference would end — all without 
consulting their allies and even before the start of the preparatory talks.
41 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [with Dobrynin], KT00551,
5.9.1972.
42 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [Discussion with Leonid 
Brezhnev of U.S. Businesses, European Security, and Arms Control], KT00562, 12.9.1972. 
(emphasis added).
43 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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Kissinger, who had little interest in a multilateral European conference, 
gained Moscow’s commitment to MBFR. Brezhnev, on the other, successfully 
elicited Washington’s assent to complete the CSCE in less than three months, 
implying that the contents of the Conference would be as thin as the Soviets 
wanted.
Of further interest, Kissinger asked Brezhnev to propose this 
CSCE/MBFR timetable as if it was presented from the Soviet side.44 Then, 
on his way home, Kissinger went to Paris on 15 September 1972, explaining 
to the French President that the Soviets had handed him a note briefly 
outlining four points regarding the timetable*
1. preparatory  ta lks for the European Security Conference will begin in Helsinki
on 22 November 1972;
2. the  Conference itself will s ta r t in Helsinki a t the end of June 1973;
3. prelim inary ta lks for MBFR will begin a t the end of Jan u ary  1973; and
4. a Conference for MBFR will s ta r t in September or October 1973.45
Kissinger stressed that he had not responded to this note before 
consultations with NATO partners.46 Of course, he never said to President 
George Pompidou that he had already agreed with the Soviets to conclude 
the CSCE before the beginning of MBFR talks.
However, suspicion towards the superpowers gradually spread. The 
Soviet note, which was also shown to other NATO countries as a 
not-yet-agreed text, was at first welcomed in general by them, because it 
clearly showed that Moscow finally accepted the opening of negotiations on
44 Ibid.
45 AN, 5 AG 2 / 1022, Audience de M. Henry Kissinger, Conseiller du President Nixon, le 15 
septembre 1972, 17 h. 30 - 18 h. 55, 15.9.1972.
46 Ibid. Before Paris, Kissinger had visited London and took the same stance, when he met 
the UK Secretary of State Douglas-Home. DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Record of a 
Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Dr. Henry Kissinger 
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at 4-00 p.m. on 14 September 1972, KT00564,
14.9.1972.
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force reductions which NATO had been demanding for a long time.47 Yet, 
some of them began to suspect the existence of the US/USSR secret 
agreement. In fact, Gromyko hinted to Dutch Foreign Minister Schmelzer on 
29 September 1972 that “a preparatory conversation on MBFR could begin at 
the end of January, while the substance could be broached after the CSCE.”48 
Gromyko’s remark indicated that the Russians would not agree to convene a 
conference for MBFR before the conclusion of the European security 
conference. France in particular was concerned with Moscow’s intention to 
finish the CSCE before the MBFR negotiations, and repeatedly opposed any 
mention of June 1973 as the opening date for a CSCE, because Paris (rightly) 
guessed that the Soviet note implied that each of the four stages in the Soviet 
scenario should be completed before the next stage began.49 A West German 
diplomat, who had visited Moscow at about that time, also told British 
diplomats of his impression that the Russians intended CSCE and MBFR 
discussions to be in strict sequence, namely that once the CSCE was over 
MBFR negotiations could take place.50 The British side too showed their 
suspicion towards not only the Soviets but also the Americans, insisting that-
[W]e should find tha t our whole thesis of a serious conference with a long 
committee stage would risk coming under attack not only from the Russians, who 
wanted a quick and simple conference anyway, but also from those such as the 
Americans who wanted a visible start to MBFR negotiations next autum n.51
Indeed, the British Foreign Office had obtained (probably from the US 
Embassy in London) a note that the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had 
delivered to the US State Secretary Rogers, which contained the clear
47 TNA. FCO 41/1002, UKDEL NATO tel no. 375 to FCO, 15.9.1972.
48 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, vol. 2924, speaking note ‘Conversation between the 
Netherlands and Soviet Ministers of Foreign Affaires on CSCE’, undated.
49 TNA. FCO 41/1003, UKDEL NATO tel no. 389 to FCO, 27.9.1972; TNA. FCO 41/1002, 
UKDEL NATO tel no. 403 to FCO, 5.10.1972.
5° TNA. FCO 41/1005, Anglo/German Talks on MBFR- Bonn Friday, 20.10.1972.
51 Ibid.
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phrase* “the agreement achieved in the talks with Mr. Kissinger last 
September in Moscow.” 52 A British diplomat underlined the word 
‘agreement’ with his pen. While Kissinger explained that the Soviet note was 
not an agreed text, the British gained evidence indicating there could be a 
secret agreement between the superpowers. Therefore, the British, French 
and West Germans conveyed their strong opposition to the Soviets, saying 
that they could not accept the idea that MBFR would take place after a 
CSCE. Though the Americans also agreed with their partners’ opinion, they 
did not (or in fact could not) tell the Russians so.53 This became a source of 
European mistrust of the Americans and fed into wider anxieties about a 
superpower condominium in Europe.
Multilateral Preparatory Talks
On 22 November 1972, as proposed by the Finns, the Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks for a CSCE began in Helsinki. Putting to one side their 
misgivings about the US/USSR bargain, the NATO governments accepted 
the Finnish government’s invitation. There was no reason for the NATO 
governments to postpone the MPT any more after the Soviet acceptance of 
the opening of MBFR negotiations. The preparatory talks continued for 
about two hundred days and on 6 May 1973 worked out the Final 
Recommendations — a record of agreements on mandates and all procedural 
issues.54 In fact, this result was a promising first step for the West. It 
contained all of the key issues that the West had proposed should be 
discussed in a Conference, including in particular respect for human rights
52 TNA. FCO 41/1048, a secret document, untitled, undated, (emphasis added)
53 TNA. FCO 41/1055, ‘Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine 20/21 November in The 
Hague. Agenda item 1- Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,’ undated.
54 The text of the Final Recommendations of the MPT is printed in John Maresca, To 
Helsinki—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1973-1975. Duke 
University Press, 1985, pp. 211-225.
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and fundamental freedoms, and equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples in a list of principles governing the relations between states. It also 
set up the celebrated agenda item which would examine cultural aspects 
including Western ideas on “freer movement” of people, ideas and 
information, though the heading of the so-called Basket III was toned-down 
to “Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.” In addition, the French 
idea of a three-stage Conference procedure was also agreed. In return, 
NATO/EPC governments had to accept the principle of the inviolability of 
frontiers and agree to discuss the “Follow-up to the Conference,” a reflection 
of the long-standing Soviet demand for the creation of permanent 
machinery.55 Of these results, however, one high-ranking British official 
commented “So far the West has done surprisingly well.”56
The detailed process of negotiations in the MPT has been documented 
elsewhere.57 Suffice it here to make four main points which, according to the 
British Ambassador in Helsinki, T.A.K. Elliott, account for the West’s success 
in the preparatory talks.58 The first reason was the careful advance 
preparation carried out in NATO and in European Political Cooperation. On 
many subjects, the opinions of the Western countries differed and clashed. 
However, the endeavours made by Western diplomats and experts 
scrutinising all issues relating to a European security conference during the 
years 1969-1972 clarified problems and points of dispute, thereby narrowing 
the divergences of view within the Western bloc. Based on such preparation, 
the EPC countries then took the initiative in the MPT by tabling the draft
55 PAAA, B-28, Bd. ZA109292, Konferenz fur Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, 
undated.
se DBPO. III. II. p. 136, fn.2.
57 Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Renort on a Negotiation. Helsihki-Geneva-Helsinki 1972-1975. 
Alphen aan den Rijn-Geneve, 1979, pp. 9*40; Robert Spencer, “Canada and the Origins of the 
CSCE,” in Robert Spencer (ed.), Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. University of Tront, 1984, pp. 84*94; Kristina Spohr-Readman, “National Interests 
and the Power of ‘Language’: West German Diplomacy and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 1972*1975”, Journal of Strategic Studies. 29/6 (2006), pp. 1098*1116.
58 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 37, Mr. Elliott (Helsinki) to Sir A. Douglas*Home, 13.6.1973.
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terms of reference for the committees which were to be set up in a CSCE.59
Secondly, the neutral countries were generally on the West’s side in the 
multilateral preparatory talks. Of course, they had their own ideas and 
opinions. However the so-called “N+NA (Neutral and Nonaligned)” countries 
supported all agenda items proposed by NATO members. In addition, it was 
Switzerland and Austria that grouped many proposed subjects into four 
Baskets- l) policy and security matters; 2) economic and related issues; 3) 
human contacts, culture and information; and 4) follow-up to the 
Conference.60 Together with giving some consideration to the Warsaw Pact’s 
views, the N+NA played an undeniably effective role in the preparatory 
phase to produce Final Recommendations which were in essence favourable 
for the West.
The third reason for the West’s success was the resolution of the 
enlarged EC Nine (the original Six members plus Britain, Ireland, and 
Denmark) not to accept an opening date for the Conference until it became 
clear that the MPT had produced satisfactory results. In addition, 
cooperation on tactics helped to strengthen this resolution. While the West 
sought daily consideration of Basket III, it attempted to guide discussion of 
Basket I items towards such time-consuming subjects as the Swiss proposal 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the question of the Mediterranean 
and the military aspects of security, in order to avoid a discussion of the 
principles governing relations between States -  the main Basket I item on 
which the East put the highest priority -  until progress on Basket III was 
clearer.61 The tactics of avoiding early discussion of the principles was also 
important for the West, because there was still Allied disagreement on the 
subject. For instance, while West Germany regarded the principle of 
self-determination as very important because it strengthened their call for
59 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 20, Minute from Mr. Tickell on CSCE Preparatory Talks, 25.1.1973.
60 Thomas Fischer, “The Birth of the N+NA- Austrian and Swiss Foreign Policy in the 
CSCE,” a paper submitted for the Conference “At the Roots of the European Security 
System- Thirty Years Since the Helsinki Final Act” (Zurich, 8-10 September 2005).
61 TNA. FCO 41/1296, Burns to Wiggin, 11.5.1973.
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the future reunification of Germany, Canada opposed it because of Quebec 
separatism.62 Therefore, it was convenient for NATO to deal with the 
problem of the principles at a later stage after such disputes had been settled 
within the Atlantic Alliance. The Warsaw Pact countries by contrast thought 
it was important to reach a conclusion as quickly as possible.63 It was the 
Eastern side that felt most pressure from the timetable agreed between 
Kissinger and Brezhnev in September 1972, which set the opening date of 
the CSCE as the end of June 1973. Western resolution and tactics thus 
worked. While there were some disagreements among the NATO members, 
this resolution and these tactics made it possible for the West to gain 
maximum concessions from the East and minimise those made by the West.
The final and decisive reason for establishing a good foundation for the 
following multilateral European conference was the maintenance of the 
West’s cohesion in the negotiations. The West’s cooperation was essential in 
order to bring their advance preparation into play in the negotiation with the 
East. If opinions within the Western camp had been divided, their leverage 
would have been weak. This point was crucial in multilateral negotiations. 
Within the Eastern bloc, Romania, which emphasised its independence and 
sovereignty in the preparatory talks, was an embarrassing factor for the 
Soviet Union, though other East European countries were under the strict 
control of the Russians. By contrast, “The performance of the Nine at 
Helsinki [was] extremely effective.”64 How the EPC countries came to 
cooperate was discussed in the previous chapter. However, how and why did 
the EPC cohesion work in the Multilateral Preparatory Talks? For a start, 
America’s attitude was a key contributory factor. Once the preparatory talks 
began, the US delegation refrained from positive intervention in the
62 PAAA, B-28, Bd. ZA111531, Betr.: KSZE-Prinzipienerklarung, 2.2 1973.
63 “Report on the Consultation of the Warsaw Treaty Comities’ Deputy Foreign Ministers 
Held in Moscow on 15 November 1972” in The Parallel History Project on NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact Home Page.
http7/www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection 3/DepFM docs/translations/721115-Mosco 
w.pdf
64 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 29, Sir A. Douglas-Home to Mr. Elliott (Helsinki), 28.3.1973.
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negotiations. They had received an instruction from Washington not to 
challenge the positions agreed among the Nine. In particular, the White 
House’s interest in a CSCE was quite low.65 The US thought that it would 
not be wise to confront both their EC friends and the USSR on CSCE matters, 
especially given their attempt to maintain good relations with Moscow since 
the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit.66 This American stance put the non-EC 
countries of NATO in an uncomfortable position, because they were 
sometimes forced to accept the Nine’s agreement as a fait accompli*1 
Without support from the US government, the voices of non-EC states like 
Greece or Turkey were feeble. As a result, EPC consultations functioned as 
the main forum for preparing for the West’s position in the MPT.
As Elliott points out, the French attitude was also significant for the 
effectiveness of EPC in the preparatory talks. Although France continued 
consultations with the USSR and the East European countries, it remained 
loyal to the positions worked out with its EPC partners and defended them 
actively not only in the multilateral debate but in private conversation with 
the Soviet Union.68 The principal tactics of the Soviet Union for reaching an 
early conclusion of the MPT were to use bilateral relations.69 The 
Pompidou-Brezhnev summit of January 1973 was regarded by the East as a 
good opportunity to extract concessions from the French.70 However, it was 
not the French but the Soviets who had to compromise. During the summit, 
the French President insisted on the idea of drafting mandates for the
65 TNA. FCO 41/ 1069, Washington tel no. 3435 to FCO, 21.11.1972.
66 Goodby, Europe Undivided, p. 62; Jussi Hanhimaki, “’They Can Write it in Swahili’- 
Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973-1975,” The Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies. 1/1 (2003), p. 45; See also, Jacques Andreani, Le Piege- Helsinki et la chute du 
communisme. Odile Jacob, 2005, p. 87.
67 TNA. FCO 41/1068, Helsinki tel no. 846 to FCO, 19.12.1972; See also, Spencer, “Canada 
and the Origins of the CSCE”, pp. 83-84.
68 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 37, Mr. Elliott (Helsinki) to Sir A. Douglas-Home, 13.6.1973.
69 Andreani, Le Piege. p. 86.
70 “Telegram by the Romanian Foreign Minister, 15.1.1973” in The Parallel History Project 
on NATO and the Warsaw Pact Home Page.
http7/www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection 3/CMFA docs/CMFA 1973/1973 2.pdf
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Committees in the second stage of the CSCE.71 In order to make the 
Conference substantial, it was quite important for the West to prepare terms 
of reference which clearly defined directions for the Committees (and 
sub-Committees) which were to be established after the first stage of Foreign 
Minister Conference. When the preparatory talks had started, however, the 
East had rejected the creation of such mandates, because a time-consuming 
process of drafting mandates would hamper a quick conclusion of the MPT. 
The initial phase of the preparatory talks had thus been stalemated. The 
French President persisted obstinately in his belief in the necessity of 
preparing the terms of reference for the CSCE. Faced with Pompidou’s 
strong demand for drafting mandates, Brezhnev finally gave way, accepting 
in general the drafting of documents which would eventually become the 
Final Recommendations of the MPT. Subsequent Franco-Soviet bilateral 
consultations during the CSCE preparatory talks also did not entirely 
develop in favour of the Russians. In the French/USSR summit, the two 
leaders had agreed to continue bilateral consultation on the CSCE.72 
Accordingly, several high-ranking exchanges between the French and the 
Soviet Union Foreign Ministries took place.73 However, the French side 
made it clear to the Soviets that it was difficult to decide multilateral things 
bilaterally, and refused, for example, to draft Franco-Soviet joint mandates.74 
In spite of frequent Paris-Moscow exchanges, the French government did not 
diverge from the EPC arrangements.
More interestingly, Jacques Andreani, the French delegation leader, 
observes that NATO functioned as a mutual surveillance mechanism among
71 AN, 5 AG 2 / 1019, Tete a tete entre M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev, 12.1.1973.
72 Ibid.
73 For example, MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, 2926, Compte-Rendu de rEntretien de 
M. Schumann et M. Gromyko a Minsk, le 12 janvier 1973, 19.1.1973; MAE, Serie Europe 
1971 • juin 1976, 3722, Compte-Rendu de lE ntretien  de M. Puaux avec M. Oberemko,
22.1.1973 ; ibid., Moscou tel no. 1229 to Paris, 23.2.1973 I ibid., Moscou tel no. 1264 to Paris,
24.2.1973 ibid., Moscou tel no. 1278 to Paris, 24.2.1973 ; ibid., Compte-Rendu de 
l’Audience accordee par le Ministre a M. Gromyko, 28.2.1973 ; ibid., Entretien du Secetaire 
general avec M. Zemskov, Vice-Ministre sovietique des Affaires Etrangeres, 28.2.1973.
74 MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, 3722, Compte-Rendu de lE ntretien de M. Puaux 
avec M. Oberemko, 22.1.1973.
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partners within the multilateral negotiations between East and West.75 In 
such a multilateral framework, the Atlantic Alliance members watched each 
other acutely and sought to verify what other partners thought. This made it 
highly difficult for NATO members to breach Western agreements during the 
multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki. Andeani also reveals that 
delegations to Finland sometimes gave EPC solidarity preference over 
instructions from their capitals.76 This example indicates that close EPC 
consultations on the spot in Helsinki came to possess their own dynamism. 
This dynamism and the mutual surveillance mechanism made the West 
altogether a more solid entity in the MPT.
The preparatory phase lasted over six months mainly because the West 
exerted pressure to draft mandates for a CSCE proper. The Multilateral 
Preparatory Talks thus did in the end become a place for substantial 
negotiations and a crucially important stage in the development of successful 
multilateral European detente. For the reasons listed above, NATO and EPC 
members were able to establish a strong foundation for a Conference with 
the June 1973 Recommendations. However, in order to make the best use of 
it, the Europeans and the Canadians had to kill off the US/Soviet agreement 
on the CSCE/MBFR timetable.
Withstanding the Superpower Agreement
At this final stage of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the US/Soviet 
agreement on the CSCE and MBFR again came to the fore. On 6 May 1973, 
Henry Kissinger visited Moscow to prepare for the planned Nixon-Brezhnev 
summit in June 1973. He still had to address the timing of MBFR, because, 
although the preliminary consultations on mutual force reductions had
75 Andreani, Le Piege. p. 86.
76 Ibid., p. 89.
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already started on 31 January 1973 in Vienna, the Eastern bloc was 
continuing to oppose fixing the opening date of a MBFR conference. In 
addition, on 15 March 1973, Senator Mansfield had succeeded in persuading 
the Senate Democratic Caucus to adopt a resolution calling for a substantial 
reduction of US troops overseas during the following eighteen months.77 
“Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and 
the beginning of MBFR?”, Kissinger hence asked when he met Gromyko in 
Moscow.78 The Soviet Foreign Minister then consented to Kissinger’s 
one-month-interval suggestion, based on the premise that “by 
September-October, the all-European conference will be over.” 79 The 
superpowers again made an agreement to commence MBFR talks one month 
after the completion of the CSCE. It was clear that the Soviets were 
attempting to reach a quick conclusion of the CSCE by exploiting MBFR. 
Such an outcome would have eviscerated the important results of the Final 
Recommendation of the MTR Therefore, the non-superpower states had to 
resist strongly such a US/USSR agreement so as to secure a meaningful 
multilateral European conference.
There is little doubt that Kissinger also wanted to finish the European 
security conference quickly, in order to launch a MBFR conference. When he 
met Bernd von Staden, the newly appointed West German Ambassador to 
Washington, on 12 May 1973, the US National Security Advisor conveyed the 
result of his trip to Moscow, explaining that it was the Kremlin’s intention to 
begin MBFR negotiations one month after the conclusion of CSCE -  despite 
the fact that it had actually been Kissinger who had suggested this 
timetable.80 At the same time, Kissinger made his opinion clear that such a
77 Documents on British Policy Overseas. Series III. Volume III- Detente in Europe. 1972-76. 
p. 35.
78 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [with Gromyko], CSCE, 
MBFR, Nuclear Agreement, U.N. Membership for FRG and GDR , 6.5.1973.
79 Ibid.
80 AAPD 1973. Dok. 137, Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an M inisterialdirektor van 
Well, 12.5.1973; DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Discussion with Ambassador von Staden of 
U.S.-European Relations, KT00721, 12.5.1973.
250
Conference should be finished as quickly as possible and not be delayed.81 
He had little intention of making the CSCE longer in order to make it 
substantial and meaningful for the West.
Yet, the idea of a one-month interval between the end of the CSCE and 
the start of the MBFR was absolutely unacceptable to the FRG government. 
Although disarmament was an important element in the whole Ostpolitik 
concept, a conference on European security was also significant to Brandt 
and Scheel as it would help make their Eastern policy sustainable. Therefore, 
a CSCE should be substantial. The Soviets might have thought that the West 
Germans would have accepted a quick CSCE conclusion in exchange for an 
early MBFR start, because the last time Brandt had met Brezhnev in 
September 1971, the Chancellor had enthusiastically stressed the 
importance of MBFR.82 Indeed, Egon Bahr, Brandt’s diplomatic advisor, still 
regarded “MBFR negotiations as very much more important than the 
CSCE.”83 However, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, whose Free Democratic 
Party had supported the idea of a CSCE for a long time, unequivocally 
rejected such a timetable linkage between the CSCE and MBFR when he 
met Gromyko on 18 May 1973.84 Brandt was also never convinced by the 
Soviet leader’s bilateral approach. When Brezhnev met Brandt on 21 May 
1973 and insisted on finishing the CSCE before the MBFR could be seriously 
negotiated, the Chancellor gently rejected the idea that, a CSCE could be 
completed before the spring of 1974 -  a very different timetable from that
si Ibid.
82 AAPD 1971. Dok. 310, Aufzeichnung des Bundeskanzlers Brandt, z.Z. Oreanda,
17.9.1971.
83 TNA. FCO 41/1340, Audland to Tickell, 31.1.1973. See also Timothy Garton Ash, In 
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sought by the Soviets.85 In brief, Bonn had no intention of shortening the 
length of CSCE negotiations for the sake of an early start to the MBFR talks.
Other NATO countries also vehemently opposed the superpower 
agreement.86 The Soviet (or US/Soviet) timetable would have led to a short 
and therefore superficial Conference. If it had been adopted, the West would 
have had to finish the Conference in less than three months so as to permit 
the opening of MBFR. The British thought, however, “The longer the CSCE 
talks last and the deeper they probe the more embarrassing it is for the 
Soviet Union both tactically and substantively.”87 The French government 
also maintained that a multilateral European conference should develop its 
own rhythm.88 For the majority of West European states, therefore, the 
negotiations of a CSCE had to be conducted independently without any time 
pressures. If the conclusion of the CSCE had been connected to the opening 
of MBFR, the West would have been exposed to internal pressures, in 
particular pressure from the US government which wanted an early launch 
of force reduction negotiations to counter Mansfield’s offensive. In order to 
avoid a Conference being hijacked by the American demand for an early start 
of MBFR, it was indispensable for other NATO countries to fix the opening 
date of MBFR negotiations in advance and independently of a CSCE 
schedule.
The first way to oppose Moscow’s CSCE/MBFR step-by-step timetable, 
adopted by EPC countries in particular, was to establish another parallelism. 
Gromyko envisaged that the second stage of a CSCE (negotiations at the 
official level centred on drafting the final text) would begin within a few days 
of the end of the Ministerial CSCE stage I, namely in early July 1973, and
85 AAPD 1973. Dok. 152, Aufzeichnung des Bundeskanzlers Brandt, 22.5.1973.
86 They were informed about the Soviet idea of the timing of MBFR on 21 May 1973. TNA. 
FCO 41/1226, UKDEL NATO tel no. 334 to FCO, 21.5.1973.
87 TNA. FCO 41/1226, Moscow tel no. 615 to FCO, 24.5.1973.
88 AN, 5 AG 2 / 1019, Entretiens Franco-sovietiques 25-27 juin 1973 • Note synthese,
20.6.1973.
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would continue only for two months.89 However, most EPC governments felt 
that stage IP of the CSCE should start at the earliest in September 1973 — 
after the European holidays in August.90 This European timetable was well 
calculated to prevent CSCE/MBFR linkage since the Soviets themselves had 
identified September or October 1973 as the best starting date for the MBFR 
negotiations in their timetable note of September 1972, which had already 
been shown to France and other EPC memebers. Given that the final two 
stages of the CSCE were unlikely to be completed within a month, the 
Soviets would only be able adhere to their own suggested schedule for the 
MBFR discussions by accepting that these run in parallel with the latter 
stages of the CSCE.91 By preparing another parallelism between the 
CSCE/MBFR talks, the EPC thus tried to oppose the US/Soviet agreement.
Another way of countering the superpowers was simply not to embark 
on a CSCE. The Netherlands and the Canadians were indeed the hardliners, 
who suggested that NATO should not agree on the date for the CSCE stage I 
Ministerial meeting before the Soviets had accepted the October date for 
MBFR sought by the Americans.92 At the end of May 1973, the delegations 
to the preparatory talks for a CSCE in Helsinki felt that the preparation for 
a Conference was approaching its conclusion. The East was pressing to fix a 
date for the first stage Ministerial Conference, and the end of June or early 
July had already been considered.93 However, the Canadian and Dutch 
governments thought that bargaining on the date for CSCE stage I was the 
West’s main leverage for getting the Russians to set an autumn date for 
MBFR.
Other NATO members were slightly less radical than The Netherlands
89 TNA. FCO 41/1226, UKDEL NATO tel no. 344 to FCO, 24.5.1973.
90 TNA. FCO 41/1226, FCO tel no. 132 to Vienna, 17.5.1973.
91 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [between Kissinger and 
Douglas-Home], KT00719, 10.5.1973.
92 TNA. FCO 41/1226, UKDEL NATO tel no. 351 to FCO, 28.5.1973. See also AAPD 1973. 
Dok. 158, fn. 13, pp. 803-4. As regards the Canadian government’s reactions, see Spencer, 
“Canada and the Origins of the CSCE,” pp. 92-3.
93 Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation, p. 40. The preparatory talks for MBFR had already 
started since 31 January 1973.
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and Canada, but their tactics were similar. They doubted the tactical wisdom 
of delaying the CSCE stage I at this final stage of the MPT.94 Technically, it 
would have been awkward to re-arrange the schedules of 35 Foreign 
Ministers and the preparations of the Finnish conference organizers at such 
a late stage of the MPT. Politically, a decision not to set an opening date 
might also have provoked a backlash from the neutral counties, which had 
been good partners for the West during the MPT. Therefore, there was wide 
sympathy for the Belgian idea that if the Russians continued to refuse a date 
for MBFR, the West could simply refuse to start the second phase of the 
CSCE at the official level in which the substance of the Conference was to be 
discussed.95 Nonetheless, the Dutch and Canadians were still adamant and 
adhered to their opinions. As a result, on the final day of the MPT 
negotiations, all NATO countries except the USA agreed in general that 
while accepting the date of 3 July 1973 as the opening of CSCE stage I as ad 
referendum, they would not be in a hurry officially to reply to the Finnish 
conference invitation. 96 Only the American representative in NATO 
demurred.97 The US government was isolated.
The US and the USSR were thus forced in the end to change their 
agreement on the CSCE/MBFR. Irrespective of their differing preferences in 
terms of tactics, the West European countries and Canada were all strongly 
opposed to the US/Soviet agreement on the timing of opening the MBFR 
negotiation. If Moscow had stuck to the idea that MBFR would begin only 
one month after the end of the CSCE, there was the danger that neither the 
CSCE nor MBFR would have been convened at all. As a result, the two
94 PAAA, B-28, Bd. ZA 111516, Vermerk, Betr.: Sowjetische Haltung zum Ergebnis der MV,
25.5.1973; TNA. FCO 41/1226, UKDEL NATO tel no. 363 to FCO, 30.5.1973.
9® Ibid.
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superpowers had to rethink their plans. According to the British Embassy in 
Washington, Kissinger confidentially told the British on 4 June 1973 that 
“The Soviet government has now suggested informally that if the Americans 
will agree that the CSCE should be concluded by the end of the year, they 
would agree to a fixed date for MBFR.”98 It seems that through the 
backchannel, Kissinger and Dobrynin had dealt with this problem. Perhaps, 
this was not only a Soviet suggestion, but an agreement between the 
superpowers, or there is a possibility that, as before, this was Kissinger’s 
own suggestion to the Soviet side dressed up as an offer from Moscow. In any 
case, when Brezhnev visited the United States in late June 1973, he and 
Nixon finally agreed to begin the MBFR negotiations on 30 October 1973.99 
In other words, the CSCE/MBFR step-by-step timetable had been dropped.
As regards this result of the US/Soviet summit, John Keliher has 
argued that “Brezhnev may have wanted Nixon to pressure the Allies to get 
on with CSCE in exchange for Soviet agreement to start MBFR,” but 
“Brezhnev achieved only limited success on this point.”100 However, the 
“limited success” was not to Nixon’s credit. It was the Europeans and the 
Canadians who eventually limited or rather prevented the US/Soviet 
“success”. Brezhnev zealously attempted to set a terminal date for a 
Conference, but Nixon could not agree because his NATO partners were 
opposed to it, replying to the Soviet leader that “All I can say is that we can 
press forward to get a conclusion as soon as possible.”101 More importantly, 
the Soviets had to yield to the Western pressures to fix the MBFR opening 
date before the'completion of the CSCE, implying that the Eastern camp lost
98 TNA. FCO 41/1226, Washington tel no. 1745 to FCO, 4.6.1973. British Prime Minister 
Edward Heath strongly opposed any US/Soviet agreement about the date for finishing 
CSCE. TNA. FCO 41/1227, Bridges to Alexander, 8.6.1973.
99 See the Joint Communique issued a t the end of Nixon-Brezhnev summit, in the European 
NAvigator (ENA) Home Page:
http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm
100 John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. The 
Search for Arms Control in Central Europe. Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 41.
101 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation [Discussion of Leonid 
Brezhnev and Richard Nixon on Arms Control and European Security], KT00762, 20.6.1973.
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had its most important (and probably the only useful) card to put pressure on 
the West to force early completion of the security Conference. Even if there 
was a secret agreement between the superpowers, the other Western 
countries could conduct the second stage negotiations of the CSCE at their 
own pace, independently and free from pressure.102 It made it possible for 
the Western side to discuss problems such as “freer movement,” longer, more 
substantially, and more thoroughly -  until the East made acceptable 
concessions.
Although initially disarmament detente had been pursued primarily by 
the West, it significantly retreated to what became the concept of Confidence 
Building Measures by early 1972. CBMs were originally the collateral 
elements of MBFR and their military value was regarded as low. The project 
of MBFR was also completely separated from the CSCE; hence the prospect 
of its future advance was crucially curtailed. However, West Europeans 
secured the true value of the security Conference. The West succeeded in 
making the East recognise drafting mandates for the CSCE and incorporate 
humanitarian elements in the terms of reference. And by defeating the 
superpowers’ secret timetable for the CSCE and MBFR, West European 
countries were able to maintain to a significant extent the integrity of a 
multilateral European conference.
Epilogue
From 3 to 7 July 1973, Foreign Ministers from thirty-five countries gathered 
in the Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, and the first stage of the Conference on
102 In the meeting between Gromyko and Michel Jobert, the new French Foreign Minister, 
on 26 June 1973, the Soviet Foreign Minister insisted that “The second phase must not be 
‘artificially prolonged’ and could be terminated at the end of November.” Jobert however 
retorted tha t “In particular, we do not desire to fix a date for the end of works of commissions 
to which we attach the greatest importance.” MAE, Serie Europe 1971 - juin 1976, 2926, 
Paris tel circulaire 388, 30.6.1973.
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Security and Cooperation in Europe took place. It marked the opening of a 
concept of the three-stage Conference as foreseen by the French. The five-day 
meeting was a formal affair, largely dominated by speeches by Ministers.103 
And the propaganda exchanges in this first stage indicated hard and long 
negotiations ahead. On the whole, the communist speakers were on the 
defensive, and repeatedly insisted on the two different systems in Europe 
and the inviolability of the frontiers between them. Gromyko, in particular, 
virtually asserted the right of national veto over any movement of 
information, ideas or people.104 According to the UK Ambassador in Helsinki, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister’s speech “was written as if nothing had 
happened in the last nine months [the MPT phase and after], and certainly 
seemed designed to ensure that nothing happened in the next.”105 However, 
the thirty-five Ministers approved the Final Recommendations prepared in 
the MPT without modification, and the mandates in the Blue Book would 
effectively regulate the direction of the CSCE process.
Beyond everyone’s expectation, the second stage of the CSCE lasted for 
almost two years. The Soviets had not insisted that stage II begin 
immediately after the Ministerial gathering in July 1973, and it started as 
the West had proposed from 18 September 1973 in Geneva. According to the 
approved June 1973 Recommendations, representatives from thirty-five 
nations set up the Co-ordinating Committee, three main Basket Committees, 
plus several Sub-Committees and Working Groups.106 In short, they 
institutionalised the terms of reference in the Blue Book and established a 
footing according to which the officials from participating countries 
negotiated in detail the content and language of the final text. The Eastern 
countries could not escape from the framework established in the 
Multilateral Preparatory Talks. Moreover, they failed to achieve a speedy
103 AAPD 1973. Dok. 221, RunderlaB Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Dohms,
10.8.1973.
104 TNA. FCO 41/1317, Helsinki tel no. 735 to FCO, 6.7.1973.
105 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 42, Mr. Elliott (Helsinki) to Sir A. Douglas-Home, 16.7.1973.
106 As regards the organisational structure for stage II of the CSCE, see DBPO III. II. p. 480.
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completion of work in stage II. At first, the Soviet Union tried to give priority 
to the agenda item of a Declaration of Principles which lay at the heart of 
Basket I and push issues in Baskets II and III to a later phase in the hope 
that the latter would be wrapped up quickly and under substantial time 
pressure. However, the Warsaw Pact had no leverage to force the West to 
accept such Eastern negotiation tactics. The opening date of the MBFR 
conference had already been fixed for 30 October 1973 and there was no 
reason for NATO governments to finish this vitally important second stage in 
a premature fashion. In mid-November 1973, the UK representative at the 
second stage CSCE in Geneva saw the situation as follows- “It seems clear 
that the Russians have now given up their hope of forcing an early 
conclusion to the second stage and are now thinking in terms of working 
until the spring [1974].”107 Yet, in the end, it was not completed until 
summer 1975.
On security matters, the achievements of the West were relatively 
limited. For a start, the principles securing the status quo in Europe, such as 
the renunciation of the threat of or use of force and the inviolability of 
frontiers were confirmed. The final agreement on confidence building 
measures -  prior notification (21 days) of large military manoeuvres (of more 
than 25,000 troops) up to a distance of 250 km from the frontier of a 
neighbour; and an exchange of observers at such manoeuvres -  was less 
satisfactory for the West Europeans, partly because these CBMs would be 
carried out only on a voluntary base, and partly because, in May 1975, 
Kissinger personally negotiated with Gromyko a larger number of troops and 
a smaller number of prior notification days and distance than the US’s 
partners had expected to obtain.108 Moreover, the negotiations on mutual
107 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 54, Mr. Hildyard (UKMIS Geneva) to Sir A. Douglas-Home,
17.11.1973.
108 Kenneth Dyson, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe- Europe before 
and after the Helsinki Final Act”, in European Detente- Case Studies of the Politics of 
East-West Relations. Ed. by Kenneth Dyson. F. Pinter, 1986, pp. 97-98; DBPO. III. II. Doc. 
136, Mr. Hildyard (UKMIS Geneva) to Mr. Callaghan, 25.7.1975; DNSA, Kissinger
258
force reductions, which had begun on 30 November 1973 outside of the CSCE 
framework, in the end continued inconclusively until the late 1980s. While 
NATO demanded balanced force cuts, the Warsaw Pact insisted on equal 
reductions, namely the consolidation of the current imbalance of force levels 
in Europe. This divergence of opinion proved impossible to overcome during 
the Cold War.
The result of the battle over the Basket II -  Co-operation in the Field of 
Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment — was a draw. 
The main difference of opinion was on principles between Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) treatment and reciprocity in trade. While the Eastern bloc 
desired comprehensive European cooperation based on the principle of MFN 
treatment, a step which would have removed quantitative restrictions from 
East-West trade, the Western bloc, and EC countries in particular, gave 
priority to the principle of reciprocity in trade relations, and ways and means 
of improving business contacts and the flow of economic information, because 
the NATO side thought that MFN would benefit only the East and would be 
of little value to the West. Indeed it could even harm the latter by 
undermining the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy.109 Both sides made 
concessions in the last month of the stage II negotiations, agreeing on 
formulae which vaguely and clumsily incorporated both sides’ views, such as- 
“on the basis of equality and mutual satisfaction of the partners, and of 
reciprocity permitting, as a whole, an equitable distribution of advantages 
and obligations of comparable scale.” 110 Although such an unclear 
compromise helped to complete the second stage of the CSCE, it amounted to 
no real agreement in the economic field. Indeed, it was highly difficult to 
convert these abstract words into concrete economic practice. The actual 
impact of such a multilaterally agreed text on East-West economic relations
Transcripts, Memorandum of Conversation, CSCE, KT01627, 19.5.1975.
109 Dyson, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” p. 98.
110 A phrase in the preamble of the Basket II in the Helsinki Final Act. Maresca, To Helsinki. 
p. 239>' DBPO. III. II. Doc. 135, Letter from Dr. Fielder (UKMIS Geneva) to Mr. T. Alexander, 
21.7.1975.
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was, therefore, marginal for both camps.111
On humanitarian aspects of the CSCE, however, the West and EPC in 
particular gained a high score. They had already successfully included the 
outstanding principle of the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the declaration on principles guiding relations between 
participating states. The Soviet Union and its allies had tenaciously tried to 
dilute the contents of the Basket III of human contacts and information by, 
for example, drafting preambles which would make it possible to use the 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs as an excuse to restrict the 
application of Basket III to concrete cases. However, the EC Nine continued 
carefully to thwart such Eastern manoeuvres.112 Kissinger, who disregarded 
the humanitarian dimension in East/West relations, preferred a quick 
conclusion of the CSCE in order to retain good relations with the Soviet 
Union. Yet, when he tried to persuade America’s allies not to be intransigent 
on the subject of human contacts, he had no legitimate means to pressurise 
them once the MBFR had started.113 The start of the force reduction talks 
before the conclusion of the CSCE, insisted upon by West European countries 
and Canada, had already deprived the US of its ability to force its Allies to 
accept a text of little substance. Moreover, it was Brezhnev who, after the 
long haul of the second stage, ultimately lost patience. In early March 1975, 
he wrote to the principal Western leaders, proposing that the “final stage of 
the Conference at the highest level” should begin on June 30 1975.114 This 
Soviet move gave a great opportunity to the West to exploit the deadline in 
order to push Moscow on the Basket III issues in return for an acceptance of 
the summit meeting. Hence, at the end of May 1975, the Warsaw Pact 
countries eventually made substantial concessions and accepted the Western
111 Philip Hanson, “Economic aspects of Helsinki,” International Affairs. 4/61 (1985).
112 Alfred Pijpers, “European Political Cooperation and the CSCE process”. Legal Issues of 
European Integration. 1 (1984), p. 142.
113 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 94, Mr. Elliott (Helsinki) to Mr. Callaghan, 29.7.1974.
114 Maresca, To Helsinki, p. 142; DBPO. III. II. Doc. 115, p. 388, footnote 3.
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proposals regarding human contacts and information.115
The final stage of the CSCE Summit opened on 30 July 1975 and 
continued for three days. The chiefs of state and heads of government 
returned to the same place where their Foreign Ministers had gathered two 
years earlier. The leaders of the main Western countries had already 
changed. Heath, Brandt and Nixon had all left power and Pompidou had died. 
New faces, Harold Wilson, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt and 
Gerald Ford, came to the capital of Finland. However, the outcome of the 
efforts of diplomats and experts since 1969 came to fruition as the Helsinki 
Final Act. On 1 August 1975, this historic document was signed and marked 
a significant step for the long-term change of the Cold War.
115 DBPO. III. II. Doc. 123, Mr. Hildyard (UKMIS Geneva) to Mr. Burns, 30.5.1975; 
Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Alphen aan den Rijn, 
The Netherlands; Rockville, Md., USA- Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981, p. 133.
Conclusion- Organising M ultilateral European Detente
This study has focused on 1969-1973, the period which led up to the opening 
of the CSCE. The four years were crucially important for organising 
multilateral European detente. Previous scholarship had largely analysed 
the CSCE itself and its aftermath. However, exploring the period 1969-1973 
offers an account of how the Conference came to be held and how it was 
arranged. The way in which the CSCE was organised was highly significant 
because it made the Conference meaningful and transformed it into 
something which contributed to ending the Cold War conflict in the long run.
The first task of this concluding chapter will be to present an overview 
of the development of detente in Europe from 1963 to 1973, and underline 
the importance of multilateral European detente. It will then ask why the 
CSCE took place from the Western point of view. Furthermore, it will 
underline the importance of the procedural aspects of the Conference, which 
on the one hand made European Political Cooperation the forefront of the 
West in the CSCE negotiations, and on the other made the Conference 
practical and meaningful. And finally it will highlight the way in which the 
CSCE, which represented an element of both the status quo and 
economic-cultural-humanitarian detente, provided a framework which 
gradually eroded the Eastern bloc system, thereby contributing to the ending 
of the Cold War.
Uncontrollable Multilateral European Detente
To start with, it is important to recognise that detente had multiple 
meanings. As argued in Chapter 1, in the 1960s, the three pillars of detente 
were the status quo, economic-cultural exchanges, and arms control and 
disarmament. By recognising current borders and regimes, status quo
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detente was. intended to pursue stability. East/West economic and cultural 
exchanges were expected to improve the atmosphere between the blocs and 
increase mutual understanding. In order to reduce the danger of military 
confrontation, arms control and disarmament were also important subjects 
of detente.
It was in the nuclear arms control domain that the first concrete result 
of detente in the early 1960s appeared- the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. 
It was also the beginning of the separation of superpower and European 
detente. In fact, the test ban treaty was primarily accomplished bilaterally 
by the USA and the USSR, and their European allies played little role. More 
significantly, the superpowers were able to reach agreement on the test ban 
owing to their detachment of the German question from their detente. In the 
1950s, the German question and the issue of arms control/disarmament had 
been closely finked. The Western powers had insisted that arms control and 
disarmament detente would come only after the settlement of the German 
problem. In order to stabilise superpower relationships, however, the US 
government decided to pursue only the subject of nuclear arms control. For 
this purpose, the Americans isolated the nuclear test ban talks from the 
German question, although conventional disarmament still continued to be 
attached to the problem of the division of Germany. In addition, Washington' 
and Moscow skilfully shelved the problem of East German recognition, which 
would have accompanied the signing of a test ban treaty. By leaving aside 
such a highly difficult problem in Europe, the United State and the USSR 
were able to concentrate on the nuclear issue. In this sense, the LTBT was 
the birth of superpower detente. *
This meant that the German question was still an overwhelming 
obstacle to multilateral European detente. Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union 
had pursued a status quo detente through the recognition of the two 
Germanies. Throughout the . 1950s and 1960s, however, West Germany 
continued to resist accepting the existence of East Germany. As long as the
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Eastern bloc wanted the recognition of the status quo including East 
Germany, it was rather difficult to develop European detente multilaterally, 
because the participation of the GDR in multilateral institutions or 
conferences automatically meant the recognition of another Germany as a 
formal member of international society. Such a step was unacceptable to the 
FRG, and other Western partners had to respect Bonn’s vital interests.
Some European countries thus attempted to promote economic-cultural 
contacts bilaterally with the Eastern governments. The most spectacular 
example was de Gaulle’s approach to the Soviet Union and East European 
countries, which culminated in his 1966 trip to Moscow. However, bilateral 
French detente in the end had little political impact on East-West relations. 
Although it is likely that few East or West European countries were 
completely satisfied with the superpowers’ domination, they also wanted to 
maintain their respective Alliances. When de Gaulle visited Warsaw in 1967, 
for instance, Gomulka underlined the significance Poland attached to 
keeping close relations with other Warsaw Pact countries. On the Western 
side, de Gaulle’s unilateral initiative towards the East, together with 
France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command, caused a 
crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. As many historians have argued, however, the 
General’s challenges contributed to the consolidation of the Western bloc 
with the adoption of the flexible response strategy and the Harmel report in 
1967, even though the aim of the General’s detente policy had been to 
dissolve the two blocs.1
Multilateral proposals were ignored. From 1966 onwards, the Warsaw 
Pact countries began to advocate convening a pan-European conference. But
1 Frederic Bozo, “Detente versus Alliance- France, the United States and the Politics of the 
Harmel Report (1964-1968)”, Contemporary European History. 7/3 (1998); Helga 
Haftendorn, “The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Detente: The 1967 Harmel 
Report,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), Crises and Compromises- The European Project 1963-1969. 
Baden-Baden- Nomos, 2001; Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity- NATO and the 
Miscalculation of Detente, 1966*1968”, Journal of Cold War Studies. 6/1 (2004); James 
Ellison, “Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 
1966”, Cold War History. 6/1 (2006).
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NATO never replied officially to such Eastern initiatives. In fact, no 
communique issued by NATO Ministers in the 1960s mentioned a 
multilateral European conference. The report on “The Future Tasks of the 
Alliance” -  the Harmel Report — identified deterrence and detente as NATO’s 
roles. However, it did-not contain any new approach towards the German 
question. Hence, the Atlantic Alliance’s move towards a multilateral 
conference was still highly restricted. Certainly, in 1968, the West also 
proposed a multilateral disarmament project- Mutual Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR). However, it was mainly aired for the purpose of 
countering US domestic pressure for unilateral US troop withdrawals from 
the European continent. MBFR was also proposed in the expectation that the 
Warsaw Pact would not respond to it immediately. This proved to be a correct 
assumption as the Eastern bloc ignored the Western initiative on mutual 
reductions of conventional forces until 1970.
In practice, the 1969-1972 period was still dominated by bilateral 
detente. Although in March 1969 the Warsaw Pact again proposed the 
holding of a pan-European security conference, the West’s first reaction to 
the East’s initiative was to keep probing the motivations of the Warsaw Pact 
countries through bilateral contacts. The superpowers also began the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) bilaterally. Moreover, the Federal 
Republic of Germany embarked on a new Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union, 
Poland and then the East Germany. Arms control, economic-cultural 
exchanges and the recognition of the status quo were still pursued mainly 
through bilateral channels.
Yet this era of bilateral detente was an indispensable precursor of 
multilateral detente since for the first time the West Germans tackled the 
German question in a practical manner. The Brandt government at last 
recognised the existence of East Germany de facto as well as accepting the 
Oder-Neisse line between East Germany and Poland. The 1970 Moscow 
Treaty between Bonn and Moscow -  the most successful outcome of
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Ostpolitik — cleared away the long-standing obstacle to a multilateral 
European conference.
The success of West Germany’s Eastern policies did not automatically 
lead to the CSCE. The Berlin problem also had to be resolved before the 
Conference could be held. The West had made the settlement of the Berlin 
talks, which had begun in March 1970 between the Four Powers, a 
precondition for the opening of multilateral preparations for the CSCE. 
Brandt also made it a precondition for the ratification of the Moscow Treaty 
in the Bundestag. As a result, the Berlin question was the central problem 
with regard to European detente. Without its settlement, no other set of 
talks could advance. Yet, the negotiations on the divided city of Berlin were 
highly difficult. Although the real talks on this subject were conducted 
through the backchannel between Kissinger and Dobrynin, even these secret 
communications soon became deadlocked. As highlighted in Chapter 4, it 
was Egon Bahr who broke the impasse by providing Kissinger with an 
ingenious idea’ shelving the juridical problem of the status of Berlin and 
concentrating on pragmatic improvements in the city’s situation. This idea 
made it possible not only to draft a Berlin arrangement pragmatically, but 
also to change the circumstances in which neither the Americans nor the 
Soviets wanted to make the first concession. In the end, the Quadripartite 
Berlin Agreement was signed on 3 September 1971. The resolution of the 
German question through the Moscow Treaty, Warsaw Treaty and the Berlin 
Agreement then paved the way for multilateral European detente.
The most sensitive problems — Germany and Berlin -  were thus dealt 
with exclusively in a bilateral manner (or at most trilateral- 
Washington-Bonn-Moscow). The result of the bilateral talks was in essence 
the recognition of the status quo — i.e. of existing status and existing borders. 
Neither side sought radical change in these negotiations. Stability was 
preferred. This was also the case for the bilateral superpower agreements on 
nuclear matters such as the LTBT, the NPT and the SALT. For Washington,
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Bonn and Moscow, these important and sensitive subjects had to be 
controlled carefully. In other words, bilateral (and sometimes secret) 
arrangements were easily controllable. And such controlled negotiations 
naturally resulted in agreements confirming and maintaining current 
politico-military circumstances. Within such bilateral talks, there was little 
space for new elements which would explicitly change the existing situation.2 
By contrast, only within the framework of multilateral detente, could 
humanitarian agenda items be incorporated, co-existing alongside status 
quo-orientated issues such as the inviolability of frontiers.
The United States and the Soviet Union also attempted to control 
multilateral projects bilaterally, and succeeded to some extent. For example, 
they agreed to separate completely the CSCE from MBFR. Although smaller 
NATO members and neutral countries wanted to connect the two sets of 
talks, the superpowers refused to compromise on this point. Washington and 
Moscow also tried to fix the timetable for the CSCE and MBFR. In fact, the 
timing of the opening of the multilateral preparatory talks for the CSCE and 
the exploratory talks for MBFR was significantly influenced by the 
arrangement made by Kissinger and Gromyko in September 1972.
However, in a multilateral context new elements of detente emerged, 
and the superpowers were not able to exercise a dominant influence over the 
procedure of the CSCE and MBFR. As early as late 1969, within NATO, the 
idea of the freer movement of people, ideas and information appeared as an 
issue to be discussed between the East and the West. This was originally a 
French idea, picked up by the Americans and jointly presented to other 
NATO partners. The issue of human relations was then proposed as an
2 The studies focusing on bilateral detente, therefore, tend to emphasise tha t detente served 
to consolidate the status quo, implying prolonging the Cold War. For example, Raymond L. 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation- American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Rev. 
ed., Brookings Institution, 1994, pp. 1171-74; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest- Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Detente. Cambridge. MA* Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 
258-9; M. E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil- East Germany. Detente, and Ostnolitik. 
1969-1973. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, pp. 174-77; Timothy 
Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. New York :Random 
House, 1993, chapter 8.
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expansion of economic and cultural exchanges. Moreover, the West Germans 
suggested incorporating a reference to human rights in the principles 
governing the relationship between states. Bonn wanted a gradual 
development of human contacts between the two camps and the two 
Germanies in particular. “Freer movement” sounded too concrete and hence 
too radical, however. Therefore, the FRG government preferred the more 
general principle of human rights, which would serve as a long-term norm. 
Although many Western diplomats did not expect such a human rights 
principle to have a substantial effect on East/West relations, it is undeniable 
that this step introduced a vital new humanitarian factor into the Cold War 
division of Europe. In the medium term this was to have a decisive effect in 
undermining the legitimacy of the Eastern Bloc regimes.
Moreover, once multilateral detente began to progress in Europe, the 
US and the Soviet Union found that they were not able to manipulate it 
completely. Washington and Moscow shared an interest in finishing the 
CSCE quickly. The Soviets wanted a brief Conference which would produce 
only vague declarations confirming the status quo. The Americans and 
Kissinger in particular had little interest in a multilateral European 
conference. Instead, in order to secure Moscow’s commitment to the MBFR 
project, Kissinger had secretly agreed with Brezhnev to complete the whole 
CSCE process by autumn 1973 after only two or three months of discussions, 
and then begin the MBFR negotiations after the conclusion of the CSCE. For 
Kissinger, therefore, a short security Conference was desirable so as to start 
MBFR as soon as possible. This was a superpower timetable that West 
Europeans and the Canadians could not accept. They thought that the longer 
the European security conference continued, the more embarrassing it would 
be for the Soviet Union both tactically and substantively,' hence it would be 
to the West’s advantage to have a security Conference which lasted for much 
longer than the two or three months envisaged by the USSR and the US. The 
CSCE had to be allowed to develop at its own pace. Therefore, they strongly
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resisted the Kissinger/Brezhnev agreement fearing that such a brief CSCE 
would make it superficial and with little substance for the West. Faced with 
vehement European and Canadian opposition, the superpowers were finally 
forced to back down, agreeing to the opening of MBFR talks before the 
completion of the CSCE. As a result, the latter Conference could continue its 
negotiations for a full two years without serious American or Soviet pressure 
to finishing it earlier in order to begin conventional force reduction talks.
The two-year negotiations were significant since they allowed the West 
to extract concessions from the East on the issues of human rights and freer 
movement of people, ideas and information. The superpowers could not 
dilute the importance of humanitarian elements in the CSCE context. As 
long as the Soviets wanted the CSCE, they could not avoid including the 
human rights issue on the agenda. Kissinger disregarded the humanitarian 
dimension in East/West relations and preferred a quick conclusion of the 
CSCE so as to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. However, 
when he tried to persuade America’s allies not to be adamant on the 
humanitarian subject, he had no legitimate means to pressure them 
especially after the MBFR had started in October 1973.3 As is known well, 
the human rights clause was included in the principles governing relations 
between states drawn up as part of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The issue of 
human contacts, which had been detached from the economic agenda item 
during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, was also contained in the Final 
Act as the famous Basket III. This was also a reflection of the superpowers’ 
inability to control multilateral European detente.
Western Commitment to the CSCE
Why was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in the
3 DBPO. III. II. pp. 323-4.
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early 1970s? As argued above, the settlement of the German question was a 
first step towards the CSCE.4 Before convening a multilateral European 
conference including East Germany, it was necessary to recognise the 
existence of another Germany. Brandt’s bilateral Ostpolitik made this 
possible. The conclusion of the Berlin negotiations was also imperative. The 
West had first looked at the idea of a European security conference with 
considerable scepticism. By using the Berlin question, therefore, the NATO 
countries tried to test the East’s sincerity and made the satisfactory 
settlement of the Berlin negotiations a precondition for the opening of 
preparatory talks for the CSCE. The settlement of the Moscow Treaty and 
the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement thus eliminated difficult obstacles on 
the way to the European security conference.
Yet, however important the settlement of the German and Berlin 
questions was, it was only a prerequisite or background condition. Of equal 
importance is to ask why the West accepted the Eastern initiative for a 
status quo-orientated conference on European security. NATO governments 
had ignored the idea during the 1960s. Why did they not continue to reject 
it? And yet at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial meeting — held before the 
success of Brandt’s Ostpolitik — the Atlantic Alliance publicly committed 
itself to the idea of the CSCE on condition that progress was made in “the 
on-going talks — in particular on Germany and Berlin.” As a starting point, 
Britain’s role in the early stages is worth highlighting.5 The British Foreign 
Office was initially highly sceptical of the Soviet proposal for a European 
security conference. Nonetheless, the then Foreign Secretary, Michael 
Stewart was more inclined towards detente in general. He felt pressures 
from within his Labour party. Equally, the British Foreign Secretary was 
concerned about underlying student criticism of the Western Alliance and 
their demands for good East/West relations. As a result, he supported the 
idea of establishing a Standing Committee on East-West Relations (SCEWR)
4 Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 139.
5 Chapter 2.
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— a formula invented by the Foreign Office. For British foreign officials, it 
was thought that this idea might serve to deflect the Warsaw Pact’s 
conference proposal. For Stewart, however, the SCEWR was a useful way of 
showing a positive stance towards detente in public. Selling the SCEWR to 
Britain’s NATO partners, Britain encouraged the Atlantic Alliance not to be 
negative towards detente and not immediately and bluntly to reject the 
conference concept. Although the idea of SCEWR itself was not finally 
accepted, British leadership was vital during 1969/70 in beginning to get 
NATO to move towards the eventual acceptance of the CSCE. Later in 1972, 
Kissinger reproachfully told Thomas Brimelow, the Deputy Under Secretary 
at the UK Foreign Office, that “If they [the USA] had been able to get the 
support of two or three European countries, they might have prevented it 
[the CSCE].”6 President Nixon also told Burke Trend, the British Cabinet 
Secretary, that “The US government themselves had never wanted the 
Conference - it was some of the European countries, not least the United 
Kingdom, who had originally pressed for it.”7 Although the British were not 
necessarily enthusiastic about the Conference itself, the British initiative 
had worked — unintentionally to some extent -  in pushing NATO towards the 
CSCE.
In addition to the importance of Stewart’s leadership, NATO Foreign 
Ministers’ general preference for detente was highly significant in explaining 
the growth of support for the CSCE. During 1969-1972 in particular, NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact had continued a “dialogue by communique.”8 In 
drafting such communiques during Ministerial NATO Council meetings, 
many NATO Foreign Ministers wanted to make them as forthcoming as 
possible. Through positive wording, they wanted to demonstrate that the
e DBPO. III. II. Doc. 12.
7 PRO. PREM 15/1362, Record of Discussions with Dr. Kissinger a t Washington on 28th July, 
1972.
8 Kenneth Dyson, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Europe before 
and after the Helsinki Final Act,” in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), European Detente' Case Studies 
of the Politics of East-West Relations. F. Pinter, 1986, p.86.
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West was willing to promote detente. By so doing, the Atlantic Alliance 
became publicly involved in the idea of a European security conference 
because they accepted the Conference in their communiques, albeit 
conditionally. As a result, once the negotiations on the Moscow Treaty or 
Berlin progressed, even those countries that disliked the CSCE gradually 
came to think that the convening of a security Conference was inevitable. 
Why did the NATO Foreign Ministers believe that they needed to be positive 
towards detente? Some, such as Stewart or Harmel, personally supported 
detente. Others, in particular Ministers of smaller countries, felt public 
pressures in favour of a relaxation in tension between East and West. In 
general, though, the feelings of NATO Foreign Ministers are probably best 
explained by Wenger and Suri’s comment that- “Diplomacy and social protest 
in the 1960s left a legacy of pervasive unrest for policy-makers in succeeding 
years.”9 Politicians’ anxieties about social unrest, British leadership and the 
settlement of the German question were the reasons for NATO’s eventual 
commitment to the CSCE.
Organising the CSCE
The years between 1969 and 1973 were vitally significant not only for the 
gradual acceptance that a CSCE would be held, but also for a series of 
decisions about how the Conference itself would be organised. Indeed, the 
procedural aspects of the Conference, to which earlier scholarship has 
generally paid little attention, were important in at least two ways. Firstly, 
the procedural problem was the key issue to understanding the way in which 
EPC -  a central player of the Western bloc in the MPT and the Conference 
proper -  developed its cooperation on CSCE matters. Secondly, the French
9 Andreas Wenger and Jeremi Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History- 
The Nuclear Revolution, Dissent and Detente,” Cold War History. 1/3 (2001), p. 29.
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procedural concept of a three-stage Conference transformed the Warsaw 
Pact’s idea of a “pan-European” conference into a meaningful and substantial 
project.
In 1970-72, one of the most controversial points concerning the CSCE 
within NATO was how to arrange any European security conference. In the 
Western bloc, the American and French ideas on procedure were 
diametrically opposed. The US government preferred long and intensive 
preparatory negotiations and a brief one-off conference at the Foreign 
Minister level. In contrast, the French government, which had become more 
enthusiastic about the CSCE, wanted short preparatory talks and a long 
three-stage conference?' first, a Ministerial level conference after preparatory 
talks’ second, official level negotiations of some length?’ and third, a 
concluding Ministerial conference. Opinions within the Atlantic Alliance on 
these two ideas were divided. France’s EC partners largely preferred the 
American concept, because they disliked rushing into a conference with only 
brief preparatory talks. Moreover, when EPC was established, West 
Germany and the Netherlands in particular wanted to avoid EPC being 
dominated by France and joined in opposition with America, trying to 
represent US opinions within the EC’s political consultations. As a result, EC 
cooperation on the CSCE did not develop in its first year.
However, as argued in Chapter 5, the French procedural schema acted 
as a catalyst for advancing cooperation among EC members. In particular, 
the convergence of opinion between Bonn and Paris became its core. After 
the signing of the Quadripartite Berlin Agreement of 3 September 1971, the 
West German Foreign Ministry began to work harder on preparations for the 
CSCE so as to exploit it for the FRG’s interests. Yet, not all Bonn’s views 
were shared by its partners. Indeed, West German preference for a gradual 
and steady approach on the issue of human contacts was opposed by the 
more radical Americans and the British.10 In order to secure a Western
10 The US State Department was keen on the agenda item of freer movement of people,
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stance close to the West German view, Bonn needed more support from EPC 
members and in particular from France than before. The FRG thus began to 
accept the French procedural concept of a three-stage conference for the sake 
of Franco-German cooperation in the EPC. France also made a concession so 
as to gain backing for its procedural plan. A new French idea was critically 
important; Paris proposed that the Multilateral Preparatory Talks be asked 
to prepare a mandate for the CSCE, a step which would make the MPT 
relatively longer and more substantial. The new combination of a mandate 
and a three-stage conference was finally supported by West Germany and 
other partners except the Netherlands. Because the majority among the EPC 
now preferred the French proposal, it then became the working hypothesis 
on which EPC’s studies on the CSCE were developed and accumulated in 
1972. By the end of the year, the Dutch had also accepted the French idea. 
When the MPT began in November 1972, it was thus EPC that led the 
preparatory negotiations for the CSCE. And EPC’s success in the MPT gave 
its members incentives to be cooperative in the Conference itself in 1973-75. 
In this sense, the successful resolution of the procedural problem amongst 
the European Community members was the origin of EPC’s “one voice” in the 
CSCE negotiations.
Another significant aspect of CSCE’s procedure was the way in which 
the Conference became meaningful and constructive owing to the French 
schema. If one compares the French ideas with the other suggestions on the 
table, its transformative effect on the CSCE will become clear. The original 
Soviet idea was for brief preparations and one Summit conference 
culminating with a general declaration including the inviolability of frontiers. 
The aim was merely to recognise the status quo in Europe. A status quo 
detente providing stability might have emerged if a Soviet-type Conference
ideas and information in 1969-1972. However, after the successful US/USSR summit of May 
1972, the White House and Kissinger in particular came to prefer a less confrontational 
approach towards the Soviet Union to improve humanitarian aspects between East and 
West.
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had been concluded. However, it would not have contained any elements 
reducing East/West antagonism.
The procedural concept proposed by the Americans was not 
constructive. The US government wanted a long preparatory phase, because 
its underlying intention was to retain the possibility of not holding the 
conference itself at all. Washington disliked the idea of a European 
conference and therefore insisted on long preliminary talks in order to be 
able to reject it, should the East, during the preparatory phase, provide it 
with an excuse to do so such as military intervention somewhere in the world 
as had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This American approach was 
criticised by the French in particular since it risked giving the impression 
that the West was uncooperative towards detente. A long preparatory phase 
was also unattractive to the Soviets. Moreover, as will be argued below, a 
single Ministerial conference would not have been enough to elicit enough 
concessions from the East.
The French formula worked much better than the others. The 
combination of mediunrlength preparatory talks for a mandate, a symbolic 
first-stage Ministerial conference, real and longer negotiations during the 
second stage, and a final Ministerial/Summit conference, was the key to 
making the CSCE successful. Firstly, by putting the real negotiations in the 
second stage of a conference, it made the preparatory phase look as if it could 
be finished in a relatively short time! This made it appealing for Moscow and 
lured the Warsaw Pact countries into the French three-stage idea. Secondly, 
during the preparatory talks, the West succeeded in forcing the East to 
accept draft terms of reference for the second-stage negotiations. The 
mandates, which were prepared mainly by EPC, set the direction of talks at 
the official level and contained the West’s main negotiating aims, namely the 
establishment of a principle of human rights and the inclusion of an agenda 
item on human contacts. The Eastern bloc, which wanted to hold a 
Ministerial conference, had to agree to these terms of reference. Thirdly, the
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long official level negotiations based on and directed by the mandate, made 
the Conference more substantive -  again something which favoured the West. 
And finally, after two years of negotiations, partly thanks to Brezhnev’s 
personal preoccupation with holding a Summit level conference at the third 
stage, the Warsaw Pact finally made further compromises over the 
humanitarian agenda item. When the idea of a pan-European conference had 
been proposed by the East, there had been little advantage in it from the 
Western point of view. With the French procedural concept and the inclusion 
of the humanitarian elements, the CSCE became constructive, substantial 
and meaningful for detente in Europe.
Stability and the Helsinki Effect
Viewed with the benefit of post-Cold War hindsight, disarmament detente in 
Europe represented from 1968 onwards by MBFR did not play a significant 
role in ending the Cold War. The conventional force reduction talks, which 
had begun in October 1973, were able to reach a conclusion only after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and communist regimes in Eastern Europe.11 
Disarmament talks could not reduce military tension in Europe during the 
Cold War. The concept of Confidence Building Measures (CBM), which was 
incorporated in the Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, was originally merely 
a “collateral constraint” to accompany force reductions in MBFR. The 
emergence of the idea of CBM reflected the Western realisation that 
balanced troop cuts in Europe would be highly difficult. From the beginning, 
moreover, the military value of CBM was regarded as marginal.12 Instead, it 
was the CSCE, including a status quo detente and 
economic-cultural-humanitarian detente, that in the long run contributed to
11 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed on 19 November 
1990 in Paris.
12 See Chapter 6.
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the lifting of the Iron Curtain.
On the one hand, the stabilising effect of status quo detente in the 
CSCE explains why there was no immediate drastic change in the East/West 
division in Europe. The Warsaw Pact governments celebrated the Helsinki 
Final Act as a triumphant confirmation of “peaceful coexistence.”13 The 
Helsinki Accords were a de facto World War II peace treaty accepting the 
post-war borders and the two Germanies in a multilateral framework.14 The 
principles on the “inviolability of frontiers” and the “non-intervention in 
internal affairs” contained in the Final Act were, however, a double-edged 
sword. While they were criticised as a symbol recognising Soviet hegemony 
in Eastern Europe, they -  together with the principle on “refraining from the 
threat or use of force” — would also serve as a basis for repudiating the 
Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty. In any case, the CSCE offered 
grounds for stabilising state relationships in Europe.
On the other hand, in the relatively stable atmosphere at governmental 
level, economic-cultural detente including human rights norms encouraged 
elements which shook the Eastern bloc from below. In the latter half of the 
1970s, economic and cultural exchanges between East and West Europe 
increased. Although the terms of the Helsinki Final Act’s Basket II were not 
necessary helpful for increasing East/West economic exchanges, the French 
President Giscard d’Estaing and the West German Chancellor Schmidt in 
particular energetically developed such cooperation in the atmosphere of 
detente created by the success of the CSCE.15 In fact, there was a marked 
increase in East-West trade in the 1970s.16 Economic growth in Eastern
13 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect- International Norms. Human Rights, and the 
Demise of Communism. Princeton, NJ- Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 94.
14 John Maresca, To Helsinki, p. xii.
15 Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Detente. 1950-1991. Palgrave, 2002, 
pp. 145-7. See also, Marie-Pierre Rey, “Le retour a l’Europe? Les decideurs sovietiques face a 
l’integration oust-europeenne, 1957-1991.” Journal of European Integration History. 11/1 
(2005), pp. 19-20.
16 William V. Wallace and Roger A. Clarke, Comecon. Trade and the West. London: Pinter, 
1986, pp. 162-63.
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Europe in that decade was extensively funded by Western loans.17 This 
gradually changed the societies of the Eastern bloc, increasing the need for 
Western consumer goods and necessitating further credit support. The 
autonomy of the closed states was thereby eroded.
More importantly, what Daniel Thomas has called the Helsinki effect, 
the Final Act’s human rights norms affected the peoples of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern European.18 The contents of the Helsinki Accords became 
known by them gradually but steadily. Dissidents in the socialist bloc 
organised groups and developed networks.19 Eurocommunism in Spain, 
Italy and France also asserted its respect for human rights, challenging the 
ideological legitimacy of the Soviet system. In practice, however, human 
rights in the socialist regimes did not improve drastically nor immediately 
after the conclusion of the Final Act. The Warsaw Pact governments tried to 
stop the effect of the Helsinki Final Act and many activists were arrested 
and jailed. Yet, there were limits to how far the communist authorities could 
go in this repression because they wanted to maintain the stability needed 
for good economic relations with the West and, for that reason, they could not 
repress the dissidents so blatantly that they were eliminated. While the 
CSCE stabilised Europe by recognising the status quo, the Helsinki effect 
started to weaken the foundations of the Eastern bloc.
The final stages of the Cold War at the superpower level needs further 
explanation.20 “Why did the Cold War end in 1989” is also an important 
question to be explored.21 In the context of the Cold War in Europe, however, 
the triangle of stability, economic relations, and human rights provided a
17 David Reynolds, One World Divisible- a Global History since 1945. New York- W.W. 
Norton, 2000, p. 551.
18 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, chapter 3.
19 Ibid.. chapter 4.
20 A brief and systematic analysis of the end of the superpower Cold War is given in, Jeremi 
Suri, “Explaining the End of the Cold War- A New Historical Consensus?” Journal of Cold 
War Studies. 4/4 (2002).
21 Vladislav M. Zubok “Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of ‘The Turn’,” in 
Odd Arne Westad (ed.) Reviewing the Cold War- Approaches. Interpretations. Theory. 
London- Frank Cass, 2000.
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framework for ending the Cold War. In this framework established by the 
Helsinki Final Act, many dissident groups such as Charter 77, Solidarity, 
and Helsinki Human Rights Watch were given encouragement to advance 
their activities. As long as the Soviet Union and its allies wanted stability 
and economic exchanges, they also could not escape from the human rights 
issue in their countries. And the more the Eastern economies struggled, the 
more the framework mattered. When economic necessity and people power 
combined, the 1989 East European revolutions happened in this CSCE 
triangular framework, which had been prepared by multilateral European 
detente developed in 1969*1973.
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